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Developing countries are increasingly realizing the need to attract foreign direct 
investment to achieve economic and social welfare. Although the advantages of FDI are 
numerous and well documented, economic development through FDI has failed in most 
developing countries. Studies show that bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have not played a 
significant role in promoting and encouraging economic development for host states. By 
contrast, studies show that BITs have over-protected foreign investors and investments, at the 
expense of host country development. This is a result of the historical background and 
circumstances surrounding the formation of BITs in the 1950’s. Recently, many countries and 
international organisations have expressed the need to effectuate the reciprocal nature of 
investment treaties, whereby BITs serve as a tool for economic development, in addition to 
investment protection. 
States, as sovereigns, have the duty and right to pursue legitimate development goals and 
regulate matters of public concern without fear of liability to foreign investors. This requires a 
balanced approach to BITs, in which economic development objectives of the host country, and 
foreign investment protection are both addressed and equally preserved. 
Model BITs are becoming an even more important tool to achieve development goals 
from FDI. A model BIT is an investment treaty designed specifically to address the needs and 
goals of a specific country. If the model BIT strikes the right balance between economic 
development and investment protection, then development through FDI should be possible.  
v 
This thesis takes Jordan as an example of a developing country that is striving to attract 
FDI, and does not have a model treaty specifically designed for its needs and objectives. The 
proposed BIT for Jordan shifts the focus from pure investment protection to balanced protection 
tied with economic development. Overly protective treatment standards and their innovative 
interpretations by arbitral tribunals, are analyzed, and guidelines are provided to help avoid past 
problems for developing countries. This doctrinal and comparative study draws on the case law 
of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and existing model 
BITs to develop an up-to-date BIT for Jordan that addresses the country’s development goals. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
OVERVIEW 
“What is the impact of foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on development? The 
answer is important for the lives of millions – if not billions- of workers, families, 
and communities in the developing world. The answer is crucial for policy makers 
in the developing and developed countries and multilateral agencies. The answer 
is central to the debate about the costs and benefits of the globalization of 
industry across borders.”1 
I. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
Economic development is an important goal for any country. It becomes the most important goal 
for developing countries whose standard of living and international power is fundamentally tied 
to their economic position in the world. Although there is no single definition of economic 
development, it is commonly described as the creation of jobs and wealth, and the improvement 
of the quality of life.2 Economic development can also be described as a process that influences 
growth and restructuring of an economy to enhance the economic well-being of a community.3  
                                                 
1 Edward Graham Theodore Moran, Magnus Blomstrom, Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? 1 
(Institute for International Economics 2005). 
2 The International Economic Development Council: Economic Development Reference Guide 3. Available at 
http://www.iedconline.org/clientuploads/Downloads/IEDC_ED_Reference_Guide.pdf. 
3 Id. at 3. Available at http://www.iedconline.org/clientuploads/Downloads/IEDC_ED_Reference_Guide.pdf. 
2 
Each country has a unique set of challenges for economic development; therefore 
different countries address these challenges in different ways depending on their own needs and 
circumstances. However, if proper conditions exist, FDI can play an important role in securing 
the development needs of any state.4 The development process is accelerated by the spillover 
effect of transferred technologies, human capital enhancement, increased competitiveness in the 
host market which results in better and cheaper services and goods, the injection of foreign 
capital in the local economy, employment opportunities, management of resources, increased 
revenues to the host state government from the taxes and duties paid by the foreign investment, 
and many other advantages of FDI. 
The use of FDI for development became increasing significant after WWII, when states 
began to negotiate and sign Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). These treaties had three 
purposes: i) to enhance development through the attraction of FDI to the host state, ii) to protect 
the out-bound investors of the home state from the risks associated with investing in other 
countries, and iii) to clarify the rules and enforcement mechanisms otherwise existing in 
customary international law that would apply in the event of a dispute between an investor and 
the host state.5 
The new trend of signing BITs came after the international community realized that other 
forms of development finance, such as foreign aid and loans, started to dry up and became harder 
to obtain.6 Thus, there was a need to find an alternative to such scarce development resources.  
                                                 
4 Leon Tarkman, Foreign Direct Investment: Hazard or Opportunity?, 41 GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL 
LAW REVIEW 5 (2009). 
5 See in general, Genevieve Fox, A Future For International Investment? Modifying BITs to Drive Economic 
Development, 46 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 231-32 (2014). 
6 Jeswald Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime For Investment, 51 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 441 
(2010). 
3 
A. FOREIGN AID AND INTERNATIONAL LOANS AS A TOOL FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 
Due to corruption, bad governance, or the lack of natural resources, among other problems, many 
developing states were, and still are, dependent on foreign aid and loans to secure funding for 
major domestic projects, cover budget deficits, and create jobs. This funding is provided to them 
by developed states and international development institutions, mainly the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. 
Although foreign aid can help a developing country with such needs in the short run, 
recent studies have found that financial aid has not proven to contribute significantly to the 
general development and welfare of countries in the long run.7 Donor governments also often 
seek to produce political benefit for themselves from conditions attached to foreign aid.8 In order 
to keep aid flowing, donor states often require that the subsidized state adopt political decisions 
and attitudes which might not be in the subsidized state’s best interest, or which might go against 
the subsidized state’s own policy. Any change in the subsidized state’s political interest could 
jeopardize the financial aid given to it by these donor states.9  
Dependency on foreign loans also has its negative effects. Loans provided to developing 
states by international development institutions impose heavy restrictions on the borrowing 
                                                 
7 See in general, Peter Boone, Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid 40 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 
(1995). See also, Daniel Ehrenfeld, Foreign Aid Effectiveness, Political Rights and Bilateral Distribution, THE 
JOURNAL OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (2004). 
8 See in general, Donald Hindley, Foreign Aid to Indonesia and Its Political Implications, 36 PACIFIC AFFAIRS 
(1963). 
9 Boone, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, (1995). See also, Ehrenfeld, THE JOURNAL OF HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE, (2004). 
4 
government’s operations, a feature known as “conditionality.”10 Loans from international 
development institutions are continued based on requirements that the borrower undertake major 
policy changes and reforms that affect the governance of the country concerned. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, these forms of development finance from developed countries 
and aid institutions started to dry up and became more difficult to obtain, thus “developing 
countries increasingly felt the need to promote foreign investment in order to foster economic 
development.”11 They saw their participation in investment treaties as a way to obtain alternative 
funding for their development goals and infrastructure, and therefore signed such treaties in 
increasing numbers.12 Engaging in BITs with other countries was a way of signaling that a state 
would afford foreign investors with protections and guarantees, and that, in return, would attract 
foreign investors to the country, which would then lead to economic development.  
B. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AS A TOOL FOR DEVELOPMENT 
“Developing countries, emerging economies and countries in transition have come increasingly 
to see FDI as a source of economic development and modernization, income growth and 
employment.”13 FDI can be defined as an equity or ownership of more than 10 percent by an 
                                                 
10 For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines the term “conditionality” as follows: “When a 
country borrows from the IMF, its government agrees to adjust its economic policies to overcome the problems that 
led it to seek financial aid from the international community. These loan conditions also serve to ensure that the 
country will be able to repay the Fund so that the resources can be made available to other members in need.” See 
IMF Factsheet, available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm. 
11 Nicholas P. Sullivan Jeswald W. Salacuse Do Bits Really Work?: An Evaluation Of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
And Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 67, 77 (2005). 
12 See in general UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development; National and 
International Perspectives. xv (2003). 
13 Foreign Direct Investment for Development: Maximising Benefits, Minimising Costs (Overview). 5 (2002). 
5 
investor in one country (known as “the home country” or “capitol-exporting country”), in an 
enterprise located in another country (known as “the host country” or “capital importing 
country).14 Typically, such investment involves transferring capital, machinery, equipment, 
technology and other components related to the investment project, from the home country to the 
host country.15 FDI is distinguished from portfolio investments in which foreign entities invest 
only in the stock and shares of local companies, and thus there is no transfer of technology and 
equipment, nor is their real “control” by the foreign investor over the local entity.16 
FDI is more effective than international aid and loans in fueling the development of 
countries. While foreign aid and loans bring the host country only money, FDI provides the host 
state with a package of vital elements for the creation of a productive economy.17 In fact, 
controversy has risen as to whether economic development is a criterion for, and part of the 
definition of, FDI and its eligibility for protection under international law.18  
The rationale for increased attention to FDI stems from the belief that FDI has many 
advantages to the host state economy. These advantages include access to markets, technology 
transfers, the introduction of new processes and know-how to the domestic market, human 
resources training and enhancement, infrastructure development, and higher revenues resulting 
from taxes and duties paid by the foreign investor to the host state.19 These benefits, along with 
the direct capital financing FDI provides, offer strong incentives for states, especially developing 
ones, to compete for FDI and use it as a tool for development.  
                                                 
14 JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT : NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND 
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 14 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
15 Id. at 15. 
16 Tarkman, GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, 5 (2009). 
17 SALACUSE. 18 (2013). 
18 SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FORIGN INVESTMENT 10 (Cambridge University Press 3 ed. 2012). 
19 SALACUSE. 18-19 (2013). 
6 
To draw these advantages and other benefits from FDI, the host state is compelled to 
offer foreign investors and investments protections and treatment standards that mitigate the risks 
of investing in their territory and encourages the inflow of FDI. This is done via the conclusion 
of BITs, which provide protection and treatment standards to foreign investors. Thus, developing 
countries promote and encourage the inflow of foreign investment into their territory anticipating 
development through FDI.20 This is the “grand bargain” of BITs; “a promise of protection of 
capital in return for the prospect of more capital in the future.”21 Hence, BITs have two main 
objectives: i) investment protection, and ii) host state development. 
C. THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF BITS 
BITs and investment agreements are not a new phenomenon; they can be traced back to the BCE 
era.22 However, the investment treaty we know today, the (BIT), emerged in the 1950’s when 
Germany signed the first BIT with Pakistan in 1959.23 Since then BITs have proliferated at an 
extraordinary rate, reaching around 3300 BITs worldwide in less than 60 years.24 The question is 
whether BITs serve their two main purposes (i.e., investment protection and economic 
                                                 
20 Tarkman, GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, 5 (2009). 
21 Jeswald W. Salacuse HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, 77 (2005). 
22 Early investment treaties appeared in the old Babylonian period (2003-1595 BCE). See AMNON ALTMAN, 
TRACING THE EARLIEST RECORDED CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST (2500–330 BCE ) 
§ 8, at 67 (Randall Lesaffer ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 2012).  
23 TREATY BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND PAKISTAN FOR THE 
PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS (1959). 
24 Information taken from UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB Website. Available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA  
7 
development). The BIT movement which started in the 1950’s is a good starting point to answer 
this question.  
As articulated by Lord Shawcross (a former Attorney General of the U.K.) and Herman 
Abs (Chairman of the Deutsche Bank in Germany): 
[I]t is now widely recognized that major steps must be taken to buttress 
the economic position of the free-world nations, both as a measure against Soviet 
moves and as a means of resolving some of the demands being made by the 
peoples of the underdeveloped nations of the world, the notion of greater 
protection under international law for private investment takes on added 
importance.25  
From its inception, the BIT was designed and structured by capital exporting countries 
singularly focusing on one aspect of the investment process: to protect the investments of their 
outbound investors in less developed, newly independent, countries. BITs were not built to 
enhance or encourage development, although that was a projected goal by developing 
countries.26 The BITs signed in the 1950’s and 1960’s are not very different in essence from 
those signed today. While investment protection has been a success, development through 
investment has failed in most countries.27 This failure is due to the fact that BITs focus on 
investment protection singularly without consideration given to any other objective.28  
The current BIT system offers rights of protection to foreign investors without offering 
corresponding rights to the host state. Capital exporting countries impose overly protective, catch 
                                                 
25 “The Proposed Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment, A Round Table,” Introduction by the Editors, 
Journal of Public Law, Vol. 9, p. 115, 1960. 
26 “Developing countries increasingly felt the need to promote foreign investment in order to foster economic 
development.” Jeswald W. Salacuse HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, 77 (2005). 
27 Aaron Cosbey Nathalie Bernasconi -Osterwalder, Lise Johnson, Damon Vis -Dunbar, Investment Treaties and 
Why They Matter to Sustainable Development, 8 (2012). 
28 As one commentator notes “[T]reaty-based investment arbitration – mainly under BITs and NAFTA – has been 
biased in favour of foreign investors to the detriment of the sovereign power and duty of host States to pursue the 
general interest for their populations of promoting their national development.” Attila Tanzi, On Balancing Foreign 
Investment Interests with Public Interests in Recent Arbitration Case Law in the Public Utilities Sector, 11 THE LAW 
AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 47, 48 (2012). 
8 
all, provisions that protect their outbound investors. Hence, host countries become restricted 
when regulating matters of public concern, such as public health, employment and environment. 
Also, the current BIT system does not provide the host country with an effective enforcement 
mechanism to ensure foreign investors’ good conduct and contribution to the economic 
development of the host country. Nor does the current BIT template contain provisions that 
ensure that foreign investors effectively participate in the development process of the host 
country in order to be covered under the umbrella of treaty protection. Typically, BITs do not 
contain any requirements that oblige the foreign investor to import the latest technology into the 
country, for example, or require employment of host state nationals to facilitate the transfer of 
skills and know-how.  
The magnitude of this problem has been increased by the novel application and 
interpretation of BIT treatment standards by arbitral tribunals, sometimes in a manner not 
intended by the treaty parties. For example, the MFN treatment standard has been used to import 
law from agreements to which the home state is not a party.29 The national treatment standard 
has been used to challenge public policy laws introduced by host countries, on the basis that 
these laws have greater impact on foreign investors than competing domestic investors.30 Such 
expansive interpretations of treatment standards have put host countries in a position where they 
become reluctant to take any regulatory action in the public good, fearing liability. Additionally, 
the amounts of money awarded as damages in investor-state arbitrations are becoming greater 
and disproportionate to the real damages sustained by the foreign investor. Some tribunals have 
awarded foreign investors massive amounts in damages which have become a concern and a 
                                                 
29 e.g.,Emilio Agustín Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain (Decision on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 2000). 
30 e.g., GAMI Investments, Inc. v The Government of the United Mexican States (Award), (NAFTA, 2004). 
9 
burden on host states. For example “in 2004, a U.S. investor won an arbitration against 
Ecuador . . . The award and claim amount relative to government expenditure were 1.92% and 
7.5%. The importance of these numbers becomes clear in the light that Ecuador spends annually 
around 7% of their government expenditure on health.”31 
In the light of these flaws, the BIT developed 70 years ago no longer fits the needs of 
many countries, even capital exporting countries. BITs are no longer concluded exclusively 
between developed and developing countries, in what is known as North-South relationship. In 
fact, BITs are now being concluded between developed countries (North-North), and between 
developing countries (South-South).32 Some developing countries are becoming capital 
exporting countries, such as China and Saudi Arabia, hence developed countries are increasingly 
becoming vulnerable to the BIT system they created over half a century ago. Accordingly, 
development through FDI is no longer a projected goal of developing countries only, nor is 
investment protection the only goal for developed countries. Rather, both goals are now a 
concern for both the North and South blocs. 
These developments and concerns have raised the voices of many civic and not-for-profit 
organizations which call for the transformation of BITs, and the need to incorporate economic 
development and growth as an explicit purpose. Many international organizations have presented 
working papers and studies on the importance of re-balancing the purposes of BITs to include 
economic development.33 For example, a recent initiative was taken by the UNCTAD Secretariat 
                                                 
31 Kevin P. Gallagher & Elen Shrestha (2011, May). Investment Treaty Arbitration and Developing Countries: 
A Re-Appraisal, Global Development and Environment Institute, Working Paper No. 11-01, p.10 
(referring to Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador (LCIA Case No. UN3467)). 
32 UNCTAD - Bilateral InvestmentTreaties 1959-1999, at 2 (2000). 
33 See Investment Treaty Law, Sustainable Development and Responsible Business Conduct: A Fact Finding 
Survey. (2014). Also see David Gaukrodger, The Balance Between Investor Protection and the Right to Regulate in 
Investment Treaties: A scoping paper (OECD Working Papers on International Investment ed., 2017). Also See 
 
10 
in the “Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (IPFSD),”34 which is 
designed to promote a new generation of investment agreements that contain a development 
agenda. 
D. A BIT FOR DEVELOPMENT 
BITs have not addressed the need for development. By clarifying the obligations that often lead 
to a diminution of the right to regulate, they can better address reciprocal promise to both 
investors and states. Hence, the time is now ripe for a re-balancing of the interests protected by 
investment treaties. The rights of protection from government wrongdoings to foreign investors 
should not be affected, but also should not be over emphasized and expanded in a manner that is 
detrimental to host state development. Host countries must have the ability to act in their best 
interest and reach economic growth through FDI, as much as foreign investors have the right to 
protect their investments.  
Equating the interests for host states and foreign investors and balancing the BIT requires 
tying treaty protection to foreign investments with host country development. This can be 
achieved by re-defining “foreign investment” and “foreign investors” so that treaty protection is 
given to those investments that are of quality and benefit to the host state. Also, BITs should 
incorporate the development challenges and objectives of the host country, and preserve that 
country’s right to regulate and pursue legitimate public policy and development objectives. In 
                                                                                                                                                             
HOWARD MANN AARON COSBEY, LUKE ERIC PETERSON, KONRAD VON MOLTKE, IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: NEGOTIATORS’ HANDBOOK (International Institute 
for Sustainable Development (IISD) 2nd ed. 2006). 
34 Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (2015). 
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addition, investor treatment standards must be clearly defined and framed so as not to allow 
innovative and unintended interpretations by arbitral tribunals. 
Reforming the BIT template cannot be done via a single investment treaty adopted by all 
countries. Different countries have different economic, political and social circumstances, and 
development goals vary among countries. Therefore no single model BIT could be expected to 
suffice on a global basis. Given the range of states involved, and their distinctive circumstances, 
prior attempts for an international unified investment agreement have failed.35 The concept of a 
uniform model investment agreement on a global basis is an obsolete one. The solution to this 
problem rests in reforming the bilateral investment treaty for each country alone, by drafting 
model BITs that are specifically designed to accommodate the needs and objectives of a specific 
country. 
Country specific BITs (model BITs) are an important tool in obtaining the economic and 
development fruits of FDI. Contrary to developed countries, most developing countries do not 
have model BITs that are specifically designed to foster their economic development through 
investment. Nor do the BITs offered to them by other countries allow them the ability to act in 
their best interests and achieve development through FDI, as these BITs where designed to 
advance the interests of the capital exporting country. By preparing country specific BITs, host 
countries may have increased control in negotiating and imposing the terms and conditions that 
                                                 
35 For example, in 1995 OECD took the initiative to establish a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). The 
negotiators from capital-importing and capital exporting countries had different views on the proposed MAI. “All 
the principle negotiating states had substantial investments abroad and so had a common interest in seeing that those 
investments received maximum protection.” OECD capital-importing countries, on the other hand, were concerned 
about the types of foreign investment they will have to accept in their territories under the MAI and the high level of 
protection proposed by capital-exporting states. The negotiators seemed not to find a common ground, and therefore 
the negotiations for the MAI failed. See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 118-22 
(Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2015). See also SALACUSE, The Three Laws of International Investment : National, 
Contractual, and International Frameworks for Foreign Capital. 353-54 (2013). 
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are aligned with their own policies and development objectives. The threat of moving businesses 
offshore limits the ability of host countries to impose or introduce inefficient, or overly strict, 
provisions into the BIT.36 Thus a balanced approach to protect both interests is vital for the 
success of a model BIT for any country. 
By signing BITs and enacting investment laws and policies, developing states have 
increased control in negotiating and imposing the terms and conditions that are aligned with their 
own policies and development objectives. The most important challenge for a state that aims at 
achieving development through FDI is to strike a balance between protections and guarantees 
that increase FDI flows to its economy, and policies that secure and ensure the contributions of 
these inward investments on its economy and development. This is not an easy task, as strict 
legal regimes that impose heavy requirements on foreign investors will result in labeling a 
country as unattractive and unfriendly to foreign investors. On the other hand, a very liberal 
regime can have negative effects on the host state economy. Thus, finding a development-
oriented balance is the challenge in the implementation and content of BITs. A legal system that 
is “premised on the notion that all foreign investment is uniformly beneficial is not one based on 
sound foundations.”37 
The fact that some countries are desperately in need of FDI to enhance their 
development, sometimes at any cost, creates the opportunity for the imposition of “treaty – 
contracts of adhesion,”38 when BITs are entered by a developing state with a developed state. 
This happens when investor exporting states, usually developed, aim to facilitate the entry of 
                                                 
36 ASSAF RAZIN & EFRAIM SADKA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: ANALYSIS OF AGGREGATE FLOWS 124 (Princeton 
University Press. 2008). 
37 SORNARAJAH. 230 (2012). 
38 Jose Alvarez, A BIT On Custom, 42 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 39 (2009). 
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their investors into developing markets and obtain for them the highest level of protection by 
drafting BITs and offering them to the developed countries on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.39 
Developing states may have no other choice but to accept the excessive investor protection 
standards and vaguely worded umbrella clauses drafted by the powerful party, anticipating 
economic advancement from the importation of foreign investments.40 Some developing 
countries have fallen victim to their own actions when disputes regarding such BITs arise.41 
Although having a modern legal framework which provides protection and incentives to 
the foreign investor is essential, this does not mean that the host state should not promote and 
create investment opportunities.42 An excellent example is Saudi Arabia after its discovery of 
large amounts of oil in the 1930’s. At that time Saudi Arabia did not have the basics of a legal 
system, yet investors lined up to take part in this profitable investment opportunity.43  
The Saudi example does not mean that an investment opportunity is limited to 
investments in the extractive industry or investing in the natural resources of a state. Investment 
opportunities can result from the privatization of public entities, public-private-partnerships 
(“PPPs”), and concession agreements.44 Investment opportunities can also result from a state’s 
                                                 
39 Jose Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revisiting The Necessity Defense: Continental Casualty v. Argentina 361 (Karl 
Sauvant ed., Oxford University Press 2011), referencing, KENNETH VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT 
TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE 82 (Kluwer Law and Taxation. 1992). 
40 See for example, Sarah Anderson, Foreign Investors Gone Wild: Leaders of developing countries are often forced 
to work with institutions that promote and protect foreign investment -- with little regard for the costs to democracy 
and the environment., FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS 2007. 
41 For example, due to the unclear language of the umbrella clause in the Switzerland – Philippines BIT, the arbitral 
tribunal in SGS v. Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, (ICSID January 29, 2004)., found that contractual breaches 
are considered treaty breaches for the purposes of ICSID jurisdiction.  
42 Griffin Weaver, The Underutilized Foreign Investor, 5 CREIGHTON INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
JOURNAL (2013). 
43 MOHAMED RAMADY, THE SAUDI ARABIAN ECONOMY: POLITICS, ACHIEVEMENTS, AND CHALLENGES (Springer 
2nd ed. 2010). 
44 Silvano Domenico Orsi, Arab Spring Brings Winds Of Change To The Maghreb And Mena Region: Does That 
Spell Opportunity For Infrastructure Development And Project Finance?, 11 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW 
& BUSINESS (2011). Also see, Andrew Hill, Foreign Infrastructure Investment In Chile: The Success Of Public-
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adoption of different policies, or a state’s focus on specific sectorial development. A good 
example of the latter is the increased change of policies, in many countries, to diversify their 
energy mix and be more reliant on clean and renewable energy sources.45 
To attract and maintain high levels of FDI, any country should take two steps. The first is 
to enact a balanced, well-developed and modern legal framework that addresses and incorporates 
the country’s economic development issues and defines the objectives sought from FDI, while at 
the same time incentivizing foreign investment, and conforming to the international standards of 
foreign investment protection. The second step is to create investment opportunities that attract 
foreign investors by focusing on sectorial development and engaging the private sector in the 
establishment and operation of major and high value public facilities via privatizations and PPPs. 
The latter can be achieved by incentivizing FDI in particular sectors and offering those 
investments greater protections to encourage foreign their inflow. This may be furthered by a 
carefully-developed model BIT. 
In the chapters which follow, I investigate and analyze how Jordan can successfully 
achieve these two steps through its future BIT network, in order to attract and maintain high 
levels of FDI and reach their economic development objectives. I conclude with a model BIT for 
Jordan that grounds the findings and recommendations of this thesis in a practical example. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Private Partnerships Through Concessions Contracts, 32 NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
BUSINESS (2011).  
45 Xiaodong Wang, Legal and Policy Frameworks for Renewable Energy to Mitigate Climate Change, 7 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY (2007). 
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II. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
By taking Jordan as an example, I follow an analytical, empirical, and comparative methodology 
to answer the question: How can developing countries draft model BITs that balance the 
protection of foreign investors with the host state’s right to economic development? 
Jordan, like other developing countries, must enact a balanced, well-developed and 
modern legal framework that preserves the country’s interests and incorporates its development 
goals, while at the same time providing incentives to foreign investors, and conforming to 
international standards of foreign investment protection. This can be achieved via drafting a 
model BIT for Jordan that takes into account the development challenges and goals of the 
country and reflects the latest developments in investor-state arbitration.  
III. THESIS STRUCTURE: 
This thesis will consist of (5) chapters. This chapter (Chapter 1) outlines the research problem, 
objective, and scope of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides a historical overview of international 
investment law, its sources, and how this field of law emerged and developed. It traces 
international investment agreements from their early beginnings in the old Babylonian period 
(2003-1595 BCE),46 until modern time. The historical discussion focuses on the BIT movement 
and the development of international investment law in the twentieth century. It highlights how 
international investment agreements, throughout their history and development, have always had 
                                                 
46 See ALTMAN. 67 (2012). 
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two objectives: protection of foreign investment, and enhancing host state development. This is 
also demonstrated through the historical background and motives behind the adoption of major 
international conventions that have contributed to the development of international investment 
law as it exists today. Most notable of these conventions are the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID),47 and the 
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).48 
Chapter 3 elaborates on the thesis problem. Basically, whether BITs and their 
interpretation have equally served the two main purposes of BITs –i.e. investor protection and 
host state development. Chapter 3 provides evidence that investor protection has won out over 
host state development.49 It illustrates how investor-state arbitration decisions have focused on 
the protection of investments “to the detriment of the sovereign power and duty of host States to 
pursue the general interest for their populations of promoting their national development.”50 It 
explains how the failure to achieve host state development from FDI lies in the vague clauses of 
BITs and their interpretation by investor-state tribunals.51 Chapter 3 also discusses the different 
approaches taken by some countries to avoid unintended interpretations in future investor-state 
arbitrations and clarify their intent. 
Chapter 4 offers a comprehensive review of the application and interpretation of different 
treaty provisions and treatment standards in BITs and in investor-state arbitration. It illustrates 
                                                 
47 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1965). 
48 The Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (1985). 
49 As one commentator notes “[T]reaty-based investment arbitration – mainly under BITs and NAFTA – has been 
biased in favour of foreign investors to the detriment of the sovereign power and duty of host States to pursue the 
general interest for their populations of promoting their national development.” See Tanzi, THE LAW AND PRACTICE 
OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, 48 (2012). 
50 Id. at 48. 
51 A recent UNCTAD report concludes -after reviewing different arbitral decisions- that “the outcome of many 
disputes hinged upon the wording of specific provisions in the applicable IIA.” See Investor–State Dispute 
Settlement: Review of Developments in 2016, at 29 (2017). 
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how BITs use vague and open-ended language for treatment standards which allows for 
expansive interpretations. This has resulted in arbitral tribunals expanding the protection of 
investments to the determent of host state development. Chapter 4 also provides policy 
guidelines and recommendations that help developing countries in limiting the possibility of 
expansive interpretations that go against the host state’s interests. These policy guidelines and 
recommendations are a reflection of the development and interpretation of such provisions and 
treatment standards by investor-state arbitral tribunals. 
Chapter 5 grounds the findings in previous chapters’ by applying the recommendations 
and policy guidelines to a specific country. Jordan is taken as an example of a country that does 
not have a model BIT designed for its needs and development challenges. Hence, this Chapter 
analyzes the development challenges in Jordan and demonstrates the role of FDI in overcoming 
these challenges. It then proposes a set of guidelines and suggested provisions for foreign 
investment lawmaking which serve as “design criteria” for a model BIT for Jordan. These 
guidelines and suggested clauses are based on Jordan’s development challenges and are intended 
to ensure economic development through FDI in future BITs. They can serve as a reference point 
for legislatures and policymakers in formulating future national investment policies and 
negotiating BITs. Developments in investor-state arbitration regarding the application and 
interpretation of different treaty provisions are also reflected in these guidelines and suggested 
clauses. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
International investment law is a relatively new field of law that falls under the umbrella of 
international law. It has developed a myriad of principles and norms, mainly from international 
economic law, to become a distinctive set of legal rules worthy of its own category.1  
International investment law has its roots in international trade practices.2 Prior to the 
emergence of the concept of “investment,” the international flow of capital happened primarily 
through trade. As merchants conducted business across borders they acquired property in foreign 
countries in order to create trade establishments.3 This form of acquiring property overseas, and 
the need to protect it from expropriation, is the foundation from which international investment 
                                                 
1 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 19 (Oxford 
University Press 2 ed. 2012). 
2 Kate Miles, International Investment Law: Origins, Imperialism and Conceptualizing the Environment, 21 
COLORADO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1 (2010). 
3 JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT : NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND 
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 13 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
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law developed.4 Host countries saw this as an opportunity to benefit from the overspills of trade 
and thus were encouraged to grant protections to foreign merchants. 
In order to gain protection for their property, foreign merchants would request guarantees 
from the sovereign to be treated with favoritism, and be protected. 5 At the same time, sovereigns 
took this opportunity to expand foreign trade in their territory and strengthen their relations with 
groups of foreign territories.6 Thus the sovereign would ‘grant’ foreign merchants a ‘concession’ 
which provided for the protection of the merchant’s property as well as other privileges, such as 
reduced duty rates and rights of access.7 Although these grants where a unilateral act by the 
sovereign, they constituted the early beginnings of the current investment agreements which 
contain reciprocal benefits for both the foreign investor and the host country.  
As trade relationships developed, traders and investors needed assurance from the 
sovereign that their property was protected from arbitrary acts. It would render any assurance 
given by the sovereign useless if, in the event of breach, the investor would have to seek redress 
through the sovereign’s own legal system. The sovereign who has the power to issue laws, has 
the power to repeal those laws in its favor when troubled by them.8 This explains the need to 
elevate investors’ claims from the realm of local laws and courts to a supranational and bias free 
domain, namely international law. 
The contemporary practice of investment agreements, which are mostly in the form of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) concluded between two states, serve the goal of elevating 
                                                 
4 SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FORIGN INVESTMENT 11 (Cambridge University Press 3 ed. 2012). 
5 JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 89 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2015). 
6 Id. at 89. 
7 Id. at 89. 
8 Thomas Hobbes reasons this principle as follows “The sovereign of a Commonwealth, be it an assembly or one 
man, is not subject to the civil laws. For having power to make and repeal laws, he may, when he pleaseth, free 
himself from that subjection by repealing those laws that trouble him, and making of new; and consequently he was 
free before. For he is free that can be free when he will.” See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XXVI, at 2 (1651). 
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foreign investment protection from the host country’s legal system to the international sphere. 
BITs provide foreign investors with substantive treatment standards, and a dispute settlement 
mechanism that ensures effective enforcement of these treatment standards, to encourage the 
inflow of FDI and achieve development. The treatment standards consist of a set of international 
legal principles that give protection to the foreign investor’s property from arbitrary acts of the 
host government, such as expropriation. They also provide how the foreign investor is to be 
treated while performing his investment activity in the host country. The National Treatment 
standard ensures that the foreign investor is not discriminated against because of his foreign 
nationality,9 and the Most Favored Nation standard enables the foreign investor to enjoy the 
more favorable privileges and protections given to other foreign investors.10 
Host countries are bound by the treatment standards offered in a BIT, and are subject to 
liability if they breach a commitment owed to the foreign investor. If a breach occurs, the foreign 
investor may invoke the dispute settlement mechanism contained in the investment treaty and 
resort to an international tribunal which will apply international law principles to the claim. In 
this manner, the foreign investor avoids the possibility of local bias and inefficiency in the host 
country’s legal system.11 
The current investment regime thus offers two layers of protection to foreign investors. 
The first is the set of international treatment standards which the parties agree on applying in 
their BIT or investment contract. The second is an effective dispute settlement mechanism if the 
                                                 
9 Andrea K. Bjorklund, National Treatment, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 29 (August Reinisch ed. 
2008). 
10 Andreas R. Ziegler, Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT TREATMENT 60 
(August Reinisch ed. 2008). 
11 See in general regarding the barriers of recovery by foreign investors in the host country’s legal system DON 
WALLACE JR. CHRISTOPHER DUGAN, NOAH RUBINS, BORZU SABAHI, INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 13-18 (Oxford 
University Press. 2008). 
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host country breaches an obligation owed to a foreign investor. This dispute settlement usually 
occurs through arbitration under the auspices of the International Center for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID),12 which is a dedicated Center for the settlement of investor-state 
disputes. 
Although foreign investment law emerged from early trade practice, international 
investment law is now a field of its own dedicated to the protection of “investments” and 
“foreign investors” for economic growth of host countries. Therefore, it is essential to recognize 
the dual objective of modern investment treaties; providing protection to foreign investors to 
encourage their inflow, and consequently achieve economic development for the host state. 
However, to better understand the current investment regime and the dual objective of modern 
investment treaties, an understanding of the historical evolution of the current regime is helpful. 
In this Chapter, I will provide that historical background to the current international 
investment regime. I will trace, in chronological sequence, the development of this field of law 
from its early beginnings, moving through the major development milestones, to its current state 
of affairs. I will identify the main sources of investment law, including the principal treaties that 
shape the current regime. Throughout the discussion, I will illustrate how the international 
regime governing FDI was built on development and economic growth of countries, along with 
investment protection to encourage its mobility into developing counties. 
                                                 
12 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1965). 
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I. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 
A. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS 
The history of international investment law before the second half of the eighteenth century is 
not extensive.13 The term “investment” itself was not known in the English language until 
1615.14 Trade was the dominant means of international flow of capital and goods in earlier times. 
Therefore most international treaties at that time were concerned with establishing and 
maintaining trade relationships.15 Nonetheless early trade treaties introduced many of the 
concepts and principles of the current international investment law regime.  
Early trade treaties established the norm of protection of foreigners and their property in 
the host country. They contained an assurance from the sovereign that foreign merchants trading 
in his territory are protected from negative actions of the sovereign and local individuals.16 This 
section will provide highlights and examples of how international investment law originated and 
developed from international trade in early history. 
                                                 
13 LLUÍS PARADELL ANDREW NEWCOMBE, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF 
TREATMENT 3 (Kluwer Law International. 2009). See also Lucja Nowak, Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, History, Policy, and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 2010 (Book Review), POLISH 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 318 (2010). 
14 The first known use of the word “investment” was in 1615. It was used specifically in the East India trade, to 
imply “the employment of money in the purchase of Indian goods.” It was not until 1740 when the term 
“investment” was used to mean “the conversion of money or circulating capital into some species of property from 
which an income or profit is expected to be derived in the ordinary course of trade or business.” See OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, "INVESTMENT, N." (Oxford University Press.). http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/ 
99052?redirectedFrom=investment  
15 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C.-DAVIS JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 157, 158 (2005). 
16 SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT : NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL 
FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 332 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
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1. The BCE Era: The Assyrian Example (2003-1595 BCE) 
A good example of early trade treaties containing treatment standards similar to the current 
treatment standards are the treaties between the City of Ashur (Syria) and Kültepe (Turkey). 
These treaties date back to the old Babylonian period (2003-1595 BCE).17 In one of these 
treaties, the City of Ashur agreed with an unknown Ruler of Kültepe (Turkey) that he would 
safeguard Assyrian merchants’ interests, among other matters, while trading in his territory. The 
treaty is in the form of an oath, taken by the Ruler and his dignitaries,18 where the Ruler and his 
dignitaries promised protection and trade routes to Assyrian merchants. In exchange for this 
protection, the Ruler was entitled to duty rates in silver and tin. The oath provided that the Ruler 
and his dignitaries would be killed if they failed to comply with their oath, which was: 
There shall be no loss (of property belonging) to an Assyrian in your country, 
rope, peg or anything. If there occurs a loss in your country you shall search (the 
lost object) and you shall return it to us. If there occurs blood (shed) in your 
country you shall hand over the killers to us and we shall kill (them)… You shall 
not demand anything from us. Just like your father you may take 12 shekels of tin 
per (donkey) from a caravan on its way to Kaniš. You may consume, like your 
father, 1 1/4 shekels of silver per donkey from a return caravan. You shall not 
take anything in excess (of this)… He raised his hand towards (the gods) Aššur 
and Adad, to the Netherworld and to the spirits of his ancestors, he … his table 
and his chair … and he filled his cup and then emptied it; the ruler said: … And 
                                                 
17 These are three commercial treaties concluded by the city of Ashur with the kings of Kaniš and Ḫaḫḫum, and of a 
city whose name was not preserved. See AMNON ALTMAN, TRACING THE EARLIEST RECORDED CONCEPTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST (2500–330 BCE ) § 8, at 67 (Randall Lesaffer ed., Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers. 2012). 
18 During the Babylonian era, treaties were concluded in two ways; either in writing, or by oath. If the treaty was 
concluded via an oath, the political heads of both contracting parties would get together and discuss the terms of the 
treaty. When an agreement is reached, certain rituals took place, “in which an animal (a donkey is usually attested) 
was slaughtered, and the parties smeared its(?) blood. The parties then exchanged oaths regarding the terms of the 
agreement in front of the divine statues or symbols brought to the meeting for this purpose. A festive drinking (of the 
blood?) and exchange of gifts concluded the ceremony.” For more details about treaty making and their rituals in the 
Babylonian era see id. at 69-75. 
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they (i.e. his dignitaries) said: “if we reject your sworn treaty our blood shall be 
shed like (the contents of) the cup!19 
Other treaties between Assyrians and Kültepe go even further to provide for the 
protection of movable and immovable assets of Assyrian merchants. These treaties provide that 
Assyrian merchants’ assets are not to be expropriated, or taken in payment of a lower price.20 In 
case of dispute between an Assyrian and a local citizen the local ruler shall pass honest judgment 
on them. They also provided for the duty of the sovereign to secure the caravan road passing 
through his territory, as well as securing the water routes in the regions where river 
transportation was carried out. Any loss to Assyrian freight passing through designated trade 
routes is to be fully compensated by the sovereign.21 In exchange for these favorable rights and 
privileges, the Assyrian merchants would pay the kings and rulers of these territories taxes and 
duties. 
It is clear from these treaties that Assyrians wanted to conduct their business in foreign 
territories with minimal risk. This is identical to what modern investors seek; minimal risk and 
preferential treatment in foreign countries. Commentators observe that Assyrians made treaties 
with the kings and rulers of other territories to get: i) protection and resident’s rights, 
ii) extraterritorial rights so that the foreign territories were in a sense political and juridical 
extensions of the city government of Ashur, and iii) protection of the roads and guarantees 
against losses due to robbery and other acts of the locals.22 These goals are similar to what the 
current BIT system offers to foreign investors. The international standards of treatment contained 
                                                 
19 The English translation adopted here is that of J.G. Dercksen, as in his “editor’s note” in the article of Günbatti 
1994: p. 250, note 8. Cited by id. at 76. 
20 Id. at 76. 
21 Id. at 76. 
22 Id. at 75-78. 
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in BITs now, such as; national treatment, full protection and security, protection against 
expropriation, and elevating foreign investors from the local legal system to the international 
domain, are reflections of the ancient trade treaties concluded by the Assyrians with foreign 
territories. However, today foreign investors are given incentives, such as tax breaks and tax 
reduction, to encourage their investment in the host country. In the Assyrian treaties, foreign 
investors had to pay (in the form of duty rates) for the protection they receive. This is due to the 
historical attitude towards foreigners, who were always regarded with suspicion, if not fear, due 
to their differences from the native people.23 The general attitude towards foreigners was 
hostility. Therefore it was only by agreements concluded with the sovereign, along with the 
payment of duties, that protection could be secured.  
In the modern era, the effect of globalization has changed, to a large degree, the 
historically suspicious view of foreigners based on their difference. The hostility of some 
countries towards foreign investors in modern times is based on the fear of being exploited and 
harmed by foreign investors. This belief stems from the past experiences of developing countries 
which were dominated and exploited by the developed world. The effect of pervious experiences 
on the attitude of some developing countries towards foreign investments will be dealt with 
below. 
                                                 
23 Dharmendra Chatur, Responsibility of States for Injury to Aliens, From the Selected Works of Dharmendra Chatur 
KING & PARTRIDGE 7 (2009). 
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2. The Middle Ages 
Some commentators attribute the origins of international investment law to trade treaties 
concluded by European countries during the Middle Ages.24As seen in the Assyrian treaties 
above, however, such a statement may be inaccurate. The treaties of the Middle Ages show that 
rulers and states understood the reciprocal benefits that result from protecting foreign traders in 
their territories. Thus the notion of using trade as a tool for development in the host country 
appeared and was explicitly mentioned in the trade agreements of this period.  
The guarantees of protection during the Middle Ages where often in the form of a 
unilateral “grant” or “concession” issued by the sovereign in a written document.25 Various 
European sovereigns granted protection to foreigners using these grants. For example, in 991 AD 
the Byzantine Emperors Constantine VIII and Basil II granted the merchants of Venice rights to 
trade in their territory at reduced tax rates, protection, and a building (domo) in which to do 
business.26 This grant by the Emperors was found in the form of a written document called 
“chrysobull.” The grant included the right of Venetian merchants to trade in the ports of the 
Byzantine Empire, as well as the right to “a quarter in the Constantinople, known as an embolum, 
for dwelling and trading.”27  
                                                 
24 See CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH 
CENTURIES 11-12 (University of California Press. 1985). Also see Miles, 21 COLORADO JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 3 (2010). 
25 SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT : NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL 
FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 332 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
26 OLIVIA REMIE CONSTABLE, HOUSING THE STRANGER IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD: LODGING, TRADE, AND 
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Another example of such grants was that given by the English King Henry II to German 
merchants in 1157 AD, providing protection of the German merchants’ lives and property in 
London.28 The purpose was mainly to encourage the inflow of German traders into England, 
which would reflect positively on the English economy. 
Many other European countries started to realize the importance, and reciprocal benefits, 
of foreign trade and investment to their own economies. Therefore trade agreements were 
concluded in many parts Europe.29 he grant issued by King Eric of Norway to the Hamburg 
merchants in 1296 AD explicitly articulated this goal. In his grant the Norwegian King granted 
the merchants of Hamburg extensive privileges and protection, for the purpose of “the 
amelioration of our territories through trade.”30 
Trade treaties of the Middle Ages also established the second main purpose of investment 
agreements, which is enhancing development of the host country, along with protection of 
outbound merchants and investors. These reciprocal benefits to both treaty parties accelerated 
and encouraged the conclusion of more detailed trade treaties in the sixteenth, and seventeenth 
centuries. 
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B. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SIXTEENTH, SEVENTEENTH, AND 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 
As Europe emerged from the middle Ages, the new European countries acted in various ways to 
protect and advance the interests of their nationals in other countries. To that end, they 
negotiated trade and commerce treaties that regulated trans-border economic activity.31 This 
resulted in a series of bilateral treaties that would later become the basis for protection of aliens 
and their property. These treaties provided for national treatment, protection of property, and 
most-favored-nation treatment, along with other protections including access to courts, forming 
the base of the current investment protection regime.  
Article VII of the Peace Treaty between Spain and the Netherlands in 1648 (also known 
as the Peace of Münster), provided for national treatment of aliens in both countries. It reads 
“The Subjects and Inhabitants of the Lands of the aforenamed Lords King [Spain] and States [the 
Netherlands], trading in each other's Lands, shall not be required to pay more duties and 
imposts than the other side's own Subjects.”32 The treaty also provided for the protection of 
aliens and their property in the host country, “They [the subjects of each country] shall also be 
permitted to enter and remain in each other's lands and there conduct their business and trade in 
full security, on the sea, in other waters, as well as on land.”33 The parties of this treaty gave 
freedom of entry to the nationals of the other party, and undertakings not to interfere with their 
business: “… commerce among the respective Subjects shall not be interfered with, and if any 
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such interference occurs, it shall be removed in fact and deed.”34 The treaty also provided for 
most-favored-nation treatment,35 as Dutch merchants were accorded no less favorable treatment 
than that offered to English and Hanseatic merchants in Spain.36  
By the end of the seventeenth century most European countries had entered into 
economic agreements with other European countries.37 Economic treaties came to be seen as a 
tool to spread European dominance and influence outside of Europe. Hence European countries 
would start concluding economic treaties with less developed countries, mainly in the Far-East 
Asia and the Middle East.38 However these treaties differed from the ones concluded between 
European countries. The treaties between European countries offered equal rights to the nationals 
of each state. The new treaties with the developing world, although purporting to be of mutual 
benefit, were de facto “unequal” and “non-reciprocal.”39 These new treaties granted non-
reciprocal privileges and “extraterritorial jurisdiction” to the nationals of the European country 
trading in the territory of the less developed party.40  
The practice of concluding unequal and non-reciprocal agreements started with the 
Ottoman Empire, creating what became to be called the “capitulary system.”41 The first 
capitulary treaty was signed between King Francis I of France and the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman 
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I in 1535.42 This treaty gave French merchants in the Ottoman Empire privileges which included 
exemption from taxes and duties,43 and extraterritorial jurisdiction. French judges were to hear 
the civil and criminal affairs of French subjects in the Ottoman Empire and apply French law to 
them.44 Since then, other European countries obtained similar privileges, as those of “the 
Franks”, for their nationals trading in the Ottoman Empire.45 England entered its capitulary 
treaty in 1583,46 the Netherlands in 1609, and Austria in 1615.47 
The capitulation system spread widely in the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, when traders from the West were spreading Western influence in non-Western and less 
developed countries by a process of infiltration rather than by annexation.48 The extensive 
privileges and extraterritorial jurisdiction enjoyed by the Europeans under the capitulary treaties 
created imperium in imperio in the Ottoman Empire, thus encouraging European countries to 
implement the capitulary system in other parts of the world.  
The Sino-British Supplementary Treaty of 1843 is an example of this extension of the 
capitulary system.49 This treaty granted the British subjects in China the right of 
extraterritoriality. It also established British courts on Chinese soil, where British subjects are to 
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be tried. The treaty granted the British “most-favored-nation” treatment, which promised that any 
concession granted later to other foreign powers would also then be granted to the British.50 The 
treaty did not give any corresponding rights to Chinese residents in England.51 In 1844 China 
signed similar treaties with the United States and France, and in 1847 with Sweden and 
Norway.52  
After the end of the colonial era, most capitulation treaties ended. However, their 
exploitive and unequal nature would not be quickly forgotten by developing countries. The scare 
left from their injustice would carry on to modern times, when developing countries became 
skeptical about foreign investment.53 It would be safe to conclude that developing countries, 
reflecting on their past experiences, saw modern investment agreements as instruments for 
exploitation by Western countries similar to the capitulation treaties. It can also be said that 
developing countries in modern times, which had recently gained their independence from 
colonial powers, were fearful that investment treaties are a tool for economic and political 
dominance; a threat to their recently acquired sovereignty. 
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C. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EIGHTEENTH, NINETEENTH, AND 
TWENTIETH CENTURIES 
1. The Colonial Era (1700-Early 1900) 
The Industrial Revolution, which began in England near the end of the eighteenth century, 
gradually transformed the industrial life of all the Western countries and played an important role 
in the expansion of Western countries through colonialism.54 Industrialized countries needed 
markets for their machine-made products, and they also needed resources and materials for their 
growing industrial sector.55 This need for new markets and resources encouraged the newly 
industrialized countries, mainly in Europe, to adopt a policy of annexation, or colonization, of 
territories in different parts of the globe, particularly in Africa, Asia, and South America.56 
Hence foreign investment, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was made mainly 
through the context of colonial expansion.57 
Colonized countries were an extension of the political and legal systems of the colonizing 
countries. Therefore investors did not need special protection for their property in the colonized 
country. They were, de facto, investing under their own legal and political systems.58 Hence 
investment and trade treaties with the colonized countries were not needed. As for developing 
countries that were not colonized, a blend of force and diplomacy by the concerned developed 
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country ensured that the rights of its subjects were not infringed.59 Some non-colonized countries 
were forced to sign treaties that gave European investors the right to be governed by their home 
country laws.60 At the same time, developed countries were negotiating treaties among 
themselves that gave treaty parties greater equality, unlike the treaties concluded with less 
developed countries.61 The United States followed the path of concluding treaties with developed 
countries, these treaties were known as treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
(FCN).62 
Modern investment treaties in their current form and content can be traced to the treaties 
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation concluded by the United States in the eighteenth, and 
early nineteenth centuries. Although these treaties were they shifted through time to include 
investment protection, and later became the basis for investment treaties in the modern era.63 
Thus it is important to examine the evolution of FCN treaties in order to understand how the 
current BIT system evolved. 
2. The American Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
The United States concluded a series of bilateral treaties with other developed countries known 
as treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. The first FCN treaty was concluded with 
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INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT : NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN 
CAPITAL 335 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
60 SORNARAJAH, 20 (Cambridge University Press 3 ed. 2012). 
61 SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT : NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL 
FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 335 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
62 For a detailed discussion about FCNs see The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the Modern 
Era, 51 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 302 (2013). 
63 Id. at 307-11. See also RONALD A. BRAND, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § II, at 
713-16 (Center for International Legal Education – University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 2015). 
34 
France in 1778,64 and over the course of the next decade the United States would enter into 
additional FCN treaties with the Netherlands (in 1782), Sweden (in 1783) and Prussia (in 
1785).65 In 1815, an FCN treaty was signed with Great Britain, a treaty that is still in force 
today.66 These treaties dealt with trade and diplomatic relations between the parties.67 They 
contained MFN clauses for trade and navigation, and provided for very broad and “absolute” 
provisions that protected foreign ownership of property.68 European states concluded similar 
treaties starting from the 1820’s, which dealt with matters relating to establishment, trade, and 
double taxation.69 
Starting from the mid-nineteenth century, the United States entered into FCN treaties 
with developing countries. These treaties escalated the level of protection for foreign owned 
property from the “national treatment” norm to a higher level. They required the host country to 
afford foreign investors with “special protection,” “full and perfect protection,” or “the most 
complete security and protection” to their property.70 The protection to foreign ownership of 
property under these FCN treaties was restricted to those engaged in commercial activities, i.e. 
merchants and traders.71 For example, the 1903 U.S.-Ethiopia FCN treaty promised protection to 
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“those engaged in business and of their property.”72 Although the extent of protection was not 
explicitly mentioned in these treaties, they did implicitly require that foreign persons, and their 
property, are entitled to a minimum of respect and protection regardless of what the municipal 
law offers. 73 Thus, although FCN treaties were concerned with the protection of property rather 
than investment,74 they did help in the formation of a new treatment standard for foreign 
investors; that is the “international minimum standard.” 
FCN treaties also dealt with dispute resolution. The early FNC’s provided for dispute 
resolution between the injured foreigner and the host country through local courts. The foreigner 
was entitled to national treatment before the courts of the host country and the right to appoint a 
counsel of his choice. FCN treaties also provided for dispute settlement through arbitral tribunals 
between the state parties, including matters related to the confiscation of property.75 However 
FCN treaties signed in the nineteenth century only provided arbitration for claims existing at the 
time of entry into the FCN treaty. Thus, FCN treaties of this time did not include any clause or 
method for settlement of disputes through binding third party procedures.76 
The move towards the use of FNC treaties by the United States had a major impact on the 
formation of international investment law as we know it today. They introduced the concept of 
bilateral agreements between two sovereign states that offered equal rights to its parties, contrary 
to the capitulary system and former agreements which were exploitive of the weaker party. They 
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also introduced the international minimum standard of treatment, which was an innovative 
standard, to protect American interests abroad, especially in less developed countries where the 
rule of law and the administration of justice might be ineffective or inefficient.  
The international minimum standard was later adopted by other developed countries in 
their treaties. European countries found the international minimum standard to be a convenient 
standard to adopt for the same reasons the Americans did. The international minimum standard 
later became recognized as a rule of customary international law.77 However, developing 
countries resisted its application and challenged its existence as a rule of customary international 
law, and insisted on maintaining the national treatment standard which was incorporated in their 
constitutions.78 To illustrate the controversy between developed and developing states on the 
question of treatment of aliens, it is important to discuss the concept of state responsibility for 
injuries to aliens. This concept is universally recognized, however, controversy arose in the 
second half of the nineteenth century as to when state responsibility to aliens arises. This 
responsibility depends on the standard of treatment which international law obliges that state to 
adopt. 
3. State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens 
The rules of state responsibility for injuries to aliens is a body of international law which seeks to 
establish a standard of treatment to aliens who enter states for various reasons, including for the 
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purpose of doing business.79 The host state is held liable when it breaches the treatment standard 
owed to aliens on its soil or fails to protect them from injury. Therefore a state is under an 
international obligation not to improperly treat foreign nationals residing on their soil. Violation 
of this obligation will incur international responsibility on the part of the host state.80 
The theory on which liability of the host state for injuries to aliens rests is the “mediate 
rule.” Under this rule, an alien is seen as a medium of his home country in the host state, thus 
making an injury to the alien an indirect injury to his home country. The mediate rule is the 
invention of the Swiss philosopher, diplomat, and jurist, Emerich de Vattel (1714-1767).81 In his 
writings, Vattel encouraged countries to adopt the mediate rule to protect their citizens abroad.82 
Vattel declared that “whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly offends the state, which is bound to 
protect this citizen; and the sovereign of the latter should avenge his wrongs, punish the 
aggressor, and, if possible, oblige him to make full reparation.”83 
According to Vattel’s theory, the home country may take measures against the host 
country if the host country breaches the standard of treatment owed to the home country’s 
citizen. These measures can range from the use of diplomacy – to remedy the injury through 
what is known as diplomatic protection – to international adjudication, or even the use of 
military force against the injuring country. 
The Permanent Court of Justice explained the mediate rule as follows:  
                                                 
79 Id. at 120-21. 
80 Chatur, From the Selected Works of Dharmendra Chatur KING & PARTRIDGE 7 (2009). 
81 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book II, Chapter VI. Translated and Edited by Béla Kapossy and Richard 
Whitmore (2008), Liberty Fund. Can be found on http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/2246/Vattel_1519_ 
EBk_v6.0.pdf 
82 Id. (Vattel) at 198. 
83 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book II, Chapter VI. Translated and Edited by Béla Kapossy and Richard 
Whitmore 198 (2008), Liberty Fund. Translation found on http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/2246/Vattel_1519_ 
EBk_v6.0.pdf  
38 
[I]n taking up the case of one of its nationals, by resorting to diplomatic action or 
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its 
own right, the right to ensure in the person of its nationals respect for the rules of 
international law. This right is necessarily limited to intervention on behalf of its 
own nationals because, in the absence of a special agreement, it is the bond of 
nationality between the State and the individual which alone confers upon the 
State the right of diplomatic protection, and it is as a part of the function of 
diplomatic protection that the right to take up a claim and to ensure respect for 
the rules of international law must be envisaged.84 
Although there was universal recognition on state responsibility for injuries to aliens, 
controversy arose in the second half of the nineteenth century as to when this responsibility 
arises. Whether a state is internationally responsible for its treatment to foreigners depends on 
the standard of treatment which international law obliges that state to adopt. The standard of 
treatment that should be afforded to aliens, which raises liability when breached, was the subject 
of considerable debate between capital importing and capital exporting countries.85 This debate 
reflected the different political, economic, and social backgrounds of states, especially on matters 
related to state sovereignty, protection of national resources, and treatment of aliens.  
Capital exporting countries favored an international minimum standard of treatment, 
which elevates the protection of foreign investors from the host country’s local law, to an 
internationally accepted threshold of treatment that the host country must maintain with aliens.86 
Capital importing countries on the other hand, maintained the national treatment standard, where 
aliens are subject to the protection offered in the host country’s municipal laws, in equality with 
the nationals of the host country.87 
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a. The International Minimum Standard vs The Doctrine of Equality Before the advent of 
an international minimum standard, the doctrine of equality was the dominant standard of 
treatment for aliens and their property. Under this doctrine the host state’s international 
obligation towards the treatment of aliens and their property is fulfilled once aliens receive 
“treatment equal to that accorded to the nationals of the host state.”88 In other words, the 
standard of treatment under this doctrine was “national treatment.” The treaties entered into by 
developed European countries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries offered national 
treatment to aliens from other European countries.89 
However in the nineteenth century, when developed countries gave up their colonies and 
the era of industrialization and globalization began, national treatment became ineffective in 
protecting the rights and property of aliens in host countries. The need for clear protection rules 
for outbound investors reached its peak, especially for those foreign investors in less developed 
countries. This was due to the fact that the legal and judicial systems of many developing 
countries were neither independent nor efficient. As described by the American Secretary of 
State, Elihu Root, “[t]he judges are removable at will; they are not superior, as they ought to be, 
to local prejudices and passions, and their organization does not afford to the foreigner the same 
degree of impartiality which is afforded to citizens of the country, or which is required by the 
common standard of justice obtaining throughout the civilized world.”90 Another reason was the 
need to protect the life and liberty of aliens’ in situations of turmoil that frequently occurred in 
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some developing countries.91 Thus there emerged a need for capital exporting countries to 
structure a new system of protection for their outbound investors. This required a higher standard 
of treatment than national treatment.  
The International Minimum Standard Led by the United States, capital exporting countries 
advocated that aliens must be treated according to an international minimum standard. This 
standard of treatment is really a set of international legal principles recognized by developed 
countries, or the “civilized countries”, which set a “threshold” of treatment of aliens. If the host 
country’s legal system is below that internationally recognized “threshold” then that host country 
must maintain the international standard of treatment. In 1910, U.S. Secretary of State, Elihu 
Root, explained the international minimum standard, by stating:  
There is a standard of justice very simple, very fundamental, and of such general 
acceptance by all civilized countries as to form a part of the international law of 
the world. … If any country’s system of law and administration does not conform 
to that standard, although the people of the country may be content to live under 
it, no other country can be compelled to accept it as furnishing a satisfactory 
measure of treatment of its citizens.92 
The international minimum standard came to externalize the legal regime governing 
foreign investors only when the municipal legal system of the host country is below the 
international threshold of justice.93 It is only when there is no hope to obtain justice from the 
laws and tribunals of the host country that an international standard applies and externalizes the 
legal regime governing the foreign investor. Otherwise the alien is subject to the laws and courts 
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of the host country. In 1850 Lord Palmerston spoke to the House of Commons in relation to the 
Don Pacifico Case,94 and explained when the international minimum standard applies:  
If our subjects abroad have complaints against individuals, or against the 
government of a foreign country, if the courts of law of that country can afford 
them redress, then, no doubt, to those courts of justice the British subject ought in 
the first instance to apply; and it is only on a denial of justice, or upon decisions 
manifestly unjust, that the British Government should be called upon to interfere. 
But there may be cases in which no confidence can be placed in the tribunals, 
those tribunals being, from their composition and nature, not of a character to 
inspire any hope of obtaining justice from them.  
I say, then, that our doctrine is, that, in the first instance, redress should be 
sought from the law courts of the country; but that in cases where redress can not 
be so had – and those cases are many – to confine a British subject to that remedy 
only, would be to deprive him of the protection which he is entitled to receive.95 
The international minimum standard also gave foreign investors the right to seek dispute 
resolution before an international tribunal, if the remedies provided by the host state proved 
inadequate.96 The home government, under this standard, may also intervene by way of 
diplomatic protection if the rights of its citizen have been infringed by the host government.97 
However the exercise of diplomatic protection by the host government should not be abused. The 
Venezuelan Claims Commission of 1885 commented on this issue by stating:  
Strong and powerful governments must not take advantage of their superiority 
and exaggerate the duty of protection by exercising pressure upon weak 
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governments, in order to compel them to favor their citizens and exempt them 
from certain obligations or grant them privileges of any nature whatsoever.98 
On the other hand, capital importing countries – mainly in Latin America – refused to 
apply the international minimum standard of treatment on foreign investors. These countries, 
which had recently gained their independence from colonial powers, were striving to encourage 
foreign investment in their economies.99 To encourage foreign investment, the constitutions of 
these new countries' promised foreigners equality of treatment with nationals, along with other 
investment protection rights.100 Latin American countries upheld that aliens are entitled to 
treatment not less, but also not better, than that afforded to the citizens of the host country.101 
This maintained the “doctrine of equality”, which also became known as the Calvo doctrine, as 
the standard of treatment of aliens in developing countries.102  
The Doctrine of Equality Under this doctrine, relying on the principle of state sovereignty, no 
alien has the right to own property in a country other than his own.103 Therefore an alien needs 
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to gain approval from the host government to invest and acquire property on its soil. If the alien 
is admitted to the host country, he is then entitled to non-discriminatory treatment. The host 
state’s international obligation towards the treatment of aliens and their property is fulfilled once 
aliens receive “treatment equal to that accorded to the nationals of the host state.”104 No regard is 
given whether the alien, or his home state, are dissatisfied with the treatment received.105 Thus 
the Calvo doctrine instituted a standard of “national treatment.” 
The foreign investor is subject to the laws and courts of the host country when seeking 
redress form state injuries, as is any local. This also meant that home governments of foreign 
investors cannot intervene by way of diplomatic protection in the claims of their subjects against 
the host state unless there was a denial of justice.106 For Latin American countries, denial of 
justice was defined narrowly as: failure to provide access to domestic courts.107 
The logic used by Latin American countries in maintaining the doctrine of equality 
comes from their past experiences as colonies. Newly independent Latin America wanted to 
signal their new status as sovereign countries equal to other countries in the international 
arena.108 They also wanted to signal that the era of domination by imperial powers was over. 
Hence, as sovereigns in the international system equal to other sovereigns, Latin American 
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countries refused to be subject to any legislative authority other than their own.109 They refused 
to apply any international standard or law on foreign investors on their soil. Moreover, out of the 
notion of fairness, they refused to give foreign investors a privileged position over their national 
investors. As articulated by the Mexican Foreign Minister Eduardo Hay:  
[T]he foreigner who voluntarily moves to a country which is not his own, in 
search of a personal benefit, accepts in advance, together with the advantages he 
is going to enjoy, the risks to which he may find himself exposed. It would be 
unjust that he should aspire to a privileged position.110 
When capital exporting countries called for the international minimum standard as a rule 
of customary international law in the second half of the nineteenth century, capital importing 
countries, mainly Latin American countries, challenged this rule and some denied its existence as 
a rule of customary international law.111 
International custom can be defined simply as “a general practice [of states] accepted as 
law.”112 For an international customary rule to be formed, two criteria must be met. The first is 
continuous practice by states which must be “both extensive and virtually uniform.”113 The 
second criterion is that the practice should occur “in such a way as to show a general recognition 
that a rule of legal obligation is involved.”114 Latin American countries argued that both of these 
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criteria were not present, as regional uniformity and practice regarding the international 
minimum standard was not established, let alone international recognition.115  
However, international custom does not require universal recognition to form a rule of 
customary international law.116 The United States had introduced the international minimum 
standard in its early FCN treaties with many countries.117 In Europe, imperial powers adopted the 
international minimum standard in their bilateral treaties when they gave up their colonies in 
Asia and Africa.118 Capital exporting countries replied to the Latin American argument that the 
international minimum standard of treatment has been recognized between civilized nations, and 
does not require universal recognition to form part of international customary law.119 
The continuous practice of the United States, and other European countries, of including 
the international minimum standard in their bilateral treaties during the twentieth century, along 
with the willingness of developing countries to accept such inclusion to encourage foreign 
investors leaves no room for further debate on this matter. The international minimum standard 
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has now become an established rule of contemporary customary international law. Although the 
doctrine of equality may still find some support by some developing countries.120 
4. The Application and Enforcement of the International Minimum Standard 
The treaties of the colonial era, although they elevated the level of protection and treatment to 
foreign investors, did not provide any legal means of enforcement in the event of violation by the 
host state. Foreign investors did not have the right to direct claims against the offending host 
country in international courts. Therefore the only path investors had was to rely on their home 
governments when seeking redress from host countries that infringed their rights. To that end, 
home governments used a blend of diplomacy and force to protect the interests of their nationals 
abroad.121 Initially, investment disputes in this era were solved by two means; either through 
diplomatic protection, or by the use of military force (gunboat diplomacy). Both of these 
customary means of enforcement proved to be inefficient.122 Hence, the use of mixed claims 
commissions, as a means of investment dispute resolution via arbitration, prevailed at a later 
stage and became the favored means of solving investment disputes for many countries.123 These 
three models of investment dispute resolution and enforcement will be discussed below. 
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a. Diplomatic ProtectionThe practice of diplomatic protection by states can be traced back to 
the Middle Ages, or earlier.124 The rationale behind diplomatic protection rests on the mediate 
rule: an injury to a state’s national is an injury to the state itself. Therefore the state has the right 
to protect itself from such injurious acts.125 This gave home governments the right to pursue 
claims against other countries that injured their nationals.126 To that end, capital exporting 
countries developed a notion of protecting their injured citizens through the use of diplomacy, 
what came to be known as “diplomatic protection.”127  
The International Law Commission defines diplomatic protection as “the invocation by a 
State, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of 
another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural or 
legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to the implementation of such 
responsibility.”128  
The exercise of diplomatic protection required the injured investor to request his home 
government to “espouse” his claim with the offending host government.129 The injured investor 
should have exhausted all local remedies in the host country before requesting espousal for 
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redress from his home government.130 The home government is under no obligation to accept the 
espousal request and is free to reject espousing the claim without giving justification. However, 
if the home government accepts to espouse the claim against the country that caused injury, it is 
entitled to settle the dispute on the terms it deems suitable.131 In other words, the injured investor 
loses control over the claim, and will have to accept the outcome of the espousal process, 
whatever it may be. 
Diplomatic protection was used continuously by home governments in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. This continuous and steady practice led the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) in 1924 to recognize the right of a state to exercise diplomatic 
protection over its nationals as an “elementary principle of international law.”132 The PCIJ 
affirmed that: 
[A] State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to 
international law committed by another state, from whom they have been unable 
to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one 
of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial 
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights – its right 
to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international 
law.133 
However, the continuous practice of diplomatic protection by home governments to 
resolve investment disputes proved to be an inadequate remedy for investors. This is mainly 
because home governments are usually reluctant in accepting espousal of claims against host 
governments.134 This hesitation arises from the possibility of disrupting diplomatic relations with 
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the host state. Other reasons contributed to its ineffectiveness, such as the requirement to exhaust 
all local remedies under the local law of the host state before requesting espousal. This 
requirement entails a lengthy and costly process on the investors’ part, and usually does not 
result in a satisfactory remedy to the investor. Another reason is the fact that the investor has no 
right to direct or interfere with the espousal process once taken by his government. The home 
government may settle the dispute on any terms it wishes, therefore the outcome of the espousal 
is unpredictable, and may also be unsatisfactory to the investor. 
b. Gunboat Diplomacy: The Latin American Experience During the colonial era, when 
diplomatic efforts failed, the use of military force was the final arbiter in solving investment 
disputes.135 Gunboat policy, or “diplomacy”, was used by capital exporting countries in the 
eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries.136 Latin America is an example of a region 
that suffered from this policy when it defaulted on its commitments and obligations towards 
foreign investors.  
In the early 1800s, Latin American nations eagerly sought foreign investment.137 The 
effort by these countries to attract foreign investment was initially a great success. However, by 
1833 “every Latin American bond issue was in default, and most of the foreign companies 
established to conduct business in the area had collapsed. In the following years, foreigners as 
well as nationals were exposed to economic losses.”138 The inability of Latin American 
governments and judicial institutions to protect foreigners' property led home governments to 
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intervene by the use for force. The examples are many, but an interesting one is the intervention 
of France in Mexico, where the French invaded Mexico, overthrew its government, and 
appointed a “foreigner” as President of the country.  
In 1860, the Mexican Government defaulted on a loan from J B. Jecker & Company, a 
Franco-Swiss bank.139 The original loan was for 75 million Francs, however the Mexican 
Government only borrowed 3.5 million of that amount. When the Mexican government defaulted 
on that amount, it was deemed to have defaulted on the whole contract amount.140 This triggered 
the French Government to invade Mexico in 1861. It overthrew the government and maintained 
a puppet government there headed by Emperor Maximilian. The latter was the brother of the 
Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph I who accepted an offer by Napoleon III of France to rule 
Mexico. However in 1867 Emperor Maximilian was overthrown by the Mexicans and executed 
by a firing squad.141  
Gunboat diplomacy stretched into the early twentieth century. The United States, for 
example, prevented the destruction of property owned by an American company, New York & 
Bermudez Company, in Venezuela, by sending a naval vessel.142 The Vessel’s mandate was to 
“protect all existing rights and maintain the status quo”,143 of the American company in 
Venezuela. 
The most notorious of all countries in using force in Latin America was Great Britain. 
The British “gunboat diplomacy” reached its peak in the 1840’s and 1850’s, during the tenures of 
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Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, who said “as the Roman, in days of old, 
held himself free from indignity, when he could say Civis Romanus sum [I am a Roman Citizen]; 
so also a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident that the watchful eye 
and the strong arm of England, will protect him against injustice and wrong.”144 
The intervention in Latin America continued on repeated occasions during the first third 
of the twentieth century to protect foreign property, until the Franklin Roosevelt Administration 
ended the practice in 1933.145 However, the main goal of these military interventions was to 
encourage Latin American countries to adjudicate disputes under terms that the invading powers 
deemed acceptable.146 As a result, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the use of 
arbitration became the preferred method for solving investment disputes between countries. To 
that end, “mixed claims commissions” were established. These commissions helped in the 
evolution of international investment law and are the foundation to the current investor-state 
arbitration mechanism. 
c. Mixed Claims Commissions By the second half of the nineteenth century, investment dispute 
resolution by states started to shift from the use of diplomatic protection and gunboat diplomacy 
to the use of arbitration. States formed ad hoc commissions that were vested with the 
responsibility of solving specific claims, or classes of claims, via arbitration.147 The first 
commission of this kind was established between the United States and Great Britain in 1794 to 
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decide on matters relating to the treatment of nationals of both parties during and after the 
American Revolution.148 Disputes were remitted to the arbitral tribunal which consisted of five 
commissioners; two appointed by each party and the fifth commissioner appointed via 
unanimous vote of the four appointed commissioners. This model became the standard of later 
mixed claims commissions which became the principle means of solving investment disputes 
between states.149 
Over sixty commissions were established between states between 1840 and 1940 by 
different states, and other ad hoc commissions were also established to decide on specific 
claims.150 The mixed claims commission model for resolving disputes was built on the 
diplomatic protection model, meaning that only states can be parties before the commission. 
Therefore investors could not direct claims against the host country, and were still required to 
seek the approval of their home government to espouse their claims before the commission. 
Nonetheless, the mixed claims commissions proved to be a success in solving investment claims 
peacefully. Their success and efficiency was recognized by states as the best means for dispute 
settlement.151 This success and recognition helped in the evolution and development of investor-
state arbitration as known today. 
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II. THE POST-COLONIAL ERA 
A. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
By the start of the twentieth century, states, as well as investors, realized the need to restructure 
the international legal regime governing foreign investment. Customary international law, which 
was the principal instrument in protecting the rights of foreign investors in earlier times, was 
proving deficient for several reasons. First, there was no universal consensus on the standard of 
treatment of foreign investors. Second, the content of the international minimum standard, in the 
countries where it existed, was vague and subject to varying interpretations.152 Third, there was 
no effective enforcement mechanism for investors’ rights.153 Home governments became even 
more reluctant to espouse claims due to the complex network of diplomatic and military alliances 
around the world. This network was vulnerable to disturbance should the inconsistent practice of 
diplomatic protection remain unchanged. Fourth, the use of gun-boat diplomacy had become 
internationally unacceptable. Developing countries pressured for the pacific settlement of 
disputes, after they suffered from uncivilized treatment by Western countries, which frequently 
invaded and destroyed their newly established and fragile countries. Finally, the success of 
mixed claims commissions in solving investment disputes demonstrated that arbitration was a 
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peaceful and effective dispute settlement mechanism that could replace other ineffective means 
such as diplomatic protection and gunboat diplomacy. 
In 1907, the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was drafted 
(Hague I Convention).154 This Convention prohibited states from the use of armed force in the 
settlement of disputes. The signatories of the Hague I Convention recognized arbitration as “the 
most effective, and at the same time the most equitable, means of settling disputes which 
diplomacy has failed to settle.”155 Recourse to the use of force under the Hague Convention was 
allowed only if there was refusal to submit the claim to arbitration.156  
The Hague I Convention also encouraged signatories to conclude arbitration agreements 
amongst themselves, “with a view to extending obligatory arbitration to all cases which they may 
consider it possible to submit to it.”157 This started a new phenomenon in the international arena 
were states began to rely on arbitration to solve disputes. From 1900-1914, more than 120 
bilateral arbitration treaties entered into force.158 The adoption of the Geneva Protocol on 
Arbitration Clauses in 1923,159 by which the contracting states agreed to recognize the validity of 
arbitration agreements between private parties, added to this movement. This enforced the notion 
of arbitration as a means of alternative dispute resolution, and enabled private parties to submit 
their claims to an international impartial tribunal and be able to enforce their arbitral awards. 
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Another reason for the need to restructure the international legal regime governing 
foreign investment was the expansion in volume and scope of foreign investments worldwide. 
Customary international law was not able to accommodate the new trends and practices of 
foreign investment, nor did it take account of issues that were of concern to investors.160  
To that end, the American government undertook a project of reviewing its FCN treaties 
with the goal of including more detailed property protection provisions.161 The focus of FCN 
treaties started to shift from general consular and trade affairs to substantive investment 
protection.162 The FCN treaty signed with Japan in 1911 signaled that change in the American 
FCN treaty practice, becoming the first treaty to introduce important substantive protections for 
foreign investment, such as giving corporations’ legal status in the host country and allowing 
them domestic court access. 163 It also provided for the protection of intellectual property rights 
and protection against exchange controls.164 Further, it included a dispute resolution provision in 
which both states consented to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for disputes 
involving the interpretation or application of the agreement.165 The more favorable of national 
treatment and most-favored-nation treatment was offered to the foreign investor in the new FCN 
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treaty. The new American FCN treaty was innovative, and provided a solid ground for 
investment protection.  
The effect of the new FCN treaties did not last long. Two developments prevented the 
new FNC treaty from gaining momentum and adoption in other countries.166 The first was the 
conclusion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947.167 The GATT 
shifted international trade matters from bilateral negotiations and treaties to a multilateral 
framework, making bilateral “commerce” treaties no longer necessary.  
The second development was the rise of the communist bloc, led by the USSR, and the 
start of the cold war era. The communist bloc, driven by its ideology, regarded foreign 
investment as a source of exploitation and interference in the affairs of the host state. Communist 
states embraced an unfriendly attitude towards foreign investment and expropriated investments 
on their soil.168 They also encouraged their developing allies to view such agreements as a new 
form of colonialism by Western countries that should be resisted. The communist block 
advocated the notion of state control over natural resources, and that foreign investments should 
be heavily regulated and monitored by the state.169  
Therefore the United States FCN treaty nose-dived as a tool for investment protection. 
The communist bloc succeeded in spreading a speculative view, among developing countries, 
towards foreign investment. Hence capital exporting countries endorsed a new idea; a 
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multilateral legal framework governing investment. This effort intended to harmonize the rules 
of investment protection internationally. However due to the speculative view developing states 
had on foreign investments, such efforts were always unsuccessful.170  
The first of these failed attempts to establish a multilateral legal framework for 
investment was the Havana Charter in 1948.171 The charter sought to establish an International 
Trade Organization (ITO) with a mandate to achieve the gradual liberalization of trade and 
investment.172 Subsequent efforts included the International Chamber of Commerce's (“ICC”) 
International Code of Fair Treatment of Foreign Investment in 1949,173 the International 
Convention for the Mutual Protection of Private Property Rights in Foreign Countries in 1957,174 
a private effort known as the Abs-Shawcross Convention,175 and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign 
Property in 1967.176 While none of these initiatives was fruitful, as a group, they did “inform and 
influence the development of the BIT movement that was to come.”177 
As the multilateral legal framework attempts failed, along with the insecure climate for 
private capital in many parts of the world, there became an immediate and practical need to rely 
on bilateral treaties that are specifically designed for investment protection.178 These treaties 
would set out the legal framework governing foreign investments between two state parties in a 
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clear, binding, and enforceable manner. Thus, the rules on treatment standards, expropriation, 
compensation, dispute settlement, and investor rights would no longer be subject to international 
customary law which was vague, scattered, and non-uniform.179 Arbitration had already proved 
its success as a tool for dispute settlement for investment matters in the mixed claims 
commission model.180 The opposing attitudes towards foreign investment around the world, 
along with the expropriation trend by many newly decolonized and independent countries,181 set 
the stage ready for BIT’s to enter and reshape the international regime of foreign investment. 
B. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY:  
1. The BIT Movement 
By the end of World War II, capital exporting states realized the need to create bilateral treaties 
focused on investment protection and promotion. This came as a response to the uncertainties 
and inadequacies of customary international law in protecting foreign investment.182 The United 
States led this movement when it initiated a program to conclude a network of FCN treaties 
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which, among other commercial and counselor matters, specifically sought to protect and 
facilitate U.S. investments overseas.183  
The new FCN treaty expanded and strengthened investment protection to be non-
distinguishable from the modern BITs. This new FCN treaty was introduced in 1946, and 
became a success due to their strong protection of foreign investments. One of its main 
innovations was the protection of locally incorporated entities – by foreign investors – in the host 
country.184 It also encouraged the use of commercial arbitration in the settlement of disputes 
between the foreign investor and other private parties in the host state, by including a clause 
providing for judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.185 Other new provisions were also 
introduced in these FCN treaties which gave the foreign investor more rights, such as the right to 
currency and monetary transfers. The Hull doctrine was incorporated into these FCN treaties 
which provided for “prompt, adequate, and effective compensation” for expropriation. This 
formula expanded the previous requirement of “just compensation” and reinforced protection 
guarantees.186  
However the protectionist policies of many developing countries and their skepticism 
about foreign investment impeded the American FCN program. It is possible also that many 
developing countries, which were dependent on foreign aid, were reluctant to enter into a treaty 
of “friendship” with the United States. Signing such an agreement will impede any potential aid 
from the communist bloc, in addition to other measures of “disciplinary” nature, such as 
termination of economic relationships. By 1968 The United States had entered into 23 of these 
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new FCN treaties with other countries.187 After 1968, the United States did not enter into any 
FCN treaty with any other nation.188 
Although the United States FCN treaty was indistinguishable from modern BITs, the first 
document to hold the name “Bilateral Investment Treaty” was in 1959 between Germany and 
Pakistan.189 It is hardly ever noted that the United States had signed a FCN treaty with Pakistan 
in the same year.190 A comparison between the two treaties signed with Pakistan that year reveals 
that they both provide for the same degree of protection to foreign investors, and they both do 
not contain third party dispute resolution.  
However the practice of concluding bilateral agreements focused solely on investment 
protection started to gain momentum, especially among European countries. By the end of the 
1960’s, around 74 BITs were signed, almost half of them by Germany. Other countries such as 
the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland had also signed a significant number of these BITs.191 
During the 1970’s revolutionist regimes acquired power from post-colonial regimes in 
many developing countries, and a new wave of nationalizations started to take place. Also the 
communist bloc was still influenced by the notion of state control and state ownership of 
property. Hence developing and communist countries started a campaign at the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) calling for recognition of their right to expropriate foreign 
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investments without the payment of market value of the expropriated property. Relying on their 
numerical superiority in the UNGA, they were successful in passing the Declaration of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974.192 NIEO declared that states shall have “[f]ull 
permanent sovereignty” over their natural resources and other economic activities.193 This 
includes “the right of nationalization or transfer of ownership to its nationals.”194 The 
Declaration did not specify any obligation to pay compensation.  
In December of the same year (1974), developing countries managed to pass another 
document that was critical to foreign investment protection; the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States (CERDS).195 It declared that each state has the right “[t]o nationalize, 
expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation 
should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and 
regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent.”196 The Charter did not 
specify that compensation must be paid, nor did it specify that compensation should be 
calculated in accordance with international law. Thus the matter of calculating compensation was 
transferred to the municipal laws of the expropriating country.197 
These two documents let capital exporting countries to realize the importance of BITs as 
tools to protect their interests in less developed countries, especially from expropriation. The 
practical need for prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for expropriation in developing 
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countries required capital exporting states to engage in BITs that enforce this principle.198 
Therefore many capital exporting countries started to enter into BITs with other countries to 
secure the investments of their nationals. Belgium concluded its first BIT in 1970,199 France in 
1972,200 the United Kingdom in 1975,201 Austria in 1976,202 and Japan in 1977. 203 The United 
States launched its BIT program in 1977 but did not enter into its first BIT until 1982.204 By end 
of the 1980’s the number of BITs worldwide had increased six fold, from that of the 1960’s, 
reaching almost 500 signed BITs.205 Another major event pushed the proliferation wheel even 
faster during the 1990’s; the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the communist 
economic ideology.206 After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the over-protective, state-run, 
and speculative communist economy was no longer available as an alternative to the open 
market, capitalist economy. Hence many developing countries gave up their protectionist and 
highly restrictive legal regimes governing FDI and introduced new laws that were in the 
direction of greater liberalization.207 The 1990’s decade witnessed the largest proliferation of 
BITs of any time, as over 2000 BITs were signed by the end of the year 1999.208 The 
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proliferation of the BIT network remained at an extraordinary rate in the twenty-first century. 
Today there are around 3300 signed BITs and investment agreements, involving almost every 
country in the world.209 
2. The ICSID Convention 
As illustrated earlier in this Chapter, historically foreign investors had limited options when 
seeking redress for damages caused by the acts or laws of host countries. Before the introduction 
of the investor-state dispute resolution mechanism, injured foreign investors had only four 
options: i) to accept the injury as a cost of doing business offshore and pass this cost to the 
secondary market, ii) seek diplomatic protection by petitioning their home governments to 
espouse their claims, iii) lobby their home governments to use military force to coarse the 
offending host country to make good to the offence, or iv) accept the remedies provided for by 
the host country’s local courts. All of these options put the foreign investor at a disadvantage. 
The foreign investor had to choose between increasing the cost, and consequently the price, of 
his service or goods, or having to be subjected to the political considerations of the home 
government when requesting diplomatic protection, or having to ruin his relationship with the 
host country after his home country used military force against it, or having to accept the 
discriminatory treatment and inefficient legal systems of host countries.  
Thus, there became a practical need to solve investment disputes in a peaceful, 
depoliticized, and impartial manner. The use of arbitration by the mixed claims commissions’ to 
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solve investment disputes had great success, and encouraged the use of arbitration as a neutral 
and efficient method of solving investment disputes. However, although of its long use (1840-
1940) the mixed claims commissions’ model had its own shortcomings. Basically it did not 
allow foreign investors to directly press claims against the offending host country, but rather 
investors’ claims had to be forwarded to the commission by the home government. Thus foreign 
investors were still subject to the discretion of their home government. 
The use of commercial arbitration to solve investment disputes started in the early 
1900’s, when investment contracts were signed between states and private investors. However, 
international commercial arbitration is a system designed to solve private parties’ disputes. It is 
not equipped to include a sovereign among its litigants, due to matters relating to state 
sovereignty and state immunity. Legal theorists, specifically from those of the positivist school 
of legal thought, criticized the use of arbitration to solve investor-state disputes.210 The 
theoretical problem lays in that private natural and legal persons have no legal standing under 
international law to seek reparation from sovereigns. International law was seen as a field of law 
that governs the relations between states exclusively. Consequently, disputes arising out of 
contracts between sovereign states and private foreign investors were considered to be subject to 
the host state’s municipal law. This was also supported by developing countries, especially those 
adopting the Calvo doctrine, were they resisted the notion of being brought into arbitrations by 
private foreign investors. The ICJ took a similar stance when it affirmed that a relationship 
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between a borrowing state and a private person is one that falls “within the domain of municipal 
law.”211 
Hence there became a need for a system designed in particular to tackle the issue of 
investor-state dispute settlement. During the early years of the 1960’s international organizations 
realized even more the importance of FDI as a source of development for newly independent and 
economically weak countries. However, the immature and fragile legal systems of those 
countries constituted an impediment for FDI inflow. Foreign investors were hesitant to invest in 
countries where the local legal system might fail to protect them. Therefore it became 
increasingly clear that “if the plans established for the growth in the economies of the developing 
countries were to be realized, it would be necessary to supplement the resources flowing to these 
countries from bilateral and multilateral governmental sources by additional investments 
originating in the private sector.”212 
Consequently many international organizations started to consider different schemes that 
aimed at removing barriers and obstacles that hinder the flow of FDI into developing countries, 
and consequently hinder their development. The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (the World Bank) proposed an international convention which establishes an 
institution that provides investor-state arbitration and conciliation facilities to settle investment 
disputes. The idea was proposed by the President of the Bank in 1961, who had frequently been 
requested to lend his good offices for the settlement of various types of financial disputes, 
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including some between governments and private foreign investors.213 The World Bank 
concluded that an institution specifically designed to deal with the special problems of settling 
investment disputes between foreign private persons and country governments would facilitate 
and enhance the international flow of capital, and hence development.214 
Drawing on the defaults of the customary means of investment dispute settlement, the 
Bank recommended that the proposed convention recognizes the following main principles: i) 
the possibility of direct claims by private investors against host governments, ii) recognition by 
states that arbitration agreements entered into with private investors are binging international 
instruments, iii) the provision of arbitration facilities, arbitrators, arbitration rules, and so forth, 
and iv) provide conciliation as an alternative to arbitration.215  
It took almost four years of deliberations, consultations, meetings, and many drafts to 
transform this project into its current form and content. On March 18th of 1965 the Executive 
Directors of the Bank took the resolution to adopt the draft text of the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID 
Convention or the Convention),216 and instructed the President to transmit the Convention and 
the accompanying reports to all member governments of the Bank for their consideration and 
signature.217 The Convention was soon signed by a number of States, and the twentieth 
ratification was deposited on September 14, 1966; pursuant to its Article 68(2), the Convention 
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thereupon entered into force 30 days later, on October 14, 1966.218 Today 161 countries have 
signed the ICSID Convention, a 151 of which have deposited their instruments of ratification.219 
The Convention established the International Center for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID or the Center); a dedicated institution for the settlement of investor-state 
disputes located in Washington, DC. The ICSID Center is on one of the five institutions that 
form the World Bank Group. The Center registered its first case in 1972, and has since become 
an international hub for investor-state dispute resolution with a caseload of 570 registered cases 
until today.220 
The foundation on which the Convention was built on is: economic development of states 
through private foreign investment. The view of the founders of the Convention was that 
protection of investment enhances its mobility. For example; from 1980 until 1997 global FDI 
outflows increased at an average rate of about 13 percent a year.221 Of course this success cannot 
be attributed only to the Convention, but providing a neutral and bias free venue to litigate 
investor-state disputes did encourage capital mobility from developed countries to less developed 
ones. However developing countries did not have major success in achieving economic growth 
from FDI. On the contrary, some developing countries are now denouncing the Convention,222 or 
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have expressed their intention not to include ICSID arbitration clauses in their future BITs.223 
The issue of why the Convention has not succeeded in fostering development for developing 
countries will be dealt with later in this thesis. However in brief it can be said that the 
inconsistent decisions and interpretations of the treatment standards, along with the expansive 
and innovative interpretations of BITs provisions by ICSID tribunals, have hindered the 
economic development of countries through FDI. 
3. The MIGA Convention 
Investing in less developed countries usually entails increased non-commercial risks and political 
uncertainties. These uncertainties, generally referred to as “political risks”, arise from the 
unpredictable behavior of the executive, legislative, and judicial authorities of the host country in 
the long-term. In essence, political risks are uncertainties related to the host country’s legislative 
and administrative acts, which “deny or restrict the right of an investor/owner (i) to use or benefit 
from his/her assists; or (ii) which reduce the value of the firm.”224 This can be the result of 
sudden change of government attitude towards foreign investors. For example a coup d'état in 
the host country might replace a liberal government with a nationalistic one. Thus 
expropriations, nationalizations dispossessions, or the alternation of property rights become 
government policies affecting foreign investors.225 Also some events of a political nature can 
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have an adverse effect on foreign investment, which is compromised by situations of instability 
in the host country.226 Wars, revolutions, government seizure of property, and government 
actions that restrict the movement of profits or other revenues from or within the country, are just 
a few events that can place investor property and contractual rights in jeopardy.227 
Economic growth and development of developing countries requires increased foreign 
capital to be injected into their economics. The latter objective can only be achieved if internal 
barriers’ and risks in these countries are reduced to the minimum in order to encourage the 
inflow of foreign investment. Political risks are given great weight in the investment making 
decision process and can play a major role in deterring foreign investments into the host 
country.228 
Based on its commitment to improve the investment climate of developing countries to 
achieve development, the World Bank initiated a project to establish a multilateral investment 
protection agency that would provide insurance against political risks to foreign investments in 
developing countries.229 Alden Clausen, President of the World Bank initiated the MIGA project 
based on the need “to improve the investment climate – for potential investors and potential 
recipients alike.”230 The project materialized in 1985 when the Board of Governors approved the 
Convention establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA Convention). In 
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1988 the required minimum ratifications and capital were reached and MIGA was officially 
created.231  
The MIGA Convention provides insurance against non-commercial and political risks to 
qualifying investments originating from developed member countries and invested in developing 
member countries.232 Eligible investments for coverage are those which fall under two 
categories; i) equity interests, which include FDI and portfolio investments, and ii) non-equity 
direct investments, which include service and management contracts, franchising agreements, 
turnkey contracts, and the like; provided that they have terms of at least three years.233 MIGA 
provides eligible investment protection against four separate political risks. These risks are; host 
country restrictions on currency conversion and transfer, ii) expropriation and similar measures 
that deprive the foreign investor from effective control, ownership, or benefit from his 
investment, iii) breach of contracts by the host government, or is subject to procedural delays, or 
is unable to enforce decisions made in his favor, and iv) military action and civil disturbance.234 
CONCLUSION 
The history of international investment law reveals that the system of foreign investment 
protection was built on the notion of reciprocal benefits for the foreign investor and the host 
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state. In early centuries, foreigners were perceived as invaders and thus confronted with an 
unfriendly attitude. However sovereigns realized their importance as sources of capital and 
products that fuel their economic development. Therefore they granted foreign traders in their 
territory protections and incentives to encourage and increase their inflow. 
From the early beginnings until modern times the reciprocal benefits notion was central 
to the development of international investment law. The main conventions and multilateral 
agreements that govern this field (e.g. ICSID Convention and MIGA) were concerned with the 
development of host states as much as their concern with investor protection. In fact the 
protection of foreign investment was the tool to achieve capital mobility into developing 
countries, and hence achieve economic development around the globe. This goal, as mentioned 
above, is explicitly stated in the preparatory works and preambles of these multilateral 
instruments.  
The BIT movement in the 1950’s came as a “deal” between developed capital exporting 
states and developing capital importing states. By facilitating the entry of FDI and providing it 
with protection, and hence being exposed to liability, the developing state anticipated 
development by encouraging FDI inflows. 
Therefore it can be concluded that economic growth and development was always a 
central objective in all international instruments that deal with overseas investment. Indeed the 
development of countries through FDI cannot be reached if FDI is not encouraged by 
guaranteeing its protection from harmful acts of host countries, thus protection of investment is 
the other central objective. All international conventions and BITs refer to economic 
development and investor protection as the driving force behind their enactment and adoption.  
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Nonetheless the current international legal regime of foreign investment is overlooking 
the historical and practical objective of FDI for state development. Instead, in the current state of 
affairs, the focus is on the protection of the investor. BITs are becoming stricter on investment 
protection in a manner that leaves little margin for the host country to benefit from FDI for its 
development. Concerns have been expressed about the balance between investment protection 
and the host country’s public interest in regulating various matters of public concern, such as 
environmental protection, health protection, social and human rights, etc. Inconsistency in 
arbitral interpretation of investment treaty obligations and the expanding protective interpretation 
of treatment standards have led many countries and civil organizations to question the legitimacy 
and benefits of the entire system. 
These issues have pushed investment treaties into the light of public scrutiny. That focus 
has turned up a number of concerns about how investment treaties operate, and the conflicts they 
can create between the goal of attracting investment and other public policy aims that may be 
impacted in the process. The concern is that investment treaties may be benefiting foreign 
investors and investments to the detriment of the goal of host state development through  
FDI.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MODERN INVESTMENT TREATY 
AND THE ISSUE OF DEVELOPMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is vital to the economic development of countries.1 In the 
second half of the Twentieth Century, the international community realized that mobilizing 
capital from developed countries to developing countries, to assist the latter in their 
development, requires eliminating the risks for foreign investors in these countries.2 Hence, the 
drafting and adoption of multilateral conventions governing international investment, such as 
ICSID and MIGA, were designed both to achieve the goal of minimizing investor risks in 
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text of agreements and commitments adopted at the International Conference on Financing for Development, para. 
20 (Monterrey, Mexico, 18-22 March 2002) (United Nations 2003). 
2 See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 417 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2015). 
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developing countries and to demonstrate that “development is closely related to, and could be 
viewed as a core objective of, national and international investment law and policy.”3 
 The BIT movement in the 1950’s had a similar purpose. BITs came to fill a gap created 
by the inefficiency of customary international law in providing adequate protection to foreign 
investment.4 The rise of communist ideologies in many parts of the world, and the formation of 
newly independent developing states, created a climate of uncertainty for cross-border private 
capital which needed to be rectified.5 Developed countries wanted to create a stable international 
legal framework to facilitate and protect the investments of their nationals in developing 
countries.6 To that end, they drafted treaties that govern foreign investments in developing 
countries.7 As articulated by Lord Shawcross (a former Attorney General of the U.K.) and 
Herman Abs (Chairman of the Deutsche Bank in Germany) in 1960: 
[I]t is now widely recognized that major steps must be taken to buttress the 
economic position of the free-world nations, both as a measure against Soviet 
moves and as a means of resolving some of the demands being made by the 
peoples of the underdeveloped nations of the world, the notion of greater 
protection under international law for private investment takes on added 
importance.8 
                                                 
3 Markus Gehring & Andrew Newcombe, An Introduction to Sustainable Development in World Investment Law, in 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 4 (Markus W Gehring Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, 
Andrew Newcombe ed. 2011). 
4 LLUÍS PARADELL ANDREW NEWCOMBE, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF 
TREATMENT 41 (Kluwer Law International. 2009). 
5 See Asoka de Z. Gunawardana & José E. Alvarez, The Inception and Growth of Bilateral Investment Promotion 
and Protection Treaties, 86 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING (AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW) 
544, 555 (1992). 
6 Ahmad Ali Ghouri, The Evolution of Bilateral Investment Treaties, Investment Treaty Arbitration and 
International Investment Law, 14 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW REVIEW 189, 191 (2011). 
7 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 621, 627 (1998). 
8 The Proposed Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment, A Round Table, Introduction by the Editors, 
Journal of Public Law, Vol. 9, p. 115, 1960. 
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 The movement to conclude BITs was initiated and driven by Western, capital-exporting 
countries to protect their nationals’ investment interests in developing countries.9 Most capital 
exporting countries created model BITs – prototypes – they would use when negotiating with 
developing countries.10 Although these treaties are formally reciprocal, they were developed by 
capital exporting countries to protect their nationals abroad, hence their obligations are 
asymmetrical.11 Virtually all early BITs were entered into between developed countries on one 
hand, and developing countries on the other hand, providing what is called a North-South 
relationship.12 
 One might ask, then, why would developing countries, which do not have the surplus of 
capital and technology, sign agreements that impose a liability on them without any reciprocal 
benefit?13 Developing countries were inclined to sign such treaties to encourage the inflow of 
foreign investment into their economies.14 The host country sought to obtain the elements of 
                                                 
9 Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign 
Investment in Developing Countries, 24 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 655, 665 (1990). 
10 SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 101 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2015). It is worth to mention 
that BITs nowadays are not exclusively signed between capital exporting and capital importing countries. Rather 
many developing countries have signed, and continue to sign, investment treaties between them (South-South) and 
many developed countries sign investment treaties between them (North-North). This shows that the benefits of FDI 
for economic growth (especially the transfer of technology) are no longer an issue attached to developing countries. 
See Alvarez, 86 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING (AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW) 544, 545 
(1992). 
11 Andrew Newcombe, Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law, 8 THE JOURNAL OF WORLD 
INVESTMENT & TRADE 357, 363 (2007). 
12 UNCTAD-Bilateral InvestmentTreaties 1959-1999, at 1 (2000). 
13 “For most of these [developing] countries, the promised reciprocity of the BIT – the promise that the treaty will 
permit their investors to enter the lucrative U.S. market – is for now an illusion. Few U.S. BIT signatories expect to 
be able to compete in the U.S. market. The truth is that these countries enter into BITs with the United States, as 
Professor Vandevelde has suggested, as a symbolic announcement that they welcome U.S. investors and in the 
hopes that such investors are forthcoming.” Alvarez, 86 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING (AMERICAN 
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW) 544, 552-53 (1992). 
14 UNCTAD-Bilateral InvestmentTreaties 1959-1999, at 1 (2000). Also as on commentator puts it “developing 
countries, beset with economic difficulties, have come to realize that one of the best ways in which their economies 
can be developed is by encouraging foreign investments, and that the bilateral investment treaty is a fine instrument 
to achieve that objective.” Alvarez, 86 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING (AMERICAN SOCIETY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW) 544, 546 (1992). 
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economic growth, which it lacked.15 Capital, technology, and know-how are the main economic 
growth elements that can be obtained through foreign investment.16 In addition, host countries 
sought to benefit from the spillover effects of foreign investments, such as; infrastructure 
development, employment opportunities and increased revenue from taxes and duties paid by the 
foreign investors.17 
 The dual objectives of investment protection and development stimulation are reflected in 
the titles and preambles of virally all BITs.18 Typically a BIT it titled “Treaty Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments.” The preambles acknowledge the 
parties’ desire to “promote greater economic cooperation” by creating a “stable framework for 
investment” that results in greater inflow of “private capital and the economic development of the 
Parties.”19 BITs were considered to be a “win-win” deal, or a “grand bargain,”20 for both parties 
involved: 
What should, after all, not be forgotten in this debate is that both capital-
importing and capital-exporting countries derive benefits from increased flows of 
foreign investment. Apart from the transfer of technology connected to foreign 
investment, the creation of employment, additional tax revenue, etc., investment 
treaties create a legal infrastructure for the functioning of global market economy 
by protecting property rights, offering contract protection, establishing 
nondiscrimination as a prerequisite for competition through national and most-
favored-nation treatment, and making effective dispute-settlement mechanisms. 
                                                 
15 Howard Mann Aaron Cosbey, Luke Eric Peterson, Konrad Von Moltke, Investment and Sustainable 
Development: A Guide to the Use and Potential of International Investment Agreements 1 (International Institute for 
Sustainable Development 2004). 
16 Nicholas P. Sullivan Jeswald W. Salacuse Do Bits Really Work?: An Evaluation Of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
And Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 67, 77 (2005). 
17 SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FORIGN INVESTMENT 48 (Cambridge University Press 3 ed. 2012). 
18 “BITs are agreements between two sovereign states. From the point of view of the capital importing country, their 
basic purpose is to help to attract FDI. From the point of view of the capital-exporting country, the basic purpose of 
BITs is to protect investors from political risks and instability and, more generally, safeguard the investments made 
by its nationals in the territory of the other state.” Lisa E. Sachs & Karl P. Sauvant, BITs, DTTs and FDI flows: an 
Overview, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, 
DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS 9 (Karl P Sauvant & Lisa E Sachs ed. 2009). 
19 See for example the Preamble of the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012). 
20 Jeswald W. Salacuse 46 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 67, 77 (2005). 
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Perfect market conditions presupposed, this leads to the efficient allocation of 
capital, economic growth, and development, and benefits both capital-exporting 
and capital-importing countries through an increase in overall well-being.21 
 This chapter focuses on the question of whether BITs serve each of their two main 
purposes – i.e. investor protection and host state development – equally. Evidence shows that 
investor protection has won out over host state development.22 While this is demonstrated by 
economic studies,23 that is not the focus here. Rather it is the individual clauses of BITs and their 
interpretation by investor-state arbitral tribunals that has demonstrated this failure.24 
 Decisions in investor-state arbitration have focused on the protection of investments “to 
the detriment of the sovereign power and duty of host States to pursue the general interest for 
their populations of promoting their national development.”25 As a result, BIT parties have 
responded to decisions in investor-state arbitrations by amending their model BITs in manner 
that preserves more regulatory flexibility for the host state via the addition of exceptions and 
reservations, “carve-outs,”26 of certain state measures from treaty protection. These 
                                                 
21 Charles Brower & Stephan Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment 
Law?, 9 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 471, 496 (2009). 
22 As one commentator notes “[T]reaty-based investment arbitration – mainly under BITs and NAFTA – has been 
biased in favour of foreign investors to the detriment of the sovereign power and duty of host States to pursue the 
general interest for their populations of promoting their national development.” See Attila Tanzi, On Balancing 
Foreign Investment Interests with Public Interests in Recent Arbitration Case Law in the Public Utilities Sector, 11 
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 47, 48 (2012). 
23 For a full discussion on the impact of BITs on foreign investment inflows see Sauvant, in THE EFFECT OF 
TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND 
INVESTMENT FLOWS (Sachs ed. 2009). Also see Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 655 (1990). 
24 A recent UNCTAD report concludes – after reviewing different arbitral decisions – that “the outcome of many 
disputes hinged upon the wording of specific provisions in the applicable IIA.” See Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: Review of Developments in 2016, at 29 (2017). 
25 Tanzi, 11 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 47, 48 (2012). 
26 “Carve-outs are a popular tool in Mega-Regionals to protect host states’ regulatory freedom by ensuring that 
certain measures are not subject to investment treaty disciplines in the first place. Mega-Regionals may offer three 
main types of carve-outs: 1) carve-outs from the entire agreement; 2) carve-outs from specific treaty obligations; and 
3) carve-outs for certain industries or areas of regulation. Notably, all three types of carve-outs can be found in U.S. 
and NAFTA practice.” Stephan W. Schill & Heather L. Bray, The Brave New (American) World of International 
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modifications and clarifications to model BITs are a reflection of the expansive pro-investor 
interpretations of treaty provisions in investor-state arbitrations. Other approaches to re-
balancing investment treaties include issuing joint interpretations – by the state parties – for 
provisions of existing investment agreements.27 This prohibits future tribunals from adopting 
expansive interpretations of treaty provisions that go beyond the intent and interest of the BIT 
parties. Moreover, a significant number of states have responded to these decisions by 
terminating their existing BITs,28 and by rejecting investor-state arbitration in future BITs.29 
 While this chapter will demonstrate that some arbitration decisions and the current BIT 
structure favor investor protection at the expense of host state development, Chapter 4 will 
demonstrate that it is not the arbitration process, but the fundamental substantive treaty 
provisions, which can best be changed to bring the system into place. There is no need to eject 
arbitration as a dispute settlement process when the rules can be clarified for proper application 
within that framework.30 
                                                                                                                                                             
Investment Law: Substantive Investment Protection Standards in Mega-Regionals, 5 BRITISH JOURNAL OF 
AMERICAN LEGAL STUDIES 419, 429 (2016). 
27 For instance, following concerns by the NAFTA parties regarding interpretations of the “fair and equitable 
treatment (FET)” standard in NAFTA arbitrations, the NAFTA parties issued a joint interpretation of the FET 
standard. This joint interpretation is binding on future tribunals. Interpretation of the Free Trade Commission of 
Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, section B, July 31, 2001, available at 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38790.pdf. 
28 See footnote 127. 
29 See footnote 128. 
30 See Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2016, at 29 (UNCTAD ed., 2017). 
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I. THE CONTENT OF BITs 
Although there are over 3300 BITs worldwide, most BITs have a similar general structure and 
content. However, this does not mean that all BITs are identical, nor does it mean that BITs are 
not subject to constant developments. On the contrary, by looking into the details of each treaty 
one can distinguish a variety of approaches with regard to individual provisions.31 These 
differences exist as a result of the underlying rationale of the BIT, the degree of protection it 
offers, and the number of qualitative innovations.32 Below is a brief introduction to the basic 
structure and content of BITs. It does not discuss the individual differences or approaches, but 
rather gives a general overview of modern BITs and their basic provisions. 
A. SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
A BIT usually starts with a definitions article that basically outlines the treaty’s scope of 
application.33 The definitions of “investments,” “investors,” “companies,” “nationals,” and 
“territory” are of the essence, as they constitute the rules that determine the applicability of the 
BIT. Economic activities, and the foreign natural or legal persons conducting them, must fit the 
definitions given in the treaty to benefit from treaty protection. Consequently, these definitions 
play an important role in the negotiation and conclusion of treaties. Capital exporting countries 
                                                 
31 UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1995-2006: TRENDS IN INVESTMENT RULEMAKING 
§ UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5, at xiii (United Nations 2007). 
32 Id. at xiii. 
33 The preamble precedes the definitions provision in the BIT. The preamble expresses the objectives and purposes 
of the BIT, which usually are: to intensify economic cooperation between treaty parties, investment protection, and 
investment promotion to achieve economic development. 
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attempt to broaden these definitions to include all types of investments to protect all of their 
outbound investors. Capital importing countries on the other hand, especially those seeking 
economic development through FDI, should attempt to limit these definitions in a fashion that 
responds to their objectives and needs from FDI. It is well established that a legal system 
“premised on the notion that all foreign investment is uniformly beneficial is not one based on 
sound foundations.”34 Currently, most BITs adopt an open asset-based definition for investment. 
Such a wide and inconclusive definition can encompass actives that are not “investments” within 
the meaning and intent of the host state seeking development through FDI. Thus, development 
through FDI requires that these definitions be both clear and limited, and that they encompass the 
development objectives of the host country so that treaty protection is given to FDI that 
contributes to economic development. A more detailed discussion of these definitions and their 
interpretation in investor-state arbitrations will follow in the next Chapter to demonstrate the 
need for new definitions in future BITs that incorporate the goal of host state development. 
B. INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION 
One of the basic principles of state sovereignty is that aliens are not entitled to enter into a 
country and acquire property or conduct business in it unless the alien has gained explicit 
authorization from the host country to do so.35 Every sovereign has the right to regulate the entry 
of foreign investment into its soil, and most countries have enacted national laws to that effect. 
                                                 
34 SORNARAJAH, 230 (Cambridge University Press 3 ed. 2012). 
35 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 520 (Oxford University Press 7th ed. 2008). 
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Depending on the state’s economic ideology, its national laws can be protective, restrictive, or 
liberal towards FDI. After WWII many developing countries adopted conservative laws that 
restricted the entry of FDI into their economies. BITs circumvent these conservative national 
laws were the capital exporting country engages in a bilateral agreement that allows their 
nationals to access the markets of the otherwise conservative country. For example, the United 
States BIT program explicitly lists investment liberalization as one of its basic goals.36 The 
American BIT encourages foreign countries to adopt “market-oriented domestic policies that 
treat private investment fairly.”37 Therefore, one of the aims of the BIT movement has been to 
reduce internal barriers for FDI, through treaty provisions on investment promotion, admission, 
and establishment.38 
 The BIT obligations of a state owed to the foreign investor before entering the host 
country, or pre-establishment, are called “investment liberalization provisions.”39 The totality of 
obligations owed to him after entering the host country and establishing his economic project, 
post-establishment, are referred to as “treatment provisions.”40 Treatment provisions are the 
standards of treatment and protection that the foreign investor is entitled to after establishing his 
project, and which the state undertakes to preserve and maintain throughout the project term. The 
investment liberalization provisions are the obligations that the state undertakes in order to 
encourage and facilitate the admission of inbound investments coming from the other state party 
                                                 
36 Jeffrey Lang, KEYNOTE ADDRESS: The International Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: Obstacles & 
Evolution (Symposium), 31 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 455, 457 (1998). 
37 Id. at 457. 
38 SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 214 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2015). 
39 Jeswald W. Salacuse 46 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 67, 82 (2005). 
40 Id. at 82. 
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to the BIT. Hence, investment liberalization provisions serve to encourage and promote foreign 
investment and facilitate its entry, rather than giving protection to the potential investment. 
 The investment liberalization goal of a BIT is usually expressed in its preamble where the 
contracting parties express their wish to “create favorable conditions for greater investment by 
investors of one country in the other country.”41 Thus, BITs place an obligation upon host 
countries to promote FDI from treaty partners by creating “favorable conditions” within their 
territories. However, BITs usually do not specify the practical measures that should be taken by 
the host country to create these “favorable conditions.” The notion of “favorable conditions” is 
very wide, and it can range anywhere from political, economic, and social conditions to the 
liberalization of laws, policies, and administrative decrees, to reforms in the judicial and 
administrative authorities. Consequently, this obligation is naturally vague and difficult to 
implement. The absence of a clear definition, or threshold, to determine when a state has reached 
that level of “favorability” or what constitutes an acceptable level of favorability, makes the 
applicability of such an obligation even harder. 
 Creating “favorable conditions” does not entail automatic admission of FDI into the host 
country. Under the principle of state sovereignty, no state is compelled to accept any foreign 
investments trying to enter its economy. On the contrary, a state is entitled to regulate all 
economic activity on its soil.42 It is hard to imagine, although possible, that a country will be 
                                                 
41 The Preamble of the AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA FOR 
THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT (2013). See also Article 2 of the Agreement between 
the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar for the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (2014). 
42 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 88 (Oxford 
University Press 2 ed. 2012). 
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willing to adopt an “open door” policy were it will accept any type of inward investment.43 
Many considerations restrain a country from doing so, such as public policy, national security, 
economic security, development objectives, social and cultural sensitivities, political motives, 
and others. 
 Investment liberalization aims to promote and encourage FDI, while preserving the host 
country’s right to regulate its admission. Hence, the contracting parties in most BITs usually 
stress that foreign investments are admitted to the host country only if they are made “in 
accordance with its laws and regulations.”44 As a consequence of adopting such language in the 
BIT, only investments that comply with the host country laws are admitted and entitled to treaty 
protection. The host country will enact local laws that regulate, encourage, and prohibit inward 
investments in accordance with its national interests and development objectives. This allows the 
host country to retain control over the entry of foreign capital, in addition to the ability to screen 
and eliminate undesired FDI in accordance with its national laws.45 
 Some countries have taken a different approach in their BITs in this regard. The United 
States, followed by Canada, Japan, and Turkey, require host countries to provide admission 
treatment that is not less favorable than the admission treatment given to the nationals of the host 
country, or to any third parties, in like circumstances. The purpose of such a provision is to 
                                                 
43 China adopted an open-door policy in 1979 to attract FDI and develop an export-based economy. Indeed the open-
door policy was a success and transformed the Chinese economy into one of the largest in the world. “In 1978, 
China was ranked thirty-second in the world in export volume. In 1989, it became the world’s thirteenth largest 
exporter. Its share of world trade almost doubled during this period. Between 1978 and 1990, the average annual rate 
of trade expansion was above 15 percent, more than three times higher than that of total world trade.” See Shang-Jin 
Wei, The Open Door Policy and China's Rapid Growth: Evidence from City-Level Data, in GROWTH THEORIES IN 
LIGHT OF THE EAST ASIAN EXPERIENCE, NBER-EASE 74 (Takatoshi Ito & Anne O. Krueger ed. 1995). 
44 e.g. Article 2(1) of the Argentine-Qatar BIT (2016). 
45 SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 219 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2015). 
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equalize competitive conditions for market entry among potential investors.46 The U.S. Model 
BIT states the national treatment standard for admission in Article 3, which reads: 
Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with 
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.47 
The Model BIT goes on in Article 4 to state the Most-Favored-Nation treatment for admission, 
which reads: 
Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any non-Party 
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.48 
 Whatever approach a country may take regarding the admission of FDI, once the foreign 
investment is admitted to enter into the host country and establishes his project, that investment 
becomes covered under the BIT. From this point on, the treatment standards in the BIT become 
applicable, and serve to protect the foreign investment from the wrongdoings of the host state, in 
addition to vesting the foreign investor with certain rights pertaining to his investment. 
C. INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND TREATMENT STANDARDS 
The protection of foreign investment and property is the core of, and the original idea behind, 
BITs. The provisions that obligate the host country to afford FDI on its soil certain “treatment” 
constitute the substantive part of the BIT as they determine what protection the foreign investor 
                                                 
46 Id. at 222. 
47 Article 3 (1) of the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012). 
48 Id. at Article 4 (1). 
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enjoys. The word “treatment” can be defined in the context of investment as “the rights and 
privileges granted and the obligations and burdens imposed by a Contracting State on 
investments made by investors covered by the treaty.”49 
 The treatment provisions of a BIT define a standard to which the host country must 
conform when dealing with foreign investors and investments.50 Failure by the host country to 
conform to these provisions will render it potentially liable to pay compensations for the injury it 
has caused to the foreign investor. Consequently, the treatment provisions of a BIT can be 
described as an economic bill of rights for foreign investors.51 
 Treatment standards can be categorized as “general” or “specific” depending on what 
they protect in the investment. The general treatment standards are those standards that apply to 
all aspects of the investment in the host country. They include the “fair and equitable treatment”, 
“full protection and security”, “most favored nation treatment”, “national treatment” and 
“international minimum standard.” The specific treatment standards, however, apply to particular 
matters of the investment, such as; monetary transfers, expropriation, investor rights in times of 
war and disturbance, and investor employment rights. 
 Different BITs offer some or all of these treatment standards depending of the level of 
protection the BIT parties wish to provide to foreign investors and investments. BITs can also 
offer similar, but not identical, versions of each of these treatment standards, to limit or expand 
their application and protection. For example, a BIT may offer investments “complete protection 
and security”, “full protection and security”, “full legal protection and security,” or simply 
                                                 
49 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v The Argentine Republic, para. 
55 (DECISION ON JURISDICTION ), (ICSID). 
50 SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 228 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2015). 
51 Susan D. Franck, Conflating Politics And Development? Examining Investment Treaty Arbitration Outcomes, 55 
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13, 21 (2014). 
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“protection and security.” Additionally, a BIT may provide these treatment standards as 
standalone standards where they apply independently from each other, or they may tie their 
application with another treatment standard. For example, the U.S. Model BIT specifies that “full 
protection and security” treatment requires each party to provide “the level of police protection 
required under customary international law.”52 
 Treatment standards are articulated vaguely in almost all BITs, which make their 
interpretation by arbitral tribunals difficult, inconsistent, and pro-investor. Thus, a balance 
between preserving and protecting investors’ interests, and, the host country’s ability to regulate 
and act in the public interest, is essential. The development objective of the BIT should be given 
the same weight as the investment protection objective when interpreting treatment standards. 
 A country that anticipates development through FDI, should modify the treatment 
provisions in their BITs to insure that these protection standards will not obstruct it from 
development, nor frustrate its ability to act in its best interest. The need to draft and include 
limitations regarding general treatment provisions in BITs is important to achieving development 
through investment. Chapter 4 will discuss in detail the inconsistent interpretations of some 
treatment standards in investor-state arbitrations, and will illustrate how redrafting these 
standards can illuminate inconsistent and over-protective interpretations in the future. 
                                                 
52 See Article 5 (2) (b) of the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012). 
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D. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
The treatment standards and protections contained in a BIT have no value if the foreign investor 
cannot enforce them when breached by the host country. Investor protection requires that host 
countries be bound to their treaty commitments, and responsible for their injurious actions 
towards foreign investors. Hence, an integral part of any BIT is the investor-state dispute 
settlement mechanism which enables foreign investors to enforce rights and treatment standards 
against the host state. 
 The investor-state dispute settlement mechanism depends on investment arbitration as a 
means of dispute settlement. Distinguishing investment arbitration from commercial arbitration 
can be difficult, as they both fall under the notion of international, binding, third-party, dispute 
settlement, outside of the ordinary constitutional route of court adjudication. However, some 
differences exist between the two systems of arbitration which makes them distinguishable from 
each other. The differences lay in the legal framework governing each of the two systems.53 
 In commercial arbitration, generally, the relevant international law that applies is the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York 
Convention),54 which deals with the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements and 
arbitral awards. However in investment arbitration, international treaties play an important 
substantive role, particularly the vast network of BITs, and other multilateral agreements such as 
the ICSID Convention. The procedural law in commercial arbitration is chosen by the parties, 
                                                 
53 For a more detailed comparison between commercial and investment arbitrations see Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, 
Commercial and Investment Arbitration: How Different are they Today?, 28 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL (LCIA 
JOURNAL) 577 (2012). 
54 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958). 
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whether it be a national law, institutional rules, or the parties own rules of procedure. Whatever 
the parties may agree on, the procedure in commercial arbitration must always respect and 
conform to the mandatory legal rules of the seat in order for the award to be enforceable.55 In 
investment arbitration the procedural rules are usually provided in the international treaty that 
governs the investment arbitration process (i.e. ICSID Convention, or NAFTA, for example). 
The mandatory rules of the seat only become relevant in investment arbitration if the parties 
agreed to arbitrate their investment disputes at a conventional arbitration institution (ICC, SCC, 
LCIA … etc.). In the latter situation the mandatory rules of the seat become relevant by virtue of 
the seat’s arbitration law and the institutional rules, which require conformity of arbitration 
procedure with the seat’s mandatory rules.56 
 Another important distinction between commercial and investment arbitration is the 
enforceability of awards. Unlike commercial arbitral awards, arbitral decisions awarded under 
ICSID do not require domestic enforcement procedures in accordance with the New York 
Convention and, therefore, cannot be refused enforcement inter alia on public policy grounds.57 
An ICSID award is equivalent to “a final judgment of a court” in all of the ICSID contracting 
states, and therefore is directly executable.58 However should the investment arbitration be 
                                                 
55 Id. at Article 5. 
56 For example Article 33 of the ICC Arbitration Rules provides “Before signing any award, the arbitral tribunal 
shall submit it in draft form to the Court. The Court may lay down modifications as to the form of the award and, 
without affecting the arbitral tribunal’s liberty of decision, may also draw its attention to points of substance. No 
award shall be rendered by the arbitral tribunal until it has been approved by the Court as to its form.” See Rules of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (2012). 
57 Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs: Impact on Investor-State Claims § December, No. 2, at 2 
(United Nations UNCTAD ed., 2010). 
58 See Article 54(1) of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States (1965). 
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conducted in any forum other than ICSID it would have to be enforced in accordance with the 
New York Convention.59 
 As disputes between foreign investors and the host countries are foreseeable, and to 
ensure that the foreign investors’ rights under the treaty are respected, virtually all BITs contain a 
dispute settlement section. Under the dispute settlement section of most BITs, a sequence of 
procedures has to be followed by the foreign investor to resolve the dispute with the host state. 
 The procedure usually starts by requiring the parties – the foreign investor and the host 
government – to initiate amicable negotiations for a specified period of time to attempt to solve 
the dispute.60 Some BITs give the parties the option to resort to non-binding conciliation during 
this period.61 However, if the negotiations and the conciliation procedures fail, the foreign 
investor has the right to submit his claim to binding arbitration. Submitting to arbitration is 
usually governed by time bars. Many BITs specify the passage of a certain time period from the 
date of the event(s) giving rise to the dispute before the investor becomes eligible to submit his 
dispute to arbitration, usually six months.62 Also BITs usually specify a statute of limitations on 
submitting claims to arbitration; whereby the foreign investor can only submit claims to 
                                                 
59 Some countries avoid the issue of enforcement under the New York Convention, and hence avoid the possibility 
of non-enforcement of the award based on public policy grounds, by including a provision in the BIT which 
provides for the immediate recognition and enforcement of any arbitral awards rendered by an independent 
arbitrator or arbitration center between the foreign investor and the host state. For example Article 10 (3) of the 
German Model BIT reads “The [arbitral] award shall be binding and shall not be subject to any appeal or remedy 
other than those provided for in the Convention or arbitral rules on which the arbitral proceedings chosen by the 
investor are based. The award shall be enforced by the Contracting States as a final and absolute ruling under 
domestic law.” German Model Treaty (2008). 
60 See Article 7 of France Model BIT (2006). Article 23 of U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012). Article 
25 of Canada Model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (2004). Article 10 of German Model 
Treaty (2008). 
61 For example, see Article 10 of the German Model Treaty (2008). 
62 For example, see Article 26 of the Canada Model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement 
(2004). Article 24(3) of the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012). Article 10 of the German Model Treaty 
(2008). Article 7 of France Model BIT (2006). 
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arbitration within a specified time period from the date of the event(s) that raised the dispute, 
usually three years.63 
 Arbitral proceedings under most BITs are not limited to ICSID arbitration. In fact, a 
single BIT may provide for serval arbitral forums to settle investor-state disputes.64 Under such 
BITs, the foreign investor can choose to settle his claims at conventional arbitration centers, such 
as the ICC or SCC, or via ad hoc arbitration conducted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
or via ICSID arbitration under the Convention, or ICSID arbitration under the Additional Facility 
Rules if one of the state parties of the concerned BIT is not a member of the ICSID 
Convention.65 By providing for all these arbitral forums in the BIT, the state parties are 
simultaneously giving the consent needed to establish the jurisdiction of ICSID, or other arbitral 
forums, for future disputes with investors from the other contracting state. 
II. THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF BITs 
There is no doubt that investment treaties have been successful in securing protection to foreign 
investors. The global network of BITs has become the international legal framework governing 
economic activities conducted by nationals of one party on the territory of the other party. BITs 
set the rules and treatment standards which protect foreign investors from injurious acts by the 
host state, such as discrimination or unreasonable measures. They also govern the procedure to 
be followed when disputes arise between foreign investors and the host states. On numerous 
                                                 
63 For example see Articles 22(2) and 23(2) of the Canada Model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreement (2004). Article 26 of U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012). 
64 E.g. Argentine-Qatar BIT (2016). 
65 See Article 2(a) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules (2006). 
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occasions, foreign investors have been able to invoke their rights under BITs, and obtain 
compensation for damages caused by host states actions.66 BITs have also complemented the 
encouragement of foreign capital inflow into less developed countries, by boosting investor 
confidence in the legal framework governing their investment in the host state.67 
 While BITs succeeded in providing a legal framework for the protection of foreign 
capital in host countries, they have failed in their second objective (i.e. economic 
development).68 The origin and structure of modern BITs provide the reason for this failure. 
BITs were drafted and structured by capital exporting countries singularly focusing on one 
aspect of the investment process: to protect their investors in less developed, newly independent, 
countries.69 In fact, BITs signed in the second half of the twentieth century are not different from 
investment treaties signed in the colonial era, other than the addition of investment liberalization 
provisions.70 Hence, they were not built to enhance or encourage development, although that was 
a projected goal by developing countries and the international community. BITs principally 
                                                 
66 In 2016 foreign investors initiated 62 known investor-state arbitrations. This is higher than the 10 year average of 
49 cases per year (2006-2015). Also, in 2016 at least 57 awards were rendered. It is reported that most of those 
awards rendered on the merits were in favor of the investor. For detailed statics and information see Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2016, at 2-5 (UNCTAD ed., 2017). 
67 Studies have found that BITs “act more as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, good institutional quality 
and local property rights. In host countries with weak domestic institutions, including weak protection of property, 
BITs have not acted as a substitute for broader domestic reforms. On the other hand, countries that ‘are reforming 
and already have reasonably strong domestic institutions, are most likely to gain from ratifying a treaty.’” See THE 
ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 36 (UNCTAD ed., UNITED NATIONS 2009). Also see Jeswald 
W. Salacuse 46 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 67, 111 (2005). 
68 See in general Aaron Cosbey Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Lise Johnson, Damon Vis-Dunbar, Investment 
Treaties and Why They Matter to Sustainable Development, (2012). Sornarajah inquires “[W]hy after such a long 
period of foreign investment flows, no economic development has taken place and resource rich countries remain 
abysmally poor.” SORNARAJAH, 48 (Cambridge University Press 3 ed. 2012). 
69 See Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment 
in Developing Countries, 24 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 655, 665 (1990). 
70 Howard Mann, Reconceptualizing International Investment Law: Its Role in Sustainable Development, 17 LEWIS 
& CLARK LAW REVIEW 521, 523 (2013). 
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addressed the problem of investment protection rather than encompassing the developmental 
aspect of FDI for host countries.71 
 The surge in investor-state arbitrations in the past two decades revels that BITs are not 
harmless documents, but rather they can “bite.”72 As will be shown below, the broad and vague 
provisions of BITs, coupled with their expansive interpretations by arbitral tribunals, has affected 
host state’s ability to benefit from FDI for its development. 
A. BROAD AND VAGUE PROVISIONS 
Investment agreements generally consist of three sections: definitions, substantive treatment 
obligations for host states, and provisions for binding investor-state dispute resolution. The 
definitions of investments and investors are broad and inconclusive, and thus bring a wide range 
of economic activities under the jurisdictional scope of the treaty.73 This is a result of capital 
exporting states drafting open-ended definitions of “investment” that aim at capturing a wide 
variety of economic activities under the jurisdiction of the treaty. Hence, regular economic 
activities may qualify as “investments” that enjoy treaty protection, although they may not be the 
types of economic activities that contribute to the host state’s development, nor constitute an 
“investment” within the meaning intended by the developing host state. 
                                                 
71 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C.-DAVIS JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 157, 179 (2005). 
72 Reforming the International Investment Regime: An Action Menu 125 (2015). 
73 Claire Cutler, Human Rights Promotion Through Transnational Investment Regimes: An International Political 
Economy Approach, 1 POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE 16, 21 (2013). 
93 
 The treatment standards, which are usually “open-ended and ambiguous”, have no 
unified meaning.74 The vague formation of treatment standards has allowed foreign investors to 
challenge core domestic policies of the host state that serve its development.75 For instance, the 
FET standard in its typical formation can be used by investors “to challenge any type of 
governmental conduct that they deem unfair.”76 This is due to its “open-ended and largely 
undefined nature” as the notions of “fairness” and “equality” do not prescribe a clear set of rules 
and are open to subjective interpretation.77 As a result, the scope of the FET standard has varied 
as to the governmental and administrative actions that can be reviewed under this standard.78 
Another challenge to the FET standard is its extension to cover the “legitimate expectations” of 
foreign investors. Concerns have been expressed that “the potentially far-reaching application of 
the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ … can restrict countries’ ability to change investment-
related policies or introduce new policies – including those for the public good – if they have a 
negative impact on individual foreign investors.”79 
 Similarly, the requirement of “like circumstances” under the national treatment (NT) and 
the most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) standards created controversy among different 
tribunals on what constitutes a suitable comparator.80 The typical formation of these standards 
                                                 
74 Thomas Walde and Stephen Dow, Treaties and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment: The Effectiveness of 
International Law Disciplines versus Sanctions by Global Markets in Reducing the Political and Regulatory Risk for 
Private Infrastructure Investment, 34 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 1, 45 (2000). 
75 Reforming the International Investment Regime: An Action Menu 125 (United Nations 2015). 
76 Id. at 137. 
77 Id. at 137. 
78 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment § II (UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
ed., United Nations 2012). 
79 Reforming the International Investment Regime: An Action Menu 137 (United Nations 2015). 
80 Andrea K. Bjorklund, National Treatment, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 38 (August Reinisch ed. 
2008). 
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does not provide whether comparison should be based on “market sector, production methods, or 
physical location.”81 
 The vague and broad formation of different treatment standards has also created an 
overlap effect between them. For instance, the NT standard protects against nationality based 
discrimination, while the FET standard encompasses a non-discrimination obligation.82 Some 
treaties specifically prohibit the contracting parties from according “arbitrary and 
discriminatory” treatment to foreign investors in a separate clause.83 However, such a clause 
overlaps with the FET standard as “any measure that might involve arbitrariness or 
discrimination is in itself contrary to fair and equitable treatment.”84 A detailed discussion of 
different treatment standards and their application and implications on state actions will follow in 
the next Chapter. However, it is evident that the typical definitions and treatment standards in 
investment treaties need to be revised and redrafted to reduce uncertainty and over-protection 
arising from their broadly worded provisions.85 
                                                 
81 II Charles H. Brower, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 37, 61 (2003). 
82 CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Republic of Argentina, Award, para. 290 (ICSID, 2005). 
83 E.g. Article II(3)(b) of the Jordan-USA BIT (1997). 
84 CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Republic of Argentina, Award, para. 290 (ICSID, 2005). Also the 
tribunal in Saluka noted that a violation of the non-arbitrary measures provision does not “differ substantially from 
the violation of the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard.” See Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The 
Czech Republic, para. 461 (Partial Award), (UNCITRAL, 2006). 
85 Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2016, at 29 (UNCTAD ed., 2017). 
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B. REGULATORY CHILL 
Another issue of current BITs is their “regulatory chill” effect, 86 as they “make it difficult for 
host States to regulate in socially desirable areas.”87 The vague provisions of modern BITs 
denies host states certainty as to the interpretation of the commitments they undertook in the 
investment treaty, and the possible outcomes of treaty claims.88 A single provision such as the 
fair and equitable treatment (FET) provision can encompass endless possibilities of breach 
depending on its interpretation.89 As such, “difficult legal questions about the borderline between 
permitted regulatory activities of the State and illegal interference with investor rights” arise.90 
 The loss of regulatory space creates a situation where the host state is hesitant to regulate 
legitimate public matters fearing liability to foreign investors.91 This limits the regulatory 
flexibility of the host sate to “pursue not only economic development policies but other public 
policies as well.”92 
                                                 
86 Mann, 17 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW 521, 532 (2013). 
87 Definition of “Regulatory chill” available on: http://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/regulatory-chill/44758. 
Mann suggests “It is extremely difficult to chronicle the so-called “regulatory chill impact” of investment treaties 
whereby threats of arbitration are used to try to fend off new regulations. But it is widely accepted that investors use 
such threats to “warn” governments of potential consequences if a planned measure is actually taken. Governments, 
however, generally do not state that the reason for not adopting a measure is due to such threats.” See id. at n.14. 
88 Id. at 532. 
89 Reforming the International Investment Regime: An Action Menu 125 (United Nations 2015). 
90 Id. at 124. 
91 “[G]overnments are widely understood to be threatened with arbitration by foreign investors if a proposed new 
measure is adopted. What is certain is that investor-state arbitration has shifted from being a shield of last resort to a 
sword of first resort in many disputes, or potential disputes, between governments and foreign investors.” See Mann, 
17 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW 521, 527 (2013). 
92 Sauvant, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, 
DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS 9 (Sachs ed. 2009). To give an example on the effect of 
BITs on the regulatory space of the host state, Peterson & Gray argue that “host states may wish to regulate the 
economy, including foreign investors embedded therein, in a manner which seeks to promote or protect certain 
human rights interests…. Where bilateral investment treaties are in place, foreign investors will often enjoy the 
ability to challenge these human-rights inspired measures through international arbitration.” LUKE ERIC PETERSON & 
KEVIN R. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND IN INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION 5 (International Institute for Sustainable Development. 2003). 
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C. PRO-INVESTOR INTERPRETATIONS 
The vague and ambiguous language of BIT provisions has had an effect on their interpretation in 
investor-state arbitrations. Arbitral tribunals in investor-state disputes have expanded the 
interpretation of treaty provisions in a novel, and sometimes contradictory, manner to serve the 
goal of investment protection.93 The MFN standard is a good example of contradictory and 
inconsistent arbitral interpretations of treaty obligations.94 Some tribunals interpreted the MFN 
standard to extend to the more favorable procedural provisions of other BITs (specifically more 
favorable dispute resolution provisions),95 while other tribunals rejected that logic.96 In some 
instances, tribunals have created meanings to treaty provisions rather than discovering the 
meaning consistent with the parties’ intent.97 For example, the Swiss government, in response to 
the tribunal’s decision in SGS v. Pakistan and its reading of the “umbrella clause” in the 
Switzerland-Pakistan BIT, sent a letter to the ICSID Deputy Secretary-General attaching a three-
page reaction to the tribunal’s decision and interpretation of the provision. In that letter, “Swiss 
officials stated that they were ‘alarmed’ by the tribunal’s reading and considered it to be 
‘counter’ to the government’s intent and the intent of other states.”98 Hence, there is a broadly 
                                                 
93 Mann notes “There was the perception that investor treaties should be broadly interpreted to reflect the purpose of 
protecting investors, which created expansionary interpretations of what had been thought to be fairly limited 
understandings of international customary law on key issues. This perception is in fact reflected in a number of 
arbitral awards that expressly take this perspective.” Mann, 17 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW 521, 526-27 
(2013). 
94 Zachary Douglas, The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration: Treaty Interpretation Off the Rails, 2 JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 97 (2011). 
95 E.g. Emilio Agustín Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain (Decision on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 2000). 
96 E.g. Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v The Republic of Hungary (Award), (ICSID, 2006). 
97 Douglas, 2 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 97, 99 (2011). 
98 See Lise Johnson & Merim Razbaeva, State Control over Interpretation of Investment Treaties 7 (VALE 
Colombia Center on Sustainable International Investment 2014). See Also Douglas, 2 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 97, 99 (2011). 
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shared view that treaty provisions “need to be clear and detailed, and drafted on the basis of a 
thorough legal analysis of their actual and potential implications.”99 
 By prioritizing the goal of investment protection, arbitral tribunal have “broadly 
interpreted [treaty provisions] to reflect the purpose of protecting investors, which created 
expansionary interpretations of what had been thought to be fairly limited understandings of 
international customary law on key issues. This perception is in fact reflected in a number of 
arbitral awards that expressly take this perspective.”100 Some tribunals have explicitly stated 
their pro-investor reading of the treaty, for example one tribunal stated: 
The BIT is a treaty for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments. 
According to the preamble it is intended “to create and maintain favourable 
conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of 
the other.” It is legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its interpretation so as to 
favour the protection of covered investments.101 
 The inconsistent, pro-investor, and expansive interpretations of the broadly worded treaty 
provisions have added to the failure of BITs to accommodate for the interests of host states. 
Exaggeration in the protection of investors on the determent of states undermines the overall aim 
of the treaty (i.e. to intensify the economic relations between treaty parties to reach 
development), as states will be discouraged to accept new FDI into its territory to avoid any 
                                                 
99 Reforming the International Investment Regime: An Action Menu 126 (United Nations 2015). 
100 Mann, 17 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW 521, 526-27 (2013). 
101 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, para. 116 (Decision on Jurisdiction), 
(ICSID, 2004). 
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negative consequences.102 This can also lead states to refuse concluding new BITs or terminate 
their existing BITs.103 
 Investment disputes touch on complex questions that can go to the heart of a state's public 
policymaking.104 They impact the way host states govern, legislate, and adjudicate due to the 
significance and consequences of these disputes on the host government and society alike. The 
expansive interpretations add to the risk of regulatory chill; as governments seek to avoid 
regulating in the public good due to their uncertainty of what measures may expose them to 
liability, and consequently pay large amounts of compensation to foreign investors.105 Hence, 
interpretation of treaty provisions plays an important role in furthering the benefits, or 
alternatively increasing the costs, of the BIT system. 
 The goal of “economic development of the Parties” in the preambles of virtually all BITs 
is generally overlooked.106 Under principles of international law the preambles of agreements are 
not legally binding on the parties. Rather, the preambles provide a platform for the parties’ to 
express their objectives and purposes of concluding the treaty.107 The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith and “in 
                                                 
102 The tribunal in Saluka pointed out the effect of pro-investor by stating that “[A]n interpretation which 
exaggerates the protection to be accorded to foreign investments may serve to dissuade host States from admitting 
foreign investments and so undermine the overall aim of extending and intensifying the parties’ mutual economic 
relations.” Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic (Partial Award), para. 300 
(UNCITRAL, 2006). 
103 See footnotes 127 & 128. 
104 Schill, 9 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 471, 497 (2009). 
105 See Mann, 17 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW 521, 532 (2013). 
106 See Gabriele Gagliani, The interpretation of general exceptions in international trade and investment law: is a 
sustainable development interpretive approach possible?, 43 DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
POLICY 559, 568 (2015). 
107 Max H. Hulme, Preambles in Treaty Interpretation 164 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1281, 1300 
(2016). 
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accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty.”108 Hence, the 
“terms” of the treaty are the substantive material to be relied upon when designating the 
obligations and commitments of the parties. The preamble on the other hand, serves as a 
supplement to the interpretation of those terms; Article 31 of VCLT states that the terms of the 
treaty shall be interpreted “in light of its objective and purpose.”109 Thus the preamble, per se, is 
not a source for the imposition of obligations and commitments, and holds no significant binding 
power. In the context of investor-state arbitration, arbitrators have on many occasions 
disregarded the economic and development objectives found in the preamble of the investment 
treaty, and interpreted the terms solely from an investment protection lens.110 It is crucial to 
include the developmental objectives in the “terms” of future BITs, to give more binding power 
and enforceability to them. 
 Unlike most tribunals, the tribunal in Saluka Investments v Czech Republic took a 
balanced approach in its treaty interpretation.111 In its interpretation of the FET standard, the 
tribunal acknowledged that protection of investment is not the sole goal of investment treaties, 
and that a balanced interpretation of treatment standards requires taking into account the diverse 
goals of investment treaties, including the goal of economic development. It stated: 
The protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of the Treaty, but rather 
a necessary element alongside the overall aim of encouraging foreign investment 
and extending and intensifying the parties’ economic relations. That in turn calls 
for a balanced approach to the interpretation of the Treaty’s substantive 
provisions for the protection of investments, since an interpretation which 
                                                 
108 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
1155, p. 331. Article (31)(1). 
109 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
1155, p. 331. Article (31)(1). 
110 “Interpretations giving significant weight to the object and purpose of investment treaties have been criticized as 
favouring investors to the detriment of host States.” J. ROMESH WEERAMANTRY, TREATY INTERPRETATION IN 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 191 (Oxford University Press. 2012). 
111 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic (Partial Award), (UNCITRAL, 2006). 
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exaggerates the protection to be accorded to foreign investments may serve to 
dissuade host States from admitting foreign investments and so undermine the 
overall aim of extending and intensifying the parties’ mutual economic 
relations.112 
 However, the approach in Saluka is not the norm among other tribunals. As illustrated 
above, arbitral tribunals have generally prioritized the protection of investors’ interests over the 
legitimate and essential interests of the host state.113 The excessive investment protection 
provisions in BITs, and their broad interpretation by arbitral tribunals, have denied host countries 
from reaping the benefits of FDI, and have restricted their ability to limit their potential risks or 
harms.114 This is demonstrated by the fact that after a long period of foreign investment flows, 
“no economic development has taken place and resource rich countries remain abysmally 
poor.”115 
D. REBALANCING INVESTMENT TREATIES 
Different approaches have been taken by states to re-balance the provisions of investment 
treaties and limit their unintended interpretations by arbitral tribunals. Many countries have 
revised their model BITs and incorporated limitations and exceptions that preserve their policy 
making flexibility and reflect their stance on the developments in investor-state arbitration.116 
                                                 
112 Id. at para. 300. 
113 E.g. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines (Decision on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 
2004). 
114 Aaron Cosbey, at Executive Summery page (International Institute for Sustainable Development 2004). 
115 SORNARAJAH, 48 (Cambridge University Press 3 ed. 2012). 
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The usual 8-10 page model BIT has now become a complex document of over 50 pages.117 For 
example, in response to the interpretation of the tribunal in Maffezini,118 (that the MFN standard 
extends to the more favorable dispute resolution provisions found in other BITs) the Norwegian 
Model BIT was amended to include the following exception “For greater certainty, treatment 
referred to in paragraph [MFN] does not encompass dispute resolution mechanisms provided 
for in this Agreement or other International Agreements.”119 The United States and Canada, for 
example, drawing on their experience as respondents in NAFTA cases, have revised their model 
BITs to clarify the scope and meaning of different investment obligations.120 South Africa 
revised its investment policy after it concluded that “BITs and international arbitration pose 
unacceptably high risks to the government's right to regulate in the public interest.”121 India's 
reconsideration of its BIT program was related to concerns about the imbalance between 
investment protection and the Indian state’s regulatory power.122 
 Other countries have issued joint interpretations of certain articles of their investment 
treaties, to unify their application and limit expansive interpretations by future tribunals. For 
instance, following concerns by the NAFTA parties regarding interpretations of the “fair and 
equitable treatment (FET)” standard, the NAFTA parties issued the following joint interpretation 
which is binding on future tribunals: 
1) Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard 
of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to 
investors of another Party. 
                                                 
117 Andrew Newcombe, General Exceptions in International Investment Agreements: Draft Discussion Paper 
Prepared for BIICL Eighth Annual WTO Conference 13th and 14th May 2008, London 2 (2008). 
118 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain (Decision on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 2000). 
119 Norway Model BIT (2015). Article 4(3). 
120 Reforming the International Investment Regime: An Action Menu 124 (United Nations 2015). 
121 David Gaukrodger, The Balance Between Investor Protection and the Right to Regulate in Investment Treaties: A 
scoping paper 9 (OECD Working Papers on International Investment ed., 2017). 
122 Id. at 9. 
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2) The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and 
security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required 
by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens. 
3) A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the 
NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there 
has been a breach of Article 1105(1).123 
 Recent BITs now include language that permits the state parties to issue binding 
interpretations of treaty provisions. The Canada-China BIT, for example, enables the state parties 
to “take any action as they may jointly decide, including … issuing binding interpretations of 
[the] Agreement.”124 Some countries have exchanged diplomatic notes with their BIT partners to 
confirm their understanding of a treaty provision. Argentina and Panama took such a step when 
they exchanged diplomatic notes regarding their shared understanding that the MFN clause in 
their BIT “did not and never was intended by them to extend to dispute resolution clauses.”125 
 All these efforts illustrate the growing need for a revised BIT system. A recent report 
notes that “the outcome of many disputes hinged upon the wording of specific provisions in the 
applicable IIA. This underlines the importance of balanced and careful treaty drafting and the 
need to reduce uncertainty arising from (broadly worded) provisions.”126 The following chapter 
will discuss certain provisions and treatment standards of current BITs and their application and 
interpretation. It will also provide some policy guidelines on how to limit the expansive 
application and interpretation of these provisions in future BITs to achieve the goal of host state 
development. 
                                                 
123 Interpretation of the Free Trade Commission of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, section B, July 31, 2001, 
available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38790.pdf. 
124 Article 18(2) of the Canada-China BIT (2012). 
125 Razbaeva, 6 (VALE Colombia Center on Sustainable International Investment 2014). 
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CONCLUSION 
Existing investment treaties do not address the issue of host state development. They do not 
contribute to the development of host countries because of the public policy constraints they 
impose on host countries. This is coupled with the expansive and unpredictable interpretations by 
some arbitral tribunals to different treaty provisions. Thus, the future of BITs is being 
scrutinized; as many countries are becoming more hesitant to enter in, or renew their, BITs.127 
Some countries have withdrawn from the ICSID Convention, while others have expressed their 
desire to exclude investor-state arbitration from their future BITs.128 Accordingly, a backlash 
towards the use of investment treaties is foreseeable,129 should they remain to be seen as a 
detrimental to state sovereignty to regulate and take measures that preserve its public interests.130 
A new generation of investment treaties that accommodate the interests of the host state equally 
with the interests of foreign investors need to emerge to maintain the current BIT system.131 
                                                 
127 Some States have terminated certain agreements or refrained from concluding (new) investment agreements. 
Most recently are the decrees signed by President Correa of Ecuador on 16 May 2017 to terminate “16 Bilateral 
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terminate its investment treaties (e.g., with the Netherlands as of 2015).” Andreas R. Ziegler, Special Issue: Towards 
Better BITs? – Making International Investment Law Responsive to Sustainable Development Objectives, 15 THE 
JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 803 (2014); id. at 804. 
128 “A variation has been the termination of the participation in the ICSID Convention or the negotiations of BITs 
without investor-State dispute settlement. Venezuela denounced the ICSID Convention in 2012, Bolivia had done so 
already in 2007 and Ecuador in 2010. Australia and the United States have concluded a comprehensive free trade 
agreement (Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement – AUSFTA) in 2004 that included an investment chapter, 
but did not contain an investor-State dispute settlement mechanism.” See id. at 804-05. 
129 Alvarez, 86 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING (AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW) 544, 555 
(1992). 
130 Ziegler, 15 THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 803, 804 (2014). 
131 “A key challenge is promoting investment in areas that make the greatest contribution to sustainable 
development. This requires a new generation of investment promotion and facilitation strategies, tools, institutions 
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 Future BITs should respond and reflect the developments and jurisprudence of investor-
state arbitrations. Their provisions should be well drafted in a manner that clearly details and 
indicates the parties’ intent and interpretation of the treaty provisions.132 The treatment standards 
should be narrowed down by the use of exceptions and reservations that limit their application to 
their intended purpose. This will limit the potential of expansive interpretations by arbitral 
tribunals in future disputes. Future BITs should take a balanced approach towards the 
preservation of all parties’ interests, by allowing the host country the flexibility to pursue its 
legitimate economic policy objectives without the fear of liability to foreign investors. 
 The next Chapter 4 will discuss certain sections of the modern BIT. It will discuss the 
application and interpretation of some of the most important provisions and treatment standards 
in modern BITs. Chapter 4 will also provide some policy guidelines and recommendations that 
limit the expansive interpretations that go against the host state’s interests. These policy 
guidelines and recommendations are a reflection of the developments and interpretations of such 
provisions and treatment standards by investor-state arbitration tribunals. 
                                                                                                                                                             
and partnerships.” Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, at Executive summary page 
(UNCTAD 2015). 
132 See Razbaeva, 7 (VALE Colombia Center on Sustainable International Investment 2014). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, INVESTORS, 
AND TREATMENT STANDARDS 
INTRODUCTION 
States, as sovereigns, have the right and obligation to ensure the security and development of the 
territories and societies they govern.1 The development objectives and security concerns of a 
country dictate its policy on the entry of persons and capital. Foreign investors and investments 
are no exception. Host countries want to ensure that foreign investors entering their soil to 
establish economic projects will benefit the country’s development agenda and will not cause 
harm to its economic security. Accordingly, states enact laws and regulations that aim at 
maximizing the benefits and minimizing the risks of incoming investments.2 
One of the tools used by states to attract FDI is signing bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) with other states. In a BIT, the two states agree on the types of investments and investors 
they aim to attract by offering those investments protections and incentives. In exchange for this 
protection, the host country anticipates a positive contribution by the foreign investment to its 
                                                 
1 Emilio J. Cardenas, The Notion of Sovereignty Confronts a New Era, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT AND THE LAW 13 (Robert Pritchard ed. 1996). 
2 JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT : NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND 
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 18 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
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economy and development. This relationship between foreign investments and host countries is 
referred to as the ‘grand bargain.'3 The host country provides protection to the foreign investor in 
exchange for the resources and spillovers from the foreign investments that help the host country 
in its development. 
Although FDI can contribute positively to the hots state economy and development, it 
may also cause damage. The notion that ‘all investment is good investment’ is absolute.4 
Therefore, host countries seeking development through FDI should attract those investments that 
they deem beneficial to their development. To encourage the inflow of useful or beneficial 
investments to the host country, the latter should tailor the definitions of investments and 
investors in their BITs to that end. 
A key element in any investment treaty is its provisions defining foreign “investment” 
and foreign “investor.”5 These definitions determine if an investment qualifies for protection 
under the investment treaty or enjoys incentives under local laws. They are also used to establish 
ICSID jurisdiction if a dispute arises between the foreign investor and the host country. 
The treatment standards prescribed to the “investment” and “investor” under the BIT 
determine the scope of protection enjoyed by the foreign investor. They constitute a scale to 
evaluate what measures and actions by the host state infringe upon the foreign investor’s rights 
under the BIT. Thus, the treatment standards are the substantive part of any BIT. 
In this Chapter, I begin with the definitions and interpretations of “investment” and 
“investors” in modern investment treaties, the ICSID Convention, and arbitral decisions. I then 
                                                 
3 See Nicholas P. Sullivan Jeswald W. Salacuse Do Bits Really Work?: An Evaluation Of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties And Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 67 (2005). 
4 See Howard Mann, Reconceptualizing International Investment Law: Its Role in Sustainable Development, 17 
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW 521, 530 (2013). 
5 SALACUSE, 365 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
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explore how their broad definitions in the current system can allow harmful or undesirable 
investments in host countries, negatively affecting their economies. Next, I propose amendments 
that enable developing countries to promote development through foreign investment and attract 
quality investments that will effectively contribute to their development objectives. This can be 
achieved by amending the current standard definitions to avoid the arbitral controversy regarding 
their interpretation, and give more clarity to the economic activities, and persons, encompassed 
within them. 
Later in the chapter, I discuss the scope, application and interpretation of treatment 
standards. I explore the current expression of these standards in BITs and their interpretation by 
arbitral tribunals and the controversies that arose in this context. I propose policy guidelines 
addressing the ambiguity of the scope and interpretation of these treatment standards. The 
proposed amendments will provide policy flexibility for host countries, allowing enhanced 
development without the fear of liability to foreign investors. 
I. THE DEFINITION OF ‘FOREIGN INVESTMENT’ 
A. THE TERM ‘FOREIGN INVESTMENT’ 
The term ‘Investment’ or ‘to invest’ can be generally defined as the act of committing resources 
by a natural or legal person to a specific purpose in order to gain profit.6 It is derived from the 
                                                 
6 Id. at 1. 
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Latin word investire, which means “to clothe.”7 An investor “cloths” an enterprise with capital 
during the process of investment to gain revenue.8 In other words, the act of laying out money 
and other resources in such a manner that it may yield income is defined as an investment.9 An 
‘Investor’ is the natural or legal person who commits resources to a project for the purpose of 
gaining revenue, or simply, the “one who cloths or invests.”10 
The term “foreign investment,” on the other hand, has no unified definition. It is a term 
that has changed over time with the development of international economic relations.11 Before 
the emergence of this term, international treaties used the term “foreign property,” which 
referred to property and financial interests owned by foreign nationals in the host state.12 At that 
time, international law only protected the tangible property of aliens, and state responsibility for 
injuries to aliens arose only in the context of physical harm to the alien or his tangible property.13 
Intangible property was not protected, presumably because the creation of intangible property 
was dependent on the extent to which the local laws of the host state recognized such rights.14 
After the mid-twentieth century, investment forms evolved from simple ownership of 
land, plantations, vessels, bonds and the like, to more complex transactions that involved 
technology, consolidated business enterprises, complex financial instruments, trademarks, etc. 
These new types of property rights needed to be protected. The static notion of “property” is not 
broad enough to comprehend the latter developments in international investment. Hence the need 
                                                 
7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, "INVESTMENT, N." (Oxford University Press.). 
8 SALACUSE, 1 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
9 Ballentine’s Law Dictionary: https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/b52d31a3-10e7-431e-aa9f-0cc6055a653d/ 
?context=1000516. 
10 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, "INVESTOR, N." (Oxford University Press.). 
11 SCOPE AND DEFINITION - UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, at 7-8 
(2011). 
12 International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations. 46-47 (OECD 2008). 
13 SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FORIGN INVESTMENT 11 (Cambridge University Press 3 ed. 2012). 
14 Id. at 190-91. 
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to include a wider range of tangible and intangible property rights dictated the need to replace the 
term “foreign property” with the more dynamic and encompassing term “foreign investment.”15 
B. THE TERM ‘FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI)’ 
Before addressing the definition of FDI, an important distinction has to be made between the 
main types of foreign investment. Traditionally, foreign investments have been categorized as 
either direct investments (FDI) or portfolio investments (indirect investments).16 Foreign direct 
investment is the type of investment that most states aim at attracting and is the subject matter of 
bilateral investment treaties. Portfolio investments, however, have been controversial in respect 
to their protection under investment treaties.17 This distinction between direct and indirect 
(portfolio) investments stems from the different characteristics of each and their benefits to the 
host state. 
1. Foreign Direct vs Indirect Investments 
A foreign direct investment (FDI) results when a natural or legal person, usually a corporation, 
from one state (the “home state” or “capital exporting state”), commits resources and assets, 
whether tangible or intangible, in another state (the “host state” or “capital-importing state”) for 
the purpose of gaining profit. The foreign investor in direct investments exercises a degree of 
                                                 
15 P. Juillard, L’évolution des sources du droit des investissements, THE HAGUE ACADIMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
24 (1994). Referred to in [Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations. 47 (OCED 2008)]. 
16 International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations 47 (OCED ed., 2008). 
17 See below for a discussion on the issue of portfolio investments and their protection under BITs. 
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control and influence in the management of the enterprise.18 Hence, direct investments are 
physical, long-term investments where the foreign investor effectively manages and controls the 
enterprise in the host state.19 The foreign investor transfers capital, technology, know-how, 
trademarks, personnel and other resources to the host country. He employs local labor and 
provides a new service or commodity in the host economy. Consequently, direct investments 
provide the host state with new resources and enable the host state to benefit from the spillover 
effect of such imported resources for its economic development. For that reason, countries seek 
FDI and offer protection and incentives to foreign investments in their BITs and national laws to 
encourage their inflow. 
Portfolio investments (indirect investments), on the other hand, are made by a resident of 
one country through the purchase of shares, or other financial instruments, in an enterprise 
located in another country.20 Usually this purchase happens in international stock markets.21 
Here, there is no direct linkage between the investor and the host country, as there is no transfer 
of resources, no physical presence, and no intention for a long-term relationship with that 
country. The investor does not control or have influence over the management of the enterprise; 
he is merely trading in shares to gain profit.22 
                                                 
18 See the definition of the IMF Balance of Payments “A direct investment relationship arises when an investor 
resident in one economy makes an investment that gives control or a significant degree of influence on the 
management of an enterprise that is resident in another economy.” Balance of Payments and International 
Investment Position Manual para. 6.9 (BPM6). (2009). 
19 See OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 4th Edition, para. 11 (2008), where foreign 
investment is defined as “a category of cross-border investment made by a resident in one economy (the direct 
investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that 
of the investor (the direct investment enterprise). The motivation of the direct investor is a strategic long-term 
relationship between the direct investment and the enterprise which allows a significant degree of influence by the 
direct investor in the management of the direct investment enterprise.” [emphasis added]. 
20 SORNARAJAH, 190 (Cambridge University Press 3 ed. 2012). 
21 Id. at 9 & 190. 
22 SCOPE AND DEFINITION - UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, at 29 
(United Nations 2011). 
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There is a consensus in the field of international investment law that 10 percent voting 
power or more by a foreign investor in a local enterprise renders the investment a direct one.23 
The OECD Benchmark Definition of FDI characterizes a direct investment as one where the 
foreign investor owns a lasting interest in an enterprise located in an economy other than his 
own. This lasting interest “is evidenced where the direct investor owns at least 10 percent of the 
voting power of the direct investment enterprise.”24 The IMF Balance of Payments Manual sets 
the threshold of control and influence required for a direct investment to be “10 percent or more 
of the voting power in the investment enterprise.”25 
Whether portfolio investments are protected investments under investment treaties is a 
controversial issue outside the scope of this Chapter. However, it is sufficient to say here that 
portfolio investments are not the type of foreign investments that the drafters of most investment 
treaties intended to cover and protect.26 Unless the investment treaty contains explicit language 
that covers portfolio investments, any foreign investor holding less than 10 percent control in an 
enterprise is not a direct investor (i.e., portfolio investor) and thus does not benefit from the 
investment treaty, which is normally aimed at foreign direct investments.27 
                                                 
23 SALACUSE, 6 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
24 OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 4th Edition, para. 11 (OECD ed., 2008). 
25 IMF Manual at para 6.12, in this regard it is important to note that the Manual considerers indirect control or 
influence of an enterprise as direct investment. Indirect control or influence may be achieved when an enterprise has 
voting power in another enterprise that has voting power in the investment. See para 6.12 of the Manual. 
26 See the Legal Opinion of M. Sornarajah, In El Paso Energy International Company v The Republic of Argentina, 
Case No. ARB/03/15, Submitted to ICSID tribunal on 5 March 2007., (ICSID). 
27 Portfolio investors cannot invoke treaty protection for measures taken against the company in general. They can, 
however, invoke treaty protection if the host country measures are aimed towards the foreign shareholders directly, 
such as expropriation of their shares. Measures taken against the company in general or against the economic sector 
in which the company is involved in, even if they had a negative impact on the foreign portfolio shareholders, are 
not sufficient to give raise to treat protection. In portfolio Investments, it is the ‘rights’ of the foreign shareholders 
that are protected, not their ‘interests.’ See SORNARAJAH, 190 (Cambridge University Press 3 ed. 2012). 
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The criterion used to differentiate between FDI and portfolio investments is the degree of 
control and influence enjoyed by the foreign investor in the local enterprise.28 Control, for this 
purpose, does not mean owning the majority of shares in the enterprise, but rather having an 
effective right to participate in the management of the enterprise.29 Accordingly, as a general 
rule, a direct investment is an equity interest in an enterprise that gives the foreign investor 10 
percent or more voting power in an enterprise.30 An investment that gives the investor less than 
10 percent voting power is considered an indirect (portfolio) investment. 
2. Equity Participation in Joint-Ventures 
A distinction must also be made between portfolio investors and foreign investors who establish 
local enterprises in the host state to carry out the activities of their investments. Many national 
laws require foreign investors to establish a local company, or joint-venture, as a vehicle to carry 
out investment activities in the host state.31 In this case, similar to the concept of portfolio 
investments, the foreign investor owns shares in a local enterprise. However, contrary to 
portfolio investments, the foreign investor has control and influence over the management of that 
enterprise. The foreign investor usually transfers more than mere capital to the joint-venture 
enterprise, such as equipment, experts, and technology. The foreign investor also intends a long-
                                                 
28 Id. at 9. See also SALACUSE, 6 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
29 Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual para. 6.12 (BPM6) (FUND ed., 6 ed. 2009). 
30 SALACUSE, 6 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
31 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 50 (Oxford 
University Press 2 ed. 2012). For example, the Jordanian ‘Control of Foreign Investment Regulation of 2016’ 
categorizes the economic activities and sectors which foreign investors can investment in. The Regulation provides 
the economic sectors and activities were foreign investors can own up to 100% of the enterprise (article 3), the 
activities and sectors which foreign investors can own an equal share of 50% with a Jordanian partner (article 4), the 
activities and sectors which foreign investors can own only a minority share not exceeding 49% of the enterprise 
with a Jordanian majority partner (article 5), and activities and sectors were foreign investors are not allowed to 
invest in, i.e., activities that are exclusive to Jordanians (article 6). 
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term stay in the host country, and is not simply trading in shares. Therefore, foreign shareholders 
of locally incorporated enterprises are protected under BITs and are not considered portfolio 
investors if the exceed the 10 percent threshold of control. 
C. THE DEFINITION OF ‘INVESTMENT’ UNDER BITs 
The state parties to an investment treaty define investment by enumerating the generic categories 
of assets and rights that are subject to the substantive protections of the treaty. Therefore, the 
scope of protection of the investment treaty is mutually determined by the contracting parties in 
the definition of “investment.” Yet whether a foreign investor acquires a particular right in rem, 
and the scope of that right, are matters determined by the municipal law of the host country.32 
Thus the BIT definition of investment, which declares the general categories of protected 
investments, safeguards against unilateral change in the treaty’s scope by the host country via 
amending its national laws. However, the definition of investment in the BIT does not “detach 
the rights in rem that underlie those investments from the municipal law that creates and gives 
recognition to those rights.”33 
The definition of “investment” in a BIT has many implications - not only for the foreign 
investor, but also for the contracting states. Hence, treaty states should devote extra care and time 
when drafting the definition. The current practice in most BITs is to include an asset-based 
definition of investment. This type will be explored in further detail below. However, while the 
                                                 
32 See ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 72-73 (Cambridge University Press. 
2009). 
33 Id. at para. 123. 
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majority of investment treaties use the asset-based definition, albeit in various versions, other 
types of definitions exist.34 For example, the enterprise-based definition defines “investment” as 
the establishment or acquisition of a business enterprise, or acquiring a controlling share in a 
business enterprise in the host country.35 This type of investment is more akin to direct foreign 
investments and excludes portfolio investments.36 This is in contrast to asset-based definitions, 
which define “investment” as any asset transferred to the host country. Asset-based definitions 
therefore do not necessitate the creation of an enterprise or participation in an already existing 
enterprise in the host country, as do enterprise-based definitions. The asset-based definition has 
three main versions: 
1. Open Asset-Based Definitions 
The definition of investment is found at the beginning of the BIT, usually in the definitions 
article. Most BITs adopt an asset-based definition for investment, which covers both tangible and 
intangible assets of the foreign investor. Such definitions tend to be broad in scope by defining 
investment as “every kind of asset”37 or “any type of property.”38 This broad definition of 
investment comes as a response to the complexity of modern international finance and the 
creativity of investors.39 
                                                 
34 For example, the enterprise-based definition which defines investment as the establishment or acquisition of a 
business enterprise, or acquiring a controlling share in a business enterprise. 
35 SCOPE AND DEFINITION - UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, at 22 
(United Nations 2011). 
36 See Note by the Chairman - DEFINITION OF INVESTOR AND INVESTMENT, Negotiating Group on the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) (OECD ed., 1995). 
37 For example, Japan - Uruguay BIT (2015). Article 1(a). 
38 For example, INVESTMENT COOPERATION AND FACILITATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL AND THE REPUBLIC OF MALAWI (2015). Article 2(1). 
39 Jeswald W. Salacuse 46 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 67, 80 (2005). 
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Capital exporting states prefer a broad definition of investment in their BITs to protect all 
types of outbound investments. They aim to capture most forms of investment, which continue to 
evolve rapidly, under the umbrella of treaty protection. Hence, they accompany the asset-based 
definition with a non-exhaustive list of generic categories that illustrate the forms an investment 
can take. The purpose of the non-exhaustive list is to make clear that the treaty’s protection of 
investment does not depend on the particular form an investment takes,40 and to illustrate that all 
forms of assets, whether tangible or intangible, are covered under the protection of the treaty. 
The U.K Model Investment Treaty may be taken as an example of what an open asset-based 
definition will generally include: 
“investment” means every kind of asset, owned or controlled directly or 
indirectly, and in particular, though not exclusively, includes: (i) movable and 
immovable property and any other property rights such as mortgages, liens or 
pledges; (ii) shares in and stock and debentures of a company and any other form 
of participation in a company; (iii) claims to money or to any performance under 
contract having a financial value; (iv) intellectual property rights, goodwill, 
technical processes and know-how; (v) business concessions conferred by law or 
under contract, including concessions to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit 
natural resources.41 
Most BITs adopt a similar open asset-based definition of investment, which gives 
protection to a wide variety of property both tangible and intangible.42 The transfer of 
technology and know-how, as well as the use of well-known trademarks, require that intangible 
rights be recognized as protected investments. Also, licenses, permits and concessions that are a 
matter of administrative law are also included in the definition of protected investments. This 
                                                 
40 The tribunal in Siemens v Argentina noted that “The specific categories of investment included in the definition 
are included as examples rather than with the purpose of excluding those not listed.” SIEMENS A.G. v THE 
ARGENTINE REPUBLIC para. 137 (Decision on Jurisdiction), (ICSID 2004). See also JESWALD W. SALACUSE, 
THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 177 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2015). 
41 UK Model BIT (2008). Article (1)(a). 
42 UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1995–2006: TRENDS IN INVESTMENT 
RULEMAKING § UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5, at 8 (United Nations 2007). 
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inclusion is not out of mere caution by the capital-exporting country, but rather recognition that 
some permits and licenses given by the host country’s administrative authorities are vital to the 
foreign investment. In fact, the survival of some investment projects, such as those in the mining 
and extracting sectors, depend on the existence of such public law rights.43 
The asset-based definition approach is beneficial to the capital-exporting country, as it 
captures a very wide range of investment forms under the protection of the treaty. However, such 
an approach may be disadvantageous to the host country, which seeks the other end of the 
bargain when concluding a BIT: economic development. The asset-based definition gives 
protection to investments that may not contribute to the development of the host country, and 
may even give protection to some economic activities that caused harm to the host economy, 
such as those exploitive of the host state’s natural resources. The wide range of protected 
investments in the asset-based definition may also result in unpredictability; as the host country 
will find it difficult to determine which investments qualify for protection, in order to comply 
with its obligations and avoid disputes. Finally, the phrase “every kind of asset” may give 
protection to economic activities that are not “investments” by their nature. As one commentator 
explains: 
If, by way of illustration, the legal characteristics of an investment were to be 
considered in isolation from the common sense economic meaning of that term, 
then, pursuant to some investment treaty definitions of an investment, a metro 
ticket might qualify as a ‘claim to money or to any performance under contract, 
having a financial value’ and thus as an investment.44 
Hence some investment agreements add another dimension to the asset-based definition 
by requiring that the underlying asset must have “the characteristics of an investment.” 
                                                 
43 SORNARAJAH, 192 (Cambridge University Press 3 ed. 2012). 
44 DOUGLAS, 163 (Cambridge University Press. 2009). 
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2. Asset-Based Definitions Requiring Investment Characteristics 
The U.S. Model BIT defines investment as “every asset that an investor owns or controls, 
directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics 
as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the 
assumption of risk.45 The definition then proceeds to list a non-exhaustive list of investment 
forms. 
By adding the three characteristics of an investment (capital, expectation of profit, and 
risk), the state parties of the investment treaty clarify that ordinary trade and purely financial 
transactions do not qualify as covered investments.46 It provides objective criteria for interpreters 
when distinguishing between covered investments and ordinary trade transactions. It also 
provides host countries seeking development from foreign investment the assurance that only 
substantial investments that contribute to their development are protected, as short-term 
economic activities usually do not contribute to the host state’s development due to their 
instability and volatility.47 
Unfortunately, the characteristics of investment provided for in such treaties are neither 
exhaustive nor well-defined. Hence, they too do not provide certainty. For example, what is the 
minimum amount of capital or resources required for an economic activity to qualify as an 
investment? How is the risk to be assessed? Do all three characteristics (capital, profit, and risk) 
                                                 
45 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012). Article 1. See also AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND 
THE ORIENTAL REPUBLIC OF URUGUAY FOR THE LIBERALIZATION, PROMOTION AND 
PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT (2015). 
46 Emmanuelle Cabrol, Pren Nreka v. Czech Republic and The Notion of Investment Under Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2009-2010, at 228 (Karl 
Sauvant ed. 2010). 
47 SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT : NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL 
FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 181 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
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need to exist for an investment to be identified or only some? As these questions do not have 
definite answers, some countries have opted for a more narrow, “closed asset-list,” definition of 
investment in their BITs.48 
3. Closed Asset-List Definitions 
Some states adopt a “closed list” definition for investment in their BITs. The closed-list approach 
provides an extensive asset-based list of tangible and intangible property that is exhaustive rather 
than illustrative.49 The closed list may also contain explicit exclusions of certain commercial 
transactions, such as sales contracts and financial loan agreements that involve no capital risk.50 
The use of closed-list definitions is emerging as a trend in investment treaty-making.51 
This is due to the high level of certainty and control such a definition gives to contracting parties 
through the identification of economic activities that are covered under treaty protection. It also 
allows host countries seeking development through FDI to ensure that only desirable foreign 
investments will be protected. Hence for a developing country, the use of a closed-list definition 
in its BITs might be the most suitable option to manage its liability and protect desired 
investments. 
Regardless of which definitional approach the contracting parties may decide to adopt in 
their investment treaty, certain limitations or additional requirements can be added to the 
definition. The purpose of these additional requirements is to limit the treaty’s protection to those 
                                                 
48 For example see the Canada Model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (2004). Article 1. 
49 SCOPE AND DEFINITION - UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, at 29 
(United Nations 2011). 
50 See Canada Model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (2004). Article 1. 
51 SCOPE AND DEFINITION - UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, at 114 
(United Nations 2011). 
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investments that fulfill the definition and also comply with the additional conditions imposed in 
the investment treaty. 
D. LIMITATIONS ON THE DEFINITION OF INVESTMENT UNDER BITs 
The limitations on treaty protection for foreign investments can take several forms. One form is 
the requirement that the investment is made in accordance with the national laws of the host 
state.52 Another form is the requirement that the foreign investment obtains approval from the 
host country’s government.53 
1. Conformity with the Host State’s Legislation 
Most BITs condition treaty protection on compliance of the investment with the municipal laws 
of the host state. Thus, these treaties not only offer protection to investments that fit the treaty 
definition of an “investment,” but also add that the investment must be made “in accordance 
with the [host country’s] laws.”54 Thus, if the investment violates the national legislation of the 
host state, it will automatically lose treaty protection. This requirement serves to ensure that 
foreign investors do not benefit from their own wrongdoing by not observing the host state’s 
                                                 
52 See for example; Japan - Ukraine BIT (2015), Colombia - Turkey BIT (2014), Brazil - Chile BIT (2015), 
Azerbaijan - San Marino BIT (2015), Colombia-Israel FTA, Kuwait - Mauritius BIT (2013). 
53 This approach is followed, mainly, by Malaysia and Singapore in their investment treaties. 
54 For example the Canada – Slovania BIT defines ‘investment’ as “any kind of asset held or invested either directly 
or indirectly by an investor of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party in accordance 
with the latter’s laws and, in particular, though not exclusively, includes …” AGREEMENT BETWEEN CANADA 
AND THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS (2010). 
Article 1(d). 
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national regulations.55 Also, states have a fundamental interest in securing respect for their 
national laws by foreigners.56 An arbitral tribunal explained this requirement by stating that the 
language found in BITs that requires an investment to confirm to the laws and regulations of the 
host country “seeks to prevent the BIT from protecting investments that should not be protected, 
particularly because they would be illegal.”57 
An investment “made in accordance with the host country’s law” does not mean that the 
existance of the investment depends on whether the host country’s municipal law recognizes it as 
an “investment.” On the contrary, the investment treaty is the instrument that determines what 
types of economic activities are considered to be “investments.” Complaince with host country 
laws “refers to the validity of the investment and not to its definition.”58 Hence, there becomes 
an absolute obligation on the investor to make his investment in compliance with the host state 
laws in order to benefit from the treaty protection.59 
2. The Requirement of Approval 
Another requirement that is found in some BITs is that a foreign investment needs to obtain 
approval, or admittance, from the host country in order for the investment to be protected.60 For 
example, the Sweden–Malaysia BIT defines investment as “any kind of asset;” however, it adds 
                                                 
55 SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT : NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL 
FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 367 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
56 Alasdair Ross Anderson et al v Republic of Costa Rica, para. 58 (ICSID, 2010). 
57 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v Kingdom of Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction para. 46 (2001), 
(ICSID 2001). 
58 Salini v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 46 (ICSID, 2001). 
59 SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT : NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL 
FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 187 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
60 This approach has been followed, mainly, by Malaysia and Singapore in their investment treaties. See for example 
the Australia-Malaysia FTA (2012) at article 12.2 which defines covered investments as those investments which 
have been “admitted by the host Party, subject to its relevant laws, regulations and policies.” 
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that such an asset must, when invested in Malaysia, be “a project classified by the appropriate 
Ministry in Malaysia in accordance with its legislation and administrative practice as an 
‘approved project.’”61 
The approval requirement enables the host state to screen incoming investments and 
approve those that are beneficial to its economy and necessary for its development. It also 
enables the host country to prevent exploitive and unwanted investments from entering the 
country, or at least to not encourage their inflow by granting them treaty protection. Countries 
that impose such a requirement adopt one of two policies: either an “open door” policy where the 
host state allows all sorts of foreign investments, albeit only those that get approved enjoy certain 
privileges and treaty protection, or, a “restricted policy” where the host state requires approval 
for all incoming investments.62 Some treaties, however, impose both requirements in their 
definition; for example, the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement defines “covered 
investment,” with respect to a Member State as: 
An investment in its territory of an investor of any other Member State in 
existence as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement or established, 
acquired or expanded thereafter, and has been admitted according to its laws, 
regulations, and national policies, and where applicable, specifically approved in 
writing by the competent authority of a Member State.63 
It must be noted that an investment made in accordance with the laws and regulations of 
the host country will not, without more, satisfy the approval requirement.64 What is needed under 
                                                 
61 Agreement Between the Government of Sweden and the Government of Malaysia Concerning the Mutual 
Protection of Investments (1979). Article 1(i). 
62 SORNARAJAH, 195 (Cambridge University Press 3 ed. 2012). 
63 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (2009). Article 4(a). 
64 SORNARAJAH, 195 (Cambridge University Press 3 ed. 2012). See also YAUNG CHI 00 TRADING PTE LTD v 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR (Award), 42 ILM 540, (ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST 
ASIAN NATIONS para. 58 (ASEAN) ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL, 2003). 
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the approval requirement is an approval in the form of a governmental document or contract.65 
Failure to satisfy the approval requirement will render the investment without treaty protection, 
since it is not an “approved project” within the meaning and requirement of the treaty. 
The approval requirement can be used by countries seeking development as a tool to 
avoid the negative impacts of the foreign investment and harvest its benefits in accordance with 
its needs. For example, the host state can require the foreign investor to satisfy certain 
conditions, such as local employment quotas, transferring a minimum amount of capital for the 
project, or any other condition that it deems appropriate to advance its economy – so long as 
such a condition is not prohibited by the treaty’s terms. 
There are other limitations that can be imposed on the definition of investment. Some 
treaties impose a “sectoral” limitation, whereby investments in certain sectors qualify for treaty 
protection.66 Other investment treaties impose a “territorial” limitation on covered investments. 
Such a limitation requires the foreign investment to be made in the territory of the host country 
for the latter to enjoy treaty protection.67 It requires the transfer of assets to the territory of the 
host country – and not to any other country. Thus, for example, a foreign investor who takes on a 
project to construct an embassy for the host country in a third country will not benefit from treaty 
protection. 
                                                 
65 Philippe Gruslin v Malaysia para. 25.5 (Final Award), (ICSID, 2000). 
66 For example the AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT ON THE ONE HAND AND 
THE BELGO -LUXEMBOURG ECONOMIC UNION ON THE OTHER HAND, ON THE ENCOURAGEMENT 
AND RECIPROCAL PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS (1977). This BIT defines ‘investment’ in Article III(1) 
as “every direct or indirect contribution of capital and any other kind of assets, invested or reinvested in enterprises 
in the field of agriculture, industry. mining. forestry , communications and tourism.” However this BIT was replaced 
with a new BIT in 1999. The new BIT removed the sectoral requirement imposed in the 1977 BIT. 
67 See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines para. 99 (Decision on Jurisdiction), 
(ICSID, 2004). “The language is clear in requiring that investments be made ‘in the territory of’ the host State … In 
accordance with normal principles of treaty interpretation, investments made outside the territory of the Respondent 
State, however beneficial to it, would not be covered by the BIT.” 
123 
By inserting limitations on the definition of investment in the investment treaty, a host 
country can tailor the treaty protection to encourage the inflow of beneficial investments. 
However, this might not be an easy task, as capital-exporting states might not be willing to 
accept these limitations, which put their outbound investors at a disadvantage. 
E. THE DEFINITION OF INVESTMENT UNDER ICSID 
The purpose of having an investment within the definition and requirements of a BIT is to enjoy 
the treatment standards and protections given under that BIT. These substantive protections are 
of no value if there is no effective and reliable mechanism to enforce them against the host 
country when violated. Therefore, BITs traditionally contain a dispute resolution section, which 
uses international arbitration as a means to solve disputes that arise between the foreign investor 
and the host country. By resorting to international arbitration, the dispute is elevated from the 
host country’s national legal system to the international domain. Thus, foreign investors are 
assured a fair and impartial review of their disputes through the application of international law. 
Most BITs provide for arbitration under the ICSID Convention.68 Article 25(1) of the 
ICSID Convention provides the subject matter jurisdiction of the Center to hear disputes. It reads 
as follows: 
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out 
of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or 
                                                 
68 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1965). 
Hereinafter referred to as (the “Convention”) or (the “ICSID Convention”). 
Alternatively Some Investment treaties refer to other arbitration venues, such as the International Court of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce (SCC), or to ad hock arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
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agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a 
national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in 
writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no 
party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.69 
From this article, it is clear that access to ICSID arbitration depends entirely on the 
existence of an “investment.” However, the Convention does not define the term in any of its 
provisions. The drafters of the ICSID Convention considered adding a definition, but ultimately 
they decided that a fixed definition may limit the Center’s jurisdiction in the future due to the 
evolving nature of international investments.70 Therefore, “the definition was left to be worked 
out in the subsequent practice of States, thereby preserving its integrity and flexibility and 
allowing for future progressive development of international law on the topic of investment.”71 
The non-inclusion of a definition for “investment” in the Convention raised uncertainty 
among arbitrators on how the term should be interpreted when determining ICSID jurisdiction. 
Article 25(1) requires a “legal dispute arising directly out of an investment;” therefore, tribunals 
have diverged on the question of what is an “investment” that satisfies the jurisdictional 
requirement of the Convention? 
A survey of the ICSID case law in this respect shows two main lines of interpretation. 
The first, sometimes referred to as the deferential approach,72 uses the host state’s ex-ante 
consent to refer future disputes to ICSID arbitration as an indicator that the economic activity in 
question is an “investment” for purposes of ICSID jurisdiction.73 The second line of 
                                                 
69 Id. at art. (25)(1) [emphasis added]. 
70 REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES. para. 27 (1965). 
71 Mihaly International Corporation v Socialist Democratic Republic of Sri Lanka, para. 33 (ICSID, 2002). 
72 Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning Of “Investment”: ICSID's Travaux and the Domain of International 
Investment Law, HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 269 (2010). 
73 It should be noted that ICSID arbitration is available whenever both parties, the foreign investor and the host state, 
have consented to submit their dispute to the Center. This consent can raise in three ways; i) it can be a dispute 
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interpretation, sometimes referred to as the restrictive approach, uses a set of criteria to 
determine if an investment exists within the meaning required in Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention.74 These criteria, or “features” as described by Schreuer, are typical to most 
investment operations,75 and thus render particular economic activities “investments” within the 
meaning required under the Convention. However, tribunals following this approach have not 
reached a consensus on the exact criteria that should be used to determine if an economic activity 
is an investment within the meaning of the Convention.76 
1. The Deferential Approach in Defining Investment for ICSID Jurisdiction 
Under the deferential approach, consent of the parties to arbitrate their disputes at ICSID is the 
cornerstone of ICSID jurisdiction.77 If the economic activity or asset fits the definition of an 
                                                                                                                                                             
settlement clause in an investment contract, designating ICSID as the forum for dispute resolution for claims arising 
out of that contract, ii) it can be in the form of a post dispute agreement to submit the claim to ICSID for settlement, 
or iii) it can be in the form of a standing offer by the host state to submit disputes with a class of investors to ICSID. 
The standing offer to submit disputes to ICSID is usually found in the host state’s BITs or national investment laws. 
The foreign investor accepts this standing offer by submitting his claim to ICSID when a dispute arises, or presents 
before the ICSID tribunal if he is the respondent. 
74 See Mortenson, HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 271 (2010). 
75 CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 122 (2001). 
76 In Saba Fakes v. Turkey the tribunal noted that “no unanimous approach has emerged so far from the existing case 
law” regarding the definition of “investment.” The tribunal added that the “proposed solutions are inconsistent, if 
not conflicting, and do not provide any clear guidance to future arbitral tribunals.” Mr. Saba Fakes v. Republic Of 
Turkey, para. 97 (Final Award), (ICSID, 2010). 
77 See REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES para. 23 (World Bank 
1965). Also LANCO INTERNATIONAL INC. v THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 41 
(1998). “This rule [Article 25(1) of the Convention] enumerates several requirements to determine ICSID's 
jurisdiction, among which the fundamental and central consideration is the consent given by the parties to the 
dispute to submit their dispute to ICSID.” Also in Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine, para. 19 (Decision on Jurisdiction), 
(ICSID, 2004). where the tribunal said “The jurisdiction of the Centre depends first and foremost on the consent of 
the Contracting Parties, who enjoy broad discretion to choose the disputes that they will submit to ICSID. Tribunals 
shall exercise jurisdiction over all disputes that fall within the scope of the Contracting Parties’ consent as long as 
the dispute satisfies the objective requirements set forth in Article 25 of the Convention.” 
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“investment” in the underlying consent document,78 then ICSID jurisdiction is established. In 
other words, so long as the economic activity or asset falls within the definition of “investment” 
in the document that gives consent to ICSID arbitration (the BIT, contract, or national law),79 
then the jurisdictional requirement of having an “investment” under Article 25(1) of the 
Convention is fulfilled. According to this approach, any economic activity may be included or 
excluded from ICSID jurisdiction based on the parties’ agreement in the consent documents. 
In AG Frankfurt Airport Services v. Philippines, the tribunal stated that its jurisdiction 
was determined by “the arbitration agreement, in the instant case, both the BIT and the 
Washington Convention.” The tribunal explained that: 
Article 25 of the Washington Convention, which provides, inter alia, parameters 
of jurisdiction ratione materiae, does not define ‘investment’, leaving it to parties 
who incorporate ICSID jurisdiction to provide a definition if they wish. In 
bilateral investment treaties which incorporate an ICSID arbitration option, the 
word ‘investment’ is a term of art, whose content in each instance is to be 
determined by the language of the pertinent BIT which serves as a lex specialis 
with respect to Article 25 of the Washington Convention.80 
Tribunals following the Deferential Approach suggest that the Convention imposes no 
further jurisdictional limits.81 The tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan opined that the Convention does 
                                                 
78 The term ‘Consent Documents’ means any legal instrument which expresses the consent of the parties (foreign 
investor and the host country) to refer current or future disputes between them to ICSID arbitration. Thus the 
consent documents to arbitration can be the BIT, or the investment contract. 
79 In ICSID arbitration, there must be an agreement to arbitrate -in writing- between the host State and the foreign 
investor. Article 25 of the ICSID Convention provides “The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal 
dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency 
of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the 
parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.” Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1965). Consent it usually given as a standing offer in the 
BIT, or national law of the host state. In other instances that consent is given in in the investment contract signed 
between the host state and the foreign investor. For more information see UNCTAD, Dispute Settlement: Consent to 
Arbitration 5-6 (UNCTAD ed., United Nations UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.2 ed. 2003). 
80 FRAPORT AG FRANKFURT AIRPORT SERVICES WORLDWIDE V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, 
para. 305 (Award), (ICSID, 2007). 
81 “It has been suggested by some writers that where the parties have agreed that a dispute involves an investment, 
the ICSID tribunal is not required to check if the alleged investment is also an investment under the ICSID 
 
127 
not limit the definition of the investment, and that the parties are free to define the term in 
accordance with their needs and objectives.82 
Consent of the parties to refer disputes to ICSID can be as broad or narrow as the parties 
wish.83 However, arbitral tribunals have indicated on several occasions that the parties’ consent 
cannot be extended to activities that are clearly outside the scope of the Convention.84 Thus, 
“tribunals should give effect to [the parties’ consent], unless doing so would allow the 
Convention to be used for purposes for which it clearly was not intended.”85 Although tribunals 
have not elaborated on what activities would be ruled out of the Convention, it is agreed that a 
single commercial transaction (such as the import of one load of goods) will be outside the scope 
of the Convention regardless of how broad the parties’ consent is.86 
Arbitrators following the deferential approach focus on the host country’s ex ante policy 
of referring future disputes with foreign investors to ICSID arbitration. Therefore, the host 
                                                                                                                                                             
Convention,” Kathigamar V.S.K. Nathan, Submissions to the International Center for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes in Breach of the Convention, 12 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 30 (1995). See also 
Mortenson, HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 269 (2010). 
82 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 133 (ICSID, 2003). “The ICSID Convention does not delimit the term “investment,” 
leaving to the Contracting Parties a large measure of freedom to define that term as their specific objectives and 
circumstances may lead them to do so.” 
83 See Ceskoslovenska Obchodní Banka (CSOB) v. Slovak Republic, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 
68 (ICSID, 1999). Also see Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine, para. 39 (Decision on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 2004), where the 
tribunal states “We emphasize here that Contracting Parties are free to define their consent to jurisdiction in terms 
that are broad or narrow; they may employ a control-test or reserve the right to deny treaty protection to claimants 
who otherwise would have recourse under the BIT.” 
84 See ENRON CORPORATION AND PONDEROSA ASSETS, L.P. v THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC , Decision 
on Jurisdiction para. 42 (ICSID, 2004). “… there is, however, a limit to this discretion of the parties because they 
could not validly define as investment in connection with the Convention something absurd or entirely incompatible 
with its object and purpose.” See also Ceskoslovenska Obchodní Banka (CSOB) v. Slovak Republic, Decision on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 68 (ICSID, 1999), where the tribunal states “The concept of an investment as 
spelled out in that provision [Article 25(1) of the Convention] is objective in nature in that the parties may agree on 
a more precise or restrictive definition of their acceptance of the Centre’s jurisdiction, but they may not choose to 
submit disputes to the Centre that are not related to an investment.” 
85 Supra Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine, para. 39 (Decision on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 2004). 
86 See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction n.153 (ICSID, 2003). 
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country’s objection to ICSID jurisdiction after the dispute arises is irrelevant.87 The ex-ante 
policy of the host state creates a “legitimate expectation” to the foreign investor that his disputes 
with the host country will be adjudicated at ICSID. This legitimate expectation is protected under 
international investment law.88 Hence, the only way for a host country to escape ICSID 
jurisdiction after a dispute arises is to prove that the economic activity or asset is not an 
“investment” within the meaning found in the consent document (i.e., the BIT, contract, or 
national law).89 
2. The Restrictive Approach in Defining Investment for ICSID Jurisdiction 
The restrictive approach gives supremacy to the Convention, not to the parties’ consent.90 In 
other words, tribunals following this approach apply a two-level jurisdictional analysis, 
otherwise referred to as the “double key-hole”91 or “double barrel” test.92 The first test requires 
the tribunal to investigate whether the economic activity in question is an “investment” within 
the definition given in the relevant investment treaty. Once that is satisfied, the tribunal moves to 
the second jurisdictional test, which is to determine whether the economic activity in question is 
                                                 
87 See LORETTA MALINTOPPI CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, AUGUST REINISCH, ANTHONY SINCLAIR, THE ICSID 
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY para. 130 (Cambridge University Press 2 ed. 2009). 
88 Legitimate expectations of foreign investors are protected under the fair and equitable treatment standard. See for 
example Azurix Corp. v The Argentine Republic para. 372 (Final Award), (ICSID, 2006). 
89 See Mortenson, HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 269-71 (2010). 
90 “the Washington Convention has supremacy over an agreement between the parties or a BIT.” THE CASE OF 
PATRICK MITCHELL V. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO para. 31 (Decision on the Application for 
Annulment of the Award), (ICSID, 2006). 
91 Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, para. 278 (Award on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 2005). 
92 Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN, BHD v The Government of Malaysia, para. 55 (Award on Jurisdiction), 
(ICSID, 2007). 
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an “investment” within the meaning of Article 25(1) of the Convention.93 Hence, if the economic 
activity fits the definition of “investment” in the BIT (first test), but fails to pass the second test 
(an “investment” within the requirements of the Convention), the ICSID tribunal will not have 
jurisdiction.94 The tribunal in the Malaysian Salvors case explained the restrictive approach in 
the following terms: 
Under the double-barrelled test, a finding that the Contract satisfied the definition 
of “investment” under the BIT would not be sufficient for this Tribunal to assume 
jurisdiction, if the Contract failed to satisfy the objective criterion of an 
“investment” within the meaning of Article 25.95 
This is in contrast to the deferential approach, where only one jurisdictional 
determination is made based on the parties’ consent documents referring to ICSID arbitration. 
The restrictive approach is also in contrast with investment arbitrations outside of ICSID, were 
one level of jurisdictional determination is required (i.e., under the investment treaty or contract), 
as the Convention itself is not applicable.96 Therefore, ICSID arbitrators who follow this 
approach try to define the undefined term “investment” in the Convention to determine their 
jurisdiction. This has resulted in an array of different and inconsistent interpretations of the term. 
This uncertainty and confusion may indeed endanger the “whole ICSID system or at least 
jeopardize its development.”97 
                                                 
93 The tribunal in ToTo Construzioni v Lebanon made this clear by stating “it is not sufficient that the dispute arises 
out of an investment as per the meaning of "investment" given by the parties in the Treaty, but also as per the 
meaning of "investment" under the ICSID Convention.” Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A. v. Republic Of Lebanon 
para. 66 (Decision on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 2009). See also International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts 
and Tracking Innovations 59 (OECD 2008). 
94 THE CASE OF PATRICK MITCHELL V. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO para. 31 (Decision on the 
Application for Annulment of the Award), (ICSID, 2006). 
95 Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN, BHD v The Government of Malaysia, para. 55 (Award on Jurisdiction), 
(ICSID, 2007). 
96 DON WALLACE JR. CHRISTOPHER DUGAN, NOAH RUBINS, BORZU SABAHI, INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 280 
(Oxford University Press. 2008). 
97 Pierre - Emmanuel Dupont, The Notion of ICSID Investment: Ongoing 'Confusion' or 'Emerging Synthesis'?, 12 
THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 246 (2011). 
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The restrictive approach emerged after the prominent scholar and arbitrator, Christoph 
Schreuer, introduced a set of “features,” or “typical characteristics,” of an investment.98 Schreuer 
suggested that these features can be used as a guide for arbitrators to determine whether an 
economic activity is an “investment” within the requirement of Article 25(1) of the 
Convention.99 Schreuer’s five features of an investment are: i) a certain duration, ii) regularity of 
profit and return, iii) the assumption of risk, iv) a substantial commitment, and v) the operation’s 
significance for the host state’s development.100 These features were not meant to be fixed or 
rigid requirements that would need to be satisfied in every activity to establish ICSID 
jurisdiction. On the contrary, Schreuer made clear that “these features should not necessarily be 
understood as jurisdictional requirements but merely as typical characteristics of investments 
under the Convention.”101 
Many arbitral tribunals have used these features, subject to variation, as a rigid test to 
determine if an activity qualifies for ICSID jurisdiction.102 These “typical characteristics” of an 
                                                 
98 Christoph Schreuer, Commentary on the ICSID Convention, ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal, 
Vol. 11, 1996, at pages 355-358. However after the Salini v Morocco case the features became known as the ‘Salini 
Test.’ 
99 CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, 153 (Cambridge University Press 2 ed. 2009). 
100 Id. at para. 153. 
101 Id. at para. 153. 
102 For example see; Fedax v. Venezuela , Decision on Jurisdiction, (ICSID, 1997). The tribunal, in its decision, 
cited an early article of Schreuer published in 1997 (Christoph Schreuer: "Commentary on the ICSID Convention," 
ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal, Vol. 11, 1996, at pages 355-358.). The Fedax tribunal stated that 
“The basic features of an investment have been described as involving a certain duration, a certain regularity of 
profit and return, assumption of risk, a substantial commitment and a significance for the host State's development,” 
at para 43 of the decision. See also Salini v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, (ICSID, 2001). The tribunal used 
some of the features introduced by Schreuer, it said at para 52 “The doctrine generally considers that investment 
infers: contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract and a participation in the risks of the 
transaction ... In reading the Convention's preamble, one may add the contribution to the economic development of 
the host State of the investment as an additional condition.” Also in Joy Mining Machinery Limited v The Arab 
Republic of Egypt, Award, para. 53 (ICSID, 2004), “…the project in question should have a certain duration, a 
regularity of profit and return, an element of risk, a substantial commitment and that it should constitute a 
significant contribution to the host State’s development.” See also Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN, BHD v The 
Government of Malaysia, paras. 107-48 (Award on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 2007). See also Joy Mining Machinery 
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investment have been transformed into a prescriptive list of requirements for ICSID 
jurisdiction.103 This can be attributed to the repeated application of these criteria by arbitral 
tribunals, which has resulted in a perception that they were not merely “features indicative of 
investments,” but rather are mandatory rules.104 
The line of interpretation followed by the supporters of the restrictive approach in 
determining ICSID Jurisdiction goes against principles on which the Convention was founded. 
Basically, the drafters of the Convention believed that “adherence to the Convention by a 
country would provide an additional inducement for, and stimulate a larger flow of, private 
international investment into its territory, which is the primary purpose of the Convention.”105 
The Preamble to the ICSID Convention speaks of “the need for international cooperation for 
economic development, and the role of private international investment therein.” The deliberate 
omission of a definition of ‘investment’ in the Convention was to give Contracting States the 
discretion to determine what economic activity would be considered to be an “investment” 
according to their developmental needs.106 Arbitrators following the restrictive approach impose 
a higher threshold on the definition of “investment” to find jurisdiction. This goes against the 
Convention’s main purpose, as it imposes a higher burden on foreign investors to establish 
ICSID jurisdiction by requiring their economic activity to satisfy a list of requirements that must 
be fulfilled in order to render their economic activity in question an “investment” within the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Limited v The Arab Republic of Egypt, Award, para. 53 (ICSID, 2004), “the elements that an activity must have in 
order to qualify as an investment,” and then proceeds to list the criteria. 
103 See CHRISTOPHER DUGAN, 265 (Oxford University Press. 2008); Mortenson, HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL 272 (2010). 
104 CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, 159 (Cambridge University Press 2 ed. 2009). 
105 REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES para. 11 (World Bank 
1965). 
106 Id. at para. 27. See also G. R. Delaume, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 64, 70 (1966). 
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meaning of the Convention. Hence it is perceivable that “foreign agents who doubt the 
qualification attributed to their transaction [will] turn away from ICSID arbitration (in spite of 
the advantages it presents) for the benefit of other available modes of dispute resolution, in order 
to discard the uncertainty concerning ICSID ratione materiae jurisdiction.”107 This impacts the 
Convention’s purpose as an instrument of international policy for the promotion of economic 
development.108 The ICSID Convention should not be seen merely as a means of dispute 
settlement, but rather as a tool to promote development through FDI. 
Nonetheless, the typical features used by arbitrators under the restrictive approach are 
good indicators for drawing the line between regular commercial transactions and investments. 
Although they should be used as guidance and not as a mandatory list of requirements to 
establish ICSID jurisdiction, they are useful tools for determining whether a particular 
transaction falls in the grey area of ordinary commercial transactions that should be denied 
ICSID jurisdiction, or is an investment that falls within the reach of ICSID jurisdiction. 
3. The Features of ‘Investment’ Under the Restrictive Approach 
a. Duration: Investments, by their nature, are economic activities of extended duration. Host 
states attract foreign investments with the intention that the investments will be beneficial to the 
states’ development. The injection of capital and other resources into the host state’s economy 
for prolonged periods of time enables the host state to rely on such resources for development. 
This is contrary to short-term activities that are unpredictable and likely to withdraw from the 
                                                 
107 Sébastien Manciaux, The Notion of Investment: New Controversies, 9 JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & 
TRADE 448 (2008). 
108 CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, 4 (Cambridge University Press 2 ed. 2009). 
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host economy when conditions deteriorate, consequently “worsening financial volatility in the 
country rather than mitigating it.”109 Therefore, the duration of an activity is key when 
differentiating between investments falling within the requirement of the Convention and other 
commercial activities that fall outside its scope.110 For example, a three-month servicing and 
maintenance contract for military airplanes, although the contract may be worth tens of millions 
of dollars, will not qualify as an “investment,” regardless of its major contribution to the 
economy. In this example, the duration of the transaction is too short to be considered an 
investment. 
However, the issue that arises is not related to the necessity of a long duration for an 
activity to be considered an ‘investment’ within the meaning of Article 25(1) of the Convention. 
Rather, the issue is how long, or the minimum length of time, required for an activity to satisfy 
the ‘duration’ criterion. 
In Salini v. Morocco the tribunal opined that “the minimal length of time upheld by the 
doctrine, … is from 2 to 5 years.”111 The tribunal in Bayindir v. Pakistan found that a three-year 
construction project, followed by a one-year defect liability period, satisfies the duration 
criterion, by stating, “contracts over similar periods of time have been considered to satisfy the 
duration test for an investment.”112 The latter tribunal also ruled that guarantee periods should be 
taken into account when calculating the duration of an activity, as risks may arise during those 
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periods.113 However, in Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Morocco a construction contract of 20 months 
did not meet this criterion.114 It is the fact that the parties had agreed to extend the contract for 
another six months that enabled the contract to satisfy “the minimal duration observed by the 
doctrine which are 2 to 5 years.”115 Hence, tribunals have reached a consensus on the minimum 
length of time required to satisfy the duration criterion: two years. 
In Saipem v. Bangladesh, the construction of an oil pipeline contract of fourteen months 
was claimed by the defendant to not meet the two year minimum requirement.116 The tribunal 
held that duration should be calculated based on the “entire or overall operation,” thus “the entire 
or overall operation includes the Contract, the construction itself, the Retention Money, the 
warranty and the related ICC Arbitration.”117 The tribunal in this case reasoned that the duration 
criterion should be calculated based on the total duration of when risks to the foreign investor 
exist.118 The tribunal in Joy Mining v. Egypt also tied duration with risk.119 A contract for the 
sale of mining equipment was rejected as an “investment,” because payment had happened at an 
early stage in the contract.120 Hence, the “duration of the commitment is not particularly 
significant,” as most risks of the sale had ended when payment was made.121 
The Saipem and Joy Mining cases make clear that the minimum length of time required 
to satisfy the duration criterion is two years. Calculation of duration includes not only the 
duration of the project or contract, but also extends to periods where risk may exist. Thus, a one-
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year project will not satisfy the duration criterion; however, a one-year project with a one-year 
defect liability period will satisfy the duration criterion. 
A two-year minimum duration is reasonable and effectively filters out commercial 
activities from the jurisdiction of ICSID. However, the minimum duration requirement should 
not be strictly applied as in the cases above. Arbitrators following this approach should shorten 
the minimum length if all other characteristics of an “investment” exist, or if the nature and 
circumstances of the project at hand do not require a lengthy time to conclude. Also, arbitrators 
should respect the host country’s consent if that country had accepted to treat the economic 
activity as an “investment,” regardless of its short duration. 
b. Regularity of Profit and Return: The driving force behind investors seeking opportunities 
overseas is to gain profit. Even if no profits eventually materialize, the expectation of profits is a 
typical element of any investment. In commercial transactions the profit, if any, materializes 
immediately after the merchant receives the payment for his goods or services. In investments, 
however, the return may not be profit, as the investor needs to first recover the costs of the 
investment, usually over several years. Thus, it is the ‘regularity’ of return that differentiates 
investments from other commercial transactions. 
It can be said that the profit or regular return feature aims at keeping ‘not-for-profit’ 
organizations and companies outside the reach of ICSID.122 The issue of including not-for-profit 
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organizations in ICSID jurisdiction is controversial.123 However, the satisfaction of this feature 
requires the demonstration of a ‘regular and steady’ return, or the expectation thereof, rather than 
proof of profitability. 
In Joy Mining v. Egypt, a sales contract was considered not to meet the meaning of 
investment under the Convention, because “the duration of the commitment is not particularly 
significant, as evidenced by the fact that the price was paid in its totality at an early stage. 
Neither is therefore the regularity of profit and return.”124 The tribunal considered the full 
payment of the contract price not to be a “regular” return. Other tribunals have described this 
feature as “immaterial” to the question of investment, and that its presence or absence is not 
determinative on this question.125 Hence, the expectation of a regular return or profit will suffice 
for this purpose, if there is no actual return. 
c. Assumption of Risk: Investments, as long-term projects with the expectation of profits, entail 
some form of risk assumed by both parties (i.e., the host country and the foreign investor).126 
This risk is different from that associated with commercial transactions. The type of risk required 
for an activity to be considered an “investment” must be “other than normal commercial 
risks.”127 It should not be an inherent risk in the contract, but rather “a special feature of the 
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Contract” that affects the investor’s decision to undertake the project.128 Therefore, activities that 
entail regular commercial risks, such as the risk non-performance by one of the parties or the 
termination of contract, fall outside the scope of “investments” as required under the 
Convention.129 
One tribunal tried to define “risk” in this sense by stating that it is a situation where the 
investor “cannot be sure of a return on his investment, and may not know the amount he will end 
up spending, even if all relevant counterparties discharge their contractual obligations. Where 
there is ‘risk’ of this sort, the investor simply cannot predict the outcome of the transaction.”130 
Another tribunal identified this criterion as “an economic risk entailed, in the sense of an 
uncertainty regarding its successful outcome.”131 
The tribunal in Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malaysia considered the risk inherent in a 
salvage contract, which was on a ‘no-find-no-pay’ basis. The tribunal found that most salvage 
contracts are concluded on a ‘no-find-no-pay’ basis, hence: 
The risks assumed under the Contract were no more than ordinary commercial 
risks assumed by many salvors in a salvage contract. The Claimant has not 
provided any convincing reasons why the risks assumed under the Contract were 
anything other than normal commercial risks.132 
The tribunal confirmed that ordinary commercial risks are not investments within the 
meaning of the Convention. It noted that the risk criterion should be satisfied in a qualitative, not 
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quantitative, sense; therefore, even if the Claimant had satisfied the risk criterion “in a 
quantitative sense (i.e., that there was inherent risk assumed under the Contract), the quality of 
the assumed risk was not something which established ICSID practice and jurisprudence would 
recognize.”133 
The tribunal in Fedex v. Venezuela found that “the very existence of a dispute . . . 
evidences the risk.”134 Although this case was decided a decade before Malaysian Salvors, it is 
somewhat peculiar in its consideration of the existence of a dispute as an investment risk. Any 
transaction is under the risk of dispute for non-performance. Thus, this would easily fall under 
common commercial risks. Other tribunals have considered political and economic climates of a 
country to constitute an investment risk. In Ioannis Kardassopoulos v. Georgia the tribunal 
found that the political and economic climates in Georgia following its independence in 1991 
constituted an investment risk.135 
d. Substantial Commitment of Resources: The term in “investment” in its most basic and 
simple definitions require the commitment of capital, or other resources, for a certain period of 
time to gain revenue. Thus, a substantial commitment of resources is key to differentiate between 
investments that fall within the scope of the Convention and other commercial transactions. 
However, a substantial commitment does not mean the financial value of the investment. 
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The drafters of the ICSID Convention considered and rejected a minimum amount in 
dispute as a requirement for ICSID jurisdiction.136 Therefore, monetary contribution in a project, 
while it constitutes a factor, should not be the only determinant of whether there is an 
‘investment’ within the meaning of the Convention. In fact, it would be arbitrary to have 
monetary contribution as the main and only determinate, as monetary contributions have 
different values depending on the investor and the host country. To illustrate this point, an 
investment of USD 250,000 for a startup company might be substantial, however, it is a trivial 
amount for companies like Chevron or Microsoft. This also applies to where the investment is 
made. An investment project of USD 250,000 might be substantial in an underdeveloped 
country. However, such an amount is seen insignificant in well-developed and wealthy countries 
like the USA or UK. 
Tribunals should consider several factors when deciding if there is a substantial 
commitment of resources. These factors should include the resources the foreign investor has 
committed and imported to the host country, such as know-how, employment opportunities, 
technology, and capital. The tribunal in Bayinder v. Pakistan acknowledged this by stating “to 
qualify as an investment, the project in question must constitute a substantial commitment on the 
side of the investor. In the case at hand, it cannot be seriously contested that Bayindir made a 
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significant contribution, both in terms of know-how, equipment and personnel and in financial 
terms.”137 
In Malaysian Salvors v. Malaysia, the tribunal held that the substantiality of an 
investment should not be determined solely on its economic contribution, even if it is the largest 
financial contribution in its respective industry. Rather, “to determine whether the Contract is an 
investment the litmus test must be its overall contribution to the economy of the host State.”138 
The Malaysian Salvors tribunal thus followed the line of reasoning adopted in Bayinder v. 
Pakistan; however, it clarified that assessment should be based on the “overall contribution to 
the economy.”139 
e. Contribution to the Economic Development of the Host State: While the other features 
relate to the economic activity itself (duration, risk, expectation of profits, and commitment of 
resources), this feature looks at the host state’s motivation to accept and protect the economic 
activity at question.140 It is well known that countries attract foreign investments to benefit from 
the resources and expertise that foreign investors bring to their economies. In return of these 
benefits, and to encourage their inflow, the host country offers foreign investors protections and 
incentives under the investment treaty.141 
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This feature is the most controversial of all other features of an investment under the 
restrictive approach.142 The controversy arises from “the subjective character of this element and 
the resulting difficulty to ascertain its presence in a given investment.”143 
The ICSID Convention was founded on the vision that protection of foreign investments 
encourages capital flows around the globe, consequently boosting the economic development of 
countries. This view is explicitly expressed in the preamble of the Convention, which reads 
“Considering the need for international cooperation for economic development, and the role of 
private international investment therein.”144 Therefore, some tribunals have adopted the view 
that this feature is essential when considering whether an economic activity qualifies as an 
investment within the meaning of the Convention. The tribunal in Malaysian Salvors v. Malaysia 
noted this feature to be “of considerable, even decisive importance.”145 
In Patrick Mitchell v. Congo, Mr. Mitchell, an American lawyer, established a law firm 
in Congo. In 1999, pursuant to a Military Court order, security forces raided the premises of the 
law firm, sealed it, and seized some of its documents and items. Some lawyers working in the 
firm were detained during the raid.146 Mr. Mitchell filed an expropriation claim against the 
Government of Congo at ICSID. The first award was in favor of Mr. Mitchell.147 However, this 
award was rejected by the Annulment Committee on the grounds of lacking merit, manifest 
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excess of powers, and failure of the tribunal to state reasons when they found that the legal 
practice was an investment under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.148 The Annulment 
Committee, in its effort to determine whether a law firm constitutes an “investment” within the 
meaning of the Convention, elaborated on the “contribution to the development of the host state” 
feature, and summarized the previous case law in this respect: 
28. The Preamble of the Washington Convention sets forth a number of basic 
principles as to its purpose and aims, which imbue the individual provisions of the 
Convention, including Article 25… 
29. It is thus quite natural that the parameter of contributing to the economic 
development of the host State has always been taken into account, explicitly or 
implicitly, by ICSID arbitral tribunals in the context of their reasoning in applying 
the Convention, and quite independently from any provisions of agreements 
between parties or the relevant bilateral treaty. 
30. Indeed, in the Salini case, the contribution to the economic development of the 
host State was explicitly set as a ‘criterion’ for an investment which was 
subsequently taken into account in respect of the construction of a highway, 
which led to the conclusion that the highway was clearly of public interest. 
Similarly, in the Fedax case, which involved promissory notes issued by the 
Republic of Venezuela to guarantee a loan equivalent to their amount, the arbitral 
tribunal observed that: ‘It is quite apparent that the transactions involved in this 
case are not ordinary commercial transactions and indeed involve a fundamental 
public interest […] There is clearly a significant relationship between the 
transaction and the development of the host State.’ Finally, in the CSOB case, 
which involved a ‘consolidation agreement’ between the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, and the Czechoslovak bank CSOB, with each of the two new States 
guaranteeing the reimbursement of the loan granted by CSOB to its national 
Collection Company, the Arbitral Tribunal observed that: ‘Under certain 
circumstances a loan may contribute substantially to a State’s economic 
development […] [The] undertaking involved a significant contribution by CSOB 
to the economic development of the Slovak Republic within the meaning of the 
Convention.’ While it is true that in these cases, where explicit reference was 
made to the “contribution to the economic development of the host State,” the 
concept of investment was somewhat ‘broadened,’ this does nothing to alter the 
fundamental nature of that characteristic. It is thus found that, in another group of 
cases where the contribution to the economic development of the host State had 
not been mentioned expressly, it was doubtless covered by the very purpose of the 
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contracts in question – all of which were State contracts – which had an obvious 
and unquestioned impact on the development of the host State. 
31. In addition to the foregoing, it bears noting that Professor Schreuer regards the 
contribution to the economic development of the host State as ‘the only possible 
indication of an objective meaning’ of the term ‘investment’ … 
32. … the same Treaty [U.S. – Congo BIT] also recognizes clearly in its Preamble 
that agreement upon the treatment to be accorded such investment will stimulate 
the flow of private capital and the economic development of both Parties. 
Moreover, this is a provision that appears in all bilateral treaties signed by the 
United States, and was even emphasized in the Preamble to the 2004 Model BIT. 
33. The ad hoc Committee wishes nevertheless to specify that, in its view, the 
existence of a contribution to the economic development of the host State as an 
essential – although not sufficient – characteristic or unquestionable criterion of 
the investment, does not mean that this contribution must always be sizable or 
successful; and, of course, ICSID tribunals do not have to evaluate the real 
contribution of the operation in question. It suffices for the operation to contribute 
in one way or another to the economic development of the host State, and this 
concept of economic development is, in any event, extremely broad but also 
variable depending on the case.149 
The Annulment Committee found that Mr. Mitchell’s law firm did not contribute to the 
development of Congo, thus it did not qualify as an ‘investment’ within the meaning of the 
Convention.150 The cases cited in the Annulment Committee’s decision, and others, consider the 
“contribution to the development of the host state” as an important feature of an “investment” as 
required by the Convention. However, other tribunals have had an opposite view. 
In Phillip Morris v. Uruguay, the tribunal noted that the preamble of the Convention and 
the preambles of BITs, referring to economic development, are “too general to permit the 
drawing of definitive conclusions regarding the need for the investment to contribute to the host 
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State’s economic development.”151 This aligns with the position taken in Electrabel v. Hungary, 
where the tribunal opined that the economic development of the host State “is one of the 
objectives of the ICSID Convention and a desirable consequence of the investment, but it is not 
necessarily an element of an investment.”152 The tribunal in Saba Fakes v. Turkey held the same 
position, noting that the preamble of the Convention referring to this goal is a desired 
consequence, but that it would be “excessive to attribute to this reference a meaning and function 
that is not obviously apparent from its wording.”153 The latter tribunal opined that the economic 
development of the host state through foreign investment is an expected goal; however, “certain 
investments expected to be fruitful may turn out to be economic disasters. They do not fall, for 
that reason alone, outside the ambit of the concept of investment.”154 
The divergent views on this criterion show that there is far from a consensus among 
ICSID tribunals. From a host country’s point of view, economic development is the main reason 
to attract foreign investors into their territory.155 Hence it becomes natural that the host country 
will want to provide treaty protection to those investments that contribute to its development. 
The assessment of whether the investment project in question has contributed to the development 
of the host country should not be at the time of dispute. Indeed, as the tribunal in Saba Fakes 
noted, at the time of the dispute the investment project may not be a success story and may have 
caused harm to the host state’s economy. Hence, a better proposition would be to assess the 
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contribution at the time when the foreign investment entered the host country and was 
established. The question should be: did the foreign investment project have the potential to 
contribute to the development of the host country at the time it entered? If the answer is in the 
affirmative then - even if it does not eventually materialize - the project should be regarded as an 
“investment” within the meaning of the Convention. The assessment should look at the impact 
the foreign investment was to make on the economy and community of the host country when it 
was entered. 
It is important that an economic activity contributes, or is at least expected to contribute, 
to the development of the host country. In order for an investment to gain the protection and 
incentives given by the host country, it must fulfill its part of the “grand bargain.”156 
The expectation of return and profit feature is also one of the areas where investor-state 
tribunals have not reached an agreement, as some categorize it under the feature of risk.157 
Therefore, the features that are generally agreed upon by most arbitrators following the 
restrictive approach are: duration, risk, and the commitment of resources. There is a consensus 
between arbitrators that these features are intertwined, and that the satisfaction of one feature can 
indicate the satisfaction of other features.158 For example, if a substantial amount of resources is 
committed to a project, that can serve as an indication of the satisfaction of the ‘contribution to 
the host state development’ feature, and so forth. However, these features, although usually 
considered individually, should be assessed collectively due to their interdependent nature.159 
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4. The Correct Approach? 
As the definition of ‘investment’ is not found in the Convention, one should give considerable 
attention to the drafters’ objectives and purposes behind this omission. The omission of a 
definition was not due to the drafters’ inability to define the term, but rather it was deliberately 
left undefined.160 The drafters of the Convention, after a long debate, opted to leave the term 
undefined to give the Convention a wide-open jurisdiction.161 Different countries have different 
purposes and perceptions on the matter of foreign investment; therefore, they are better 
positioned to define the term in accordance to their needs and objectives.162 Hence, the drafters 
transferred the burden of defining the term ‘investment’ from the Convention to individual 
countries.163 This thereby gave them the ability to decide what activities they would consider as 
‘investments’ worthy of ICSID arbitration in their national laws, investment contracts, and 
BITs.164 
The World Bank Executive Directors’ Report provides that “the Executive Directors did 
not think it necessary or desirable to attempt to define the term ‘investment’ given the essential 
requirement of consent of the parties and the fact that Contracting States could make known in 
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advance within what limits they would consider making use of the facilities of the Centre. Thus 
each Contracting State could, in effect, write its own definition.”165 
Given the fact that the drafters opted for a wide-open jurisdiction for the Center by not 
defining the term ‘investment,’ the drafters also created a set of opt-out mechanisms that 
individual countries can use to tailor the forms of investment eligible for protection in their 
particular circumstances.166 In the latter option, states can notify the Center of any disputes they 
wish not to arbitrate under ICSID, even if those disputes arise from an “investment” under their 
national laws, contracts, or BITs.167 
Thus, an “investment” can be described as a “status” that a country consents to grant to 
certain foreign economic activities operating on its soil that enables them to enjoy the protection 
of international law. This status is given to foreign economic activities that fit certain criteria that 
the host country incorporates in its BIT or local laws. Any economic activity fulfilling that 
definition is considered an “investment,” which the state consents, in advance, to elevate to 
ICSID jurisdiction in case of dispute. While the State parties have a wide margin in defining the 
                                                 
165 History of the ICSID Convention: Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States § 2, part 1, at 972 (ICSID 2009 
reprint) [emphasis added]. 
166 Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention sets the opt-out mechanism by contracting states, “Any Contracting State 
may, at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention or at any time thereafter, notify the 
Centre of the class or classes of disputes which it would or would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the 
Centre. The Secretary-General shall forthwith transmit such notification to all Contracting States. Such notification 
shall not constitute the consent required by paragraph (1).” 
167 Until May 2016 seven countries have submitted their reservations in accordance with Article 25(4) of the ICSID 
Convention. Examples of these reservations are: (China: excludes all complaints not based on expropriation or 
nationalization), (Saudi Arabia: reserves the right not to submit any questions pertaining to oil, or pertaining to acts 
of sovereignty), (Turkey: will submit only disputes arising directly out of an investment which has been approved by 
the authorities). Other countries that made reservations are (Guatemala, Indonesia, Jamaica, and Papua New 
Guinea). See CONTRACTING STATES AND MEASURES TAKEN BY THEM FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE 
CONVENTION. (ICSID, 2016). At section 8-D (NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING CLASSES OF DISPUTES 
CONSIDERED SUITABLE OR UNSUITABLE FOR SUBMISSION TO THE CENTRE). Available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Documents/ICSID%208-Contracting%20States%20and% 
20Measures%20Taken%20by%20Them%20for%20the%20Purpose%20of%20the%20Convention.pdf. 
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term, they should always consider the objectives and purpose of the Convention, thus not 
including transactions that are clearly unrelated to the general concept of “investment.”168 
It is clear that the intention and goal of the drafters was to follow the deferential approach 
in defining “investment” under the Convention.169 Tribunals should consider this historical 
background and respect state autonomy in this matter. Any economic activity fulfilling the 
definition of investment in the consent documents of the host state should be allowed access to 
ICSID arbitration. Access to ICSID should not be restricted to activities that are found to be 
“investments” in the arbitrators’ view (i.e., the restrictive approach).170 The only barrier to 
arbitration under ICSID should be where the definition of investment in the host country’s law or 
BIT is disconnected from the objective purpose of the Convention (i.e., a definition that includes 
pure commercial transactions, or disputes arising from non-legal grounds). This is the position 
taken by the founders of the Convention; they stated that “Consent of the parties is the 
cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Centre.”171 However, that consent should be within the 
objectives of the Convention, hence “While consent of the parties is an essential prerequisite for 
the jurisdiction of the Centre, consent alone will not suffice to bring a dispute within its 
jurisdiction. In keeping with the purpose of the Convention, the jurisdiction of the Centre is 
further limited by reference to the nature of the dispute and the parties thereto.”172 
                                                 
168 The parties of a BIT “have considerable freedom to determine for themselves whether, for the purpose of the 
ICSID Convention, their dispute arises out of an investment. That freedom is not, however, unlimited; it is not so 
extensive as to permit the parties to submit to arbitration under the ICSID Convention disputes that clearly do not 
relate to investments.” See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata & Antonio R. Parra, The Experience of the International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, 14 ICSID REVIEW 299, 307-08 (1999). 
169 SCHREUER, 74 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2012). 
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171 REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES para. 25 (World Bank 
1965). 
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The features used under the restrictive approach should not be used as jurisdictional 
requirements as some tribunals have done. The definition of “investment” is not static and keeps 
evolving with the needs and objectives of both host countries and investors. Thus, the term 
investment under the Convention should be given a broad and flexible interpretation. The 
position taken by the tribunal in Philip Morris v Uruguay is probably the most clear and 
balanced, as the tribunal discussed the restrictive approach by stating that: 
“[the] Salini test has received varied applications by investment treaty tribunals 
and doctrinal writings. In the Tribunal’s view, the four constitutive elements of 
the Salini list do not constitute jurisdictional requirements to the effect that the 
absence of one or the other of these elements would imply a lack of jurisdiction. 
They are typical features of investments under the ICSID Convention, not ‘a set of 
mandatory legal requirements.’ As such, they may assist in identifying or 
excluding in extreme cases the presence of an investment but they cannot defeat 
the broad and flexible concept of investment under the ICSID Convention to the 
extent it is not limited by the relevant [investment] treaty.”173 
The different views on the interpretation of Article 25(1) of the Convention have raised 
some serious concerns as to the Convention’s effectiveness in solving investment disputes. In 
Saba Fakes v. Turkey the tribunal voiced this concern by stating, “no unanimous approach has 
emerged so far from the existing case law” and that the “proposed solutions are inconsistent, if 
not conflicting, and do not provide any clear guidance to future arbitral tribunals.”174 Renowned 
practitioners in the field have also voiced their concerns on this matter. For example, Professor 
Dolzer noted that “the diversity of reasoning of the tribunals make it difficult to predict the 
direction of future jurisprudence.”175 
                                                 
173 PHILIP MORRIS BRANDS SÀRL, PHILIP MORRIS PRODUCTS S.A. and ABAL HERMANOS S.A. v 
ORIENTAL REPUBLIC OF URUGUAY, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 206 (ICSID, 2013). 
174 Mr. Saba Fakes v. Republic Of Turkey, para. 97 (Final Award), (ICSID, 2010). 
175 R. Dolzer, ‘The Notion of Investment in Recent Practice', in S. Chamovitz, D. Steger, & P. Van Den Bossche 
(eds.), LAW in the Service of Human Dignity: Essays in Honour of Plorentino Feliciano 261-275 at 275 (2005). 
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It is clear that not reaching a consensus on this matter will affect the development and 
effectiveness of the whole ICSID system. The agents of the investor-state arbitration system may 
start to select other venues to arbitrate their disputes (such as the ICC or SCC) to avoid the issue 
of proving that their investments qualify for the jurisdictional requirement of Article 25(1) of the 
ICSID Convention.176 They would save themselves the time, effort and money of doing so at 
ICSID if the tribunal reviewing their case follows the restrictive approach. Hence, there is a 
pressing need to harmonize the interpretation of “investment” under the Convention to preserve 
its role in international economic development.177 Professor Emmanuel Gaillard has expressed 
his hopes that the current divergence between tribunals on the question of “investment” under the 
Convention “will be harmonized in a manner consistent with the all too often overlooked 
intentions of the Convention's drafters.”178 
F. POLICY GUIDELINES FOR THE DEFINITION OF INVESTMENT 
To better serve the goal of development through FDI, a state should determine its development 
needs and the objectives it seeks from attracting foreign investment. Once that determination is 
made, the country would be better positioned to tailor the definition of “investment” to reach 
                                                 
176 See in this regard Manciaux, 9 JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 443, para. 7 (2008). 
177 “The ICSID Convention and other investment protection treaties were created not for the sake of directing all 
private-public disputes into arbitration, but specifically in order to increase salutary economic activity and feed the 
engine of sustained development and prosperity around the world.” Noah Rubins, The Notion of 'Investment' in 
International Investment Arbitration, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: PROCEDURAL AND 
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178 Emmanuel Gaillard, Identify or Define? Reflections on the Evolution of the Concept of Investment in ICSID 
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those goals. For example, a country that is in need of foreign capital and hard currency can adopt 
an “open asset-based definition” of investment to cover a large array of investment forms and 
encourage their inflow. On the other hand, a country aspiring to develop its energy sector, for 
example, might want to emphasize this objective in the BIT by adopting a closed asset-based 
definition that provides treaty protection to energy related FDI. 
The use of exceptions and exclusions in the definition of investment can be useful as 
well. By inserting exceptions in the definition of investment, the state will clarify, rather than 
narrow or restrict, the meaning of covered investments. Thus, a country might want to adopt an 
open asset-based definition to attract as much FDI as it can, but insert exceptions for some 
economic activities to exclude the latter from the ambit of that definition. For example, to clarify 
that it will not extend treaty protection to portfolio investments, a state can add an exception to 
that end while maintaining its open asset-based definition of investment, which provides treaty 
protection to “any kind of asset.” 
The use of limitations on the definition of investment can further help the host country in 
managing its exposure to investor-state arbitration. For example, requiring that the FDI be 
established and operate “in accordance with the host country laws,” and that it “has the 
characteristics of an investment,” will narrow the range of economic projects that can claim 
treaty benefits and protection. Additionally, these limitations ensure that the investment 
conforms to the host country’s national policies and laws, thus limiting the risks of FDI on the 
host economy. A host country may want to limit the application of the treaty to “approved” 
investments. By doing so, the host country can evaluate the impact of the investment on its 
economy and development. On the basis of that determination, the host country can allow the 
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investment to enter its territory with grant of treaty protection, allow it to enter its territory 
without grant of treaty protection, or deny it entry. 
It should be noted however, that a country seeking development should not adopt a single 
strategy or formula for defining “investment” in its investment treaties. Instead, the definition 
should be based on the desired types of FDI from each treaty partner. For example, the capital 
importing country might want to attract FDI in the mining and energy sectors from country (A), 
while not giving the latter access to its transport and infrastructure sectors. At the same time, the 
capital-importing country may want to attract investments in the field of transport and 
infrastructure from country (B), but not give it access to its energy sector. By adopting this 
strategy, the capital-importing country can control the types of FDI it wishes to attract from 
direct treaty partners. It will also be able to attract the best and most advanced technologies and 
know-how from capital-exporting countries that are known for their advancement in a specific 
sector. For example, attracting investments in the nuclear energy sector from North American or 
Western European countries, where such sector is highly advanced, might be better than 
attracting this type of investment from Asian or African countries, where the same sector is not 
as advanced. 
Another issue related to the definition of investment can be the inclusion of certain 
requirements to the definition. These requirements enable treaty protection only when they are 
satisfied by the foreign investor. For example, a country with high unemployment rates can 
require foreign investors to employ a certain quota of nationals. The host country can be stricter 
in this regard by requiring employment of its nationals in specific levels of management and 
technical positions to ensure the transfer of know-how and managerial skills. The host country 
can also require that the assets covered under the investment treaty must be used in a commercial 
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or business operation. Thus, vacation assets or other personal assets of the foreign investor in the 
host country will not be covered by treaty protection. The requirement of physical presence in 
the host country can ensure that only real investments that contribute to the development of the 
host country will be covered under the treaty. 
Many BITs provide in their preambles that the objective of the BIT is to enhance 
economic relations and economic development of its parties. However, they do not include this 
objective in the definition of covered investment. Hence, host countries might want to include a 
“contribution to development” requirement in their definition.179 This will be a useful way to 
target and encourage those investments that provide development benefits to the host country. It 
will also clearly indicate that the protection of the investment treaty should be balanced with the 
host country’s expectation of development from the foreign investment. This will allow the host 
country to raise this as a defense in investor-state arbitration should future disputes arise. 
II. THE DEFINITION OF ‘FOREIGN INVESTORS’ 
International investment law is designed to protect natural and juridical foreign investors who 
invest their resources overseas. Therefore, not only should the economic activity in the host state 
fit the definition of “investment” under the investment treaty to enjoy protection, but it should 
also be conducted by a “foreign investor.” Similarly, for investor-state dispute resolution under 
                                                 
179 UNCTAD supports a including a development-based definition for “investment” in future BITs. SCOPE AND 
DEFINITION - UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, at 119-22 (United Nations 
2011). 
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the ICSID Convention, “a national of another Contracting State” is required to enable ICSID 
jurisdiction to review the dispute.180 
The foreignness of an investor, whether it be a natural or juridical person, is determined 
via its nationality.181 Determining the investor’s nationality can be a complex issue, especially 
when the foreign investor is a juridical person incorporated in several countries and consisting of 
different layers of ownership.182 This section will discuss the definition of “investor” and the 
related qualifications for rights under investment treaties and the ICSID Convention. 
A. FOREIGN INVESTORS UNDER INVESTMENT TREATIES 
Almost uniformly, investment treaties will contain a definition of either “investors”183 or 
“nationals,”184 and in some instances a definition of both terms.185 A typical definition is wide 
enough to include both natural and juridical persons. The U.S. Model BIT defines ‘investor of a 
party’ as: 
[A] Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an enterprise of a Party, 
that attempts to make, is making, or has made an investment in the territory of the 
other Party.186 
                                                 
180 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1965). 
Article 25(1). 
181 Dolzer and Schreuer suggest that “it is most appropriate to refer to investors in general not as ‘she’ or ‘he’ but as 
‘it’” due to the fact that most investors are companies. See SCHREUER, 44 n.3 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2012). 
182 CHRISTOPHER DUGAN, 291 (Oxford University Press. 2008). 
183 e.g., Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (2007). Article 1(3). 
184 e.g., Between The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and The Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (2009). Article 1(c). 
185 e.g., U.K. - U.A.E. BIT, (1992). Article 1(e). 
186 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012). Article 1. 
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This definition includes three categories of foreign persons which, for purposes of the 
BIT, are “foreign investors” eligible for treaty protection. The first category is states and state 
enterprises; here, the BIT gives “foreign investor” status to the state itself and its administrative 
agencies, if they invest in the other party’s territory.187 The second category is natural persons 
investing in the territory of the other contracting party.188 The third category is legal, or juridical, 
persons from one party investing in the territory of the other treaty party.189 
The three categories of investors in the U.S. Model BIT definition are commonly found, 
with variation, in most BITs. However, the issue of whether the investor is eligible to claim 
treaty protection depends on the existence of a link between the investor and one of the 
contracting parties of the BIT.190 Proving the existence of this link depends on whether the 
investor is a natural or legal person, and also depends on the requirements of the investment 
treaty in this regard. This link between the natural person and one of the investment treaty parties 
is established via the investor’s nationality. 
1. Natural Persons as ‘Investors’ 
The issue of establishing a link between a natural investor and one of the treaty parties does not 
entail much complexity. This link is determined via nationality; the natural investor should be 
                                                 
187 See Mark Feldman, The Standing of State-Owned Entities Under Investment Treaties in YEARBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2010-2011, at 633 (Karl P. Sauvant ed. 2012). Also, the U.S. Model 
Treaty defines ‘State enterprise’ as “an enterprise owned, or controlled through ownership interests, by a Party 
[state].” 
188 The U.S. Model Treaty defines a ‘National’ in regards to the United States as “a natural person who is a national 
of the United States as defined in Title III of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” 
189 The U.S. Model Treaty defines a ‘enterprise’ as “any entity constituted or organized under applicable law, 
whether or not for profit, and whether privately or governmentally owned or controlled, including a corporation, 
trust, partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture, association, or similar organization; and a branch of an 
enterprise.” 
190 SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 207 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2015). 
156 
endowed with the nationality of one of the contracting parties, and make an investment in the 
territory of the other party.191 Consequently, the natural person should be foreign in the host 
country. 
Investment treaties usually refer to natural and juridical persons as “nationals.”192 A 
national of a country is one who holds its nationality.193 Hence, the general meaning of the term 
“national” - in the context of natural persons - is limited to those who hold the nationality of that 
country. However, some BITs explicitly extend the meaning of this term to include permanent 
residents.194 Thus, the contracting parties agree to offer permanent residents of one country, even 
though not citizens, the advantage of benefiting from the treaty if they make an investment in the 
other party’s territory. 
As a principle, the acquisition or loss of nationality is a matter of domestic jurisdiction.195 
Thus, arbitral tribunals, and interpreters of the investment treaty, should accord great weight to 
the national laws of the country whose nationality is claimed to rule on the question of 
nationality.196 Investment treaties usually express this principle by stating that a “national” of 
one party is one who holds that nationality, or permanent residency status, in accordance with its 
domestic laws.197 Even in scenarios where this principle is not explicitly expressed in the 
                                                 
191 CHRISTOPHER DUGAN, 296 (Oxford University Press. 2008). 
192 e.g., UK Model BIT (2008). U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012). 
193 See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, "NATIONAL, ADJ. AND N." (Oxford University Press.). “A citizen or subject of 
a (usually specified) state; a person whom a state is entitled under international law to protect in its relations with 
other states.” 
194 e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1992). At Article 201(1) which defines a “national” as “a 
natural person who is a citizen or permanent resident of a Party.” See also Canada - Argentina BIT (1991). At 
Article 1(b) which defines ‘investor’ as “any natural person possessing the citizenship of or permanently residing in 
a Contracting Party in accordance with its laws.” 
195 See CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, para. 642 (Cambridge University Press 2 ed. 2009). 
196 Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v The United Arab Emirates para. 55 (Final Award), (ICSID, 2004). 
197 E.g., The U.K. - Colombia BIT (2014). Defines an ‘Investor’ as “in respect of the United Kingdom: Physical 
persons deriving their status as United Kingdom nationals from the law in force in the United Kingdom.” See also 
U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012). 
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investment treaty,198 it is accepted in international law “that nationality is within the domestic 
jurisdiction of the State, which settles, by its own legislation, the rules relating to the acquisition 
(and loss) of its nationality.”199 
An issue arises when a natural investor holds the nationalities of both contracting parties 
of the investment treaty. BITs usually offer a solution to this issue by explicitly stating that “a 
natural person who is a dual national shall be deemed to be exclusively a national of the State of 
his or her dominant and effective nationality.”200 
The doctrine of effective nationality appeared and developed in the context of diplomatic 
protection.201 A country cannot espouse a claim of an injured individual unless the latter was a 
national of that country.202 However, if the injured individual is a national of both countries (the 
home and the host states), then the state that holds the right to espouse his claims is the state of 
his effective nationality. The ICJ affirmed this customary rule in the Nottebohm case,203 where it 
said that international tribunals have “given their preference to the real and effective nationality.” 
The ICJ provided indicators for determining the effective nationality of a dual citizen: 
Different factors are taken into consideration, and their importance will vary 
from one case to the next: the habitual residence of the individual concerned is an 
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important factor, but there are other factors such as the center of his interests, his 
family ties, his participation in the public life, attachment shown by him for a 
given country and inculcated in his children etc.204 
2. Natural Investors under ICSID 
The requirements for ICSID jurisdiction over “investors” are similar to those of “investments.” 
Foreign investors that wish to invoke dispute settlement under the Convention must pass a dual 
test. First, they have to fit within the definition ascribed to “investors” in the documents giving 
consent to ICSID arbitration (usually in the BIT). Second, the foreign investor must meet the 
nationality requirements under the ICSID Convention. Under the ICSID Convention, natural 
persons must meet the conditions specified in Article 25(2)(a), which stipulates that a “national 
of another contracting state” means: 
Any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the 
State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit 
such dispute to conciliation or arbitration as well as on the date on which the 
request was registered pursuant to paragraph (3) of Article 28 or paragraph (3) 
of Article 36, but does not include any person who on either date also had the 
nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute.205 
This provision conditions qualification for ICSID jurisdiction by requiring that a natural investor 
must be i) a national of a signatory state to the Convention, and ii) not a national of the host state, 
or a dual national holding the nationality of the host state. Hence, the question of ICSID 
jurisdiction also relies on determining the nationality of the natural investor. 
The ICSID Convention does not provide any guidance on the question of nationality. 
Thus, arbitral tribunals ruling on the question of nationality should, referring to the general rule 
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under the law of diplomatic protection, apply the national laws of the country whose nationality 
is claimed.206 This customary rule is incorporated in the Convention on Certain Questions 
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, which provides that: “[any] question as to whether 
a person possesses the nationality of a particular State shall be determined in accordance with the 
law of that State.”207 
However, the international law of diplomatic protection limits the weight that tribunals 
should accord to the national laws of the country of nationality.208 The ICJ tribunal in the 
Nottebohm case explained this limitation by stating that whether a country is entitled to exercise 
diplomatic protection “does not depend on the law or on the decision of … that State,” but rather 
“[i]t is international law which determines whether [it] is entitled to exercise [diplomatic] 
protection and to seise the Court.”209 Therefore, international tribunals should give substantial 
difference to the national laws of the country whose nationality is claimed; however, this shall 
not be conclusive on the question of nationality. 
The tribunal in Soufraki v. U.A.E. affirmed this doctrine.210 Mr. Soufraki brought an 
ICSID case under the Italy-UAE BIT.211 The UAE objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal on 
the grounds that Mr. Soufraki was not a national of Italy. Soufraki provided the tribunal with 
several certificates of nationality and passports to prove his Italian nationality. The tribunal 
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examined these documents and ultimately decided that Mr. Soufraki did not provide sufficient 
evidence to prove his Italian nationality.212 In its analysis of the matter, the tribunal stated: 
It is accepted in international law that nationality is within the domestic 
jurisdiction of the State, which settles, by its own legislation, the rules relating to 
the acquisition (and loss) of its nationality. Article 1(3) of the BIT reflects this 
rule. But it is no less accepted that when, in international arbitral or judicial 
proceedings, the nationality of a person is challenged, the international tribunal 
is competent to pass upon that challenge. It will accord great weight to the 
nationality law of the State in question and to the interpretation and application 
of that law by its authorities. But it will in the end decide for itself whether, on the 
facts and law before it, the person whose nationality is at issue was or was not a 
national of the State in question and when, and what follows from that finding. 
Where, as in the instant case, the jurisdiction of an international tribunal turns on 
an issue of nationality, the international tribunal is empowered, indeed bound, to 
decide that issue.213 
Dual nationals holding the nationality of the host state are explicitly barred from ICSID 
jurisdiction by virtue of article 25(2)(a) of the Convention.214 The Executive Directors’ Report 
notes that “a natural person who was a national of the State party to the dispute would not be 
eligible to be a party in proceedings under the auspices of the Centre, even if at the same time he 
had the nationality of another State. This ineligibility is absolute and cannot be cured even if the 
State party to the dispute had given its consent.”215 Hence, host state nationals cannot use the 
ICSID Convention to sue their governments, because such individuals receive protection from 
the legal system of the state of which they are nationals.216 However, a situation can be imagined 
where a natural person may be a dual citizen holding the nationality of the host country by virtue 
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of the jus sanguinis principle,217 but have no real ties to the host country. It appears that 
international tribunals deal with this matter in a formalistic fashion and forbid the dual national 
from recourse to ICSID.218 
To qualify for ICSID Jurisdiction, the foreign investor must not be a national of the host 
country, but must be a national of a signatory country to the Convention, on two critical dates: on 
the date when the foreign investor and the host country consent to ICSID arbitration,219 and on 
the date when the foreign investor officially registers its arbitration request. The Convention, 
from its wording, does not require continuity of nationality between these two dates.220 
Accordingly, if the foreign investor acquires the nationality of the host state during the 
proceedings of the ICSID arbitration, this shall not affect jurisdiction. 
B. JURIDICAL PERSONS AS “INVESTORS” 
Most foreign investments are made by juridical persons. Whether a juridical person qualifies as 
an “investor” under the investment treaty is more complex. This is due to the nature of 
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218 See Champion Trading Company v Arab Republic of Egypt (Decision on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 2003). The 
ICSID Working Group had raised this question, however it expressed its “unwillingness to deal in the Convention 
with the problem of involuntary acquisitions of nationality, feeling that it would be up to the Tribunals concerned to 
decide whether forced nationality would have to be taken into account or could be disregarded.” See History of the 
ICSID Convention: Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States § 2, Part II, at 868 (ICSID 2009 Reprint). 
219 This consent must be in writing and can be in the form of a standing offer in a BIT or national investment law, a 
clause in an investment contract or in an arbitration agreement between the parties. See CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, 191-
92 (Cambridge University Press 2 ed. 2009). 
220 Id. at 276. 
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corporations, which can be incorporated and owned by various stockholders, in several layers of 
ownership, and in multiple countries. 
Investment treaties usually define juridical investors in a broad sense to include various 
types of legal entities.221 The definitions are wide enough to encompass both commercial and 
not-for-profit entities.222 The inclusion of not-for-profit organizations comes from the fact that 
they, in some cases, provide the host country with resources and capital, such as building and 
operating schools and hospitals. Also, these organizations may invest their capital in commercial 
projects to gain revenue for their not-for-profit projects. Hence, their contribution to the host 
state’s economy and development via the injection of capital, resources, and expertise is similar 
to that of foreign investors. Consequently, their status as ‘not-for-profit’ organizations seems of 
little significance, and they are therefore given treaty protection.223 
The broad definition of juridical investors in investment agreements is also wide enough 
to include both privately-owned and governmentally-owned enterprises. This is due to the fact 
that many countries create enterprises with their surplus capital to conduct investment projects 
abroad. These governmentally owned or controlled enterprises are usually “indistinguishable 
from the completely privately owned enterprise both in their legal characteristics and in their 
activities.”224 Hence, the distinction between private versus government-owned enterprises 
                                                 
221 e.g., “any legal person or any other entity duly constituted or organized … whether or not for profit, and whether 
private or government owned or controlled, including any corporation, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship, joint 
venture, association, organisation or company.” Japan - Oman BIT (2015). Article 1(c). 
222 CHRISTOPHER DUGAN, 305 (Oxford University Press. 2008). 
223 SCOPE AND DEFINITION - UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, at 81 
(United Nations 2011). 
224 Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 354-55 (The Hague Academy of 
International Law ed. 1972). 
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becomes trivial and outdated, as their investments appear to be no different from investments 
made by private investors.225 
Similar to the situation with natural investors, the link between the juridical investor and 
one of the treaty parties is established via nationality. However, in contrast to natural investors, 
most investment agreements use one of the two main standards for determining nationality of 
juridical investors. These standards are: i) the country of organization or incorporation,226 and ii) 
the country of the seat.227 Many investment treaties use a combination of these standards.228 
Some investment treaties use the standard of “the country of ownership or control,” or include it 
as an additional standard, to widen - or in other cases to narrow - the scope of covered 
investors.229 
The preference for a particular nationality standard in an investment treaty depends on 
the various interests of the contracting parties and on legal, cultural, economic and political 
factors.230 Hence all choices are valid, and it is not appropriate to establish a general rule, as 
                                                 
225 SORNARAJAH, 68-69 (Cambridge University Press 3 ed. 2012). 
226 e.g., Japan - Oman BIT which defines an “enterprise of a Contracting Party” as “any legal person or any other 
entity duly constituted or organised under the applicable laws and regulations of that Contracting Party, whether or 
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partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture, association, organisation or company.” See Japan - Oman BIT 
(2015). Article 1(c). 
227 e.g., Germany - Afghanistan BIT which defines an “investor” as “any juridical person as well as any commercial 
or other company or, association with or without legal personality having its seat in the territory of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, irrespective of whether or not its activities are directed at profit.” See Germany - Afghanistan 
BIT (2005). Article 1(3)(a). 
228 e.g., Azerbaijan – San Marino BIT which defines an “investor” as “a company or other legal entity incorporated 
or duly constituted in accordance with applicable national legislation of one Contracting Party and having its seat 
and conducting substantial business activities within the state territory of that Contracting Party who makes an 
investment in the state territory of the other Contracting Party. See Azerbaijan - San Marino BIT (2015). Article 
1(3)(b). See also SCOPE AND DEFINITION - UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
II, at 81 (United Nations 2011). 
229 e.g., Switzerland – Georgia BIT allows “legal entities not established under the law of that Contracting Party but 
effectively controlled by natural persons … or by legal entities …” of the treaty party to qualify as “investors.” See 
Switzerland – Georgia BIT (2014). Article 1(1)(c). 
230 “There are two standard tests of the "nationality" of a corporation. The place of incorporation is the test 
generally favoured in the legal systems of the common law, while the siège social is more generally accepted in the 
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different states take different approaches on the question of qualifying investors for treaty 
protection.231 Nonetheless, the consequences of these approaches vary and lead to different 
results. A country seeking development from FDI should thus consider whether it prefers a wide 
range of qualifying investors, in order to attract as much FDI as possible, or a narrow and 
specific range of investors, in order to focus its efforts on quality investments. 
1. The country of organization or incorporation 
Under the place-of-incorporation standard, “a company, partnership or other business association 
is deemed to be attached to the legal order under which it was incorporated, irrespective of the 
place and seat of its economic activities.”232 This standard is the most common method for 
defining the nationality of juridical investors in investment treaties.233 This standard provides 
simplicity and certainty in determining a juridical investor’s nationality. It also allows a capital-
importing country an easy-to-satisfy standard in order to provide treaty coverage to a wide 
variety of investors and thus attract more foreign investments into its economy. 
On the other hand, the place-of-incorporation test may lead to disadvantageous results for 
both treaty parties. It is foreseeable, under such a standard, that nationals of the host state or 
nationals of non-contracting states would incorporate shell or mailbox companies in the territory 
                                                                                                                                                             
civil law systems.” See SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE JESSUP in the Barcelona Traction Decision of 1970, at 
para. 39. 
231 See Anthony C. Sinclair, The Substance of Nationality Requirements in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 20 ICSID 
REVIEW 357, 367 (2005). 
232 RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 35 (Kluwer Law International. 
1995). 
233 The tribunal in Tokios v Ukraine observed that “reference to the state of incorporation is the most common 
method of defining the nationality of business entities under modern BITs and traditional international law.” See 
Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine, para. 63 (Decision on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 2004). 
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of the other treaty party to create artificial links with the home country. The shell company will 
not have any real or significant economic ties with the home country, nor will it bring any new 
capital or resources to the host country, as the shell company is just a cover for nationals of the 
host country to enjoy treaty protection. At the same time, host countries trying to manage their 
exposure to investor-state claims may not want to grant treaty protection to investors that do not 
have real economic ties with their home country, or to nationals of third countries that do not 
grant the nationals of the host country any similar protections or privileges. Hence, the country 
of incorporation test can be an enticement for treaty shopping - where foreign investors from 
third states, or from the host state, establish companies in the other treaty party to enjoy treaty 
protection. Although the latter practice is not illegal per se,234 it does go against the purpose of 
granting benefits for FDI. 
To avoid treaty shopping under the “place-of-incorporation” standard, a development-
seeking country may include a “denial of benefits” clause in its investment treaties.235 This 
allows the contracting parties to ensure that the protections of the investment treaty are only 
available to those juridical investors that have sufficient economic ties with the home state.236 A 
typical denial of benefits clause reads as follows: 
Subject to prior notification and consultation, a Contracting Party may deny the 
benefits of this Agreement to an investor of the other Contracting Party that is an 
                                                 
234 The tribunal in Aguas de Tunari v Bolivia stated that “It is not uncommon in practice and –absent a particular 
limitation- not illegal to locate one’s operations in a jurisdiction perceived to provide a beneficial regulatory and 
legal environment in terms, for example, of taxation or the substantive law of the jurisdiction, including the 
availability of a BIT.” Aguas del Tunari S.A. v Republic of Bolivia para. 330(d) (Decision on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 
2005). See also Christoph Schreuer, Nationality of Investors: Legitimate Restrictions vs. Business Interests, 24 
ICSID REVIEW 521, 524 (2009). “The establishment of companies so as to obtain benefits from domestic law and 
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planning has become as much a standard feature of diligent management as tax planning.” 
235 Japan - Oman BIT (2015). Article 23(2). 
236 DAVID COLLINS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 87 (Cambridge University Press. 
2017). 
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enterprise of the other Contracting Party and to its investments if the enterprise is 
owned or controlled by an investor of a non-Contracting Party and the enterprise 
has no substantial business activities in the Area of the other Contracting 
Party.237 
Such a denial of benefits clause creates a twofold test. The first test entails evidencing 
that the juridical investor maintains business activities in its home country. This requires more 
than a “brass plate” office with an address.238 The second test entails the possibility of piercing 
the corporate veil to determine the real owners and controllers of the juridical investor.239 If the 
owners and controllers of the juridical investor are nationals of a non-contracting country to the 
investment treaty, or are nationals of the host country, then the parties of the treaty have the right 
to refuse to extend treaty protection to that juridical investor. 
The incorporation of a denial of benefits clause in an investment treaty is an effective 
method to shape the contours of the definition of investor based on “a holistic rather than 
scientific (voting shares and place of incorporation) [one].”240 Therefore, the use of denial of 
benefits clauses in investment treaties, and their effect in investor-state arbitrations, is 
growing.241 
                                                 
237 SCOPE AND DEFINITION - UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, at 93 
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239 Some investment treaties define ‘ownership’ and ‘control’ of juridical investors. For example the Swiss – 
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2. The country of the seat 
Some BITs use the standard of the company seat or “siège social” to provide treaty protection. 
Under this standard, only those juridical investors with an effective center of administration of 
their business operations in the home country will qualify as investors when investing in the host 
country.242 German BITs are notable for using this standard in their BITs;243 for example, the 
Germany–Jordan BIT provides that an “investor” means “any juridical person as well as any 
commercial or other company or association with or without legal personality having its seat in 
the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, irrespective of whether or not its activities are 
directed at profit.”244 
The seat of the company may not be as easy to determine as the “place-of-incorporation.” 
However, the seat standard reflects a more substantial economic relationship with the home 
country, thus avoiding the possibility of treaty shopping. Proof of a company seat requires that a 
business entity is effectively organized at that country. This can be established by evidencing 
that director and shareholder meetings are regularly held in that country, that there is top 
company management sitting within that country, that the company has a number of employees 
working in that country, that general expenses or overhead costs are incurred in that country for 
the maintenance of the physical location of the company in that country, and an address with 
phone and fax numbers in that country.245 
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Other BITs require the satisfaction of both standards (incorporation and seat) to qualify 
for coverage under treaty protection. For example, the Swiss–Georgia BIT defines “investor” as 
“legal entities, including companies, corporations, business associations and other organisations, 
which are constituted or otherwise duly organised under the law of that Contracting Party and 
have their seat, together with substantial business activities, in the territory of that Contracting 
Party.”246 It is noticeable that this definition requires “substantial business activities;” this is 
likely to strengthen the country of seat test further and avoid granting protection to shell 
companies.247 
Finally, a few investment treaties use the “country of ownership or control” as the 
standard for determining corporate nationality. Under this standard, a juridical person will be 
considered an investor of the state whose nationals own or control it.248 However, determining 
control is not an easy task;249 hence, some treaties combine this standard with the country of 
incorporation or country of seat standards.250 
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C. JURIDICAL INVESTORS UNDER ICSID 
The ICSID Convention does not define the concept of juridical persons.251 Although the concept 
is not defined, there are inherent characteristics in the term that should be present in a juridical 
claimant under ICSID. For example, a juridical investor must have legal personality under some 
legal system, normally the legal system of the state whose nationality is claimed.252 Therefore, 
mere associations of individuals or of juridical persons would not qualify for ICSID jurisdiction, 
even if the investment treaty giving consent to ICSID arbitration extends protection to 
associations without legal personality in their definitions of “investor.”253 
Article 25 of the Convention sets the requirement for ICSID jurisdiction over juridical 
investors. It requires that juridical investors have “the nationality of a Contracting State other 
than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such 
dispute to conciliation or arbitration.”254 Thus, a juridical investor must be a national of country 
other than that involved in the dispute. ICSID tribunals have uniformly adopted the place-of-
incorporation test or seat rather than control when determining the nationality of juridical 
claimants.255 The tribunal in Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine noted that, “Although Article 25(2)(b) of 
the Convention does not set forth a required method for determining corporate nationality, the 
generally accepted (albeit implicit) rule is that the nationality of a corporation is determined on 
                                                 
251 See Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention which defines a “National of another Contracting State" as “any 
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the basis of its siège social or place of incorporation.”256 Tribunals have also agreed that the 
Convention does not require any further investigation in regards to the real controllers of the 
juridical person, or any other requirements, so long as the juridical claimant fits within the 
“reasonable” definition and requirements ascribed to “investor” under the consent documents.257 
The tribunal in ADC v. Hungary affirmed the position by stating that, “the Tribunal cannot read 
more into the BIT than one can discern from its plain text.”258 
Many national laws require foreign investors to undertake their investment in the host 
country via a nationally incorporated legal entity. This allows the host country to monitor and 
supervise the activities of the foreign investor in its territory. However, since the foreign 
investment is undertaken via a national company, that company is a national of the host country 
under the country of incorporation test. Consequently, this would exclude the foreign investor 
from the domain of ICSID jurisdiction. The drafters of the convention were aware that a large 
and important group of investors would be outside the Convention’s scope if this issue were not 
explicitly addressed in the Convention.259 
Nationally incorporated companies controlled by foreign investors were thus added to the 
jurisdiction of ICSID as an exception to the general principle of the Convention, i.e., that it deals 
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exclusively with disputes between parties of diverse nationalities.260 Article 25(b)(2) of the 
Convention, which defines juridical nationals of other contracting states, can be divided into two 
clauses as follows: 
i) any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than 
the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit 
such dispute to conciliation or arbitration and 
ii) any juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to 
the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the parties have 
agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting State for the 
purposes of this Convention.261 
For the exception to apply, a national of the host country must meet two conditions as 
specified in the second clause of Article 25(b)(2). The first condition is the agreement of the host 
state to treat the national company as a foreign entity for purposes of the Convention. Without 
this agreement, ICSID jurisdiction will not exist. The second condition is the objective factor of 
foreign control. The tribunal will have to examine and establish foreign control of the national 
claimant to extend its jurisdiction to the dispute. 
The two conditions found in the second clause of Article 25(b)(2) of the Convention 
(agreement of the host country and foreign control) are independent of each other. The sole 
agreement by the host country to treat the locally incorporated company – because of its foreign 
control - as a national of another state for purposes of the Convention will not be sufficient to 
extend ICISD jurisdiction. Rather, although the latter creates a rebuttable presumption of foreign 
control,262 the tribunal will have to examine the facts of the case to determine whether foreign 
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control exists de facto. The tribunal in Vacuum Salt v. Ghana explained the independence of 
these two conditions by stating: 
The parties’ agreement to treat Claimant as a foreign national “because of foreign 
control” does not ipso jure confer jurisdiction. The reference in Article 25(2)(b) to 
“foreign control” necessarily sets an objective Convention limit beyond which 
ICSID jurisdiction cannot exist and parties therefore lack power to invoke same 
no matter how devoutly they may have desired to do so.263 
The requirement of obtaining the consent of the host country to treat the national 
company as a foreigner for purposes of the Convention does not entail much complexity. The 
Convention does not specify any form for that consent. A simple clause that explicitly or 
implicitly gives that effect in the BIT, national legislation, or investment contract would 
suffice.264 Determining foreign control, however, is more complicated. 
The Convention does not define “foreign control.” Giving a fixed definition of foreign 
control in the Convention would have frustrated its application, as corporate investors are usually 
complexly structured. However, neither should the question of foreign control be answered in a 
formalistic manner. A formalistic determination of foreign control would be based on the 
percentage of ownership alone. The percentage of ownership in shares or voting rights in a 
company is not a reliable indicator of control. Corporate lawyers know that in many situations 
minority shareholders can have more control over the management of a company than the 
majority shareholders. This is due to the various corporate structures and different schemes of 
voting rights and classes of shares. Therefore, the mere ownership of majority shares in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
“because of foreign control.” The Tribunal concludes that the existence of consent to an arbitration clause such as 
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company is not conclusive on the question of control. Consequently, foreign control is a factual 
element that should be determined objectively based on all the facts and circumstances present in 
a particular case. One tribunal noted the following in its interpretation of “foreign control”: 
The Tribunal notes, and itself confirms, that ‘foreign control’ within the meaning 
of the second clause of Article 25(2)(b) does not require, or imply, any particular 
percentage of share ownership. Each case arising under that clause must be 
viewed in its own particular context, on the basis of all of the facts and 
circumstances. There is no ‘formula.’ It stands to reason, of course, that 100 
percent foreign ownership almost certainly would result in foreign control, by 
whatever standard, and that a total absence of foreign shareholding would 
virtually preclude the existence of such control. How much is ‘enough,’ however, 
cannot be determined abstractly.265 
Determining foreign control requires a factual and objective examination of several 
factors in their totality on case-by-case basis. These factors include the amount of equity 
participation, voting rights, and management combined.266 Tribunals reviewing this question 
should give considerable weight to the parties’ definition of “foreign control” in the consent 
documents to the extent that it does not go against the objectives of the Convention.267 For 
example, it has been noted that foreign control in this sense does not mean actual control, but 
rather the legal capacity to exercise control.268 
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D. POLICY GUIDELINES FOR THE DEFINITION OF “INVESTOR” 
The approach a state takes when defining “investor” should be tied with the approach taken 
when defining “investment.” If the host country adopts an “open asset-based definition” of 
investments because of its policy of attracting a wide range of FDI, then it should adopt the 
“place-of-incorporation” definition for “investors.” This definition is easy to satisfy, giving a 
wide range of investors the ability to take advantage of the treaty; thus, it complements the 
approach followed in the definition of “investment.” The “state of incorporation” definition may 
create the opportunity for treaty shopping, but a capital-importing country striving for FDI might 
not consider this an issue, as long as it receives the investment. 
A country that seeks specific investments in specific felids, on the other hand, may want 
to adopt a “country of seat” definition. This type of definition ensures that there is a genuine link 
between the investor and his home country, thus managing the host state’s exposure to 
investment arbitration in the future. 
Similar to the situation in “investments,” the use of limitations and exceptions in the 
definition of “investor” can be beneficial. A capital-importing country seeking development from 
FDI may require foreign investors to have substantial business activities in the home country to 
benefit from treaty protection. It can require so by including a “denial of benefits” clause in the 
investment treaty. This will prevent treaty shopping and consequently manage its exposure to 
investment claims. Another limitation can be the requirement of “control;” under this 
requirement, the foreign investor must be controlled by nationals of the home country. Thus, a 
juridical investor not controlled by nationals of the home country, although incorporated or 
seated in the home country, will not qualify for treaty protection. 
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The definitions of “investment” and “investor” are key clauses in any investment treaty, 
as they will determine the scope and application of the treaty. Therefore, states should use their 
negotiation powers to tailor these definitions to target the kinds of “investments” and “investors” 
the state wants to attract to enhance its economic development. These definitions are also 
important for purposes of investor-state claims. Eventually, these definitions will become the 
cornerstone of jurisdiction for investor-state dispute settlement tribunals. Hence, a state that 
wants to manage its exposure to investment arbitration will have to be certain of the kinds of 
investments and investors it is willing to afford treaty protection. 
III. NATIONAL TREATMENT 
When investors commit large amounts of capital and resources in countries other than their own 
they are exposed to an array of risks. One of the risks is discriminatory treatment by the host 
country due to the investor’s foreign nationality. The host government may discriminate against 
foreign investors through laws, regulations or administrative decrees that favor its national 
investors. Eliminating the risk of discrimination based on foreign nationality is vital for the 
encouragement of FDI. 
The need to avoid discrimination against foreign investors due to their foreign nationality 
is the foundation of the national treatment and most-favored-nation standards. While the former 
protects foreign investors from protectionist measures by the host state that favor its national 
investors, the latter protects the foreign investor from discrimination that favors investors from 
other countries. This section will discuss the national treatment standard, and the subsequent 
section will discuss the most-favored-nation standard. 
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A. DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION 
The national treatment standard first appeared in trade agreements in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries,269 and has become a pillar of international trade law.270 Some commentators have 
found the national treatment concept to be evolved from the Calvo doctrine,271 but the current 
national treatment clauses found in modern investment treaties have a different purpose than that 
of the Calvo doctrine.272 In contemporary practice, national treatment connotes that foreign 
investors are to be given the benefits provided to national investors, and are not to be 
discriminated against because of their foreign nationality.273 The current interpretation of 
national treatment does not confine foreign investors to local remedies as did the Calvo clause. 
The universal objective that emerged after WWII of promoting worldwide free flow of 
capital by liberalizing investment and trade required that FDI occur with the least amount of 
restrictions.274 To achieve this goal, the national treatment standard was incorporated into 
modern investment treaties to provide assurance that foreign investors will receive treatment no 
less favorable than nationals of the host state. Some states granted foreign investors equal 
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treatment with national investors on both the pre-entry and post-entry stages,275 while others 
limited it to the post-entry stage.276 Hence, the national treatment standard became an instrument 
of economic liberalization and a driver of FDI in developing and developed countries.277 
The purpose of the national treatment standard is to provide a level playing field to 
foreign investors in the host country.278 It ensures that the host state will not make any negative 
differentiation between foreign and national investors through its laws or administrative 
actions.279 The host state commits to accord the foreign investor treatment “no less favorable” 
than the treatment it accords to similarly situated national investors.280 Hence it is a relative 
standard – one that requires comparison between the treatment received by the foreign investor 
and the treatment received by national investors operating in similar or identical 
circumstances.281 The protection encompasses de jure discrimination, which happens through 
discriminatory legislation in the host country, and de facto discrimination, which happens via 
facially neutral state measures that are in fact discriminatory.282 
Related to the national treatment standard, but different in focus, is the international 
minimum standard of treatment. If the treatment accorded to national investors is below the 
internationally accepted standards, then foreign investors are entitled to treatment that conforms 
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to the internationally accepted standards.283 Therefore, customary “international minimum 
standard” serves as a “floor below which treatment cannot fall, regardless of any relevant relative 
comparison.”284 Hence foreign investors receive better treatment than national investors, because 
their right to be treated equally with national investors is protected by international law and 
backed up by the international minimum standard. 
The national treatment standard is widely used in modern investment treaties. It has been 
described as the “most important standard of treatment enshrined in international investment 
agreements.”285 At the same time, it is the most difficult to achieve, due to interference with 
public policy and sovereignty considerations of the host country. Some national economic goals 
and polices, such as the protection of infant industries, might require host countries to 
discriminate between foreign and national investors.286 Another dimension of the problematic 
application of the national treatment standard is its overlap with other investment protection 
standards. For example, the state’s obligation to provide “fair and equitable treatment” 
encompasses a non-discrimination obligation in some instances.287 Hence, national treatment is 
hard to achieve, and a few countries therefore choose not to include national treatment 
obligations in their investment treaties, which allows them more regulatory space with regards to 
foreign investors and national economic policies.288 
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Nevertheless, most countries offer a national treatment standard either in their investment 
agreements, national laws, or both.289 Usually the standard itself will be stated in a short 
paragraph at the beginning of the treaty either as a standalone article or in combination with 
other treatment standards, such as the MFN clause.290 However, the national treatment standard 
is usually accompanied by a list of exceptions that enable the host country to exercise 
discrimination against foreign investors in specific sectors or situations.291 For example, the host 
country might exclude subsidies and government supported loans from the ambit of national 
treatment to protect and support its fragile national entrepreneurs.292 
B. NATIONAL TREATMENT IN INVESTMENT TREATIES 
In investment treaties, contracting parties typically promise national treatment to foreign 
investors after the foreign investment is admitted and established in the host country (post-
establishment stage). The post-establishment model of national treatment is the preferred model 
among developing countries, because it enables them to discriminate against foreign investors in 
the pre-establishment stage.293 A typical post-entry national treatment clause would state the 
following: 
Each Party shall accord to a covered investment treatment no less favourable than 
that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments of its own investors with 
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respect to the expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other 
disposition of an investment in its area.294 
The post-entry model enables the host country to impose higher licensing burdens and 
requirements on foreign investors, and reserves the host country’s right to reject and deny 
undesired or harmful FDI from entering its territory.295 Some treaties make the application of the 
national treatment standard conditional even after the entry of the foreign investment on its 
soil.296 In such treaties, the contracting parties stress that national treatment is subject to “the 
laws and regulations” of the host country.297 Such language offers the host country the flexibility 
to enact national laws that discriminate against foreign investors to advance its national 
interests.298 Even if the treaty does not contain such language, it is agreed under customary 
international law that “a degree of discrimination in the treatment of aliens as compared with 
nationals is, generally, permissible.”299 However, such discrimination should not go below the 
international minimum standard of treatment owed to aliens,300 and the host country should be 
able to provide rational grounds that justify its discrimination.301 
A few investment agreements, mainly those signed by the United States and Canada, 
extend national treatment to the pre-establishment stage as well (i.e., before the investment is 
admitted and established in the host country).302 Under this model, the host country is obliged to 
provide foreign investors –in the pre-establishment stage- treatment no less favorable than that of 
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its own investors in “like circumstances.” Thus the host state grants foreign investors a right of 
entry into its territory as if they were domestic investors.303 The United States Model BIT, for 
example, provides that national treatment shall extend to the “establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its 
territory.”304 
Although countries vary on the issue of extending national treatment to the pre-
establishment stage, all countries seem to agree that the national treatment standard, in both 
models, should be subject to certain exceptions. The need to protect local infant industries in the 
host country requires a degree of flexibility in the treatment of national investors in specific 
economic sectors.305 Also, the need to preserve the host country’s ability to disable national 
treatment when matters of essential interest are affected requires an exception to that end.306 
These national interests include public health, morals, environment, national security, and 
economic and social policies. Hence, most investment treaties accompany the national treatment 
standard with a list of general and/or specific exceptions that exclude certain types of enterprises, 
activities or industries from the operation of national treatment.307 These exceptions serve to 
enhance the economic development of the host country by striking a balance between the 
interests of the host country and the interests of foreign investors. The host country thereby 
maintains a degree of flexibility and discretion to nurse its growing local industries and national 
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interests, while simultaneously committing to the basic principle of national treatment to foreign 
investors. 
C. THE APPLICATION OF THE NATIONAL TREATMENT STANDARD 
The national treatment standard is a relative, rather than absolute, standard.308 Therefore, the 
determination of whether the standard is infringed is not dependent on a set of objective criteria. 
Instead, it depends on a factual analysis of the treatment received by the foreign investor in 
comparison with a similarly situated local investor.309 
Arbitral tribunals have developed a three-step test to rule on the question of national 
treatment infringement.310 First, the arbitral tribunal must determine if the foreign investor is in a 
comparable setting, or in “like circumstances,” with the alleged more favored domestic investor. 
Second, it will need to determine whether the treatment accorded to the foreign investor is less 
favorable than that accorded to the domestic comparator. Finally, the tribunal will have to 
determine whether the less favorable treatment is justified on rational grounds.311 
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1. Like circumstances 
The infringement of the national treatment standard requires identifying a similarly situated 
domestic comparator who has received more favorable treatment.312 Even when the national 
treatment clause of an investment treaty does not specifically require “like circumstances,” 
arbitral tribunals seem to agree that comparison with a national investor who is in a similar 
position is required.313 However, the determination of what constitutes “like circumstances,” or 
of the appropriate domestic comparator, is no easy task. Should the foreign investment be in the 
exact same business as the national comparator to satisfy the “like circumstances” requirement? 
Or is it sufficient to find a comparator from the same economic sector without being in the same 
line of business? 
In order to preserve the purpose of the national treatment standard, arbitral tribunals have 
construed the like circumstances requirement in a broad and flexible manner depending on the 
context and facts of each case.314 For example, the tribunal in Occidental v. Ecuador stated its 
view that “in like situations” cannot be interpreted in the narrow sense, “as the purpose of 
national treatment is to protect investors as compared to local producers, and this cannot be done 
by addressing exclusively the sector in which that particular activity is undertaken.”315 Similarly, 
the tribunal in Pope & Talbot v. Canada opined that: 
‘circumstances’ are context dependent and have no unalterable meaning across 
the spectrum of fact situations. And the concept of ‘like’ can have a range of 
meanings, from ‘similar’ all the way to ‘identical.’ In other words, the application 
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of the like circumstances standard will require evaluation of the entire fact setting 
surrounding, in this case, the genesis and application of the Regime.316 
To achieve the purpose of the standard, which requires equality of competitive 
conditions, like circumstances should be construed broadly.317 However, equality of competitive 
conditions does not necessarily mean equality in competitive opportunities. The tribunal in 
Methanex Corporation v. USA ruled that if an identical comparator is available, then this is the 
comparison through which the meaning of like circumstances should be derived.318 However, if 
no identical comparator, or competitor, exists, then the most similar and in equal conditions 
comparator is used, which might not be a competitor.319 
Evaluating “like circumstances” should also take into account the overall legal context of 
the instrument in which the national treatment standard exists.320 The tribunal in Pope & Talbot 
v. Canada took into consideration the objectives of NAFTA in its assessment of the complained 
against measure, and pronounced that “[d]ifferences in treatment will presumptively violate 
Article 1102(2), unless they have a reasonable nexus to rational government policies that (1) do 
not distinguish, on their face or de facto, between foreign-owned and domestic companies, and 
(2) do not otherwise unduly undermine the investment liberalizing objectives of NAFTA.”321 The 
tribunal opined that the liberalizing objectives of NAFTA, to which the parties of the treaty had 
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agreed, should be respected by the tribunal and should not be undermined by the national 
treatment standard.322 
Assessment of like circumstances should also take into account the exceptions of national 
policy and essential interests of the host country.323 If the measure complained against is justified 
on rational grounds that serve a public policy goal or protect essential state interests, then 
national treatment is not infringed. The tribunal in S.D. Myers v. Canada stated that the 
“assessment of ‘like circumstances’ must also take into account circumstances that would justify 
governmental regulations that treat them differently in order to protect the public interest.”324 
The tribunal in Pope & Talbot v. Canada also raised this point by stating that the like 
circumstances test requires the tribunal to address “any difference in treatment, demanding that it 
be justified by showing that it bears a reasonable relationship to rational policies not motivated 
by preference of domestic over foreign owned investments.”325 
The national interests’ exception should not be used as a pretext for host governments to 
discriminate against foreign investors. It is important that the host country has genuine public 
goals that it wishes to serve from its unequal treatment to avoid liability.326 The tribunal in GAMI 
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Investments v. Mexico,327 for example, found the measure of expropriating some sugar mills not 
discriminatory to the foreign investor (GAMI), because the expropriation was “connected with a 
legitimate goal of policy”328 and was “applied neither in a discriminatory manner nor as a 
disguised barrier to equal opportunity.”329 
The “like circumstances” test is a factual and legal question that requires separate 
examination in each case. Hence, no unified definition or approach can be reached. However, it 
can be concluded that tribunals need to find an identical comparator, or, if an identical one is not 
found, at least the most similar comparator. The tribunal should give considerable attention to the 
state’s right to impose reasonable, non-discriminatory policies that preserve its national interests. 
Thus the objective of most investment treaties - to enhance economic development - should be 
balanced with the foreign investor’s right of national treatment. Nonetheless, when the tribunal 
finds a suitable comparator, the question is then: has the foreign investor received less favorable 
treatment? 
2. Less Favorable Treatment 
Discriminatory treatment of foreign investors can happen in two ways: de jure or de facto. The 
host country may introduce new laws that explicitly discriminate against foreign investors by 
denying them certain advantages or benefits offered to their domestic counterparts. De facto 
discrimination occurs when the host state introduces measures that are neutral on their face, yet 
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they effectively discriminate against foreign investors and their investments.330 The national 
treatment protection covers both forms of nationality-based discrimination and provides 
protection to foreign investors from explicit or implicit discriminatory state measures. 
Arbitral tribunals seem to agree that the less favorable treatment test, whether the 
discrimination is de jure or de facto, does not require that discriminatory treatment be 
attributable to the “nationality” of the foreign investor to succeed in a national treatment 
claim.331 In other words, in order to satisfy the less favorable treatment test, the foreign investor 
need not prove that the differentiation in treatment is due to his foreign nationality. For example, 
the tribunal in Thunderbird v. Mexico stated that “[i]t is not expected from Thunderbird that it 
show separately that the less favourable treatment was motivated because of nationality.”332 
However, eliminating the question of whether the less favorable treatment is attributed to 
the foreign nationality of the investor renders the national treatment standard redundant and 
hollow of its purpose. Other investment protection standards, such as the fair and equitable 
treatment standard, and the protection from arbitrary and unreasonable measures standard, deal 
with discriminatory treatment not based on nationality. Hence, the foreign investor should have 
to prove that the differential treatment it received was due to its “foreignness,” by demonstrating 
the measure was motivated on the basis of nationality. If the claimant fails to prove that the less 
favorable treatment was motivated by nationality, then national treatment is not breached. This is 
the position taken by some tribunals. The tribunal in Noble Ventures v. Romania considered 
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“nationality based discrimination” to be an important component necessary to a national 
treatment claim. It stated that discriminatory measures should be “directed specifically against a 
certain investor by reason of his, her or its nationality.”333 The tribunal in GAMI v. Mexico took a 
similar position, although not so clearly. It noted that the expropriation of some national sugar 
mills for a legitimate public purpose,334 in which an American investor had a minority share, did 
not offend the national treatment standard under NAFTA.335 It reasoned that the expropriation 
measure by Mexico was not motivated by the foreign nationality of the minority shareholder,336 
thus “[i]t is not conceivable that a Mexican corporation becomes entitled to the anti-
discrimination protections of international law by virtue of the sole fact that a foreigner buys a 
share of it.”337 
Likewise, if domestic and foreign investors alike receive the less favorable treatment, 
then no differential treatment exists to give way to a national treatment claim. However, the 
foreign investor in the latter case may avail itself of other protection standards, such as the 
international minimum standard and the fair and equitable treatment standard. 
The foreign nationality of the investor should be the reason behind the less favorable 
treatment it received in order to sustain a national treatment claim.338 However, proving 
“protectionist intent” by the host state is not required. The tribunal in S.D. Myers v. Canada 
correctly stated that “[i]ntent is important, but protectionist intent is not necessarily decisive on 
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its own.”339 Proving “intent” is burdensome on the foreign investor, as it requires information 
that may not be accessible, or may be hard to obtain, in developing countries that lack 
transparency.340 Requiring proof of intent would effectively limit the national treatment claim to 
de jure violations and would limit the effectiveness of the obligation.341 In addition, “[t]he word 
‘treatment’ suggests that practical impact is required to produce a breach … not merely a motive 
or intent.”342 Therefore, even if protectionist intent is proven, it would not suffice to breach the 
national treatment standard, unless it was associated with practical discriminatory measures. 
Lastly, a foreign investor may not rely on the national treatment standard to escape 
liability for conducting illegal activities in the host state, even if the foreign investor receives less 
favorable treatment in the enforcement of the law. In other words, the national treatment standard 
does not apply in situations where the host country affords the foreign investor less favorable 
treatment than domestic investors if the investment activities are illicit under the host state’s 
national law. In Thunderbird v. Mexico, Thunderbird operated gambling devices (skill machines) 
that were prohibited under Mexican law.343 When Mexico seized Thunderbird facilities with the 
devices, Thunderbird argued that some domestic facilities were not seized and were still 
operating, and thus this conduct by the Mexican State was a breach of the national treatment 
standard under NAFTA. The tribunal, in its findings on this issue, stated: 
In any event, even if Thunderbird had established without doubt that Mexico’s 
line of conduct with respect to gambling operations was not uniform and 
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consistent, one cannot overlook the fact that gambling is illegal in Mexico. In the 
Tribunal’s view, it would be inappropriate for a NAFTA tribunal to allow a party 
to rely on Article 1102 of the NAFTA [National Treatment] to vindicate equality 
of non-enforcement within the sphere of an activity that a Contracting Party 
deems illicit.344 
D. POLICY GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL TREATMENT 
By providing national treatment to foreign investors, a host country is committing itself to not 
favor its domestic investors to the detriment of foreign investors in similar circumstances. By 
eliminating the risk of nationality based discrimination through the national treatment standard, 
FDI is encouraged in the host country. Hence, the national treatment standard has a liberalization 
effect that increases the developing country’s chances of attracting FDI for its development.345 
However, the national treatment obligation may present a hurdle to the economic 
development in the host state. The national treatment obligation can decrease the regulatory 
space of the host state, impeding its development policy goals. These negative effects can be 
summarized as follows: 
i) The national treatment standard is a relative standard; the application and breach 
of this standard is fact specific. Hence, a host country must carefully examine the 
effects of any measures it wishes to introduce on foreign and domestic investors 
to determine if the proposed measures result in differential treatment. In addition 
to taking significant time, this assessment increases the administrative costs and 
resources required of the host country to determine whether a measure breaches 
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the national treatment obligation. This may also result in the measure not being 
adopted in due time. The host state’s ability to regulate in the public interest 
becomes limited from fears of breaching the national treatment obligation. 
ii) The national treatment standard requires comparison with domestic investors; 
however there are no objective criteria that an arbitral tribunal may rely on to find 
a suitable comparator. Thus, it is important that host countries, when negotiating 
investment treaties, incorporate objective criteria that help an arbitral tribunal to 
find an appropriate comparator. This can be achieved by adding the following 
elements into the text of the national treatment clause in future investment 
treaties: 1) include the requirement of “like circumstances” to reaffirm and 
thereby narrow the application of the clause to reasonable situations, and 2) insert 
objective criteria that determine what constitutes a comparator in “like 
circumstances.” The objective criteria should take into account the economic, 
social, legal, and developmental impacts of the imposed measures on the foreign 
and domestic comparator to determine whether the comparator is in “like 
circumstances.” This approach has been adopted in the COMESA Investment 
Agreement,346 and more recently, in the Morocco – Nigeria BIT.347 This approach 
ensures that the application of the national treatment obligation takes into account 
development and other policy goals, as well as investment policy considerations, 
when determining “like circumstances.” The criteria adopted in the COMESA 
Agreement directs interpreters of the treaty to consider the effects of the state 
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measures on: (a) third persons and the local community; (b) the local regional or 
national environment, including the cumulative effects of all investments within a 
jurisdiction on the environment; (c) the sector the investor is in; (d) the purpose of 
the measure concerned; (e) the regulatory process generally applied in relation to 
the measure concerned; and (f) other factors directly relating to the investment or 
investor in relation to the measure concerned.348 
iii) A pre-establishment national treatment standard gives foreign investors a right of 
entry to the host state; thus, the host country loses its ability to screen incoming 
FDI. By committing to pre-establishment national treatment, the host state is in 
effect surrendering its sovereign powers to deny entry, or impose certain 
conditions, on foreign investments entering its territory. Thus harmful or 
unwanted FDI cannot be excluded. Although states usually insert exceptions to 
the pre-establishment model, which allows them to discriminate in certain sectors, 
the fact remains that it is difficult to precisely identify all sectors and industries 
where national treatment should not apply. Therefore, for developing countries 
seeking development, a pre-establishment clause may be too risky. However, if a 
developing country wishes to encourage FDI in a specific sector, then it can offer 
pre-establishment national treatment protection by specifying the sectors that 
exclusively enjoy national treatment in the pre-establishment stage, a method 
called the “positive list approach.”349 
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1999). 
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Electing not to include a national treatment obligation in an investment treaty to avoid its 
negative effects is not a wise option. Foreign investors will be hesitant to enter a country that 
explicitly declares its willingness to discriminate against them. Hence, a better option is to 
include a national treatment clause that offers protection to foreign investors but also reserves the 
host state’s right to regulate and discriminate in certain situations. To conclude on this issue, the 
following list of guidelines should help developing countries enact more effective national 
treatment clauses and thus enhance their development: 
i. Offer national treatment in the post-establishment stage of the foreign investment. 
However, the state may offer pre-establishment protection to certain industries and 
sectors that it wishes to liberalize and develop in accordance with its development plans 
by specifying these sectors using a positive list approach; 
ii. Require the foreign investment to be established and operate in accordance with the laws 
of the host country in order to enjoy national treatment protection; 
iii. Explicitly exclude the economic sectors and industries that do not qualify for national 
treatment in order to protect and enhance national infant entrepreneurs and natural 
resources; 
iv. Insert the requirement of “like circumstances” and a list of criteria (such as those adopted 
in the COMESA Agreement) that clarify and refine what a suitable comparator should 
be;350 
v. Insert explicit reservations in order to ensure the host state’s right to impose legitimate 
non-discriminatory public purpose measures that have a connection to their purpose;351 
                                                 
350 See Article 17 of the Investment Agreement For the COMESA Common Investment Area (2007). 
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vi. Insert general reservations that preserve the host country’s ability to take measures that 
may discriminate against foreign investors but will protect the essential interests of the 
host state in situations of emergency and crisis, 
vii. Qualify or limit the national treatment obligation by inserting a “development 
exception.”352 Under this exception, the host state is entitled to offer its domestic 
investors certain advantages and benefits that are designed to enhance its national 
development. Such a clause reflects the principle that developing countries, by virtue of 
their economic weakness, are entitled to special treatment by the more advanced states.353 
The development clause allows the host state to have policy flexibility while maintaining 
the commitment to the basic principle of national treatment.354 
IV. MOST-FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT (MFN) 
When concluding investment agreements, the national treatment standard is the essential 
standard that a state grants to foreign investors to ensure non-discrimination and equality with 
                                                                                                                                                             
351 This is the test adopted in Pope & Talbot. The Norwegian Model BIT adopts this test also. It states in footnote 1 
“The Parties agree/ are of the understanding that a measure applied by a government in pursuance of legitimate 
policy objectives of public interest such as the protection of public health, human rights, labour rights, safety and 
the environment, although having a different effect on an investment or investor of another Party, is not inconsistent 
with national treatment and most favoured nation treatment when justified by showing that it bears a reasonable 
relationship to rational policies not motivated by preference of domestic over foreign owned investment.” Norway 
Model BIT n.1 (2015). UNCTAD, National Treatment § IV (United Nations 1999). 
352 This approach has been adopted in several investment treaties. e.g., the Morocco - Italy BIT (1990) at Article 
3(3) states “Investors of the two Contracting Parties shall not be entitled to national treatment in terms of benefiting 
from aid, grants, loans, insurance and guarantees accorded by the Government of one of the Contracting Parties 
exclusively to its own nationals or enterprises within the framework of activities carried out under national 
development programs.” See also the Netherlands – Jamaica BIT (1991) at Article 3(6). 
353 UNCTAD, National Treatment § IV, at 47-48 (United Nations 1999). 
354 Id. at 47. 
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domestic investors.355 However, countries also want the assurance and confidence that they have 
secured the “best deal” for their outbound investors; that is treatment as favorable as that offered 
by the host state to foreign investors from third states. Therefore, an additional guarantee of non-
discrimination is added to the investment treaty, namely the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) 
standard. Although most investment treaties combine the national treatment standard and the 
MFN standard together in the same article because of their shared objective of eliminating 
nationality based discrimination, they are two different standards. 
A. DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION 
The MFN standard shares with the national treatment standard the objective of eliminating 
nationality based discrimination. The difference between the two standards lies in the 
comparator. MFN treatment protects foreign investors from one state from less favorable 
treatment in comparison with foreign investors from other states (i.e., third states). Itis a 
commitment between state parties of an investment agreement not to provide foreign investors 
from third states with treatment more favorable than that offered to nationals of one party when 
investing in the territory of the other.356 Should the host state provide more favorable treatment 
                                                 
355 UNCTAD, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment § II, at 1 (UNITED NATIONS 2010). 
356 See Tony Cole, The Boundaries of Most Favored Nation Treatment in International Investment Law, 33 
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 537, 539 (2012), “An MFN clause in an investment treaty is 
fundamentally a promise between the two states party to the treaty that neither state will give to investors from any 
third state more favorable treatment than that given to investors from the other state party to the treaty.” 
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to investors from third states, it is liable under the MFN clause and is obliged to provide 
equivalent treatment to home state investors benefiting from the MFN clause.357 
The MFN standard has evolved in the context of trade rather than investment.358 It is a 
basic principle of international law that can be traced back to the Middle Ages, when Imperial 
grants of customs privileges were given to various cities within the Holy Roman Empire on the 
basis of favors obtained “by whatsoever other town.”359 The MFN standard, however, started to 
appear in mutual agreements between states in the twelfth century.360 In the agreement between 
King Henry V of England and Duke John of Burgundy in 1417 (Treaty for Mercantile 
Intercourse with Flanders), English vessels were granted the right to use “the harbors of Flanders 
‘in the same way as French, Dutch, Sealanders and Scots.’”361 MFN also appears in the 1490 
treaty between England and Denmark.362 
Although the MFN principle was used early in treaties, the term “MFN” was not coined 
until the seventeenth century.363 With the growth of trade and commerce in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the MFN clause became standard in bilateral economic treaties.364 
Despite the early and common use of MFN clauses in international economic relations 
between states, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, MFN treatment did not 
                                                 
357 Id. at 539. 
358 Id. at 544. 
359 Georg Schwarzenberger, The Most-Favoured-Nation Standard in British State Practice, 22 BRITISH YEARBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 96, 97 (1945). 
360 OECD, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in International Investment Law 3 (2004/02 OECD Working Papers on 
International Investment ed., OECD Publishing 2004). 
361 MOST-FAVOURED-NATION TREATMENT § III, at 12 (UNCTAD ed., United Nations 1999). 
362 See Schwarzenberger, 22 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 96, 97 (1945). 
363 John Kline & Rodney Ludema, Building a Multilateral Framework For Investment : Comparing the 
Development of Trade and Investment Accords, 6 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 1, 9 (1998), “The term ‘most 
favored nation’ appears to have originated with the 1692 treaty between Denmark and the Hanse cities.” 
364 See UNCTAD, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment § II, at 9 (UNITED NATIONS 2010). See also Andreas R. 
Ziegler, Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT TREATMENT 62-63 (August 
Reinisch ed. 2008). 
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form part of customary international law.365 To the contrary, it was seen as a higher standard 
than the international minimum standard required under customary international law.366 Thus, 
the MFN standard could only apply if the state parties of a bilateral agreement accepted it.367 
Therefore, when BITs were concluded to protect investments in the mid-twentieth century, states 
were keen to include the MFN clause in their treaties.368 
The purpose of the MFN clause in modern investment agreements is to create a level 
playing field among foreign investors from different nationalities in the host state. It ensures 
equality of treatment and conditions among different foreign investors, which establishes an 
atmosphere of competitive opportunity among all foreign investors. 
The MFN standard shares many of the characteristics of the national treatment standard. 
This can be attributed to the common objective of these two standards, which is to eliminate 
nationality based discrimination. The MFN standard is also a relative standard, which requires 
comparison of the de facto or de jure treatment received by a foreign investor with the treatment 
received by another foreign investor of a different nationality in the host state.369 Also similar to 
national treatment, the comparator must be in “like circumstances,” even if the MFN clause does 
not explicitly require so.370 The standard does not require identical treatment of all different 
foreign investors in the host state; rather, it requires “not less favorable” treatment.371 
The MFN standard has drawn recent attention regarding its scope. While the purpose of 
the MFN standard is to protect foreign investors from less favorable treatment in comparison 
                                                 
365 Ziegler, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT TREATMENT 63 (Reinisch ed. 2008). 
366 MOST-FAVOURED-NATION TREATMENT § III, at 2 (UNCTAD ed., United Nations 1999). 
367 See Collins at page 109. 
368 The first BIT was the Germany – Pakistan BIT (1959). It included a MFN clause in Article 3(3). 
369 See SCHREUER, 206 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2012). 
370 Id. at 207. 
371 COLLINS, 110 (Cambridge University Press. 2017). 
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with foreign investors from other states, it has been used as a tool to replace the articles of the 
basic treaty with more favorable treatment standards from other treaties.372 Foreign investors 
have become able to access benefits granted to other investors in other treaties, often in a manner 
not intended by the state parties to the basic treaty.373 This process effectively rewrites the terms 
of the investment treaty by borrowing more favorable provisions from other investment treaties. 
The parties to the basic treaty may have intended not to offer foreign investors from certain 
countries certain benefits based on certain policy reasons. Thus, in this context, the MFN clause 
becomes a tool to alter the specifically negotiated basic treaty by importing a different protection 
regime from another treaty374 This issue will be discussed in further detail below. First, however, 
the next sub-section will briefly survey the different types and scopes of MFN clauses in modern 
investment treaties. 
B. MFN IN INVESTMENT TREATIES 
The MFN standard is found under the treatment section of an investment treaty. It is usually 
combined with the national treatment article,375 but is sometimes found in a separate article.376 
                                                 
372 The basic treaty is the BIT signed between the foreign investor’s home country and the host country. The MFN 
clause contained in the basic treaty enables the foreign investor to import more favorable provisions from other BITs 
signed by the host state with other countries (the latter maybe referred to as “the other treaty”). 
373 See COLLINS, 110 (Cambridge University Press. 2017). 
374 See SCHREUER, 206-07 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2012). 
375 e.g., the Morocco - Nigeria BIT (2016). Article 6 titled (NATIONAL TREATMENT AND THE MOST 
FAVOURED NATION PROVISIONS). 
376 e.g., the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012). Article 4. 
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Some investment treaties offer both national treatment and MFN treatment, while others offer the 
treatment “more favorable to the investor” between the two treatments.377 
The scope of the MFN standard depends on its exact wording in the BIT. Therefore, there 
is no unified interpretation of MFN clauses in investment treaties; rather, the MFN clause 
determines the beneficiaries, covered phases of the investment, conditions, exceptions, and any 
qualifications or clarifications.378 Despite variations among MFN clauses, a typical MFN clause 
in an investment treaty will read as follows: 
Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of the other Contracting Party 
and their investments treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to investors and to investments of investors of any third State with 
respect to the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposition of 
investments.379 
A treaty may offer MFN protection to foreign investments and investors, or it may limit 
MFN protection to foreign investments, excluding foreign investors from the ambit of MFN 
protection. MFN protection may be offered in the pre-establishment and/or the post-
establishment phases of investment. Only a few investment treaties provide for pre-establishment 
MFN treatment;380 the majority of treaties limit MFN treatment to the post-establishment phase. 
As with the national treatment standard, the reason for this relates to the possibility of 
                                                 
377 e.g., Japan - Iran BIT (2016). Article 4(1) stipulates “Each Contracting Party shall in its Territory accord to 
investors of the other Contracting Party and to their investments treatment no less favourable than that it accords in 
like circumstances to its own investors and their investments or to investors of any non-Contracting party and their 
investments with respect to investment activities, whichever is more favourable to the investor.” 
378 UNCTAD, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment § II, at 38 (UNITED NATIONS 2010). 
379 UAE - Mexico BIT (2016). Article 3(2). 
380 Such as Article 4 of the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012). And Article 4 of the Canada Model 
Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (2004). 
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discriminating against foreign investors from different nationalities before entrance into the host 
country in accordance with host state’s law, national policies, and development objectives.381 
Similar to the national treatment standard, the MFN standard requires comparison 
between foreign investors who are in “like circumstances.” Some MFN clauses explicitly contain 
the “like circumstances” condition,382 while others make no reference to it. Arbitral practice has 
shown that, whatever the wording of the MFN clause, being in “like circumstances” is required 
to support an MFN claim, even if the underlying treaty does not make reference to such a 
requirement.383 
Investment treaties regularly subject the MFN clause to certain exceptions that limit its 
scope and application. These exceptions can be categorized as follows: 
i. Exceptions limiting the scope of MFN treatment in relation to other treaties. MFN 
cannot be used by the foreign investor to gain the benefits of other treaties, even if 
those other treaties with the host state provide better treatment for foreign 
investors from the other country. These exceptions allow the state parties of an 
investment treaty to preserve special arrangements they made with various 
countries that with which they have closer economic ties, such as: regional trade 
agreements, customs unions, and double taxation treaties.384 
                                                 
381 The reasons for limiting MFN treatment to the post-establishment phase of the investment are very similar, if not 
identical, to those reasons of limiting national treatment to post-establishment mentioned above. Therefore, they will 
not be repeated here. 
382 e.g., Article 3(2) of the German Model Treaty (2008). This treaty makes no reference to the ‘like circumstances 
requirement.’ 
383 UNCTAD, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment § II, at 54 (UNITED NATIONS 2010). 
384 e.g., Article 3(3) of the German Model Treaty (2008). “Such treatment shall not relate to privileges which either 
Contracting State accords to investors of third States on account of its membership of, or association with, a 
customs or economic union, a common market or a free trade area.” 
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ii. Exceptions limiting the scope of MFN treatment in relation to the treaty itself. 
The scope of the MFN clause is thus narrowed to the matters and provisions that 
are not excluded. For example, a treaty may exclude dispute settlement provisions 
from the ambit of MFN.385 Accordingly, the foreign investor cannot claim MFN 
to gain the benefit of more favorable dispute settlement options granted to 
investors from third states. Other treaties designate the articles of the investment 
treaty where the MFN standard applies.386 
iii. Exceptions limiting the scope of MFN treatment in relation to public policy and 
security. This allows the host state to take measures related to its public security 
and order without breaching the MFN standard.387 
iv. Exceptions limiting the scope of MFN treatment in relation to the investment 
activity. Some treaties exclude certain investment activities from the protection of 
MFN, which allows the host state to discriminate or provide better treatment to 
foreign investors operating in those sectors. Some investment activities may be of 
major importance or touch upon the sovereignty and security of the host state; 
thus, the state reserves its right to take measures that preserve its vital interests. 
This can also have a developmental aspect, with the host state wanting to 
encourage foreign investors from certain countries to operate in the excluded 
                                                 
385 See for example Article 4(3) of the San Marino - Azerbaijan BIT (2015). “For the avoidance of doubt, the 
present Article shall… not apply in respect of an investor's rights to submit disputes arising under this Agreement to 
any dispute settlement procedure.” 
386 e.g., Article 3(3) of the UK Model BIT (2008). “For the avoidance of doubt it is confirmed that the treatment 
provided for in paragraphs (1) and (2) above shall apply to the provisions of Articles 1 to 12 of this Agreement.” 
387 e.g., Article 3(2) of the German Model Treaty (2008). “Measures that have to be taken for reasons of public 
security and order shall not be deemed treatment less favourable within the meaning of this Article.” 
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investment activities, and thus provide them with more favorable treatment. Such 
exceptions usually are annexed to the investment treaty and called reservations.388 
  Another matter related to the scope of investment activities is the right of 
the state parties of an investment treaty to designate certain measures that are 
excluded from MFN protection. This allows the host state to impose the 
designated discriminatory measures without breaching the MFN standard. For 
example, some treaties exclude restrictions on the procurement of raw or auxiliary 
materials, or energy and fuels, from MFN protection.389 
Although the MFN standard seems, prima facie, to be a simple standard of protection, it 
has generated controversy among scholars and practitioners. The most significant controversy 
relates to whether the MFN standard extends to procedural rights (in particular dispute settlement 
procedures in other treaties), or whether it is only limited to substantive rights. The following 
sub-section considers the application of the MFN standard in arbitral practice, where this 
controversy originated. 
                                                 
388 e.g., reservations made by the parties of NAFTA. 
389 e.g., Article 3(2) of the German Model Treaty (2008). “The following shall, in particular, be deemed treatment 
less favourable within the meaning of this Article: 1) different treatment in the event of restrictions on the 
procurement of raw or auxiliary materials, of energy and fuels, and of all types of means of production and 
operation; 2) different treatment in the event of impediments to the sale of products at home and abroad; and 3) 
other measures of similar effect.” 
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C. APPLICATION OF THE MFN STANDARD 
The MFN standard does not operate to rewrite the terms of the basic treaty by incorporating 
more favorable terms from other treaties.390 In other words, if the host country provides more 
favorable treatment to other foreign investors via a treaty or national law, that better treatment is 
not automatically incorporated into the investment treaty containing the MFN standard. Rather, 
the MFN standard protects the “treatment” afforded by the host state to the foreign investor by 
entitling the latter to equivalent treatment.391 If the host state fails to provide equivalent 
treatment to the affected foreign investor, then the foreign investor is entitled to invoke the MFN 
standard by asserting a claim against the host state. In its claim, the foreign investor may demand 
monetary compensation for the damages it sustained from the less favorable treatment it 
received.392 The foreign investor does not (and cannot) demand the withdrawal of the measure 
affecting it or amendment of the protections and standards of the investment treaty containing the 
MFN standard.393 
To succeed in an MFN claim, the tribunal must find that: i) the host state has granted 
foreign investors from other countries more favorable treatment, ii)the host state has failed to 
                                                 
390 Zachary Douglas, The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration: Treaty Interpretation Off the Rails, 2 JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 97, 105 (2011). 
391 “Each treaty defines what it considers a protected investment and who is entitled to that protection, and 
definitions can change from treaty to treaty. In this situation, resort to the specific text of the MFN Clause is 
unnecessary because it applies only to the treatment accorded to such defined investment, but not to the definition of 
‘investment’ itself.” Société Générale In respect of DR Energy Holdings Limited and Empresa Distribuidora de 
Electricidad del Este, S.A. v. The Dominican Republic para. 41 (Award on Jurisdiction), (UNCITRAL, LCIA, 
2008). 
392 UNCTAD, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment § II, at 101 (UNITED NATIONS 2010). 
393 See Cole, 33 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 537, 569-70 (2012). 
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provide equivalent treatment to the claimant,394 and, iii) the claimant is in “like circumstances” 
with the more-favorably treated foreign investors from third states.395 The requirement of “like 
circumstances” is similar to that under the national treatment standard and therefore will not be 
discussed here. 
The discussion regarding the “more favorable treatment” under a MFN claim can be 
divided into two parts. The first deals with the application of the MFN clause to more favorable 
substantive provisions of other investment treaties. This part is not controversial.396 The second 
part of the discussion relates to the application of the MFN standard to the procedural provisions 
of other investment treaties. The second issue has gathered attention and created controversy 
among tribunals, as will be shown below. 
1. Application of the MFN standard to substantive provisions: 
The purpose of the MFN standard is to prevent nationality based favoritism by host states. 
Therefore, if the host state provides foreign investors from third countries with more favorable 
substantive treatment, then foreign investors, under the basic treaty, are entitled to receive 
equivalent treatment.397 This aligns with the objective of creating an environment of equal 
opportunities between different foreign investors in the host state.398 
                                                 
394 See Douglas, The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration: Treaty Interpretation Off the Rails, 2 JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 97, 104 (2011). 
395 “The essential condition of the violation of a MFN clause is the existence of a different treatment accorded to 
another foreign investor in a similar situation. Therefore, a comparison is necessary with an investor in like 
circumstances.” Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania para. 369 (Award), (ICSID, 2007). See also UNCTAD, 
Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment § II, at 63-66 (UNITED NATIONS 2010). 
396 CHRISTOPHER DUGAN, 424 (Oxford University Press. 2008). 
397 COLLINS, 110-11 (Cambridge University Press. 2017). 
398 Cole, 33 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 537, 564 n.40, at 549 (2012). 
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The determination of whether the host state has, in fact, granted more favorable 
protection to other foreign investors requires comparison between the two treaties involved (i.e., 
the basic treaty containing the MFN standard and the third party treaty that provides better 
treatment).The treaties being compared must deal with the same subject matter; that is, 
investments and investors. This principle, often referred to as the Ejusdem Generis principle,399 
requires the third party treaty to regulate the same subject matter as the basic treaty; otherwise, 
the specific treatment will be taken out of context.400 Hence, in an investment claim, the MFN 
standard cannot be extended to benefits given by the host state to other countries outside the 
scope of foreign investments. Also, matters that are explicitly excluded from the application of 
the MFN standard in the basic investment treaty cannot be overridden via claiming breach of 
MFN if they were not excluded in third party treaties.401 
Some treaty provisions, although substantive in nature, are outside the scope of the MFN 
standard. Provisions regarding the scope of the treaty (ratione temporis and ratione materiae) 
are, generally, not within the domain of the MFN.402 Hence, even if the host state offers more 
favorable treatment to investors from other countries (for example, a wider definition of 
investors or investments, or a longer temporal scope of the treaty), the MFN standard cannot be 
invoked in that regard. The tribunal in Tecmed v. Mexico stated the following: 
Matters relating to the application over time of the Agreement, which involve 
more the time dimension of application of its substantive provisions rather than 
matters of procedure or jurisdiction, due to their significance and importance, go 
to the core of matters that must be deemed to be specifically negotiated by the 
Contracting Parties. These are determining factors for their acceptance of the 
                                                 
399 See Ziegler, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT TREATMENT 74-75 (Reinisch ed. 2008). 
400 Id. at 74. 
401 Id. at 76. 
402 Also See Société Générale In respect of DR Energy Holdings Limited and Empresa Distribuidora de Electricidad 
del Este, S.A. v. The Dominican Republic para. 41 (Award on Jurisdiction), (UNCITRAL, LCIA, 2008). 
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Agreement, as they are directly linked to the identification of the substantive 
protection regime applicable to the foreign investor and, particularly, to the 
general (national or international) legal context within which such regime 
operates, as well as to the access of the foreign investor to the substantive 
provisions of such regime. Their application cannot therefore be impaired by the 
principle contained in the most favored nation clause.403 
2. Application of the MFN standard to procedural provisions: 
Whether the MFN standard extends to procedural provisions of an investment treaty is an issue 
of controversy -specifically, whether an investor may use MFN rights to claim the benefit of 
more favorable dispute settlement provisions found in other investment treaties. This controversy 
began with the 2000 arbitral decision in Maffezini v. Spain.404 The arbitral tribunal allowed 
Maffezini to bypass the requirement under the basic treaty,405 that investment disputes should be 
adjudicated in local courts for at least eighteen months before submitting the dispute to 
arbitration.406 Maffezini invoked the MFN clause under the basic treaty, relying on the more 
favorable dispute resolution clause found in the Chile – Spain BIT.407 In its analysis, the tribunal 
stated that “there are good reasons to conclude that today dispute settlement arrangements are 
inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors.”408 In the tribunal’s view, which was 
later adopted by other tribunals,409 international arbitration is essential to the protection of 
                                                 
403 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v. United Mexican States, para. 69 (ICSID, 2003). 
404 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain (Decision on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 2000). 
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investors’ rights and is materially related to the treatment provided by the host state.410 The 
Maffezini tribunal stated: 
From the above considerations it can be concluded that if a third party treaty 
contains provisions for the settlement of disputes that are more favorable to the 
protection of the investor’s rights and interests than those in the basic treaty, such 
provisions may be extended to the beneficiary of the most favored nation clause 
as they are fully compatible with the ejusdem generis principle. Of course, the 
third-party treaty has to relate to the same subject matter as the basic treaty, be it 
the protection of foreign investments or the promotion of trade, since the dispute 
settlement provisions will operate in the context of these matters; otherwise there 
would be a contravention of that principle.411 
The MFN standard should not be extended to the procedural matters of an investment 
treaty for two main reasons. First, the dispute resolution provisions of the investment treaty have 
a different purpose than its substantive provisions. The substantive provisions are commitments 
made between the sovereign treaty parties of an investment agreement to provide certain 
treatment for investments and investors coming from one treaty party to the territory of the 
other.412 The dispute resolution provisions, on the other hand, are a mechanism for the 
beneficiaries of the treaty (i.e., the foreign investors) to enforce those substantive treatment 
provisions in the event of their breach. Therefore, they cannot be considered as part of the 
treatment itself.413 The second reason is that dispute resolution provisions of an investment treaty 
relate to the mandate of the adjudicating authority of the tribunal as agreed upon between the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 2004). “the Tribunal finds that the Treaty itself, together with so many other treaties of 
investment protection, has as a distinctive feature special dispute settlement mechanisms not normally open to 
investors. Access to these mechanisms is part of the protection offered under the Treaty. It is part of the treatment of 
foreign investors and investments and of the advantages accessible through a MFN clause.” 
410 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain para. 55 (Decision on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 2000). 
411 Id. at para. 56. 
412 Douglas, The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration: Treaty Interpretation Off the Rails, 2 JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 97, 104 (2011). 
413 Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria para. 209 (Decision on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 2005): “It is one 
thing to add to the treatment provided in one treaty more favorable treatment provided elsewhere. It is quite another 
thing to replace a procedure specifically negotiated by parties with an entirely different mechanism.” 
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state parties that gave their consent to arbitrate future investment disputes. The foreign investor, 
being a non-party to the treaty itself, cannot have the power to replace the terms to which the 
state parties had agreed in order to arbitrate future disputes with foreign investors. One of the 
fundamental principles of arbitration, whether it be commercial or investment arbitration, is 
consent. The parties to an investment treaty set the terms they see fit for their consent in the 
dispute resolution provisions of the investment treaty, and provide foreign investors with a 
standing offer to submit future disputes to arbitration based on those terms.414 The investor 
cannot change those terms by invoking the MFN clause, as the host state has not given its 
consent to arbitrate disputes with investors from this state based on more favorable provisions 
imported from other investment treaties.415 
If the state parties of an investment treaty had explicitly, and without doubt, consented to 
treat the dispute resolution provisions as part of what the MFN standard in their treaty, then the 
MFN standard can be invoked to borrow more favorable procedural provisions from other 
treaties.416 This is the position taken by the tribunal in Plama v. Bulgaria:417 
An MFN provision in a basic treaty does not incorporate by reference dispute 
settlement provisions in whole or in part set forth in another treaty, unless the 
                                                 
414 Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v Argentine Republic para. 160(3) (Award), (ICSID, 2008): “In the ICSID system, 
‘consent’ of the Host State to international arbitration is given – not generally, but inter alia under a particular 
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displace, by reference to general policy considerations concerning investor protection, the dispute resolution 
mechanism specifically negotiated by the parties.” 
416 Vladimir Berschader and Morse Berschader v The Russian Federation para. 181 (Award), (SCC, 2006): “The 
present Tribunal will apply the principle that an MFN provision in a BIT will only incorporate by reference an 
arbitration clause from another BIT where the terms of the original BIT clearly and unambiguously so provide or 
where it can otherwise be clearly inferred that this was the intention of the contracting parties.” 
417 Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria (Decision on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 2005). 
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MFN provision in the basic treaty leaves no doubt that the Contracting Parties 
intended to incorporate them.418 
The extension of the MFN standard to procedural provisions of an investment treaty has 
serious public policy implications. With that extension, host states will become exposed to 
international arbitration in a manner that is likely to be wholly unexpected and against their 
will.419 Also, foreign investors will get to “cherry pick” from other treaties the procedures that 
are most suitable to their interests. The tribunal in Telenor v. Hungary noted that an expansive 
reading of MFN clauses will cause uncertainty and unpredictability to the limitations contained 
in investment agreements,420 and explained the consequences of such expansive reading by 
stating: 
The effect of the wide interpretation of the MFN clause is to expose the host State 
to treaty-shopping by the investor among an indeterminate number of treaties to 
find a dispute resolution clause wide enough to cover a dispute that would fall 
outside the dispute resolution clause in the base treaty, and even then there would 
be questions as to whether the investor could select those elements of the wider 
dispute resolution that were apt for its purpose and discard those that were not.421 
Investment agreements are concluded between sovereign states, where the state parties 
negotiate the terms and conditions of the treaty in view of their political, economic, and social 
interests. Consequently, a country may be party to many investment treaties, each of which 
contains a degree of variation from the others, due to that country’s different interests and 
objectives with different treaty partners. An interpretation of an MFN clauses as occurred in 
Maffezini disregards the fact that some treaties are concluded as a “package deal,”422 where one 
of the state parties agrees to include more favorable dispute resolution provisions in the 
                                                 
418 Id. at para. 223. See also KILIÇ ĬNŞAAT ĬTHALAT ĬHRACAT SANAYI VE TICARET ANONIM ŞIRKETI v 
TURKMENISTAN para. 7.8.10 (Award), (ICSID, 2013). 
419 COLLINS, 120 (Cambridge University Press. 2017). 
420 Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v The Republic of Hungary para. 94 (Award), (ICSID, 2006). 
421 Id. at para. 93. 
422 In this regard See Ziegler, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT TREATMENT 83-84 (Reinisch ed. 2008). 
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investment treaty as a trade-off for other benefits not related to FDI.423 Hence, the foreign 
investor should not be entitled to receive the more favorable dispute resolution procedures of the 
“package deal” treaty. 
D. POLICY GUIDELINES FOR MFN 
The MFN standard eliminates nationality based discrimination and favoritism between different 
foreign investors in the host state. Hence, similar to national treatment, the MFN standard helps 
achieve an environment of equal opportunities between different foreign investors. Indeed, such 
an environment is essential to encouraging the inflow of foreign investors into the host country. 
With greater amounts of FDI flowing into the host country, the potential for development is 
greater too. 
However, as illustrated above, the MFN standard can lead to negative consequences for 
the host state if wrongly applied and interpreted by foreign investors and arbitral tribunals. The 
MFN standard has various effects on the development agenda of the host state; which can be 
summarized as follows: 
i) The importation of more favorable dispute resolution procedures from other 
treaties –thus exposing the host state to international arbitration in an 
unanticipated manner, beyond what it has consented to in the basic investment 
treaty. 
                                                 
423 For example, to receive financial or military aid. 
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ii) The possibility of importing treatment standards that do not exist in the basic 
treaty, or removing exclusions that do not exist in third party treaties - thus 
allowing foreign investors to benefit from protection standards that were not 
intended to be enjoyed by foreign investors from a certain country for political, 
economic, social, or developmental reasons of the host state. 
iii) The possibility of future tribunals to expand the temporal and jurisdictional scope 
of a treaty through the notion of “more favorable treatment.” Although tribunals 
have rejected such attempts from foreign investors, it remains a possibility that a 
future tribunal will erroneously alter the jurisdictional and temporal scopes of the 
basic treaty via the MFN standard. 
iv) The possibility of burdening the host state by taking account of all treatment 
offered to foreign investors in new investment treaties. As with the national 
treatment standard, the MFN is a relative standard that depends on the treatment 
provided to other foreign investors of different nationalities. Hence, the host state 
has to exercise caution when concluding other investment agreements and 
enacting national laws to not offer more favorable treatment to investors from 
other countries. 
v) The possibility of problems from the vague requirement of a comparator being in 
“like circumstances.” 
vi) The possibility that the pre-establishment MFN standard gives foreign investors 
from different nationalities a right of entry to the host state, with the host country 
losing its ability to screen incoming FDI to determine the nationalities it wishes to 
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attract in accordance with its development objectives and political and social 
stances towards other countries. 
Given these effects, it is important that states seeking development from FDI carefully draft the 
MFN clause in their investment treaties. The following are suggested guidelines for drafting 
more effective, and less risky, MFN clauses in future investment treaties: 
i. For the same reasons mentioned in regard to national treatment, states should 
limit the scope of MFN protection to post-establishment activities. However, a 
host state that seeks sectorial development can offer pre-establishment MFN to 
investments operating in these designated sectors. In the latter scenario, the host 
state should explicitly state the sectors that benefit from the pre-establishment 
MFN protection, using a positive list approach. 
ii. States should include the requirement of “like circumstances” and list objective 
criteria that help identify a suitable comparator. The objective criteria used in the 
national treatment discussion, above, can also be used in the context of MFN with 
necessary modifications. The COMESA Agreement adopts this approach.424 
iii. States should explicitly exclude dispute resolution provisions of the investment 
treaty from MFN protection.425 It is more effective if the MFN clause enumerates 
the articles that it covers. These articles should be, exclusively, the articles 
dealing with substantive treatment standards. 
                                                 
424 Investment Agreement For the COMESA Common Investment Area (2007). Article 19(3) 
425 e.g., “For greater certainty, notwithstanding any other Bilateral Investment Agreement the Contracting Parties 
have signed with other States before or after the entry into force of this Agreement, the most favored national 
treatment shall not apply to procedural or judicial matters.” Article 3(3) of the UAE - Mexico BIT (2016). 
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iv. States should explicitly exclude all previous investment treaties with third states 
from the coverage of the MFN protection to ensure that foreign investors will not 
try to benefit from more favorable treatment provisions the host state has 
concluded in the past. 
v. States should explicitly exclude all past and future taxation, regional integration, 
customs union, free trade area, and similar agreements from the operation of MFN 
protection. 
vi States should insert general reservations that preserve the host country’s ability to 
take measures that may discriminate between foreign investors but protect the 
essential interests of the host state in situations of emergency and crisis. 
vii. States should insert explicit reservations acknowledging the host state’s right to 
impose legitimate non-discriminatory public purpose measures that have a 
connection with its public policy.426 
viii. States should explicitly exclude the sectors, industries, and non-conforming 
measures the host state wishes to maintain outside of MFN operation, and reserve 
a regulatory space to treat foreign investors differently (without discrimination) in 
accordance with its development objectives and needs. 
ix. States should define “treatment” or “measures” to give certainty and guidance to 
future tribunals as to what measures are subject to claims of breach under the 
MFN standard.427 
                                                 
426 The Norwegian Model BIT (2015) adopts this approach. See this point in national treatment above. 
427 e.g., “The following shall, in particular, be deemed 'treatment less favourable' within the meaning of this Article: 
unequal treatment in the case of restrictions on the purchase of raw or auxiliary materials, of energy or fuel or of 
means production or operation of any kind, unequal treatment in the case of impeding the marketing of products 
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V. FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 
Although foreign investors may be protected against nationality based discrimination under the 
national treatment and the MFN standards, this protection does not safeguard against other types 
of discriminatory and arbitrary measures by the host state. The host state may treat the foreign 
investor equally with its nationals; however, that treatment may not be internationally acceptable 
if its treatment of its own nationals falls below certain thresholds. Therefore, states agree to 
include a general standard of treatment that would ensure that foreign investors received 
treatment not less than that internationally accepted, i.e., the international minimum standard.428 
Including such a standard in an investment treaty ensures that there will be “a residual, but 
absolute minimum, degree of treaty protection to investments, regardless of possible vagaries in 
the host party’s national laws and their administration, or of a host party’s lapses with respect to 
treatment of its own nationals and companies.”429 
When the BIT movement started in the 1950’s, this general -or minimum-standard was 
included. “It appears that the authors of the BITs considered that it was desirable to include a 
general standard, in addition to the specific rules, which would cover such issues and matters 
relevant for the desirable extent of protection which did not fall under the specific rules.”430 The 
language chosen by states to formulate this standard in their BITs was identical to the language 
                                                                                                                                                             
inside or outside the country, as well as any other measures having similar effects. Measures that have to be taken 
for reasons of public security and order, public health or morality shall not be deemed 'treatment less favourable' 
within the meaning of this Article.” Article 3(2) of the Egypt - Germany BIT (2005). 
428 J.C. Thomas, Reflections on Article 1105 of NAFTA: History, State Practice and the Influence of Commentators, 
17 ICSID REVIEW 21, 26 (2002). 
429 Pamela Gann, The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, 21 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
373, 373 (1985). 
430 Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties, 39 THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAWYER 87, 90 (2005). 
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adopted in the unsuccessful Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization:431 fair and 
equitable treatment.432 
The fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard is now one of the most important 
protection standards in international investment law.433 It exists, in different forms, in virtually 
all investment treaties.434 In essence, the FET standard is a general standard that fills the gaps left 
by other specific treatment standards in the BIT, such as national treatment or MFN.435 It ensures 
that foreign investors are not unjustly treated by the host state, and therefore it is a means to 
guarantee justice to foreign investors.436 
The FET standard has drawn much attention and debate in regards to its scope and 
application.437 In particular, the debate is whether the FET standard is a reflection of the 
international minimum standard contained in customary international law for the treatment of 
aliens, or an autonomous standard additional to customary international law.438 Additionally, the 
undefined nature of what is “fair and equitable” has enabled foreign investors to bring a wide 
                                                 
431 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (1948). See also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Unified 
Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment, 43 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 43, 44 (2010). 
432 Article 11(2)(a)(i) of the Charter called for the negotiation of international agreements “to assure just and 
equitable treatment for the enterprise, skills, capital, arts and technology brought from one Member country to 
another.” Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (1948). 
433 The standard of fair and equitable treatment has acquired prominence in investment arbitration as a consequence 
of the fact that other standards traditionally provided by international law might not in the circumstances of each 
case be entirely appropriate. PSEG GLOBAL INC. AND KONYA ILGIN ELEKTRIK ÜRETIM VE TICARET 
LIMITED SIRKETI V Republic of Turkey para. 238 (Award), (ICSID, 2007). “[F]air and equitable treatment is 
emerging as one of the core concepts governing the relationship between foreign investors and host states in 
international investment law.” Stephan W. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an 
Embodiment of the Rule of Law Global Administrative Law Series IILJ WORKING PAPER 2006/6, at 2 (2006). 
434 SCHREUER, 130 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2012). 
435 Id. at 132. 
436 SWISSLION DOO SKOPJE v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia para. 273 (Award), (ICSID, 2012). 
437 “[T]he frequency with which it [FET] is invoked by foreign investors and applied as a basis for state 
responsibility by arbitral tribunals contrasts with an astonishingly fundamental lack of conceptual understanding 
about the principle’s normative content.” Schill, Global Administrative Law Series IILJ WORKING PAPER 2006/6, at 
2 (2006). 
438 SCHREUER, 134 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2012). 
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range of governmental measures to be scrutinized by investment arbitration tribunals.439 
Therefore, it comes without surprise that the FET standard is now the most invoked standard by 
foreign investors in investment arbitration, with a high success rate.440 This raises the concern 
that the FET standard may have an overreaching effect on the host country’s administrative and 
governmental action, “to a degree that threatens the policymaking autonomy of that country.”441 
Arbitral tribunals have been inconsistent in their interpretation of the FET standard,442 which has 
produced results which are the opposite of the desired certainty and stability for foreign 
investors.443 
A. DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION 
The FET standard, contrary to the NT and MFN standards, is an “absolute,” “non-contingent” 
standard.444 This means that the treatment afforded to other investors(whether national or 
foreign) is irrelevant to the question of FET breach.445 Rather, the FET standard provides for 
                                                 
439 See Graham Mayeda, Playing Fair: The Meaning of Fair and Equitable Treatment in Biilateral Investment 
Treaties, 41 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 273, 281 (2007). 
440 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment § II, at 1 (UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements ed., United Nations 2012). 
441 Id. at 1. 
442 “The contemporary meaning of the FET standard rests on interpretations by individual ad hoc arbitral tribunals 
with no effective appellate review. This opens the standard to inconsistent interpretations resulting in the uncertainty 
regarding its meaning.” See id. at 6. See also Fiona Marshall, Fair and Equitable Treatment in International 
Investment Agreements 2 (International Institute for Sustainable Development 2007). 
443 Marcela Klien Bronfman, Fair and Equitable Standard: An Evolving Standard, 10 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF 
UNITED NATIONS LAW 609, 612 (2006). 
444 David Gaukrodger, Addressing the Balance of Interests in Investment Treaties: The Limitation of Fair and 
Equitable Treatment Provisions to the Minimum Standard of Treatment under Customary International Law 8 
(OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2017/03 ed., OECD Publishing 2017). 
445 Bronfman, 10 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 609, 622 (2006). 
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“rulemaking in independent terms, without reference to the treatment of others.”446 A breach of 
other protection standards in the treaty does not automatically entail the breach of the FET 
standard, or vice versa.447 
The FET standard appeared before the advent of the BIT movement. It can be traced back 
to multilateral documents, such as the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization,448 
and the Economic Agreement of Bogotá.449 Although the Havana Charter never came into force, 
it did influence the treaty practice of the United States, which began to include the FET standard 
in its FCN treaties.450 When the BIT movement started in the 1950s, the FET standard was 
transferred to BITs. “It appears that the authors of the BITs considered that it was desirable to 
include a general standard, in addition to the specific rules, which would cover such issues and 
matters relevant for the desirable extent of protection which did not fall under the specific 
rules.”451 The inclusion of the FET standard in BITs has become general practice. 
Although the FET standard is common and has existed for over a half century, it has only 
gained attention in recent years.452 The vagueness of the standard, along with controversy 
regarding its origin and purpose, has not helped arbitral tribunals reach a unified interpretation 
regarding whether specific state conduct breaches the FET standard.453 This has resulted in 
                                                 
446 Herman Walker Jr, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 
805, 811 (1958). 
447 See Schreuer, 133 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2012). 
448 Article 11(2)(i) of the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (1948). 
449 Economic Agreement of Bogota (1948). 
450 e.g., Article I(1) of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between Germany and the United States 
(1954) reads: "Each Party shall at all times accord fair and equitable treatment to the nationals and companies of the 
other Party and to their property, enterprises and other interests." See also Article I(1) of the Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Netherlands (1956). 
451 Dolzer, 39 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 87, 90 (2005). 
452 The first tribunal to apply the FET standard was Emilio Agustín Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain (Award), 
(ICSID, 2000). Dolzer and Schreuer note that “It is only snice 2000 that investment tribunals have started giving 
content to the meaning of the standard.” See SCHREUER, 130 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2012). 
453 Schill, Global Administrative Law Series IILJ WORKING PAPER 2006/6, at 5 (2006). 
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“inconsistent decisions in the field of investment protection, possibly lessening the stability and 
predictability necessary for foreign investment and fostering the fragmentation of international 
investment law.”454 
It is widely accepted among arbitral tribunals that the FET standard is an “autonomous” 
standard (i.e., a standard that has its own meaning).455 However, the historical background of the 
FET standard reveals otherwise. The FET standard was originally introduced as a gap-filling 
device to protect foreign investors against the many types of situations in which “unfairness may 
manifest itself, such as, for example, an arbitrary cancellation of licences, harassment of an 
investor through unjustified fines and penalties or creating other hurdles with a view to 
disrupting a business.”456 It was intended to cover the situations of unfairness that are not 
covered by more specific treatment standards in the investment treaty, such as NT or MFN.457 
Therefore, the FET standard was a reflection of the minimum standard of treatment for aliens 
under customary international law,458 which constitutes a “floor below which treatment cannot 
fall.”459 This intention is apparent in the comments added to the FET standard in the OECD 
Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property in 1967.460 The OECD Draft 
Convention, which represented the position of OECD states at that time, explicitly notes that the 
                                                 
454 Id. at 9. 
455 SCHREUER, 133 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2012). 
456 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment § II, at 6-7 (Agreements ed., United Nations 2012). 
457 “[T]he FET standard serves to address such acts and occurrences which do not fall into the net of specific 
standards but nevertheless are deemed to be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the BIT, i.e., to protect and 
promote foreign investment and thereby to contribute to the economic goals of the host state, as often recognized in 
BIT preambles.” Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today's Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 7, 12 (2014). 
458 See Katia Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent Developments, in STANDARDS OF 
INVESTMENT PROTECTION 112 (August Reinisch ed. 2008). See also UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment § II, at 
6 (Agreements ed., United Nations 2012). 
459 Bjorklund, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 31 (Reinisch ed. 2008). 
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FET standard “conforms to the ‘minimum standard’ which forms part of customary international 
law.”461 
In 1984, the Report of the OECD Committee on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises stated that, “[a]ccording to all Member countries which have 
commented on this point, fair and equitable treatment introduced a substantive legal standard 
referring to general principles of international law even if this is not explicitly stated.”462 
One commentator, referring to the U.S. model BIT, notes: 
Paragraph 4 first states that investments of nationals or companies of one party in 
the territory of the other party shall be accorded “fair and equitable” treatment. 
This standard serves as a guiding principle in cases where exact terms of the BIT 
do not furnish definitive guidance, and it establishes that where more than one 
interpretation may be given to a treaty provision or applicable statutes, it will be 
given the interpretation leading to the most fair and equitable result. Further, this 
standard is meant to supplement the nondiscrimination provisions in paragraphs 1 
and 2 by providing a residual, but absolute minimum, degree of treaty protection 
to investments, regardless of possible vagaries in the host party’s national laws 
and their administration, or of a host party’s lapses with respect to treatment of its 
own nationals and companies. The standard provides, in effect, a “minimum 
standard” which forms part of customary international law.463 
It is clear that the FET standard was intended to be an expression of the international 
minimum standard.464 It was not intended to be an autonomous standard, having a meaning of its 
own that is higher than what is required by the international minimum standard under customary 
international law.465 However, as will be discussed below, arbitral tribunals have interpreted this 
                                                 
461 See notes and comments on paragraph (a) of Article (1) at para 4(a). Available at https://www.oecd.org/ 
%20investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/39286571.pdf 
462 OECD, Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, Intergovernmental Agreements 
Relating to Investment in Developing Countries, Doc. No. 84/14, at 12, para. 36 (May 27, 1984). 
463 Gann, 21 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 373, 389 (1985) [emphasis added]. 
464 Thomas, 17 ICSID REVIEW 21, 51 (2002). 
465 “[i]f the historical background is to be taken seriously, then the FET standard when first used, could not have 
meant anything higher than the [international minimum standard of treatment].” SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE 
LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE BIT 
GENERATION 69 (Hart Publishing. 2009). 
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standard inconsistently, without regard to its historical background, and have expanded its 
interpretation in a manner that favors investors.466 As a result, host states become restricted when 
enacting necessary domestic regulations or taking measures that they deem beneficial to their 
development and needs, fearing breach of FET. However, before discussing the interpretation of 
the FET standard in the context of investor-state arbitration, it is necessary to discuss the FET 
standard, and its different variations, in the contemporary BITs which have been the focus of that 
arbitral process. 
B. FET STANDARD IN INVESTMENT TREATIES 
The FET standard is included in almost all investment agreements and free trade agreements 
with investment chapters, in various formulations.467 However, in conceptual terms, the 
formulations of the FET standard in investment treaties can be placed into two main categories. 
The first is the simple “unqualified” formulation, which provides for no more than the host 
state’s obligation to provide foreign investors with fair and equitable treatment. This is the 
common formulation found in most BITs. For example, the Austria – Kyrgyzstan BIT provides 
an unqualified FET standard in the following terms: 
                                                 
466 “[M]any arbitral awards have interpreted the FET concept rather broadly, especially in cases relying on the 
legitimate expectations of the investor. The result may be an open-ended and unbalanced approach, which unduly 
favours investor interests and overrides legitimate regulation in the public interest.” UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable 
Treatment § II, at 11 (Agreements ed., United Nations 2012). 
467 Yannaca-Small, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 113 (Reinisch ed. 2008). 
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Each Contracting Party shall accord to investments by investors of the other 
Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment and full and constant protection and 
security.468 
The unqualified formulation provides minimal guidance to those interpreting the 
standard. In particular, it raises the question of whether such language can be interpreted in light 
of customary international law on the treatment of aliens, or whether it provides an autonomous 
standard that should be interpreted on a case-by-case basis by reference to general notions of 
fairness and equity.469 It must be remembered that the OECD Committee on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises reported that“[a]ccording to all Member countries … 
fair and equitable treatment introduced a substantive legal standard referring to general principles 
of international law even if this is not explicitly stated.”470 However, arbitral tribunals 
interpreting the unqualified FET standard have “delinked [it] from customary international law 
and focused on the plain meaning of the terms ‘fair’ and ‘equitable.’”471 The inherent vagueness 
of the unqualified FET standard opens the door for expansive interpretations, and provides a 
wide margin of discretion for arbitrators to review the state conduct in question subjectively 
according to their own understanding of fairness and equity.472 It also allows foreign investors to 
                                                 
468 Article 3(1) of the Austria – Kyrgyzstan BIT (2016). See also Article 5(1) of the Japan – Kazakhstan BIT which 
states “Each Contracting Party shall in its Area accord to investments of investors of the other Contracting Party 
fair and equitable treatment as well as full protection and security.” Japan – Kazakhstan BIT (2014). 
469 SCHREUER, 134-39 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2012). 
470 OECD, Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, Intergovernmental Agreements 
Relating to Investment in Developing Countries, Doc. No. 84/14, at 12, para. 36 (May 27, 1984). 
471 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment § II, at 22 (Agreements ed., United Nations 2012). 
472 One commentator describes the unqualified FET standard as an example of a “‘fundamental shift in power from 
States to arbitral tribunals’ whereby ‘substantial rule making power’ has, in effect, been transferred to tribunals 
whose ‘function is not restricted to applying pre-existing rules and principles to the facts of a case, but extends to 
developing the existing principles into more precise rules and standards of conduct.’” PATRICK DUMBERRY, THE 
FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD: A GUIDE TO NAFTA CASE LAW ON ARTICLE 1105, at 128 (Kluwer 
Law International. 2013) (quoting S. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, 275(2009)). 
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bring different state actions for review, even if the state action itself is not originally within the 
scope of the international minimum standard.473 
The second category of formulations is the qualified FET standard. This formulation 
narrows the application of the FET standard by linking it to international law, or customary 
international law. A growing number of investment treaties use this formulation.474 For instance, 
the Qatar – Argentine BIT provides that the FET standard should be “interpreted and applied as 
the treatment provided to aliens in accordance with the principles of customary international 
law.”475 Other treaties provide for a qualified FET standard in the following terms: 
Each Party shall accord to a covered investment treatment in accordance with the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens, including 
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.476 
This formulation provides for FET treatment as part of customary international law. It also 
reflects the historical background of the inclusion of the FET standard in investment treaties. The 
qualified FET standard should not be understood to require treatment above, or in addition to, 
what is required under the minimum standard of treatment for aliens under customary 
international law. This is the position taken by the NAFTA parties. Under the heading 
“International Minimum Standard,” NAFTA Article 1105 provides for FET treatment in the 
following terms: 
Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in 
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security.477 
                                                 
473 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment § II, at 22 (Agreements ed., United Nations 2012). 
474 e.g., Canada - Mongolia BIT (2016);Morocco - Nigeria BIT (2016);Argentine - Qatar BIT (2016). 
475 Article 3(4) Argentine - Qatar BIT (2016). 
476 Article 6(1) Hong Kong - Chile BIT (2016). 
477 Article 1105(1) of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1992). 
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In 2001 the NAFTA parties, after the decision in Pope and Talbot v. Canada ruled that 
the FET standard was “additive” to the international minimum standard,478 issued an interpretive 
note for Article 1105.479 The purpose of the note was “to clarify and reaffirm the meaning” of 
Article 1105:480 
Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to 
investments of investors of another Party. 
The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" 
do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens. 
A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, 
or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a 
breach of Article 1105(1).481 
Hence, it is apparent that NAFTA parties wanted to reaffirm their understanding of the FET 
standard as treatment in accordance with customary international law. 
The language of NAFTA’s interpretive note found its way into the model BITs of 
NAFTA parties and other investment agreements.482 The U.S. Model BIT, for example, adopts a 
qualified FET standard similar to that of NAFTA.483 It explicitly states that the FET standard 
prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the 
                                                 
478 Pope & Talbot Inc v The Government Of Canada para. 110 (Award on the Merits of Phase 2), (NAFTA, 2001). 
479 Under Article 1131(2), an interpretation by the Free Trade Commission of a provision of the Agreement “shall be 
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480 North American Free Trade Agreement, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, NAFTA Free 
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minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments.484 It adds that the concept 
of “fair and equitable treatment” does not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is 
required by customary international law, and does not create additional substantive rights.485 To 
give further certainty to the substantive contents of the FET standard, the U.S. Model BIT 
provides that the obligation to provide FET treatment includes “the obligation not to deny justice 
in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of 
due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world.”486 
Similarly, and more recently, the (now stalled) Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPPA) adopts a qualified FET standard identical to that of the U.S. Model BIT mentioned 
above.487 This is also the contemporary standard adopted by the European Union. In 2011 the 
European Parliament issued a resolution regarding the European Union’s investment policy.488 
The resolution stated that future EU investment treaties should define FET by reference to the 
level of treatment established by customary international law.489 
An explicit link between the FET standard and the international minimum standard 
provides guidance to arbitral tribunals interpreting the standard, and avoids expansive 
interpretations. By referring to examples of misconduct that infringe FET treatment (e.g., denial 
of justice) interpreters are able to identify the acts and level of severity required to find a breach 
of the FET standard. In other words “treaties incorporating a reference to the minimum standard 
of treatment of aliens under customary law send out a message to arbitrators that the latter cannot 
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go beyond what customary international law declares to be the content of the minimum standard 
of treatment.”490 Although the international minimum standard is not clearly defined,491 nor is 
there a general consensus on its content,492 a qualified FET formulation will nevertheless induce 
tribunals to apply a higher threshold to determine breach of the standard, as compared with the 
unqualified FET formulation.493 
New trend in investment agreements is thus to use qualified FET provisions. This has 
come as a response to the expansive interpretations of the FET standard by tribunals in investor-
state arbitrations. Linking the FET standard to customary international law is “an important 
element of governments’ efforts to address the balance between investor protection and the right 
to regulate.”494 
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C. THE APPLICATION OF THE FET STANDARD 
The application of the FET standard is at the heart of investor-state arbitration issues resulting 
from BIT interpretation and application. This can be attributed to the vague and open-ended 
nature of the standard, which allows for the review of a wide range of state activities. Hence, 
“investment lawyers representing claimants naturally seek to tailor their cases and their 
arguments so that they will be subsumed under the FET standard.”495 
Contemporary discussion of the application and interpretation of the FET standard in 
investment arbitration focuses on two main issues. The first relates to the appropriate threshold 
of liability for state misconduct. The liability threshold depends on whether the tribunal 
interprets the FET standard in light of customary international law, which provides for a higher 
liability threshold, or whether the tribunal interprets the FET standard as an autonomous 
standard, which provides a lower liability threshold. The second issue concerns the definition 
and content of the obligation to provide FET in arbitral practice. While arbitral tribunals have 
attempted to give some substantive content to the obligation to provide FET, they have not been 
consistent in doing so.496 
1. Customary International Law and the Threshold of State Liability: 
Considerable debate has surrounded the question of whether the FET standard merely reflects the 
international minimum standard or provides an autonomous standard that is additional to 
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customary international law.497 The answer to this question is relevant to the appropriate 
threshold of liability to be applied by tribunals when reviewing state actions alleged to be in 
breach of the FET standard. This makes crucial the specific wording of the FET standard in the 
relevant investment treaty. A qualified FET standard, such as that found in NAFTA article 1105, 
requires interpreters to link FET with customary international law. On the other hand, an 
unqualified FET standard enables tribunals to apply a broader scope than that required by 
customary international law.498 
Customary international law on the treatment of aliens prescribes a high threshold for 
state liability. It requires a grossly excessive and definite misconduct by the host state towards 
the foreign investor, in a manner that indicates “a clear injustice evident to any reasonable 
observer.”499 Hence, ordinary errors by the host state do not invoke the liability threshold under 
customary international law; rather, what is required is something more than mere error - 
something that is outrageous and invites condemnation.500 
The threshold of liability for state misconduct under customary international law was laid 
down in the seminal Neer case in 1926.501 An American citizen was killed by a group of armed 
men in Mexico. Mexican authorities had been unable to arrest the perpetrators. Thus, the United 
States lodged a claim with the Mexican–American Claims Commission on behalf of Mr. Neer’s 
family. The Commission found that the Mexican authorities had acted diligently and that the 
measures taken by the Mexican authorities in relation to the investigation of the crime did not 
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infringe the international minimum standard of treatment owed to aliens under customary 
international law.502 The American–Mexican Claims Commission reviewing the case stated that 
a host government would violate the international minimum standard of treatment for aliens only 
when its actions amounted to “an outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an 
insufficiency of government action so far short of international standards that every reasonable 
and impartial man would recognize its insufficiency.”503 
The Neer decision uses negative superlatives to describe the liability threshold for state 
misconduct. This illustrates the high bar for state liability under customary international law.504 
Accordingly, if the FET standard is to be interpreted as a reflection of customary international 
law, a determination of breach of the FET standard would require a high degree of egregious 
state action. The tribunal in S.D. Mayers v. Canada held that a breach of article 1105 of NAFTA 
(international minimum standard) occurs: 
[O]nly when it is shown that an investor has been treated in such an unjust or 
arbitrary manner that the treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the 
international perspective. That determination must be made in the light of the high 
measure of deference that international law generally extends to the right of 
domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own borders.505 
Similarly, the tribunal in Alex Genin et al. v. Estonia stated that the FET standard found in the 
U.S. – Estonia BIT requires “an international minimum standard that is separate from domestic 
law, but that is, indeed, a minimum standard.”506 The tribunal adopted the Neer standard for state 
liability without explicitly referring to the Neer case by stating that “[a]cts that would violate this 
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minimum standard would include acts showing a willful neglect of duty, an insufficiency of 
action falling far below international standards, or even subjective bad faith.”507 
Arbitral tribunals have not been consistent on the appropriate threshold to be applied for 
state liability under qualified FET standards. While some have accepted the high liability 
threshold set in the Neer case,508 others have rejected it on a basis related to the narrow and 
particular group of situations to which the Neer case applies.509 Another group of tribunals has 
taken a middle approach; they have accepted the Neer case, but have emphasized the developing 
nature of customary international law, which requires some flexibility in applying the Neer 
standard depending on the circumstances of each case.510 
NAFTA tribunals are bound by the joint interpretation of Article 1105 of NAFTA issued 
by the NAFTA parties, which provides that the FET standard does not require anything more 
than customary international law.511 However, NAFTA tribunals have struggled with the 
question of what is customary international law today.512 For example, the tribunal in ADF 
Group Inc. v. USA questioned whether customary international law has evolved over time to go 
beyond the types of misconduct referred to in the Neer case.513 It stated that: 
What customary international law projects is not a static photograph of the 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as it stood in 1927 when the Award in 
the Neer case was rendered. For both customary international law and the 
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minimum standard of treatment of aliens it incorporates, are constantly in a 
process of development.514 
Other tribunals have expressed the view that the standard laid down in the Neer case does 
not apply to foreign investments, as that case concerned “not the treatment of foreign investment 
as such but the physical security of the alien.”515 The tribunal in Mondev v. USA was of the 
opinion that the Neer standard was both outdated and had a different purpose (i.e., the physical 
protection of aliens): 
Neer and like arbitral awards were decided in the 1920s, when the status of the 
individual in international law, and the international protection of foreign 
investments, were far less developed than they have since come to be. In 
particular, both the substantive and procedural rights of the individual in 
international law have undergone considerable development. In the light of these 
developments it is unconvincing to confine the meaning of “fair and equitable 
treatment” and “full protection and security” of foreign investments to what those 
terms – had they been current at the time – might have meant in the 1920s when 
applied to the physical security of an alien. To the modern eye, what is unfair or 
inequitable need not equate with the outrageous or the egregious.516 
Other tribunals have held that the threshold for state liability under customary 
international law remains high; however, flexibility in application is required to reflect the 
development of customary international law. This is the stance taken by the tribunal in 
Thunderbird v. Mexico: 
The content of the minimum standard should not be rigidly interpreted and it 
should reflect evolving international customary law. Notwithstanding the 
evolution of customary law since decisions such as Neer Claim in 1926, the 
threshold for finding a violation of the minimum standard of treatment still 
remains high, as illustrated by recent international jurisprudence. For the purposes 
of the present case, the Tribunal views acts that would give rise to a breach of the 
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minimum standard of treatment prescribed by the NAFTA and customary 
international law as those that, weighed against the given factual context, amount 
to a gross denial of justice or manifest arbitrariness falling below acceptable 
international standards.517 
In Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, the tribunal maintained that the threshold of liability 
under customary international law is a high one; however, it noted that the Neer standard could 
be adapted to modern considerations of egregious misconduct that might cover a wider range of 
actions than would have been included under that standard in 1926: 
This is evident in the abundant and continued use of adjective modifiers 
throughout arbitral awards, evidencing a strict standard. International Thunderbird 
used the terms “gross denial of justice” and “manifest arbitrariness” to describe 
the acts that it viewed would breach the minimum standard of treatment. S.D. 
Myers would find a breach of Article 1105 when an investor was treated “in such 
an unjust or arbitrary manner.” The Mondev tribunal held: “The test is not 
whether a particular result is surprising, but whether the shock or surprise 
occasioned to an impartial tribunal leads, on reflection, to justified concerns as to 
the judicial propriety of the outcome…518 
It therefore appears that, although situations may be more varied and complicated 
today than in the 1920s, the level of scrutiny is the same. The fundamentals of the 
Neer standard thus still apply today: to violate the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment codified in Article 1105 of the NAFTA, an act 
must be sufficiently egregious and shocking – a gross denial of justice, manifest 
arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident 
discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons – so as to fall below accepted 
international standards and constitute a breach of Article 1105(1). The Tribunal 
notes that one aspect of evolution from Neer that is generally agreed upon is that 
bad faith is not required to find a violation of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard, but its presence is conclusive evidence of such. Thus, an act that is 
egregious or shocking may also evidence bad faith, but such bad faith is not 
necessary for the finding of a violation. The standard for finding a breach of the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment therefore remains as 
stringent as it was under Neer; it is entirely possible, however that, as an 
international community, we may be shocked by State actions now that did not 
offend us previously…519 
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Such a breach may be exhibited by a “gross denial of justice or manifest 
arbitrariness falling below acceptable international standards;” or the creation by 
the State of objective expectations in order to induce investment and the 
subsequent repudiation of those expectations.520 
Notwithstanding the different interpretations of the qualified FET standard, a qualified 
FET standard typically establishes a more demanding threshold of liability for state actions. On 
the other hand, an unqualified FET clause attaches a broad scope to the standard, thus allowing 
interpreters to apply a low threshold of liability for state misconduct. Unqualified FET clauses 
have allowed a tribunal to consider the interpretation issued by the NAFTA parties regarding 
article 1105 and the recent trend in BITs to link the FET standard with customary international 
law to confirm that “those specific instruments aside, the standard is or might be a broader 
one,”521 and that “the fair and equitable standard may be more precise than its customary 
international law forefathers.”522 Thus, “the fair and equitable standard. . . can also require a 
treatment additional to, or beyond that of, customary law.”523 
The tribunal in Lemire v. Ukraine noted that the drafting of the unqualified FET standard 
under the U.S. - Ukraine BIT allowed it to conclude that “actions or omissions of the Parties may 
qualify as unfair and inequitable, even if they do not amount to an outrage, to willful neglect of 
duty, egregious insufficiency of State actions, or even in subjective bad faith.”524 Similarly, the 
tribunal in Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentina stated that: 
Dealing first with Respondent’s argument that the fair and equitable treatment is 
limited to and to be weighed against the so-called minimum standard of treatment 
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under international law, the Tribunal concludes that there is no basis for such a 
limitation and that such an interpretation runs counter to the ordinary meaning of 
the text of Article 3 [unqualified FET standard].525 
The inconsistent applications of customary international law make it challenging for 
states to predict the threshold of liability that will apply to them. In order for states to have the 
confidence necessary to take measures that achieve their policy and development objectives, they 
should be allowed a high degree of deference. If a low liability threshold is applied, then any 
state action that is unfair or inequitable in the eyes of the tribunal may be determined as a breach 
of the FET standard. At the same time, applying the very high liability standard such as that in 
the Neer case might itself be unfair to foreign investors, as it is almost impossible for states to 
behave so egregiously. Thus, the most reasonable solution to this dilemma is that adopted in 
Thunderbird v. Mexico, which took into consideration the evolution of customary international 
law and called for a flexible interpretation in accordance with the facts and circumstances of the 
case – maintaining, however, that the threshold for state liability remain a high one.526 
2. Contents of the FET Standard 
Although the FET standard has garnered attention since 2000 as a result of the decision in 
Maffezini case,527 and has been extensively invoked in investor-state arbitrations,528 tribunals 
have not yet developed a unified understanding of the elements encompassed within the 
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obligation to provide FET.529 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),530 requires 
interpretation “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty.”531 The ordinary meaning of the term “fair and equitable” has been determined 
variously to be “‘just,’ ‘even-handed,’ ‘unbiased,’ ‘legitimate.’”532 The term “treatment” itself is 
also hard to define; 533 it can encompass a wide range of state activities that include any “act, step 
or proceeding” taken by the host state.534 It is thus difficult to determine the types of 
infringements which are possible under the FET standard.535 
The FET standard has no consolidated and conventional core meaning that can easily be 
applied by tribunals and host states.536 It should be interpreted with due regard to the surrounding 
circumstances of each case.537 It is similar to the principle of good faith found in the codes of 
civil law jurisdictions, which set out specific rules and then add the good faith principle as an 
overreaching principle that fills the gaps not covered by the specific rules.538 At its basic level, 
the FET standard should be understood as a gap filling device that protects foreign investors 
from unjust actions by the host state that do not fall within the domain of the more specific 
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treatment standards.539 The tribunal in PSEG v. Turkey explained that “[b]ecause the rule of fair 
and equitable treatment changes from case to case, it is sometimes not as precise as would be 
desirable. Yet, it clearly does allow for justice to be done in the absence of more traditional 
breaches of international standards.”540 
Arbitral tribunals have admitted that fleshing out the normative contents of the FET 
standard is a hard task given the vagueness and indeterminacy of the standard. The tribunal in 
Total v. Argentina noted that “this standard is inherently flexible, it is difficult, if not impossible, 
‘to anticipate in the abstract the range of possible types of infringements upon the investor’s 
legal position.’ Its application in a given case must take into account relevant State practice and 
judicial or arbitral case law as well as the text of the BIT and other sources of customary or 
general international law.”541 
Arbitral tribunals have nonetheless endeavored to pinpoint “some typical obligations that 
may be included in the standard, as well as types of conduct that would breach the standard, in 
order to be guided in their analysis of the issue before them.”542 Through a de facto doctrine of 
precedent,543 arbitral awards dealing with the FET standard have played a fundamental role in 
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shaping the “constitutive elements” of the standard.544 These elements are more specific 
obligations to which the FET standard is relevant and determinative. 
At the outset, one may ask whether the use of two terms, namely “fair” and “equitable,” 
entail two independent meanings, or obligations, for FET. One of the corollaries of the “general 
rule of interpretation” in the VCLT is that “interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the 
terms of the treaty.”545 If one is to follow this rule, then the two terms “fair” and “equitable” 
should be given different meanings. If the essential purpose of the FET standard –to be a gap-
filling provision that ensures justice-- is to be taken into consideration, then it can be said that 
“fair” means in accordance with the law, and “equitable” means to take into account the different 
interests involved, (i.e., the investor’s and host state’s interests) when determining whether a 
certain state measure is “fair.”546 Arbitral tribunals seem not to follow this line of interpretation; 
rather, they consider “fair and equitable” to represent a single unified standard.547 
Arbitral tribunals usually follow a “list approach” when articulating the contents of the 
FET standard, although these lists have not been identical.548 The most famous of these lists is 
from the tribunal in Tecmed v. Mexico: 
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agreement, in light of 
the good faith principle established by international law, requires the Contracting 
Parties to provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the 
basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make 
the investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent 
manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the 
foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations 
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that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and 
administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply 
with such regulations . . . . The foreign investor also expects the host State to act 
consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions or permit 
issued by the State that were relied upon by the investor to assume its 
commitments as well as to plan and launch its commercial and business activities 
The investor also expects the State to use the legal instruments that govern the 
actions of the investor or the investment in conformity with the function usually 
assigned to such instruments, and not to deprive the investor of its investment 
without the required compensation.549 
The Tecmed list of FET elements has been criticized for being pro-investor;550 but it 
contains all the elements that are now firmly rooted in the FET standard. At the risk of over 
simplifying, at its basic level, the FET standard protects foreign investors from arbitrariness and 
discrimination, as well as from substantive and procedural denial of justice, and provides for a 
stable and transparent legal framework governing investment in the host state - in particular, the 
protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations.551 There is a common thread among arbitral 
tribunals not to include bad faith or malicious intent as a necessary element for the breach of 
FET.552 
                                                 
549 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v. United Mexican States, para. 154 (ICSID, 2003). 
550 Valenti, in CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC LAW : GENERAL INTERESTS OF HOST STATES IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 39 (Sacerdoti ed. 2014). 
551 See generally Yannaca-Small, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION (Reinisch ed. 2008). See also 
UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment § II, at 1 (Agreements ed., United Nations 2012), “The standard protects 
investors against serious instances of arbitrary, discriminatory or abusive conduct by the host state.” 
Schill’s account of FET content is: “(1) the requirement of stability, predictability and consistency of the legal 
framework, (2) the principle of legality, (3) the protection of investor confidence or legitimate expectations, (4) 
procedural due process and denial of justice, (5) substantive due process or protection against discrimination and 
arbitrariness, (6) the requirement of transparency and (7) the requirement of reasonableness and proportionality.” 
Schill, Global Administrative Law Series IILJ WORKING PAPER 2006/6, at 11 (2006). See also Prof. Dolzer’s list: 
“good faith in the conduct of a party, consistency of conduct, transparency of rules, recognition of the scope and 
purpose of laws, due process, prohibition of harassment, a reasonable degree of stability and predictability of the 
legal system, and, in particular, recognition of the legitimate expectation on the part of the investor . . . arbitrariness 
and discrimination also fall under the heading of FET.” Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today's Contours, 12 
SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7, 15 (2014). 
552 “[T]here is a common thread in the recent awards under NAFTA and Tecmed which does not require bad faith 
or malicious intention of the recipient State as a necessary element in the failure to treat investment fairly and 
equitably. As recently stated in CMS, it is an objective standard ‘unrelated to whether the Respondent has had any 
deliberate intention or bad faith in adopting the measures in question. Of course, such intention and bad faith can 
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The protection of investors’ legitimate expectations is closely related, and considered part 
of, the obligation to provide a stable legal framework governing the foreign investment.553 
Arbitral tribunals have noted that the protection of the legitimate expectations of the investor is 
“the most important function” of the FET standard.554 The justification is that the foreign 
investor relies on the regulatory, contractual, and/or informal representations offered by the host 
state when making its investment decision.555 A unilateral change by the host state in these 
interests may cause harm to the investment project. The tribunal in Thunderbird v. Mexico 
provided a definition of the concept of “legitimate expectations:” 
[T]he concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ relates, … to a situation where a 
Contracting Party’s conduct creates reasonable and justifiable expectations on the 
part of an investor (or investment) to act in reliance on said conduct, such that a 
failure by the NAFTA Party to honour those expectations could cause the investor 
(or investment) to suffer damages.556 
Arbitral tribunals have identified three main situations where an investor’s legitimate 
expectations may arise, and consequently be protected, under the obligation to provide FET. 
These situations are i) expectations arising from contractual obligations between the foreign 
investor and the host country, ii) expectations arising from the regulatory framework of the host 
                                                                                                                                                             
aggravate the situation but are not an essential element of the standard.’” Azurix Corp. v The Argentine Republic 
para. 372 (Final Award), (ICSID, 2006). See also Yannaca-Small, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 122 
(Reinisch ed. 2008). 
553 “The protection of the ‘expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the investment’ 
has likewise been identified as a facet of the standard.” Enron Corporation & Ponderosa Assets, L.P v Argentine 
Republic para. 262 (Award), (ICSID, 2007). 
554 ELECTRABEL S.A. v. The Republic of Hungary (Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability), para. 
7.75 (ICSID, 2012). Other tribunals have referred to the stability of the legal framework and the protection of 
legitimate expectation as “essential elements” of the FET standard. See Occidental Exploration and Production 
Company v The Republic of Ecuador para. 183 (Award), (LCIA, 2004). 
555 Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today's Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7, 
17 (2014). 
556 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v The United Mexican States para. 147 (Award), (NAFTA, 
2006). 
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state, and iii) expectations arising from informal representations made by host state officials to 
the foreign investor. 
a. Contractual Obligations: The first relates to the unilateral modification of contractual 
undertakings by host governments.557 Contracts between the host state and the foreign investor 
generate “legal rights and therefore expectations of compliance.”558 However, arbitral tribunals 
have stressed that mere contractual obligations do not rise to the level of protection under the 
concept of legitimate expectations.559 Rather “[in] order that the alleged breach of contract may 
constitute a violation of the BIT, it must be the result of behaviour going beyond that which an 
ordinary contracting party could adopt. Only the state in the exercise of its sovereign authority 
(‘puissance publique’), and not as a contracting party, may breach the obligations assumed under 
the BIT.”560 
b. Regulatory Framework The second situation relates to the change of the general regulatory 
framework governing the investment.561 The legal framework governing the investment creates 
                                                 
557 “Legitimate expectations may follow from explicit or implicit representations made by the host state, or from its 
contractual commitments.” Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A. v. Republic Of Lebanon para. 159 (Award), (ICSID, 
2012). 
558 Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic para. 261 (Award), (ICSID, 2008). 
559 “It is evident that not every hope amounts to an expectation under international law. The expectation a party to 
an agreement may have of the regular fulfilment of the obligation by the other party is not necessarily an 
expectation protected by international law. In other words, contracts involve intrinsic expectations from each party 
that do not amount to expectations as understood in international law. Indeed, the party whose contractual 
expectations are frustrated should, under specific conditions, seek redress before a national tribunal.” Parkerings-
Compagniet AS v. Lithuania para. 344 (Award), (ICSID, 2007). 
560 Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan para. 260 (Decision on Jurisdiction), (ICSID, 2005). 
561 In Bayindir v. Pakistan, the tribunal held that FET treatment comprises “the obligation to refrain ... from 
frustrating the investor’s reasonable expectations with respect to the legal framework affecting the investment.” 
Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan para. 178 (Award), (ICSID, 2009). 
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an expectation of the foreign investor regarding its stability and predictability,562 which affects 
the investment decision and the profitability of the investment project. As such, tribunals have 
acknowledged that “there is certainly an obligation not to alter the legal and business 
environment in which the investment has been made,”563 and therefore a host state should not 
“unreasonably modify the legal framework or modify it in contradiction with a specific 
commitment.”564 
There is consensus among tribunals that the expectations of the foreign investor that can 
be relied upon are those that arise when the foreign investor enters the host state. In other words, 
the foreign investor must take the local law as it stands at the time of making the investment.565 
Another requirement is that the foreign investor should have derived its expectations from the 
local laws and acted in reliance upon those laws and regulations.566 The expectations should be 
“reasonable” or “legitimate,” and therefore should not arise solely out of the investor’s subjective 
postulates.567 The protection of legitimate expectations cannot be assessed from the investor’s 
point of view, but rather must be balanced with the views of the host state. As explained by the 
tribunal in Toto v. Lebanon, “legitimate expectations are more than the investor’s subjective 
expectations. Their recognition is the result of a balancing operation of the different interests at 
                                                 
562 “An investor’s decision to make an investment is based on an assessment of the state of the law and the totality of 
the business environment at the time of the investment as well as on the investor’s expectation that the conduct of the 
host State subsequent to the investment will be fair and equitable.” Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The 
Czech Republic para. 301 (Partial Award), (UNCITRAL, 2006). 
563 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v The Republic of Ecuador para. 191 (Award), (LCIA, 2004). 
564 El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic para. 364 (Award), (ICSID, 2011). 
565 Michele Potesta, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and the Limits of a 
Controversial Concept, 28 ICSID REVIEW 88, 110 (2013). 
566 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v The Argentine Republic para. 
226 (Decision on Liability), (ICSID, 2010). 
567 Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today's Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7, 
16 (2014). 
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stake, taking into account all circumstances, including the political and socioeconomic 
conditions prevailing in the host State.”568 
The legitimate expectations of the foreign investor should be assessed in light of the host 
state’s circumstances and its sovereign right to regulate. Protection of an investor’s legitimate 
expectations should not imply that the legal framework governing the investment should be 
“frozen” as a result of this protection under the FET obligation. It is unreasonable to expect that 
the circumstances prevailing at the time the investment was made are to remain totally 
unchanged.569 In fact, a state has the obligation and responsibility to “amend their legislation in 
order to adapt it to change and the emerging needs and requests of their people in the normal 
exercise of their prerogatives and duties.”570 The issue regarding the host state’s right to regulate 
and the protection of investors’ expectations relating to the stability of the legal framework 
governing the investment is at the center of the debate surrounding the FET standard.571 A recent 
OECD publication notes that “[the] FET provision, for example, is at the core of the right to 
regulate debate. A number of other provisions, such as those governing national treatment, most-
favoured nation, indirect expropriation or capital flows are also important, but an initial focus on 
FET is warranted by its prominence.”572 
                                                 
568 Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A. v. Republic Of Lebanon para. 165 (Award), (ICSID, 2012). “The assessment of 
the reasonableness or legitimacy must take into account all circumstances, including not only the facts surrounding 
the investment, but also the political, socioeconomic, cultural and historical conditions prevailing in the host State.” 
Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador para. 340 (Award), (ICSID, 2008). 
Similarly, the tribunal in Saluka noted: “In order to determine whether frustration of the foreign investor’s 
expectations was justified and reasonable, the host State’s legitimate right subsequently to regulate domestic 
matters in the public interest must be taken into consideration as well.” Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v 
The Czech Republic para. 305 (Partial Award), (UNCITRAL, 2006). 
569 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic para. 305 (Partial Award), (UNCITRAL, 
2006). 
570 Total S.A. v. The Argentine Republic para. 115 (Decision on Liability), (ICSID, 2010). 
571 David Gaukrodger, The Balance Between Investor Protection and the Right to Regulate in Investment Treaties: A 
scoping paper 4 (OECD Working Papers on International Investment ed., 2017). 
572 Id. at 17. 
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Accordingly, some arbitral tribunals have been cautious with the scope of protection 
provided under the legitimate expectations elements of the FET standard. These tribunals have 
declared that unless the host state provides “specific commitments” to the foreign investor not to 
change its local laws (e.g., through a stabilization clause), the host state shall have the right and 
privilege to exercise its sovereign regulatory powers freely.573 The tribunal in Parkerings v. 
Lithuania stated: 
A State has the right to enact, modify or cancel a law at its own discretion. Save 
for the existence of an agreement, in the form of a stabilisation clause or 
otherwise, there is nothing objectionable about the amendment brought to the 
regulatory framework existing at the time an investor made its investment… In 
principle, an investor has a right to a certain stability and predictability of the 
legal environment of the investment. The investor will have a right of protection 
of its legitimate expectations provided it exercised due diligence and that its 
legitimate expectations were reasonable in light of the circumstances. 
Consequently, an investor must anticipate that the circumstances could change, 
and thus structure its investment in order to adapt it to the potential changes of 
legal environment.574 
The obligation to provide a stable regulatory framework for the investment, and the 
protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations inherent in it, should not –unless a specific 
commitment in this regard has been made by the host country- preclude a host state from 
enacting and modifying its local laws in pursuit of its interests. What is protected, under this 
element of FET, is the inequitable, unfair, arbitrary or discriminatory modification of local laws 
that were relied upon by the investor to make the investment, causing him to suffer damages 
from this modification.575 The Toto v. Lebanon the tribunal explained that “[i]n the absence of a 
stabilisation clause or similar commitment, which were not granted in the present case, changes 
                                                 
573 Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine para. 267 (Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability), (ICSID, 2010). See also 
Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania para. 332 (Award), (ICSID, 2007). 
574 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania paras. 332-33 (Award), (ICSID, 2007). 
575 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment § II, at 31 (Agreements ed., United Nations 2012). 
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in the regulatory framework would be considered as breaches of the duty to grant full protection 
and fair and equitable treatment only in case of a drastic or discriminatory change in the 
essential features of the transaction.”576 Similarly, in Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentina the tribunal 
noted that “[t]he legitimate expectations of foreign investors cannot be that the State will never 
modify the legal framework, especially in times of crisis, but certainly investors must be 
protected from unreasonable modifications of that legal framework.”577 
It appears that the FET standard, and in particular the protection of legitimate 
expectations, can be applied in a balanced manner that preserves the interests of the host state 
and the investor. However, a clear system of precedent does not exist in international investment 
law. Thus it is more than possible that other tribunals will not interpret the standard 
conservatively, as in the cases mentioned above. It would be safer for a state to modify the 
traditional language of the FET standard found in typical BITs, in order to avoid a broad 
interpretation. This issue will be addressed in the next section. 
c. Informal Representations The third situation where legitimate expectations of investors may 
arise is when informal representations are made by host state authorities to the foreign investor. 
The host state may make certain unilateral promises or representations to the foreign investor, 
which the investor then relies on at the time of making its investment, expecting their fulfillment. 
The frustration of the expectation that the host state will fulfill its promises and representations 
may cause the investor to suffer damages.578 The tribunal in Waste Management v. United 
Mexican States stated that when applying the FET standard “it is relevant that the treatment is in 
                                                 
576 Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A. v. Republic Of Lebanon para. 244 (Award), (ICSID, 2012) [emphasis added]. 
577 Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic para. 291 (Award), (ICSID, 2011) [emphasis added]. 
578 Potesta, 28 ICSID REVIEW 88, 103 (2013). 
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breach of representations made by the host State which were reasonably relied on by the 
claimant.”579 
In order to create legitimate expectations protected under the FET standard, the host 
state’s informal representations should be both specific and relied upon by the investor when 
making the investment in the host state. The tribunal in Glamis Gold v. United States of America 
explained that “[a] State may be tied to the objective expectations that it creates in order to 
induce investment. Actionable reliance on such expectations thus require something greater than 
mere disappointment; it requires, as a threshold condition, the active inducement of a quasi-
contractual expectation.”580 The tribunal in PSEG v. Turkey noted that “‘[l]egitimate 
expectations by definition require a promise of the administration on which the Claimants rely to 
assert a right that needs to be observed.”581 As for the specificity of the representations, the 
tribunal in Continental Casualty stated: 
[In] order to evaluate the relevance of [the ‘reasonable legitimate expectations’ 
concept] applied within Fair and Equitable Treatment standard and whether a 
breach has occurred, relevant factors include: 
i) the specificity of the undertaking allegedly relied upon which is mostly absent 
here, considering moreover that political statements have the least legal value, 
regrettably but notoriously so.582 
The three situations where legitimate expectations of the foreign investor may arise 
(contractual commitments, the legal framework governing the investment, and informal 
                                                 
579 Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States para. 98 ("Number 2") (Award), (ICSID, 2004). 
580 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America para. 799 (Award), (ICSID, 2009). The tribunal in Parkerings v. 
Lithuania similarly noted that “[An] expectation is legitimate if the investor received an explicit promise or 
guaranty from the host-State, or if implicitly, the host-State made assurances or representation that the investor took 
into account in making the investment.” Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania para. 331 (Award), (ICSID, 2007). 
581 PSEG GLOBAL INC. AND KONYA ILGIN ELEKTRIK ÜRETIM VE TICARET LIMITED SIRKETI V 
Republic of Turkey para. 241 (Award), (ICSID, 2007). 
582 Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic para. 261 (Award), (ICSID, 2008). 
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representations) are heavily discussed in literature and case law.583 However, the tribunal in 
Electrabel v. Hungary gave a good summery of the FET standard and the previous case law 
relating to its application.584 The tribunal asserted the obligation to protect the investor’s 
legitimate expectations, but also emphasized the need to balance between the investors’ interests 
and the host states’ interests when reviewing alleged breaches of the FET standard: 
7.74 The Tribunal shares the well-established scholarly opinions (e.g. Dolzer and 
Schreuer, pp. 133-147); and decisions cited by Electrabel (Bayindir, paragraph 
178 and footnotes therein; Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v 
Egypt, paragraph 150) that the obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment 
comprises several elements, including an obligation to act transparently and with 
due process; and to refrain from taking arbitrary or discriminatory measures or 
from frustrating the investor’s reasonable expectations with respect to the legal 
framework adversely affecting its investment. 
7.75 It is widely accepted that the most important function of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard is the protection of the investor’s reasonable and 
legitimate expectations. Hungary submits that this standard is not an absolute 
guarantee that shields investors from all regulatory change. Electrabel, for its part, 
does not contest Hungary’s right to regulate Dunamenti, but maintains that 
investors may legitimately expect that any changes are made in a fair, equitable 
and transparent manner. 
7.76 As regards the relevant point in time for the assessment of legitimate and 
reasonable expectations, it is common ground in ‘investment jurisprudence’ and 
between the Parties that the assessment must refer to the time at which the 
investment is made, and that expectations must be based on more than subjective 
beliefs (Reply, paragraph 116; Counter-Memorial, paragraphs 427-428). 
However, while Hungary asserts that legitimate expectations must be based on 
affirmative governmental representations, Electrabel argues that the investor’s 
expectation that its contractual rights will not be affected by governmental 
                                                 
583 For further discussion regarding the content of FET in arbitral practice See Dolzer, Fair and Equitable 
Treatment: Today's Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2014); Dolzer, Fair and 
Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties, 39 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 87 (2005); Schill, 
Global Administrative Law Series IILJ WORKING PAPER 2006/6 (2006); Yannaca-Small, in STANDARDS OF 
INVESTMENT PROTECTION (Reinisch ed. 2008); UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment § II (Agreements ed., 
United Nations 2012); Gaukrodger, The Balance Between Investor Protection and the Right to Regulate in 
Investment Treaties: A scoping paper (Investment ed., 2017). 
584 ELECTRABEL S.A. v. The Republic of Hungary (Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability), 
(ICSID, 2012). 
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measures without compensation is legitimate in and of itself, without further 
affirmative governmental representations or assurances. 
7.77 While the investor is promised protection against unfair changes, it is well 
established that the host State is entitled to maintain a reasonable degree of 
regulatory flexibility to respond to changing circumstances in the public interest. 
Consequently, the requirement of fairness must not be understood as the 
immutability of the legal framework, but as implying that subsequent changes 
should be made fairly, consistently and predictably, taking into account the 
circumstances of the investment. 
7.78 Fairness and consistency must be assessed against the background of 
information that the investor knew and should reasonably have known at the time 
of the investment and of the conduct of the host State. While specific assurances 
given by the host State may reinforce the investor’s expectations, such an 
assurance is not always indispensable: MTD v Chile (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/7), Award, 25 May Part VII – Page 22 2004; GAMI Investments v 
Mexico. UNCITRAL, Final Award, 15 November 2004; and SD Myers v Canada, 
UNCITRAL, Second Partial Award, 21 October 2002. Specific assurances will 
simply make a difference in the assessment of the investor’s knowledge and of the 
reasonability and legitimacy of its expectations. 
7.79 Article 10(1) ECT not only speaks of fair and equitable treatment and 
equitable and stable conditions, it also refers to “favourable and transparent 
conditions.” The reference to transparency can be read to indicate an obligation 
to be forthcoming with information about intended changes in policy and 
regulations that may significantly affect investments, so that the investor can 
adequately plan its investment and, if needed, engage the host State in dialogue 
about protecting its legitimate expectations. Finally, the term “favourable” 
suggests the creation of an investor-friendly environment. Beyond that, it does not 
appear to add to the FET standard as it is generally understood.585 
D. POLICY GUIDELINES FOR THE FET STANDARD 
The FET standard ensures that foreign investors are protected from situations of unjust treatment 
by the host state that do not fall within the domain of other specific treatment standards, such as 
                                                 
585 Id. at paras. 7.74-7.79 [emphasis added]. 
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national treatment or MFN. It is an important protection standard for foreign investors; however, 
its application in arbitral practice has been criticized as threatening a host state’s right to 
regulate. The tribunal in El Paso v. Argentina explicitly pointed out that “some tribunals have … 
extended the scope of the FET to a point where, according to this Tribunal, the sovereign power 
of the State to regulate its economy is negated.”586 In particular, the protection of the investor’s 
expectations regarding a stable legal framework may inhibit host states from regulating matters 
of public concern, to avoid liability of foreign investors. Hence, countries seeking development 
from FDI should consider revising the current formulation of FET treatment in a manner that 
grants them a greater margin of regulatory flexibility, along with a high threshold for state 
liability. In addition, the contents of the FET standard, and the elements protected under it, 
should be well defined and designated. In its current formulation, the FET standard raises the 
following issues: 
i. The open-ended nature of the FET standard allows foreign investors to push the 
boundaries of the FET obligation to include legitimate state measures that serve a 
public or developmental goal. 
ii. The vague and short formulation of the FET standard does not help arbitral 
tribunals to define the contents of the standard or draw boundaries on the host 
state’s obligation to provide FET. The contents of the FET obligation are still 
evolving through arbitral practice, and hence, unless states narrow the FET 
standard in their future BITs, it is foreseeable that tribunals may adopt broader 
interpretations that favor foreign investors to the detriment of the host state’s 
policy objectives. 
                                                 
586 El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic para. 340 (Award), (ICSID, 2011). 
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iii. Customary international law on the treatment of aliens is broadly defined and its 
content has been subject to controversy among arbitral tribunals. Although 
qualifying the FET standard with customary international law helps in narrowing 
down the application of the standard, it still does not provide certainty to the 
threshold of liability that might be adopted by the tribunal. Thus states cannot be 
sure of the level of deference they will be given in the event of a dispute, nor will 
they be able to predict the outcome and consequences of their actions. 
iv. The protection of investor’s legitimate expectations relating to a transparent and 
stable legal framework governing the investment has a direct impact on the host 
state’s ability to regulate. Any change in the legal framework in the host state may 
affect the foreign investor in various possible ways. Although arbitral tribunals 
have stressed the need to balance the interests of the investor with the interests of 
the host state, they have not developed a list of subjective criteria to achieve that 
balance. This, in return, may result in inconsistent and unpredictable arbitral 
decisions as to what infringes the investors’ regulatory expectations. 
v. It is settled in arbitral practice that the FET standard protects the expectations of 
the investor at the time the investment is made. However, as foreign investors 
come into the host state at different times, it is difficult for the host state to keep 
track of, and act in accordance with, the expectations each investor has at the time 
of entering. This is a complicated and taxing burden on the host state that may 
lead to difficult compliance, as each investor has different expectations depending 
on the time it enters the host state. All these different expectations cannot be 
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accommodated by the host state, as the latter's interests dictate regular revisions 
and amendments to its legal system. 
BIT negotiators should develop a new perspective regarding the FET standard. States 
should formulate the FET standard in a way that provides guidance to tribunals regarding its 
interpretation and content. States should also explicitly reserve the right to regulate for the public 
good and in accordance with their development agendas. A better approach is not to include a 
broad FET standard similar to the typical formulation, but rather to breakdown the contents and 
elements of the standard and specify precisely which of these elements are protected under the 
BIT. This allows for a smaller margin of expansive interpretations by arbitral tribunals, and at 
the same time identifies the content and elements that are protected, leaving no room for 
investors and arbitral tribunals to expand the scope of protection. The following are policy 
guidelines and options for states regarding future FET clauses: 
1. The host state should replace the typical FET clause with a list of specific 
obligations that mirror the obligations and elements under the FET standard 
settled under customary international law, without reference to FET or customary 
international law per se. By fleshing out the contents of the FET standard a host 
state can avoid the controversies and uncertainties arising from a typical qualified 
or unqualified FET provision. This approach allows the host state to broaden or 
narrow the protection as it wishes in accordance with its objectives and needs. 
Hence, states can include a list of prohibited acts and omissions that constitute a 
breach of the treaty. They can derive this list of prohibited actions from settled 
customary international law principles and investor-state arbitrations. UNCTAD 
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has suggested the following list of prohibited state actions that can be included 
under this option:587 
a. Denial of justice and flagrant violations of due process; 
b. Manifestly arbitrary treatment; 
c. Evident discrimination; 
d. Manifestly abusive treatment involving continuous, unjustified coercion or 
harassment; 
e. Infringement of legitimate expectations based on investment-inducing 
representations or measures, on which the investor has relied. 
 International customary law on the treatment of aliens will still be 
applicable to foreign investors, even if the BIT makes no reference to it. 
However, arbitral tribunals will not be able to hear an investor’s claim 
regarding the host state’s breach of customary international law, unless the 
dispute resolution clause of the BIT is wide enough to encompass such 
claims (for example, if the dispute resolution clause gives jurisdiction to 
arbitrators to hear “any dispute arising out of an investment”). 
2. BITs should be drafted to make clear that customary international law is a 
“celling,” not a “floor,” for the obligation to provide FET.588 By tying FET to 
                                                 
587 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment § II, at 108-09 (Agreements ed., United Nations 2012). 
588 This follows the approach adopted in the Canada Model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreement (2004);U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012). 
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customary international law the host state provides a qualified FET standard. It 
thus allows the host state to enjoy a higher threshold of liability than an 
unqualified FET standard. This means that the host state is not required to provide 
treatment that is beyond or additional to what customary international law 
prescribes. States must stress that customary international law is formed by the 
continuous practice of states that stem from their sense of compliance with a legal 
obligation. This informs interpreters that a claimant investor should provide 
enough evidence that a state action infringes customary international law. Finally, 
a state should ensure that the threshold of liability to be applied to them is high by 
incorporating the Neer standard. As such, a state can complement the qualified 
FET clause with an illustrative list of conduct that rises to the level of egregious 
conduct found in the Neer case,589 such as requiring that the conduct involves 
“gross denial of justice, manifest arbitrariness, a complete lack of due process, 
evident discrimination or a manifest lack of reasons.”590 
3. Host states should include general exclusions and reservations as safeguards 
regarding the scope and application of the FET standard. In this regard four points 
are important: 
a. The host state’s right to regulate matters of public concern or take 
measures that pursue legitimate policy objectives should be clearly stated. 
The host state should insert an exception that allows it to change its 
regulations and take measures that it deems necessary for its development, 
                                                 
589 L. F. H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.A.) v United Mexican States, United Nations Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards IV 60, (General Claims Commission, 1926). 
590 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment § II, at 106 (Agreements ed., United Nations 2012). 
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as long as the measures are not applied or enforced in an arbitrary or 
discriminatory fashion and are connected with a legitimate public purpose. 
b. To clarify that a breach of any treatment standard in the treaty does not 
automatically entail the breach of the FET standard, and that a breach of 
FET requires a separate examination.591 
c. To expressly state that the assessment of investors’ expectations should be 
weighed against the principles of business risk and due diligence, along 
with the right of the state to regulate in its best interest. 
d. The host state’s level of development should be taken into consideration 
when claims of breach of FET arise.592 The understanding of the 
obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment differs from country to 
country depending on its level of development. The regulatory, 
administrative and judicial organs of an underdeveloped state are not as 
advanced as those in developed countries. Hence, measuring the failure to 
provide FET with the same ruler for all countries is not fair. It is more than 
reasonable for an investor to expect a lower level of administrative and 
judicial due process and regulatory stability in underdeveloped and 
developing countries. Nonetheless, even underdeveloped and developing 
countries must adhere to, and comply with, the customary international 
                                                 
591 This exception has been adopted in the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012). 
592 This exception has been adopted in the Investment Agreement For the COMESA Common Investment Area 
(2007). 
253 
law standards for the treatment of aliens. The COMESA Agreement 
adopts this exclusion, by stating in Article 14.3 that: 
For greater certainty, Member States understand that different Member 
States have different forms of administrative, legislative and judicial 
systems and that Member States at different levels of development may 
not achieve the same standards at the same time. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
this Article do not establish a single international standard in this 
context.593 
4. It is important for states to balance the preamble of the BIT by not making the 
protection of investors its sole objective. Many BIT preambles provide that the 
objectives of the treaty are to create “a stable framework for investments” or 
“favorable conditions for investments.” Such emphasis on investor protection 
allows tribunals to resolve all interpretive uncertainties in favor of investors. 
Thus, it is important to include other objectives, such as sustainable development 
and the contracting parties’ right to regulate. Such language will help in achieving 
a more balanced interpretation not only to the FET standard, but also to all other 
treatment standards contained in the treaty. Such an approach is adopted in the 
Morocco – Nigeria BIT preamble which states: 
 RECOGNIZING the important contribution investment can make to the 
sustainable development of the state parties, including the reduction of poverty, 
increase of productive capacity, economic growth, the transfer of technology, and 
the furtherance of human rights and human development; 
 SEEKING to promote, encourage and increase investment opportunities that 
enhance sustainable development within the territories of the state parties; 
 UNDERSTANDING that sustainable development requires the fulfillment of the 
economic, social and environmental pillars that are embedded within the concept; 
                                                 
593 Id. at art. 14.3. 
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 REAFFIRMING the right of the State Parties to regulate and to introduce new 
measures relating to investments in their territories in order to meet national 
policy objectives and taking into account any asymmetries with respect to the 
measures in place, the particular need of developing countries to exercise this 
right; 
 SEEKING an overall balance of the rights and obligations among the State 
Parties, the investors, and the investments under this Agreement.594 
CONCLUSION 
In this Chapter I have considered different BIT provisions, such as the definitions of 
“investments” and “investors,” along with the most-commonly invoked treatment standards (NT, 
MFN, and FET). As currently formulated in most BITs, these provisions are not adequately 
designed to promote development of host countries. Their vague and open-ended nature allows 
much room for innovative and expansive interpretations by foreign investors and tribunals, 
which then limits the host state’s ability to regulate and to pursue its development objectives. 
Arbitral tribunals in investor-state arbitrations have interpreted these provisions with little 
regard to the interests of the host state, and with great bias to foreign investors. Hence, BITs are 
generally asymmetrical in their in their obligations, as they pose obligations on the host state to 
provide protection to foreign investments, without any corresponding obligations on the investor 
or the investment to contribute to the host state’s development agenda. 
The vague BIT provisions and their expansive interpretations by investor-state tribunals 
jeopardize the entire BIT system which was built over many decades. In fact, there is a recent 
backlash in which countries are now refusing to enter into new BITs, or even withdrawing from 
                                                 
594 Morocco - Nigeria BIT (2016). 
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existing BITs.595 Therefore reviewing the current BIT template and equating the interests of all 
parties involved (host states and foreign investors) is vital. 
Reforming the current BIT template requires rebalancing the equation between the two 
objectives sought from concluding BITs, namely investment protection and economic 
development. The rebalancing of foreign investor and host state interests should not occur by 
eliminating the investor-state dispute-settlement mechanism (ISDS), as called for by some 
organizations and scholars.596 Rather the solution rests in the wording and formulations of 
different treaty provisions. A recent report notes that “the outcome of many disputes hinged upon 
the wording of specific provisions in the applicable IIA [international investment agreement]. 
This underlines the importance of balanced and careful treaty drafting and the need to reduce 
uncertainty arising from (broadly worded) provisions.”597 
A comprehensive review of all typical BIT provisions, and their interpretation and 
application by arbitral tribunals, is necessary. States should review BIT provisions with 
reflection on the issues and uncertainties that have appeared in investor-state arbitrations, and 
should draft balanced and up-to-date treaty provisions. This should include modifying the BIT 
template to increase the host state’s regulatory power, clarifying state party intent, precisely 
                                                 
595 Some States have terminated certain agreements or refrained from concluding (new) investment agreements. 
Most recently are the decrees signed by President Correa of Ecuador on 16 May 2017 to terminate “16 Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs), including with the US, Canada, China and eight European countries.” See news article 
on TNI website https://www.tni.org/en/article/ecuador-terminates-16-investment-treaties. Other countries have 
previously terminated certain of their BITs; “Venezuela (e.g., with the Netherlands in 2008), South Africa (e.g., with 
Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands in 2013), Ecuador (e.g., with Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay in 2008), or the announcement of Indonesia to 
terminate its investment treaties (e.g., with the Netherlands as of 2015).” See Andreas R. Ziegler, Special Issue: 
Towards Better BITs? – Making International Investment Law Responsive to Sustainable Development Objectives, 
15 THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 803, 804 (2014). 
596 See in general Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potesta, Challenges on the Road Toward a Multilateral 
Investment Court (Karl Sauvant ed., Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 2017). 
597 Investor–State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2016, at 29 (2017). 
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identifying the scope of the treaty, and adding reservations and exclusions to the BIT to give the 
host country more flexibility. 
Some countries have started to react to concerns over interpretations of BITs by 
amending their model BITs in a manner that attempts to equalize the interests of foreign 
investors and host states. Some expansive interpretations of BIT provisions in investor-state 
arbitrations have influenced countries to insert clarifications and limitations to some treatment 
standards in order to avoid problematic interpretations in the future. 
In the next chapter, I will provide a case study of a specific developing country that does 
not have a model BIT, using Jordan as an example of a country in need of FDI for its 
development. I will propose a model BIT for Jordan that accommodates the interests of both the 
foreign investor and the host state in light of recent developments in investor-state arbitrations 
and recent trends and best practices in investment treaty making. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EQUATING THE INTERESTS IN 
FUTURE BITs: AN EXAMPLE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Economic development has always been one of the main objectives behind the encouragement of 
FDI into capital-importing countries. Although there is no empirical evidence that signing BITs 
necessarily results in increased amounts of FDI,1 it is certain that providing protection and 
treatment standards to home state investors constitutes a positive factor in the investment 
decision process.2 Therefore, BITs play an important role in signaling that a capital-importing 
state is an investment-friendly destination. The increased inflow of FDI to such a capital-
importing state will, presumably, result in economic growth and development.3 
                                                 
1 For a full discussion on the impact of BITs on foreign investment inflows see Lisa E. Sachs & Karl P. Sauvant, 
BITs, DTTs and FDI flows: an Overview, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (Karl P Sauvant & Lisa 
E Sachs ed. 2009). See also Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 655 (1990). 
2 To illustrate, MIGA requires the existence of an investment treaty between the investor’s home state and the host 
state as a condition of their agreement to insure an investment. This requirement illustrates how BITs are seen as a 
tool that mitigates the risk of negative state behavior affecting the investment. See The Convention Establishing the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) (1985). Article 12(e)(iv). 
3 “[C]ountries with emerging markets entered into BITs with industrialized states in order to attract capital and 
technology to advance their development, and did so at an accelerating pace.”JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE 
LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT : NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR 
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The current FDI regime has not proved to support economic development, especially in 
developing countries.4 Bilateral investment treaties, and their interpretation by arbitral tribunals, 
have become a burden on developing countries.5 They have overprotected home state investors 
and investments, at the expense of the host state’s development.6 This can be evidenced through 
the recent decisions by countries refusing to conclude new BITs or terminating existing ones.7 
This is a result of the historical background and circumstances surrounding the formation of 
BITs in the 1950’s.8 Recently, however, many countries and organizations have voiced the need 
to effectuate the reciprocal nature of investment treaties.9 BITs should serve as a tool for 
economic development, in addition to investment protection. 
                                                                                                                                                             
FOREIGN CAPITAL 345 (Oxford University Press. 2013). See also Karl P. Sauvant and Federico Ortino, Improving 
the International Investment Law and Policy Regime: Options for the Future 21 (2013). 
4 See in general Aaron Cosbey Nathalie Bernasconi -Osterwalder, Lise Johnson, Damon Vis -Dunbar, Investment 
Treaties and Why They Matter to Sustainable Development, (2012). Also see SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW ON FORIGN INVESTMENT 48 (Cambridge University Press 3 ed. 2012). 
5 Two particular issues can be highlighted to illustrate states’ concerns about the application and interpretation of 
BITs: “(i) the failure of arbitral tribunals to apply treaties consistently, and (ii) tribunals’ application of treaties in a 
manner that expands the treaties beyond their intended or anticipated scope.” Ignacio Torterola and Ronan McHugh, 
To Risk or Not to Risk? The State’s Perspective of Investor–State Dispute Resolution at the 20th Anniversary of 
MIGA, in INVESTING WITH CONFIDENCE UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 177 
(Gero Verheyen Kevin W. Lu, and Srilal M. Perera ed. 2009). Also, BITs have been criticized of “imposing 
constraints on the ability of the host country governments to adopt the policies needed to promote sustainable 
development.” PENELOPE SIMONS J ANTHONY VANDUZER, GRAHAM MAYEDA, INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT INTO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY NEGOTIATORS 
20 (Commonwealth Secretariat. 2013). 
6 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C.-DAVIS JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 157, 179 (2005). 
7 Some countries have terminated certain agreements or refrained from concluding (new) investment agreements. 
Most recently are the decrees signed by President Correa of Ecuador on 16 May 2017 to terminate “16 Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs), including with the US, Canada, China and eight European countries.” See news article 
on TNI website https://www.tni.org/en/article/ecuador-terminates-16-investment-treaties. Other countries have 
previously terminated certain of their BITs; “Venezuela (e.g., with the Netherlands in 2008), South Africa (e.g., with 
Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands in 2013), Ecuador (e.g., with Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay in 2008), and the announcement of Indonesia to 
terminate its investment treaties (e.g., with the Netherlands in 2015).” Andreas R. Ziegler, Special Issue: Towards 
Better BITs? – Making International Investment Law Responsive to Sustainable Development Objectives, 15 THE 
JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 803, 804 (2014). 
8 Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in 
Developing Countries, 24 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 655, 665 (1990). 
9 The United States and Canada, for example, drawing on their experience as respondents in NAFTA cases, have 
revised their model BITs to clarify the scope and meaning of different investment obligations. South Africa revised 
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The need to harness economic growth and development has reached a peak. Mobilizing 
investment and ensuring that it contributes to development objectives should be a priority for all 
countries, including, in particular, developing countries. This requires a review of the current 
BIT template used by most countries and a rebalancing of the approach, policies, and law-
making of BITs, where both the economic development objectives of the host state and home 
state investor protection are addressed and equally preserved. 
A. REBALANCING BITs 
In light of the developments in investor-state arbitrations, many countries have started to redraft 
their model BITs to achieve a greater level of balance between investor protection and the host 
state’s right to pursue its development objectives. For example, the United States and Canada, 
drawing on their experience as respondents in NAFTA cases, have revised their model BITs to 
clarify the scope and meaning of different investment obligations.10 South Africa revised its 
investment policy after it concluded that “BITs and international arbitration pose unacceptably 
high risks to the government's right to regulate in the public interest.”11 India's reconsideration of 
its BIT program addressed concerns about the imbalance between investment protection and the 
Indian state’s regulatory power.12 A new generation of investment treaties is emerging. 
                                                                                                                                                             
its investment policy after it concluded that “BITs and international arbitration pose unacceptably high risks to the 
government's right to regulate in the public interest.” India's reconsideration of its BIT program was related to 
concerns about the imbalance between investment protection and the Indian state’s regulatory power. 
10 Reforming the International Investment Regime: An Action Menu. 124 (2015). 
11 David Gaukrodger, The Balance Between Investor Protection and the Right to Regulate in Investment Treaties: A 
scoping paper 9 (OECD Working Papers on International Investment ed., 2017). 
12 Id. at 9. 
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International organizations have presented working papers and studies on the importance 
of re-balancing the purposes of BITs to include economic development. The UNCTAD 
Secretariat recently published the “Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development 
(IPFSD)”13 in order to promote a new generation of investment agreements that contain a 
development agenda. The UNCTAD publication can also be used as a guide for policymakers 
when formulating their national and international investment policies. Other organizations, such 
as the OECD and IISD, have initiated similar studies and papers.14 
Different countries have different economic, political, social, and development goals. The 
model BITs offered by different international organizations are offered on a “one size fits all” 
basis, as if all countries are equal in terms of their economic situation and development 
challenges. But investment treaties touch on critical matters that have different effects on 
different countries. Hence, no single model BIT can be expected to suffice on a global basis, 
given the range of states involved and their distinctive circumstances. This is evidenced by the 
failure of prior attempts for an international unified investment agreement.15 Therefore, the 
concept of a uniform model BIT on a global basis is obsolete. The solution to this problem rests 
                                                 
13 Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (2015). 
14 See Investment Treaty Law, Sustainable Development and Responsible Business Conduct: A Fact Finding 
Survey. (2014). See also Gaukrodger, (Investment ed., 2017). See also HOWARD MANN AARON COSBEY, LUKE ERIC 
PETERSON, KONRAD VON MOLTKE, IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT: NEGOTIATORS’ HANDBOOK (International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) 2nd ed. 
2006). 
15 For example, in 1995 OECD took the initiative to establish a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). The 
negotiators from capital-importing and capital exporting countries had different views on the proposed MAI. “All 
the principle negotiating states had substantial investments abroad and so had a common interest in seeing that those 
investments received maximum protection.” OECD capital-importing countries, on the other hand, were concerned 
about the types of foreign investment they will have to accept in their territories under the MAI and the high level of 
protection proposed by capital-exporting states. The negotiators seemed not to find a common ground, and therefore 
the negotiations for the MAI failed. See SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT : NATIONAL, 
CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 353-54 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
See also JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 118-22 (Oxford University Press 2 ed. 2015). 
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on reforming the bilateral investment treaty itself, by drafting country-specific model BITs that 
are designed to accommodate the individual needs and objectives of each country.16 
Country-specific model BITs must be designed and tailored to account for the particular 
needs and objectives of a host state. They are an important tool needed to attain the economic 
and development fruits of FDI. Unlike developed countries, most developing countries do not 
have model BITs that are specifically designed to foster their economic development.17 Nor do 
the BITs offered to them by other countries allow them the ability to act in their best interest and 
achieve development through FDI, as these BITs are designed to advance the interests of the 
capital-exporting state.18 
By enacting “host state” model BITs, capital-importing countries would have increased 
control in negotiating and imposing the terms and conditions that are aligned with their own 
policies and development objectives.19 The host state model BIT, along with the home state 
model BIT, will serve as a mirror that reflects each party’s position and projection of the final 
BIT. From these two documents the parties can work together to reach a balanced final BIT that 
fits the specific relationship and accommodates the interests of both parties. The threat of 
moving investments offshore limits the ability of host countries to impose or introduce 
inefficient, or overly strict, provisions into the final BIT. At the same time, insisting on overly 
strict and vague treatment standards by the home state will run the risk of failing the BIT 
                                                 
16 A recent UNCTAD publication notes “A key challenge is promoting investment in areas that make the greatest 
contribution to sustainable development. This requires a new generation of investment promotion and facilitation 
strategies, tools, institutions and partnerships.” UNCTAD, at Executive summery page (UNCTAD 2015). 
17 See list of public model BITs at https://www.italaw.com/investment-treaties. See also SALACUSE, THE THREE 
LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT : NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR 
FOREIGN CAPITAL 342 (Oxford University Press. 2013). 
18 Andrew Newcombe, Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law, 8 THE JOURNAL OF WORLD 
INVESTMENT & TRADE 357, 363 (2007). 
19 In other words, “the party who controls the draft [model BIT] usually controls the negotiation.” 
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negotiations, and losing a market for the home state’s outbound investors. Hence, a balanced 
approach to protect the interests of both home state investors and the host state is vital for the 
success of any final BIT. If the final BIT strikes the right balance between economic 
development and investment protection, then development through FDI becomes projected. 
In this chapter, I draw upon the analysis provided earlier in this thesis regarding the 
overly protective nature of BITs and their interpretation in order to provide recommendations 
and suggestions for policy makers in developing countries to draft host state model BITs that can 
be used when negotiating BITs with home countries. These host state BITs will balance the 
equation and preserve both parties’ rights for development and investment protection in the final 
BIT between home and host states. To develop a tailored host state model BIT, I will use Jordan 
as an example of a developing state faced with many economic and development challenges, and 
which does not have a model BIT of its own that it can use when negotiating BITs with home 
countries.  
B. EQUAL PRESERVATION OF INTERESTS 
Rebalancing the interests in BITs does not mean removing or lowering investment protection 
standards. To the contrary, foreign investors look not only for good markets, but also for stable 
and low risk markets. Hence, they want to be sure that their invested capital will be neither 
discriminated against nor arbitrarily treated, and that it will be protected from governmental 
interference. A foreign investor also seeks guarantees that it will remain free to transfer its profits 
and capital to its home state. Finally, foreign investors want an efficient and neutral method to 
solve future disputes with the host state, preferably via international arbitration under the 
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auspices of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).20 Therefore, 
standards of protection are legitimate and reasonable demands of home state governments on 
behalf of their investors who invest large amounts of money and resources in host countries. 
Treatment standards not only provide assurance to home state investors, but they also discipline 
the host state , as they deter host governments from taking unjust, arbitrary, and discriminatory 
acts fearing paying large amounts of compensation to home state investors.  
To rebalance BITs, this thesis suggests that host states draft model BITs that limit the 
broad and vague language of investment protection standards to specific and unambiguous 
commitments by the host state. By clarifying the ambiguities and specifying the commitments, 
two main advantages can be attained: i) host state investors and BIT interpreters will have a 
reduced margin for expansive and unintended interpretations, while maintaining internationally 
accepted standards of protection, and ii) host states will have greater predictability of 
interpretation and more regulatory flexibility to pursue their development objectives without the 
fear of liability to home state investors. 
The host state model BIT should also rebalance investor rights vis-a-vis state obligations 
to become investor rights and obligations vis-a-vis host state rights and obligations. This is 
achieved by imposing obligations on the home state investor that ensure its contribution to host 
state development. Such obligations include requiring certain local employment quotas, 
conformity with corporate governance standards, social responsibility, and adherence to 
international conventions relating to the protection of human rights, the environment, and the 
like. The host state’s right to regulate in the public good and pursue its legitimate public policy 
                                                 
20 CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND 
NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES (1965). 
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and development objectives must be explicitly preserved. Hence, a particular provision to that 
end must be inserted in the host state model BIT, and the treatment standards should be drafted 
in a manner that does not compromise this right. Finally, the host state model BIT should limit 
recourse to international arbitration if the home state investor fails to comply with its obligations 
under the treaty. Thus, arbitration would be limited or prohibited if the home state investor 
breaches the host state’s local laws, is involved in corruption, or violates international 
conventions relating to human rights and the environment. The host state can reserve its right to 
raise these issues as defenses in investor-state arbitration, or to raise them as counter claims 
requesting compensation from, or set-off against the home state investor. Other improvements to 
future BITs that promote development through investment include the imposition of performance 
requirements that align with the host state’s development agenda.21 These issues are discussed in 
further detail below.22  
C. THE NEED FOR INDIVIDUALIZED HOST STATE MODEL BITs 
One host state model BIT cannot accommodate the different needs and objectives of all 
countries. Although there are many conceptual matters that can be transferred to individual 
model BITs, each state has its own policies, objectives, and goals; therefore, a single host 
country model BIT will not suffice. Each host state must have its own model BIT that is tailored 
                                                 
21 Performance requirements can be defined as “stipulations, imposed on investors, requiring them to meet certain 
specified goals with respect to their operations in the host country.” UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment and 
Performance Requirements: New Evidence From Selected Countries § UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2003/7, at 2 (UNCTAD 
ed., United Nations 2003). 
22 See Table in Section II of this Chapter 5. 
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specifically to its needs. Thus, the recommendations and model clauses proposed in this chapter 
address a specific developing state in light of its development challenges. This thesis will use 
Jordan as an example of a developing country that is striving to attract FDI to enhance its 
economy and development.  
Jordan is a good case study, since it is a developing country without a model BIT 
designed specifically to foster its development. Nonetheless, the recommendations and 
suggestions made in this chapter can be transferred and applied by policy makers in any country 
after studying the proposed clauses and adjusting them to their specific needs and goals. What is 
important for any developing host state when revising - or drafting - its model BIT is to maintain 
a balanced approach throughout its revision or drafting process by emphasising the rights and 
obligations of both the home state investor and the host state. Due to their resemblance with 
Jordan in economic situation, social fabric, development goals, and geographic location, 
countries in the MENA region should be able to benefit most directly from the recommendations 
set forth below. 
The proposed model clauses and policy guidelines for Jordan will incorporate the 
development challenges faced by Jordan, thereby aiming to effectively overcome these 
challenges through future FDI. The proposed BIT will shift the focus found in most BITs from 
pure investment protection to balanced protection tied with economic development. The legal 
issues that have hindered the development of other countries, such as the overly protective 
treatment standards and their innovative interpretations by arbitral tribunals, will be addressed to 
avoid similar situations in the future. This is not to say that other institutional and regulatory 
reforms within the country are not required. No model BIT will substitute for a sound and 
transparent administrative and legal system in the host state. However, BITs can play a role in 
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achieving the developmental goals of a country, if they are synchronized with a broader reform 
policy in all government levels and sectors.  
D. A FOCUS ON JORDAN AND ITS DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES 
As a small, developing country, Jordan has many of the economic problems associated with 
developing economies, including high external debt, a small export base, a small manufacturing 
sector, high unemployment (15.25% officially,23 but the unofficial rate is approximately 30%), 
high poverty (14.2%), and inflation (2.4%).24 The government is heavily reliant on foreign 
assistance due to insufficient supplies of water, oil, and other natural resources. Moreover, the 
country faces a host of regional problems, such as refugees and regional instability,25 which 
resulted in a debt-to-GDP ratio of 95% at the end of 2016.26  
The purpose of this section is not to go into the details of the Jordanian economy and its 
many challenges.27 Rather, this section identifies the most critical development challenges in the 
country that are considered a priority for the Jordanian government, so that those issues might be 
considered in the subsequent discussion of how best to address Jordan’s needs in a model host 
state BIT. 
                                                 
23 Jordan Economic Growth Plan 2018-2022, at 6 (The Economic Policy Council ed., 2017). 
24 Information found on the World Fact Book https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ 
jo.html  
25 Information found on the World Bank IBRD- IDA Data Website, Jordan. Available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/jordan , visited on July 17, 2015. 
26 Jordan Economic Growth Plan 2018-2022, at 5 (Council ed., 2017). 
27 A comprehensive discussion of Jordan’s economic challenges and the Government’s plan to overcome them can 
be found in the recently published “Jordan Economic Growth Plan 2018 – 2022”, available at 
https://rhc.jo/sites/default/files/JEPGReportEn.pdf.  
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Jordan’s first developmental challenge is securing its energy sources. Jordan lacks any 
vast quantities of natural resources and is dependent on importing conventional energy sources.28 
Recent regional instability, along with the worldwide long term increase in oil prices, have put a 
heavy burden on the government. Thus, the Jordanian government is actively promoting FDI in 
the energy sector. This includes investments in the fields of nuclear energy, oil shale, and natural 
gas.29 In addition to conventional energy sources, Jordan is actively encouraging investments in 
the renewable energy sector.30 The National Energy Strategy (2007-2020) sets a target to 
increase the share of renewable energy sources in the country’s energy mix to 10% by 2020.31 
To that effect, a law was enacted in 2010 that promotes and incentivizes renewable energy 
related investments.32 
The second major development challenge is Jordan’s scarce water resources. Jordan is 
the second poorest country in the world in water resources.33 In addition to the scarcity of water 
resources, Jordan has an out-dated water transmission and distribution network. It is reported that 
almost 57% of potable water is leaked in the distribution process before reaching consumers.34 
The 2016-2025 National Water Strategy seeks to attract FDI in the areas of waste-water 
                                                 
28 OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Jordan 2013, at 197 (2013). 
29 Id. at 204-06. 
30 “Jordan has tremendous wind, solar and biomass energy potential which can only be realized by large-scale 
investments. In 2007, the Government of Jordan developed an integrated and comprehensive Energy Master Plan. 
Renewable energy accounted for only 1% of the energy consumption in Jordan in 2007.” Salman Zafar, Renewable 
Energy Investment in Jordan, ECOMENA: ECHOING SUSTAINABILITY, 2017. Available at http://www.ecomena.org/ 
cleantech-investment-in-jordan/  
31 Jordan’s National Energy Strategy. (2007). 
32 Law on Renewable Energies and Energy Efficiency (2010). 
33 http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-world%E2%80%99s-second-water-poorest-country  
34 “At present, an estimated 57 percent of the potable water supply in Jordan’s Zarqa Governorate is lost through 
leaks in the water transmission and distribution network, with additional losses attributed to management 
weaknesses.” MCC and Jordan: A Partnership Toward Sustainable Solutions 1 (Fact Sheet) (Millennium Challenge 
Corporation ed., 2010). 
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collection and treatment, rehabilitating and upgrading water distribution systems and 
infrastructure, and protecting water resources and its management.35 
Other economic challenges exist, although they may not be as urgent as the ones 
mentioned above. These include issues in in the tourism and hospitality, public transport, and 
telecommunication sectors. These sectors contribute greatly to the country’s GDP, provide 
employment opportunities, provide hard currency, and increase Jordan’s exports.36 Thus future 
BITs in Jordan require incorporating these challenges in the BIT, by focusing on attracting FDI 
in these sectors. 
E. DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES AND A MODEL BIT FOR JORDAN 
By targeting specific sectors in its model BIT, which should also be integrated in an overall 
development policy, Jordan can attract FDI that is vital for its development. The sectoral 
approach of attracting FDI enables host states to maintain a diversified FDI portfolio, while also 
building a base for other industries.37 Therefore, for a country that lacks natural resources and is 
faced with a variety of economic challenges, the model BIT should adopt an approach of 
attracting quality FDI, instead of distorting its efforts by attempting to attract any type of FDI, 
which might not contribute to the country’s economy.38 
                                                 
35 See National Water Strategy 2016 - 2025 (Ministry of Water and Irrigation - Jordan ed., 2016). 
36 Jordan Economic Growth Plan 2018-2022, at 7 (Council ed., 2017). 
37 Ana Arias Urones & Ashraf Ali Mahate, FDI Sectorial Diversification: The Trade-Transport-Tourism Nexus 
(Karl P. Sauvant & Matthew Schroth ed., Columbia FDI Perspectives 2017). 
38 Mann notes that developing countries should shift their focus from “looking at the quantity of investment as the 
only issue, to the quality of that investment as the key issue.” See Howard Mann, Reconceptualizing International 
Investment Law: Its Role in Sustainable Development, 17 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW 521, 534 (2013). 
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Drafting a balanced and focused BIT for Jordan will not waive the need for further 
reforms on the state level to encourage FDI into the country. The Jordanian government realizes 
that attracting FDI requires “enhancing [Jordan’s] doing business eco-system, cutting the red-
tape and bureaucracy, upgrading its economic legislation framework, and streamlining its 
economic judicial transactions.”39 
F. A MODEL BIT FOR JORDAN 
The model BIT for Jordan proposed here is inspired by the recent practices in various bilateral 
and multilateral investment treaties. It also builds upon the recent efforts of other countries that 
have amended their model BITs, attempting to balance their interests with the interests of home 
state investors. The model BITs proposed by international organizations (such as UNCTAD and 
IISD) will also be consulted and referenced.40 The model BIT proposed for Jordan takes into 
account the country’s economic challenges mentioned above, in addition to the preservation of 
the government’s regulatory flexibility to pursue it development objectives. The proposed BIT 
will also take into account the application and interpretation of different treaty provisions in 
investor-state arbitrations, with the goal of limiting the possibility of overreaching and 
unintended interpretations. Finally, the proposed BIT will introduce some provisions and 
obligations that are not usually found in typical BITs. These provisions impose obligations on 
                                                 
39 Jordan Economic Growth Plan 2018-2022, at 11 (Council ed., 2017). 
40 See UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (UNCTAD 2015). Also see A Model 
International Investment Agreement for the Promotion of Sustainable Development (Konrad von Moltke ed., 
International Institute for Sustainable Development 2004). 
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host state investors that change the standard nature of BITs, as they typically only provide rights 
to host state investors with no corresponding obligations on those investors. 
The following section contains a table that is divided into six sections each addressing a 
specific part of the proposed BIT for Jordan, as follows: i) preamble and objectives, ii) 
definitions and admission (investments and investors), iii) treatment standards (NT, MFN, and 
FET), iv) dispute resolution, v) investor obligations, and vi) host state reservations and 
exceptions. The chart will summarize the current issues pertaining to these points, and propose 
the solution by illustrating examples from recent BITs and Model treaties. Table 2 will then 
propose a model BIT for Jordan based in the discussion and examples provided in the chart. 
  
27
1 
II
. T
A
BL
ES
 
Ta
bl
e (
1)
: C
ur
re
nt
 Is
su
es
 in
 B
IT
s a
nd
 th
e W
ay
 F
or
w
ar
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
Pr
ea
m
bl
e 
Th
e 
sta
rti
ng
 
po
in
t 
to
 
dr
af
t 
an
y 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
tre
at
y 
is 
to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 so
ug
ht
 fr
om
 it
. 
 In
ve
st
m
en
t 
tre
at
ie
s 
ar
e 
no
 d
iff
er
en
t. 
Th
e 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 o
f 
a 
BI
T 
ar
e 
us
ua
lly
 
st
at
ed
 
in
 
its
 
pr
ea
m
b l
e,
 
w
hi
ch
 
ty
pi
ca
lly
 e
m
ph
as
iz
es
 t
he
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
of
 f
or
ei
gn
 i
nv
es
to
rs
 a
s 
th
e 
tre
at
y’
s 
m
ai
n 
go
al
.41
 
 Pr
ea
m
bl
es
 a
re
 n
ot
 a
 s
ou
rc
e 
of
 l
eg
al
 
ob
lig
at
io
n.
 H
ow
ev
er
, p
re
am
bl
es
 p
la
y 
a 
de
te
rm
in
in
g 
ro
le
 w
he
n 
it 
co
m
es
 to
 
th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
of
 t
re
at
y 
te
rm
s.
42
 
Th
e 
em
ph
as
is 
on
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
tre
at
y 
pr
ea
m
bl
e 
ha
s 
le
d 
ar
bi
tra
l 
tri
bu
na
ls
 t
o 
re
so
lv
e 
an
y 
in
te
rp
re
tiv
e 
de
lin
qu
en
ci
es
 w
ith
 b
ia
s 
to
 in
ve
stm
en
t p
ro
te
ct
io
n.
43
  
Jo
rd
an
’s
 m
od
el
 B
IT
 s
ho
ul
d 
ha
ve
 a
 b
al
an
ce
d 
pr
ea
m
bl
e 
th
at
 e
xp
lic
itl
y 
sta
te
s 
- 
in
 a
dd
iti
on
 t
o 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
- 
th
at
 
th
e 
br
oa
de
r 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
of
 th
e 
BI
T 
is 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f 
th
e 
ho
st
 
st
at
e.
 
Th
e 
pr
ea
m
bl
e 
sh
ou
ld
 
al
so
 
gi
ve
 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 t
he
 h
os
t 
sta
te
’s
 r
ig
ht
 t
o 
re
gu
la
te
 
m
at
te
rs
 
of
 
pu
bl
ic
 
co
nc
er
n 
an
d 
pu
rs
ue
 
its
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
po
lic
ie
s. 
Su
ch
 
an
 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 
ac
kn
ow
le
dg
es
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
ho
st
 s
ta
te
 h
as
 r
ig
ht
s 
un
de
r 
th
e 
tre
at
y 
si
m
ila
r 
to
 th
e 
rig
ht
s 
of
 f
or
ei
gn
 
in
ve
st
or
s. 
 A
dd
iti
on
al
ly
, a
s 
Jo
rd
an
 is
 a
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
co
un
try
, 
it 
m
ay
 n
ot
 b
e 
ab
le
 to
 p
ro
vi
de
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
tra
ns
pa
re
nc
y 
an
d 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
as
 t
he
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 
tre
at
y 
pa
rtn
er
. 
D
ev
el
op
in
g 
co
un
tri
es
, 
by
 v
irt
ue
 
of
 th
ei
r 
ec
on
om
ic
 w
ea
kn
es
s, 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
al
lo
w
ed
 
a 
m
ar
gi
n 
of
 s
pe
ci
al
 t
re
at
m
en
t 
by
 t
he
 m
or
e 
ad
va
nc
ed
 
tre
at
y 
pa
rty
.44
 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 
it 
is 
be
ne
fic
ia
l f
or
 Jo
rd
an
 to
 m
en
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
pr
ea
m
bl
e 
Th
e 
pr
ea
m
bl
e 
of
 th
e 
Tr
an
s-
Pa
ci
fic
 P
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
(T
TP
A
),4
5  
em
ph
as
iz
es
 
th
at
 
th
e 
br
oa
de
r 
go
al
 
of
 
th
e 
TT
PA
 
is
 
to
 
“b
rin
g 
ec
on
om
ic
 g
ro
wt
h 
an
d 
so
ci
al
 b
en
ef
its
, 
cr
ea
te
 
ne
w 
op
po
rt
un
iti
es
 fo
r w
or
ke
rs
 a
nd
 b
us
in
es
se
s, 
co
nt
rib
ut
e 
to
 r
ai
sin
g 
liv
in
g 
st
an
da
rd
s, 
be
ne
fit
 
co
ns
um
er
s, 
re
du
ce
 
po
ve
rt
y 
an
d 
pr
om
ot
e 
su
sta
in
ab
le
 g
ro
wt
h.
”4
6   
 A
dd
iti
on
al
ly
, t
he
 T
TP
A
 p
re
am
bl
e 
af
fir
m
s 
th
e 
st
at
e 
pa
rti
es
’ 
“ i
nh
er
en
t 
rig
ht
 t
o 
re
gu
la
te
 a
nd
 
re
so
lv
e 
to
 
pr
es
er
ve
 
th
e 
fle
xi
bi
lit
y 
of
 
th
e 
Pa
rti
es
 
to
 
se
t 
le
gi
sla
tiv
e 
an
d 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 
pr
io
rit
ie
s, 
sa
fe
gu
ar
d 
pu
bl
ic
 
we
lfa
re
, 
an
d 
pr
ot
ec
t 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
pu
bl
ic
 w
el
fa
re
 o
bj
ec
tiv
es
, 
su
ch
 a
s p
ub
lic
 h
ea
lth
, s
af
et
y,
 th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t, 
th
e 
co
ns
er
va
tio
n 
of
 
liv
in
g 
or
 
no
n-
liv
in
g 
ex
ha
us
tib
le
 n
at
ur
al
 r
es
ou
rc
es
, 
th
e 
in
te
gr
ity
 
an
d 
st
ab
ili
ty
 
of
 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 
sy
ste
m
 
an
d 
pu
bl
ic
 m
or
al
s.”
47
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
41
 M
an
y 
B
IT
 p
re
am
bl
es
 p
ro
vi
de
 th
at
 th
e 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 o
f t
he
 tr
ea
ty
 a
re
 to
 c
re
at
e 
“a
 st
ab
le
 fr
am
ew
or
k 
fo
r i
nv
es
tm
en
ts”
 o
r “
fa
vo
ra
bl
e 
co
nd
iti
on
s f
or
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts.
” 
42
 S
ee
 A
rti
cl
e 
(3
1)
(1
) o
f t
he
 V
ie
nn
a 
Co
nv
en
tio
n 
on
 th
e 
La
w
 o
f T
re
at
ie
s (
19
69
). 
43
 “
In
te
rp
re
ta
tio
ns
 g
iv
in
g 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 w
ei
gh
t t
o 
th
e 
ob
je
ct
 a
nd
 p
ur
po
se
 o
f i
nv
es
tm
en
t t
re
at
ie
s 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
cr
iti
ci
ze
d 
as
 fa
vo
ur
in
g 
in
ve
sto
rs
 to
 th
e 
de
tri
m
en
t o
f h
os
t 
St
at
es
.”
 J.
 R
O
M
ES
H
 W
EE
RA
M
A
N
TR
Y
, T
RE
A
TY
 IN
TE
RP
RE
TA
TI
O
N
 IN
 IN
V
ES
TM
EN
T 
A
RB
IT
R
A
TI
O
N
 1
91
 (O
xf
or
d 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 P
re
ss
. 2
01
2)
. 
27
2 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
th
at
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
pa
rti
es
 in
 th
ei
r l
ev
el
 
of
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t e
xi
st.
 T
hi
s a
pp
ro
ac
h 
w
ill
 in
fo
rm
 
in
te
rp
re
te
rs
 th
at
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 h
os
t s
ta
te
 sh
ou
ld
 
be
 
gi
ve
n 
a 
la
rg
er
 
m
ar
gi
n 
of
 
de
fe
re
nc
e 
in
 
in
ve
st
or
-s
ta
te
 a
rb
itr
at
io
ns
. 
Th
e 
TT
PA
 r
ec
og
ni
ze
s 
th
at
 n
ot
 a
ll 
of
 i
ts
 1
2 
tre
at
y 
pa
rtn
er
s a
re
 o
n 
eq
ua
l f
oo
tin
g 
in
 te
rm
s o
f 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t, 
an
d 
th
er
ef
or
e 
its
 
pr
ea
m
bl
e 
ac
kn
ow
le
dg
es
 “
th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 i
n 
th
ei
r 
le
ve
ls 
of
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
nd
 d
iv
er
sit
y 
of
 e
co
no
m
ie
s.”
48
 
 Th
e 
TT
PA
’s
 p
re
am
bl
e 
m
ay
 fo
rm
 a
 n
ew
 n
or
m
 
in
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
tre
at
y 
m
ak
in
g.
 I
ts
 p
re
am
bl
e 
eq
ua
liz
es
 
th
e 
tw
o 
m
ai
n 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 
of
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
tre
at
ie
s, 
m
ai
nl
y 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
an
d 
ho
st 
sta
te
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t. 
Si
m
ila
rly
, t
he
 p
re
am
bl
e 
of
 th
e 
re
ce
nt
 S
lo
va
k 
– 
Ira
n 
B
IT
 s
ee
ks
 “
to
 p
ro
m
ot
e 
in
ve
stm
en
t 
th
at
 
co
nt
rib
ut
es
 to
 th
e 
su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f 
th
e 
Co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
Pa
rti
es
,”
 a
nd
 a
im
s 
to
 “
se
cu
re
 
an
 o
ve
ra
ll 
ba
la
nc
e 
of
 r
ig
ht
s 
an
d 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 
be
tw
ee
n 
in
ve
sto
rs
 
an
d 
th
e 
H
os
t 
St
at
e.
”4
9  
D
ev
el
op
in
g 
co
un
tri
es
 
lik
e 
Jo
rd
an
 
sh
ou
ld
 
ad
op
t –
 
in
 
th
ei
r 
m
od
el
 
B
IT
 
- 
pr
ea
m
bu
la
r 
la
ng
ua
ge
 s
im
ila
r 
in
 c
on
te
nt
 t
o 
th
at
 o
f 
th
e 
TT
PA
 a
nd
/o
r t
he
 S
lo
va
k 
– 
Ira
n 
BI
T.
50
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
44
 U
N
CT
A
D
, N
at
io
na
l T
re
at
m
en
t §
 IV
, a
t 4
7-
48
 (U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 1
99
9)
. 
45
 T
ra
ns
 P
ac
ifi
c 
Pa
rtn
er
sh
ip
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t (
TP
PA
) (
20
16
). 
46
 Id
. a
t P
re
am
bl
e.
 
47
 Id
. a
t P
re
am
bl
e.
 
48
 Id
. a
t P
re
am
bl
e.
 
49
 S
lo
va
k 
– 
Ir
an
 B
IT
 (2
01
6)
. 
50
 S
ee
 a
lso
 th
e 
pr
ea
m
bl
e 
of
 th
e 
M
or
oc
co
 - 
N
ig
er
ia
 B
IT
 (2
01
6)
. 
27
3 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
O
bj
ec
tiv
es
 
Th
e 
pr
ea
m
bl
e 
of
 a
 B
IT
 p
la
ys
 a
n 
im
po
rta
nt
 ro
le
 in
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
of
 
th
e 
tre
at
y.
 H
ow
ev
er
, 
th
e 
pr
ea
m
bl
e 
its
el
f 
is 
no
t 
a 
so
ur
ce
 
of
 
le
ga
l 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 o
n 
th
e 
pa
rti
es
, 
an
d 
is 
se
en
 a
s 
a 
m
er
e 
sta
te
m
en
t 
of
 t
he
 
m
ot
iv
es
 t
ha
t 
in
du
ce
d 
th
e 
pa
rti
es
 t
o 
en
te
r i
nt
o 
th
e 
tre
at
y.
 H
en
ce
, t
he
ir 
us
e 
in
 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
is
 
su
pp
le
m
en
ta
ry
 
an
d 
m
ay
 n
ot
 b
e 
gi
ve
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
w
ei
gh
t 
by
 
in
te
rp
re
te
rs
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 
in
se
rti
ng
 
a 
tre
at
y 
pr
ov
isi
on
 
th
at
 
st
at
es
 
th
e 
tre
at
y’
s 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 
w
ill
 
m
ak
e 
th
es
e 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 o
bl
ig
at
or
y 
on
 
in
te
rp
re
te
rs
, 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 t
he
 
ru
le
s 
of
 i
nt
er
pr
et
at
io
n 
fo
un
d 
in
 t
he
 
V
ie
nn
a 
Co
nv
en
tio
n 
on
 t
he
 L
aw
 o
f 
Tr
ea
tie
s (
V
CL
T)
.51
  
To
 s
af
eg
ua
rd
 a
ga
in
st 
a 
tri
bu
na
l’s
 n
eg
le
ct
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
ea
m
bl
e,
 t
he
 p
ar
tie
s 
ca
n 
ad
d 
an
 “
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 
cl
au
se
” 
at
 
th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
of
 
t h
e 
BI
T.
 
Th
is 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
w
ill
 o
ut
lin
e 
th
e 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 o
f 
th
e 
BI
T 
an
d 
th
e 
in
te
nt
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
pa
rti
es
. 
Su
ch
 
a 
pr
ov
is
io
n,
 b
ei
ng
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 tr
ea
ty
 te
rm
s a
nd
 th
us
 
co
m
pu
ls
or
y 
w
he
n 
in
te
rp
re
tin
g 
th
e 
tre
at
y,
 “
gi
ve
s 
ad
de
d 
w
ei
gh
t 
to
 
th
e 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
as
 
an
 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
na
l 
gu
id
e,
 b
ey
on
d 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
no
rm
al
ly
 a
ttr
ib
ut
ed
 to
 th
e 
pr
ea
m
bl
e.
”5
2  
 
Th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
te
xt
 
is
 
su
gg
es
te
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 c
la
us
e:
53
 
Th
e 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
of
 
th
is 
Ag
re
em
en
t 
is
 
to
 
st
im
ul
at
e,
 e
nc
ou
ra
ge
, a
nd
 in
cr
ea
se
 th
e 
flo
w 
of
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 th
at
 c
on
tri
bu
te
 to
 a
nd
 s
up
po
rt 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
of
 e
ac
h 
Pa
rty
, i
n 
pa
rti
cu
la
r 
th
e 
H
os
t 
St
at
e 
wh
er
e 
th
e 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
is
 l
oc
at
ed
. 
Th
e 
te
xt
 o
f 
th
e 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
cl
au
se
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 
sh
or
t a
nd
 u
nc
om
pl
ic
at
ed
. E
ff
or
ts
 to
 re
fle
ct
 a
ll 
in
te
nt
io
ns
 a
nd
 o
bj
ec
tiv
es
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
rti
es
 m
ay
 
re
nd
er
 it
 in
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
an
d 
m
ay
 c
au
se
 c
on
fu
sio
n 
to
 in
te
rp
re
te
rs
.54
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
51
 A
rti
cl
e 
31
(1
) 
of
 th
e 
V
CL
T 
re
qu
ire
s 
in
te
rp
re
te
rs
 to
 in
te
rp
re
t a
 tr
ea
ty
 “
in
 g
oo
d 
fa
ith
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
or
di
na
ry
 m
ea
ni
ng
 to
 b
e 
gi
ve
n 
to
 th
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 th
e 
tre
at
y 
in
 th
ei
r c
on
te
xt
 a
nd
 in
 th
e 
lig
ht
 o
f i
ts 
ob
je
ct
 a
nd
 p
ur
po
se
.”
 V
ie
nn
a 
Co
nv
en
tio
n 
on
 th
e 
La
w
 o
f T
re
at
ie
s (
19
69
). 
52
 S
A
D
C 
M
od
el
 B
ila
te
ra
l I
nv
es
tm
en
t T
re
at
y 
Te
m
pl
at
e 
w
ith
 C
om
m
en
ta
ry
 8
 (S
ou
th
er
n 
A
fri
ca
n 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t C
om
m
un
ity
 e
d.
, 2
01
2)
. 
53
 C
om
pa
re
 th
is
 te
xt
 w
ith
 th
e 
on
e 
in
 H
O
W
A
RD
 M
A
N
N
 A
A
RO
N
 C
O
SB
EY
, L
U
K
E 
ER
IC
 P
ET
ER
SO
N
, K
O
N
R
A
D
 V
O
N
 M
O
LT
K
E,
 II
SD
 M
O
D
EL
 IN
TE
RN
A
TI
O
N
A
L 
A
G
RE
EM
EN
T 
O
N
 IN
V
ES
TM
EN
T 
FO
R 
SU
ST
A
IN
A
B
LE
 D
EV
EL
O
PM
EN
T:
 N
EG
O
TI
A
TO
RS
’ H
A
N
D
BO
O
K
 4
 (I
nt
er
na
tio
na
l I
ns
tit
ut
e 
fo
r S
us
ta
in
ab
le
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t (
II
SD
) 2
nd
 e
d.
 2
00
6)
. 
54
 S
ee
 in
 g
en
er
al
 id
. a
t 4
. 
27
4 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 
of
 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
Th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 
of
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
de
te
rm
in
es
 t
he
 t
yp
es
 o
f 
ec
on
om
ic
 
pr
oj
ec
ts 
co
ve
re
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
B
IT
. T
he
 
de
fin
iti
on
 
is
 
al
so
 
im
po
rta
nt
 
to
 
de
te
rm
in
e 
IC
SI
D
 j
ur
is
di
ct
io
n 
w
he
n 
di
sp
ut
es
 a
ris
e.
55
 
 M
os
t 
BI
Ts
 
ad
op
t 
an
 
op
en
 
as
se
t-
ba
se
d 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f 
in
ve
stm
en
t 
th
at
 
co
ve
rs
 a
 w
id
e 
ra
ng
e 
of
 e
co
no
m
ic
 
ac
tiv
iti
es
. H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 I
CS
ID
 c
as
e 
la
w
 i
n 
th
is
 r
eg
ar
d 
sh
ow
s 
th
at
 t
hi
s 
ty
pe
 
of
 
de
fin
iti
on
 
ha
s 
en
ab
le
d 
ar
bi
tra
to
rs
 
to
 
in
cl
ud
e 
tra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 
th
at
 w
er
e 
no
t o
rig
in
al
ly
 e
nv
is
ag
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
sta
te
 
pa
rti
es
 
as
 
co
ve
re
d 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 (
fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e 
po
rtf
ol
io
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
an
d 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
de
bt
 
se
cu
rit
ie
s)
.56
 
 In
 a
dd
iti
on
, t
he
 ty
pi
ca
l d
ef
in
iti
on
 o
f 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
in
 m
os
t 
BI
Ts
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
re
qu
ire
 t
he
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
ac
tiv
ity
 
to
 
1)
 
Be
fo
re
 
dr
af
tin
g 
th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 
of
 
“i
nv
es
tm
en
t,”
 
an
y 
co
un
try
 
w
ill
 
ha
ve
 
to
 
de
si
gn
at
e 
its
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
ch
al
le
ng
es
 a
nd
 t
he
 
go
al
s 
it 
se
ek
s 
to
 a
ch
ie
ve
 f
ro
m
 p
ro
te
ct
in
g 
FD
I. 
U
po
n 
th
at
 d
et
er
m
in
at
io
n 
it 
w
ill
 b
e 
be
tte
r s
itu
at
ed
 
to
 d
ra
ft 
th
e 
m
os
t s
ui
ta
bl
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 fo
r c
ov
er
ed
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t u
nd
er
 it
s B
IT
s. 
 2)
 T
he
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
ta
l c
ha
lle
ng
es
 in
 J
or
da
n 
ar
e 
m
ai
nl
y 
th
os
e 
re
la
te
d 
to
 i
ts 
en
er
gy
 a
nd
 w
at
er
 
se
ct
or
s. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
th
e 
co
un
try
 n
ee
ds
 F
D
I 
in
 
ot
he
r 
se
ct
or
s 
as
 w
el
l 
to
 s
tim
ul
at
e 
th
e 
ov
er
al
l 
gr
ow
th
 o
f i
ts 
ec
on
om
y.
 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 
th
e 
Jo
rd
an
ia
n 
m
od
el
 
BI
T 
sh
ou
ld
 
ad
op
t 
a 
de
fin
iti
on
 
th
at
 
al
lo
w
s 
al
l 
ki
nd
s 
of
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
(o
pe
n 
as
se
t-b
as
ed
 d
ef
in
iti
on
), 
w
ith
 
em
ph
as
is
 o
n 
en
er
gy
 a
nd
 w
at
er
 re
la
te
d 
FD
I. 
Th
e 
em
ph
as
is
 o
n 
w
at
er
 a
nd
 e
n e
rg
y 
pr
oj
ec
ts 
ca
n 
be
 
ac
hi
ev
ed
 v
ia
 g
ra
nt
in
g 
pr
e-
es
ta
bl
ish
m
en
t 
rig
ht
s 
to
 F
D
I i
n 
th
es
e 
se
ct
or
s e
xc
lu
si
ve
ly
. 
 3)
 
A
n 
op
en
 
as
se
t-b
as
ed
 
de
fin
iti
on
 
is
 
no
t 
re
co
m
m
en
de
d 
by
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
in
sti
tu
tio
ns
.57
 
Th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
ad
op
te
d 
in
 t
he
 
Co
lo
m
bi
a 
– 
Tu
rk
ey
 B
IT
 is
 a
 g
oo
d 
ex
am
pl
e 
of
 
w
ha
t J
or
da
n 
sh
ou
ld
 a
do
pt
 in
 it
s 
m
od
el
 B
IT
.58
 
Th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 is
 d
et
ai
le
d 
an
d 
lo
ng
, h
en
ce
 it
 is
 
no
t 
in
cl
ud
ed
 i
n 
th
is
 t
ab
le
. H
ow
ev
er
, 
it 
is
 a
n 
op
en
-a
ss
et
-b
as
ed
 
de
fin
iti
on
 
th
at
 
ex
pl
ic
itl
y 
ex
cl
ud
es
 p
or
tfo
lio
 i
nv
es
tm
en
ts
, 
pu
bl
ic
 d
eb
t 
op
er
at
io
ns
, c
la
im
s 
to
 m
on
ey
 a
ris
in
g 
ou
t 
of
 a
 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 t
ra
ns
ac
tio
n,
 a
nd
 c
re
di
t 
gi
ve
n 
in
 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
. T
he
 d
ef
in
iti
on
 in
 th
e 
sa
id
 
BI
T 
do
es
 
no
t 
ex
cl
ud
e 
IP
 
rig
ht
s 
no
t 
pr
ot
ec
te
d 
un
de
r 
do
m
es
tic
 
la
w
 
- 
a 
re
co
m
m
en
de
d 
ex
cl
us
io
n 
by
 U
N
CT
A
D
.59
  
 O
th
er
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t t
re
at
ie
s 
(e
.g
. t
he
 C
O
M
ES
A
 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t)6
0  
al
so
 e
xc
lu
de
 g
oo
dw
ill
 m
ar
ke
t 
sh
ar
e,
 
w
hi
ch
 
- 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
N
A
FT
A
 
ju
ris
pr
ud
en
ce
 - 
co
ns
tit
ut
e 
an
 in
ve
st
m
en
t.6
1  
 Th
e 
Co
lo
m
bi
a 
– 
Tu
rk
ey
 B
IT
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
th
e 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
of
 a
n 
in
ve
stm
en
t t
o 
be
 p
re
se
nt
 
in
 
an
y 
ec
on
om
ic
 
p r
oj
ec
t 
to
 
ha
ve
 
tre
at
y 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n.
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H
ow
ev
er
, 
th
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
55
 A
rti
cl
e 
25
 o
f t
he
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
Se
ttl
em
en
t o
f I
nv
es
tm
en
t D
isp
ut
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f O
th
er
 S
ta
te
s (
19
65
). 
56
 In
ve
st
m
en
t P
ol
ic
y 
Fr
am
ew
or
k 
fo
r S
us
ta
in
ab
le
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 8
1 
(2
01
5)
. 
57
 T
he
 S
A
D
C 
M
od
el
 B
IT
, f
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 d
isc
ou
ra
ge
s 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 o
pe
n-
as
se
t 
ba
se
d 
de
fin
iti
on
s. 
Se
e 
SA
D
C 
M
od
el
 B
ila
te
ra
l 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
Tr
ea
ty
 T
em
pl
at
e 
w
ith
 
Co
m
m
en
ta
ry
 1
2-
13
 (C
om
m
un
ity
 e
d.
, 2
01
2)
. 
58
 C
ol
om
bi
a 
- T
ur
ke
y 
B
IT
 (2
01
4)
. 
59
 U
N
CT
A
D
, I
nv
es
tm
en
t P
ol
ic
y 
Fr
am
ew
or
k 
fo
r S
us
ta
in
ab
le
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 9
2 
(U
N
CT
A
D
 2
01
5)
. 
60
 In
ve
st
m
en
t A
gr
ee
m
en
t F
or
 th
e 
CO
M
ES
A
 C
om
m
on
 In
ve
st
m
en
t A
re
a 
(2
00
7)
. 
27
5 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
co
nt
rib
ut
e 
to
 
th
e 
ho
st 
sta
te
’s
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
in
 o
rd
er
 t
o 
be
 c
ov
er
ed
 
un
de
r t
re
at
y 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n.
 
H
ow
ev
er
, f
or
 a
 c
ou
nt
ry
 li
ke
 Jo
rd
an
, w
hi
ch
 n
ee
ds
 
FD
I 
in
 v
irt
ua
lly
 a
ll 
se
ct
or
s, 
th
e 
as
se
t-b
as
ed
 
de
fin
iti
on
 b
ec
om
es
 t
he
 b
es
t 
op
tio
n 
du
e 
to
 t
he
 
w
id
e 
ra
ng
e 
of
 i
nv
es
tm
en
ts 
su
ch
 a
 d
ef
in
iti
on
 
co
ve
rs
. H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 a
ss
et
-b
as
ed
 d
ef
in
iti
on
 c
an
 
be
 n
ar
ro
w
ed
 b
y 
in
co
rp
or
at
in
g 
th
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
th
at
 e
co
no
m
ic
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 c
ov
er
ed
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
BI
T 
m
us
t 
ha
ve
 
th
e 
“ c
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ic
s 
of
 
an
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t.”
 
Th
es
e 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
ar
e 
i) 
a 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l 
co
m
m
itm
en
t 
(o
f 
ca
pi
ta
l 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
re
so
ur
ce
s)
, 
ii)
 t
he
 a
ss
um
pt
io
n 
of
 r
is
k,
 i
ii)
 a
 
la
sti
ng
 
in
te
re
st 
in
 
th
e 
ho
st
 
sta
te
, 
iv
) 
th
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
n 
of
 p
ro
fit
, a
nd
 v
) c
on
di
tio
n 
th
at
 o
nl
y 
th
e 
as
se
ts
 a
nd
 re
so
ur
ce
s 
us
ed
 in
 th
e 
op
er
at
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
je
ct
 a
re
 g
iv
en
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
(th
is 
el
im
in
at
es
 v
ac
at
io
n 
as
se
ts 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
as
se
ts
 n
ot
 
us
ed
 in
 th
e 
op
er
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
in
ve
stm
en
t p
ro
je
ct
 
fr
om
 th
e 
am
bi
t o
f t
re
at
y 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n)
.  
 4)
 J
or
da
n 
ca
n 
al
so
 n
ar
ro
w
 th
e 
op
en
 a
ss
et
-b
as
ed
 
de
fin
iti
on
 b
y 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
a 
le
ga
lit
y 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
(i.
e.
 
th
at
 
th
e 
in
ve
stm
en
t 
m
us
t 
be
 
m
ad
e 
in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 th
e 
ho
st 
co
un
try
’s
 la
w
s)
. T
hi
s 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t e
ns
ur
es
 th
at
 o
nl
y 
th
os
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts 
th
at
 c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 J
or
da
n’
s 
lo
ca
l 
la
w
s 
w
ill
 b
e 
gi
ve
n 
tre
at
y 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n.
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
in
 th
e 
Co
lo
m
bi
a 
– 
Tu
rk
ey
 B
IT
 
do
 
no
t 
in
cl
ud
e 
th
e 
“c
on
tri
bu
tio
n 
to
 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
of
 t
he
 h
os
t 
st
at
e”
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
t. 
Th
e 
in
cl
us
io
n 
of
 
su
ch
 
a 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
 
is 
im
po
rta
nt
 to
 si
gn
al
 th
e 
ho
st 
co
un
try
’s
 d
es
ire
 to
 
gi
ve
 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
to
 
be
ne
fic
ia
l 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts.
 
“T
hi
s 
w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
th
e 
ad
va
nt
ag
e 
of
 m
ak
in
g 
cl
ea
r 
th
at
 t
he
 p
ol
ic
y 
of
 t
he
 t
re
at
y 
is
 n
ot
 j
us
t 
in
ve
st
or
 a
nd
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n,
 b
ut
 a
ls
o 
th
e 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
ho
st 
co
un
try
 th
at
 th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t w
ill
 m
ak
e 
a 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
to
 e
co
no
m
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t.”
63
 
Th
is
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
ha
s 
be
en
 a
do
pt
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
ne
w
 
In
di
an
 
M
od
el
 
BI
T,
 
w
hi
ch
 
re
qu
ire
s 
“s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 
[o
f 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t]
 
fo
r 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
of
 
th
e 
co
un
tr
y 
wh
er
e 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
s m
ad
e.
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 L
ah
ra
 L
ib
er
ti,
 I
nt
el
le
ct
ua
l 
Pr
op
er
ty
 R
ig
ht
s 
in
 I
nt
er
na
tio
na
l 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
A
gr
ee
m
en
ts:
 A
n 
O
ve
rv
ie
w
 1
0 
(2
01
0/
01
 O
EC
D
 W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
s 
on
 I
nt
er
na
tio
na
l 
In
ve
st
m
en
t e
d.
, O
EC
D
 P
ub
lis
hi
ng
 2
01
0)
. 
62
 C
ol
om
bi
a 
- T
ur
ke
y 
B
IT
 (2
01
4)
. 
63
 S
CO
PE
 A
N
D
 D
EF
IN
IT
IO
N
 - 
U
N
CT
A
D
 S
er
ie
s o
n 
Is
su
es
 in
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l I
nv
es
tm
en
t A
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 II
, a
t 1
20
 (2
01
1)
. 
64
 In
di
a 
M
od
el
 B
IT
 (2
01
6)
. 
27
6 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
5)
 F
in
al
ly
, J
or
da
n 
ca
n 
ex
cl
ud
e 
so
m
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
pr
oj
ec
ts 
th
at
 m
ay
 fa
ll 
un
de
r t
he
 o
pe
n-
as
se
t b
as
ed
 
de
fin
iti
on
, 
bu
t 
ar
e 
no
t 
FD
I, 
su
ch
 a
s 
po
rtf
ol
io
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
(a
nd
 
ot
he
r 
fo
rm
s 
of
 
in
di
re
ct
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t).
 T
he
 r
is
ks
 i
m
po
se
d 
by
 p
or
tfo
lio
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 f
in
an
ci
al
 p
ap
er
s 
(b
ei
ng
 
hi
gh
ly
 
vo
la
til
e 
an
d 
sh
or
t-t
er
m
) 
an
d 
th
e 
po
ss
ib
ili
ty
 o
f 
ha
vi
ng
 t
he
 h
os
t 
sta
te
 e
ng
ag
e 
in
 
in
ve
st
or
-s
ta
te
 a
rb
itr
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 in
di
re
ct
 in
ve
st
or
s 
po
se
 g
re
at
er
 r
is
ks
 t
ha
n 
th
e 
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 t
he
se
 
so
rts
 
of
 
in
di
re
ct
 
in
ve
stm
en
ts
 
m
ay
 
br
in
g.
 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 i
n 
Jo
rd
an
’s
 s
itu
at
io
n,
 i
t 
is 
ad
vi
sa
bl
e 
to
 e
xp
lic
itl
y 
ex
cl
ud
e 
po
rtf
ol
io
 i
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 a
nd
 
ot
he
r f
in
an
ci
al
 p
ap
er
s f
ro
m
 th
e 
am
bi
t o
f c
ov
er
ed
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 it
s m
od
el
 B
IT
. 
 6)
 F
in
al
ly
, 
Jo
rd
an
 i
s 
en
co
ur
ag
ed
 t
o 
ad
op
t 
a 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t-b
as
ed
 
de
fin
iti
on
 
of
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t. 
Th
is
 
is 
a 
su
pp
le
m
en
ta
ry
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
th
at
 
ne
ce
ss
ita
te
s 
th
at
 
a 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
m
us
t 
co
nt
rib
ut
e 
to
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f 
th
e 
ho
st 
sta
te
 
to
 b
e 
gi
ve
n 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n.
  
27
7 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 
of
 In
ve
st
or
 
Th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 
of
 
In
ve
st
or
 
de
te
rm
in
es
 t
he
 n
at
ur
al
 a
nd
 j
ur
id
ic
al
 
pe
rs
on
s 
th
at
 a
re
 e
nt
itl
ed
 f
or
 t
re
at
y 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n.
 T
he
 d
ef
in
iti
on
 a
ls
o 
pl
ay
s 
an
 
im
po
rta
nt
 
ro
le
 
in
 
IC
SI
D
 
ju
ris
di
ct
io
n.
 
 Ty
pi
ca
lly
, 
B
IT
s 
us
e 
th
e 
na
tio
na
lit
y 
te
st 
fo
r 
na
tu
ra
l 
pe
rs
on
s, 
an
d 
th
e 
pl
ac
e-
of
-in
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
te
st
 
fo
r 
ju
rid
ic
al
 
pe
rs
on
s. 
Th
e 
pl
ac
e-
of
-
in
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
te
st 
fo
r 
ju
rid
ic
al
 
in
ve
st
or
s 
m
ay
 
gi
ve
 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
to
 
m
ai
lb
ox
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 th
at
 h
av
e 
no
 re
al
 
ec
on
om
ic
 t
ie
s 
w
ith
 t
he
 c
ou
nt
ry
 o
f 
in
co
rp
or
at
io
n.
 
Th
es
e 
sh
el
l 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 c
an
 b
e 
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
 in
 th
e 
ho
m
e 
st
at
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
so
le
 p
ur
po
se
 o
f 
be
ne
fit
in
g 
fro
m
 th
e 
BI
T.
 H
en
ce
, t
he
 
pl
ac
e-
of
-in
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
te
st 
cr
ea
te
s 
ro
om
 f
or
 t
re
at
y 
sh
op
pi
ng
 b
y 
ho
st 
st
at
e 
na
tio
na
ls
 
or
 
in
ve
sto
rs
 
fro
m
 
th
ird
 
co
un
tri
es
, 
w
ho
 
- 
in
 
re
gu
la
r 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s 
- 
ar
e 
no
t 
en
tit
le
d 
to
 
be
ne
fit
 fr
om
 th
e 
BI
T.
 
1)
 T
he
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
ta
ke
n 
w
he
n 
de
fin
in
g 
“i
nv
es
to
r”
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
tie
d 
w
ith
 t
he
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
ta
ke
n 
w
he
n 
de
fin
in
g 
“i
nv
es
tm
en
t.”
 I
f 
Jo
rd
an
 is
 to
 a
do
pt
 a
n 
op
en
 
as
se
t-b
as
ed
 
de
fin
iti
on
 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 it
s 
po
lic
y 
of
 a
ttr
ac
tin
g 
a 
w
id
e 
ra
ng
e 
of
 
FD
I, 
th
en
 
it 
sh
ou
ld
 
ad
op
t 
th
e 
pl
ac
e-
of
-
in
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
de
fin
iti
on
 f
or
 “
in
ve
sto
rs
.”
 T
hi
s 
de
fin
iti
on
 is
 e
as
y 
to
 s
at
isf
y,
 g
iv
in
g 
a 
w
id
e 
ra
ng
e 
of
 in
ve
sto
rs
 th
e 
ab
ili
ty
 to
 ta
ke
 a
dv
an
ta
ge
 o
f t
he
 
tre
at
y;
 
th
us
, 
it 
co
m
pl
em
en
ts
 
th
e 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 
fo
llo
w
ed
 
in
 
th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 
of
 
“i
nv
es
tm
en
t.”
 
A
lth
ou
gh
 t
he
 p
la
ce
-o
f- i
nc
or
po
ra
tio
n 
de
fin
iti
on
 
m
ay
 c
re
at
e 
th
e 
op
po
rtu
ni
ty
 f
or
 tr
ea
ty
 s
ho
pp
in
g,
 
a 
co
un
try
 li
ke
 J
or
da
n,
 w
hi
ch
 is
 s
tri
vi
ng
 fo
r F
D
I, 
m
ig
ht
 n
ot
 c
on
si
de
r 
th
is 
an
 i
ss
ue
, 
as
 l
on
g 
as
 i
t 
re
ce
iv
es
 t
he
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
th
at
 c
om
pl
ie
s 
w
ith
 t
he
 
de
fin
iti
on
 se
t o
f “
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
.”
 
 2)
 
To
 
ov
er
co
m
e 
th
e 
po
ss
ib
ili
ty
 
of
 
tre
at
y 
sh
op
pi
ng
, 
Jo
rd
an
 
m
ay
 
al
so
 
re
qu
ire
 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s 
to
 h
av
e 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l b
us
in
es
s 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 
in
 t
he
 h
om
e 
co
un
try
 t
o 
be
ne
fit
 f
ro
m
 t
re
at
y 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n.
 I
t 
ca
n 
re
qu
ire
 s
o 
in
 t
he
 d
ef
in
iti
on
 
its
el
f 
or
 b
y 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
a 
“d
en
ia
l 
of
 b
en
ef
its
” 
cl
au
se
 
in
 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
tre
at
y.
 
Th
is 
w
ill
 
pr
ev
en
t 
tre
at
y 
sh
op
pi
ng
 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 
m
an
ag
e 
its
 e
xp
os
ur
e 
to
 in
ve
st
m
en
t c
la
im
s. 
  
Th
e 
ne
w
 I
nd
ia
n 
M
od
el
 B
IT
 a
do
pt
s 
a 
sim
ila
r 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 t
o 
th
e 
on
e 
re
co
m
m
en
de
d 
he
re
 f
or
 
Jo
rd
an
.65
 T
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 d
ef
in
es
 a
n 
in
ve
sto
r 
as
: “
A 
le
ga
l e
nt
ity
 c
on
sti
tu
te
d,
 o
rg
an
ize
d 
an
d 
op
er
at
ed
 i
n 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
wi
th
 t
he
 L
aw
 o
f 
th
e 
H
om
e 
St
at
e,
 o
wn
ed
 o
r c
on
tro
lle
d 
by
 a
 N
at
ur
al
 
Pe
rs
on
 o
r a
 le
ga
l e
nt
ity
 o
f t
he
 H
om
e 
St
at
e 
an
d 
co
nd
uc
tin
g 
re
al
 
an
d 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l 
bu
si
ne
ss
 
op
er
at
io
ns
 i
n 
th
e 
H
om
e 
St
at
e.
” 
Th
us
, 
th
e 
In
di
an
 
M
od
el
 
BI
T 
ad
op
ts 
a 
pl
ac
e-
of
-
in
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
de
fin
iti
on
 
th
at
 
re
qu
ire
s 
i) 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
or
 c
on
tro
l b
y 
na
tio
na
ls
 o
f t
he
 h
om
e 
st
at
e,
 a
nd
 ii
) 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l b
us
in
es
s 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 in
 
th
e 
ho
m
e 
sta
te
.  
 Th
e 
CO
M
ES
A
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
ad
op
ts
 a
 s
et
 o
f 
cr
ite
ria
 to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 a
n 
in
ve
st
or
 h
as
 
“s
ub
sta
nt
ia
l 
bu
sin
es
s 
ac
tiv
ity
” 
in
 t
he
 h
om
e 
st
at
e.
 T
he
se
 c
rit
er
ia
 a
re
: 
i) 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
br
ou
gh
t 
in
to
 t
he
 c
ou
nt
ry
; 
ii)
 t
he
 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 j
ob
s 
cr
ea
te
d;
 i
ii)
 i
ts 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
lo
ca
l 
co
m
m
un
ity
; 
an
d 
iv
) 
th
e 
le
ng
th
 o
f 
tim
e 
th
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
in
 o
pe
ra
tio
n.
66
 
 Th
e 
In
di
an
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 d
ef
in
es
 “
co
nt
ro
l”
 a
s 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
’s
 r
ig
ht
 to
 “
ap
po
in
t a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
th
e 
di
re
ct
or
s 
or
 s
en
io
r 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
of
fic
ia
ls 
or
 
to
 
co
nt
ro
l 
th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
or
 
po
lic
y 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
65
 Id
. a
t “
In
ve
sto
r.”
 
66
 A
rti
cl
e 
1(
4)
(ii
) o
f t
he
 In
ve
st
m
en
t A
gr
ee
m
en
t F
or
 th
e 
C
O
M
ES
A
 C
om
m
on
 In
ve
st
m
en
t A
re
a 
(2
00
7)
.  
27
8 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
3)
 
A
no
th
er
 
lim
ita
tio
n 
ca
n 
be
 
ad
de
d 
to
 
th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 t
o 
re
du
ce
 t
he
 p
os
sib
ili
ty
 o
f 
tre
at
y 
sh
op
pi
ng
 
un
de
r 
th
e 
pl
ac
e-
of
-in
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
de
fin
iti
on
: t
he
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
t o
f 
“c
on
tro
l.”
 U
nd
er
 
th
is 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t, 
th
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
 m
us
t 
be
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
by
 n
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
th
e 
ho
m
e 
co
un
try
 to
 
be
ne
fit
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
BI
T.
 T
hu
s, 
a 
ju
rid
ic
al
 in
ve
sto
r 
no
t c
on
tro
lle
d 
by
 n
at
io
na
ls
 o
f t
he
 h
om
e 
co
un
try
, 
al
th
ou
gh
 in
co
rp
or
at
ed
 in
 th
e 
ho
m
e 
co
un
try
, w
ill
 
no
t q
ua
lif
y 
fo
r t
re
at
y 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n.
  
de
ci
si
on
s 
of
 s
uc
h 
En
te
rp
ris
e.
” 
It 
al
so
 d
ef
in
es
 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
as
 
th
e 
in
ve
sto
r’s
 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
of
 
“m
or
e 
th
an
 5
0%
 o
f 
th
e 
ca
pi
ta
l 
or
 f
un
ds
 o
r 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
in
 th
e 
En
te
rp
ris
e.
” 
 In
 r
eg
ar
ds
 t
o 
na
tu
ra
l 
in
ve
st
or
s, 
th
e 
Ja
pa
n 
- 
U
ru
gu
ay
 B
IT
 a
do
pt
s 
a 
fle
xi
bl
e 
de
fin
iti
on
.67
 It
 
pr
oh
ib
its
 d
ua
l n
at
io
na
ls
 f
ro
m
 b
en
ef
iti
ng
 f
ro
m
 
th
e 
tre
at
y;
 h
ow
ev
er
, a
 c
av
ea
t i
s 
in
cl
ud
ed
 th
at
 
al
lo
w
s 
na
tu
ra
l 
pe
rs
on
s 
w
ho
 a
re
 n
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
bo
th
 c
on
tra
ct
in
g 
pa
rti
es
 t
o 
be
ne
fit
 f
ro
m
 t
he
 
B
IT
 if
 “
su
ch
 n
at
ur
al
 p
er
so
ns
 h
av
e 
at
 th
e 
tim
e 
of
 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
an
d 
ev
er
 
sin
ce
 
be
en
 
do
m
ic
ile
d 
ou
tsi
de
 th
e 
Ar
ea
 o
f t
he
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
in
 w
hi
ch
 th
ey
 m
ad
e 
su
ch
 in
ve
stm
en
ts
.” 
Th
is
 c
av
ea
t a
llo
w
s d
ua
l n
at
io
na
ls
 w
ho
 h
av
e 
no
 
re
al
 e
co
no
m
ic
 t
ie
s 
w
ith
 t
he
 h
os
t 
st
at
e 
to
 
be
ne
fit
 fr
om
 th
e 
tre
at
y,
 e
ve
n 
th
ou
gh
 th
ey
 h
ol
d 
th
e 
na
tio
na
lit
y 
of
 th
e 
ho
st
 st
at
e.
 
 Th
e 
de
ni
al
 o
f 
be
ne
fit
s 
cl
au
se
 i
n 
th
e 
In
di
an
 
M
od
el
 B
IT
 a
llo
w
s t
he
 h
os
t s
ta
te
 to
 d
en
y 
tre
at
y 
be
ne
fit
s 
-e
ve
n 
af
te
r t
he
 c
on
st
itu
tio
n 
of
 a
rb
itr
al
 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s 
- t
o 
in
ve
st
or
s 
or
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 th
at
 
ar
e 
i) 
“ o
wn
ed
 
or
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d,
 
di
re
ct
ly
 
or
 
in
di
re
ct
ly
, b
y 
pe
rs
on
s 
of
 a
 n
on
-P
ar
ty
 o
r 
of
 th
e 
H
os
t 
St
at
e,
 
or
 
ii)
 
be
en
 
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
 
or
 
re
str
uc
tu
re
d 
wi
th
 
th
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
67
 Ja
pa
n 
- U
ru
gu
ay
 B
IT
 (2
01
5)
. 
27
9 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
ga
in
in
g 
ac
ce
ss
 
to
 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
re
so
lu
tio
n 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s”
 
pr
ov
id
ed
 
fo
r 
in
 
th
e 
BI
T.
68
 
A
do
pt
in
g 
a 
si
m
ila
r d
en
ia
l o
f b
en
ef
its
 c
la
us
e 
in
 
th
e 
Jo
rd
an
 m
od
el
 B
IT
 i
s 
re
co
m
m
en
de
d 
to
 
el
im
in
at
e 
th
e 
po
ss
ib
ili
ty
 
of
 
gi
vi
ng
 
tre
at
y 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
to
 f
or
ei
gn
 i
nv
es
to
rs
 w
ho
 a
re
 n
ot
 
en
tit
le
d 
to
 it
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
St
an
da
rd
s:
 
N
at
io
na
l 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
(N
T)
 
Th
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
 th
e 
N
T 
sta
nd
ar
d 
is
 to
 
pr
ov
id
e 
a 
le
ve
l 
pl
ay
in
g 
fie
ld
 
to
 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s b
y 
en
su
rin
g 
th
at
 th
e 
ho
st 
sta
te
 w
ill
 n
ot
 m
ak
e 
an
y 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
di
ffe
re
nt
ia
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
fo
re
ig
n 
an
d 
na
tio
na
l i
nv
es
to
rs
 th
ro
ug
h 
its
 la
w
s o
r 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
ac
tio
ns
.69
 
 H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 N
T 
sta
nd
ar
d 
- b
ei
ng
 o
f 
a 
re
la
tiv
e 
na
tu
re
 
- 
re
qu
ire
s 
co
m
pa
ris
on
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
tre
at
m
en
t 
re
ce
iv
ed
 b
y 
lo
ca
l 
in
ve
sto
rs
 i
n 
“l
ik
e 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s.”
 
Th
us
, 
ho
st 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
 w
ill
 h
av
e 
to
 r
eg
ul
ar
ly
 
st
ud
y 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
s 
th
ey
 w
is
h 
to
 i
nt
ro
du
ce
 o
n 
fo
re
ig
n 
an
d 
do
m
es
tic
 in
ve
st
or
s 
to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
1)
 T
he
 Jo
rd
an
ia
n 
M
od
el
 B
IT
 sh
ou
ld
 o
ffe
r N
T 
in
 
th
e 
po
st
-e
st
ab
lis
hm
en
t 
sta
ge
 
of
 
th
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
to
 
pr
es
er
ve
 
its
 
ab
ili
ty
 
to
 
sc
re
en
 
in
co
m
in
g 
FD
I. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
an
 e
xc
ep
tio
n 
to
 t
ha
t 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
to
 F
D
I i
n 
th
e 
en
er
gy
 a
nd
 w
at
er
 
se
ct
or
s. 
Th
is
 
ex
ce
pt
io
n 
w
ill
 
em
ph
as
iz
e 
th
e 
im
po
rta
nc
e 
of
 p
ro
je
ct
s 
in
 t
he
se
 s
ec
to
rs
 t
o 
th
e 
co
un
try
 
an
d 
en
co
ur
ag
e 
th
ei
r 
in
flo
w
. 
Th
e 
ex
ce
pt
io
ns
 t
o 
po
st-
es
ta
bl
ish
m
en
t 
N
T 
(e
ne
rg
y 
an
d 
w
at
er
 re
la
te
d 
FD
I) 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
a 
po
sit
iv
e 
lis
t a
pp
ro
ac
h,
 w
he
re
 th
es
e 
se
ct
or
s 
ar
e 
ex
pl
ic
itl
y 
an
d 
ex
cl
us
iv
el
y 
gi
ve
n 
pr
e-
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t N
T 
rig
ht
s. 
 2)
 J
or
da
n 
ca
n 
al
so
 r
eq
ui
re
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
be
 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
an
d 
op
er
at
ed
 
in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 th
e 
la
w
s 
of
 th
e 
ho
st 
co
un
try
 to
 
Th
e 
CO
M
ES
A
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t p
ro
vi
de
s 
fo
r 
po
st-
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t N
T,
 w
hi
ch
 p
ro
m
is
es
 “
in
ve
sto
rs
 
an
d 
th
ei
r 
in
ve
stm
en
ts
 
tre
at
m
en
t 
no
 
le
ss
 
fa
vo
ur
ab
le
 t
ha
n 
th
e 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
it 
ac
co
rd
s, 
in
 
lik
e 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
, t
o 
its
 o
wn
 in
ve
sto
rs
 a
nd
 to
 
th
ei
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts.
”7
0  T
he
 s
ec
on
d 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
of
 
th
is 
ar
tic
le
 
lis
ts 
th
e 
cr
ite
ria
 
th
at
 
m
us
t 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 
w
he
n 
de
te
rm
in
in
g 
th
e 
“l
ik
e 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s”
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
t. 
Th
es
e 
ar
e 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 t
he
 m
ea
su
re
s 
on
: 
“i
) 
th
ird
 p
er
so
ns
 
an
d 
th
e 
lo
ca
l 
co
m
m
un
ity
; 
ii)
 o
n 
th
e 
lo
ca
l 
re
gi
on
al
 o
r 
na
tio
na
l 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 
al
l 
in
ve
stm
en
ts 
wi
th
in
 a
 j
ur
is
di
ct
io
n 
on
 t
he
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
t; 
iii
) 
th
e 
se
ct
or
 th
e 
in
ve
sto
r 
is 
in
; i
v)
 th
e 
ai
m
 o
f t
he
 
m
ea
su
re
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
; v
) t
he
 r
eg
ul
at
or
y 
pr
oc
es
s 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 a
pp
lie
d 
in
 r
el
at
io
n 
to
 t
he
 m
ea
su
re
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 A
rti
cl
e 
20
.1
 o
f t
he
 In
di
a 
M
od
el
 B
IT
 (2
01
6)
.  
69
 S
ee
 R
U
D
O
LF
 D
O
LZ
ER
 &
 C
H
R
IS
TO
PH
 S
CH
RE
U
ER
, P
R
IN
C
IP
LE
S 
O
F 
IN
TE
RN
A
TI
O
N
A
L 
IN
V
ES
TM
EN
T 
LA
W
 1
98
 (O
xf
or
d 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 P
re
ss
 2
 e
d.
 2
01
2)
. 
70
 S
ee
 A
rti
cl
e 
17
 o
f t
he
 In
ve
st
m
en
t A
gr
ee
m
en
t F
or
 th
e 
C
O
M
ES
A
 C
om
m
on
 In
ve
st
m
en
t A
re
a 
(2
00
7)
. 
28
0 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
if 
th
e 
pr
op
os
ed
 m
ea
su
re
s 
re
su
lt 
in
 
di
ffe
re
nt
ia
l 
tre
at
m
en
t. 
W
ha
t 
ad
ds
 t
o 
th
is 
pr
ob
le
m
 is
 th
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 th
e 
“l
ik
e 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t”
 i
s 
no
t 
de
fin
ed
, 
an
d 
he
nc
e 
is 
ap
pl
ie
d 
su
bj
ec
tiv
el
y 
by
 d
iff
er
en
t t
rib
un
al
s. 
 
 A
dd
iti
on
al
ly
, 
th
e 
N
T 
st
an
da
rd
 c
an
 
im
pe
de
 h
os
t c
ou
nt
rie
s 
fro
m
 p
ur
su
in
g 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
pu
bl
ic
 p
ol
ic
y 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 
th
at
 
di
sc
rim
in
at
e 
ag
ai
ns
t 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s, 
su
ch
 a
s 
th
e 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
of
 
in
fa
nt
 in
du
str
ie
s 
in
 th
e 
ho
st 
sta
te
, o
r 
ta
ki
ng
 
di
sc
rim
in
at
or
y 
m
ea
su
re
s 
in
 
tim
es
 o
f 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
an
d 
cr
ise
s 
to
 
pr
es
er
ve
 n
at
io
na
l i
nt
er
es
ts
. 
 Fi
na
lly
, s
om
e 
tre
at
ie
s o
ffe
r N
T 
at
 th
e 
pr
e-
es
ta
bl
ish
m
en
t 
sta
ge
 
of
 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t. 
By
 
gi
vi
ng
 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 a
 r
ig
ht
 o
f 
en
try
 t
o 
th
e 
ho
st
 s
ta
te
, t
he
 h
os
t c
ou
nt
ry
 lo
se
s 
its
 
ab
ili
ty
 to
 sc
re
en
 in
co
m
in
g 
FD
I. 
en
jo
y 
na
tio
na
l t
re
at
m
en
t p
ro
te
ct
io
n.
 
 3)
 J
or
da
n 
sh
ou
ld
 a
lso
 m
ak
e 
ex
cl
us
io
ns
 a
nd
 
re
se
rv
at
io
ns
 
to
 
so
m
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 
se
ct
or
s 
an
d 
in
du
str
ie
s 
th
at
 d
o 
no
t 
qu
al
ify
 f
or
 N
T.
 T
hi
s 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 is
 u
su
al
ly
 ta
ke
n 
to
 p
ro
te
ct
 a
nd
 e
nh
an
ce
 
na
tio
na
l 
in
fa
nt
 
en
tre
pr
en
eu
rs
 
an
d 
na
tu
ra
l 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
by
 g
iv
in
g 
th
em
 g
ov
er
nm
en
ta
l 
lo
an
s 
an
d 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
th
at
 a
re
 n
ot
 g
iv
en
 t
o 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s. 
 
  4)
 I
ns
er
tin
g 
a 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
th
at
 c
om
pa
ris
on
 f
or
 
N
T 
pu
rp
os
es
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 m
ad
e 
w
ith
 n
at
io
na
l 
in
ve
st
or
s 
w
ho
 a
re
 in
 “
lik
e 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s”
 w
ith
 
th
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
. T
hi
s r
eq
ui
re
m
en
t s
ho
ul
d 
be
 
co
up
le
d 
w
ith
 a
 l
ist
 o
f 
su
bj
ec
tiv
e 
cr
ite
ria
 t
ha
t 
cl
ar
ify
 a
nd
 r
ef
in
e 
w
ha
t 
a 
su
ita
bl
e 
co
m
pa
ra
to
r 
(n
at
io
na
l 
in
ve
st
or
s 
in
 
“l
ik
e 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s”
) 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e.
 
 5)
 In
se
rt 
ex
pl
ic
it 
re
se
rv
at
io
ns
 to
 th
e 
ho
st 
st
at
e’
s 
rig
ht
 t
o 
im
po
se
 l
eg
iti
m
at
e 
no
n-
di
sc
rim
in
at
or
y 
pu
bl
ic
 p
ur
po
se
 m
ea
su
re
s. 
  
co
nc
er
ne
d;
 
an
d 
vi
) 
ot
he
r 
fa
ct
or
s 
di
re
ct
ly
 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
or
 
in
ve
st
or
 
in
 
re
la
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
.”
  
Th
e 
M
or
oc
co
 –
 N
ig
er
ia
 B
IT
 a
lso
 a
do
pt
s 
th
es
e 
cr
ite
ria
.71
 
 So
m
e 
re
ce
nt
 t
re
at
ie
s 
ex
cl
ud
e 
ce
rta
in
 s
ec
to
rs
 
fr
om
 t
he
 a
m
bi
t 
of
 t
he
 N
T 
ob
lig
at
io
n;
 f
or
 
ex
am
pl
e,
 th
e 
Ja
pa
n 
– 
K
en
ya
 B
IT
 p
ro
vi
de
s t
ha
t 
N
T 
sh
al
l 
no
t 
ap
pl
y 
“ t
o 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ad
op
te
d 
or
 
m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
by
 
a 
Co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
Pa
rty
 
wi
th
 
re
sp
ec
t 
to
 i
nc
en
tiv
es
 o
nl
y 
fo
r 
th
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
 
pr
om
ot
in
g 
sm
al
l 
an
d 
m
ed
iu
m
 
siz
ed
 
en
te
rp
ris
es
 in
 it
s 
Ar
ea
.”
72
 J
or
da
n 
m
ay
 w
an
t t
o 
ad
d 
so
m
e 
se
ct
or
s 
w
he
re
 i
t 
m
ay
 n
ot
 w
an
t 
to
 
ex
te
nd
 N
T,
 s
uc
h 
as
 a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 p
ro
je
ct
s 
th
at
 
ar
e 
su
bs
id
iz
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
Jo
rd
an
ia
n 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t. 
 So
m
e 
re
ce
nt
 t
re
at
ie
s 
ha
ve
 s
ta
rte
d 
to
 i
nc
lu
de
 
ex
ce
pt
io
ns
 r
el
at
in
g 
to
 t
he
 r
ig
ht
 o
f 
th
e 
BI
T 
pa
rti
es
 t
o 
ta
ke
 “
an
y 
ac
tio
ns
 t
ha
t 
it 
co
ns
id
er
s 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
of
 i
ts
 e
ss
en
tia
l 
se
cu
rit
y 
in
te
re
sts
,”
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 m
ea
su
re
s 
“t
ak
en
 
in
 
tim
e 
of
 
wa
r 
or
 
ot
he
r 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
in
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
re
la
tio
ns
.”
73
 
Su
ch
 
ex
ce
pt
io
ns
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
71
 M
or
oc
co
 - 
N
ig
er
ia
 B
IT
 (2
01
6)
. 
72
 A
rti
cl
e 
3(
3)
 o
f 
th
e 
Ja
pa
n 
– 
K
en
ya
 B
IT
 (
20
16
). 
Th
is 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
al
so
 b
ee
n 
ad
op
te
d 
in
 th
e 
M
or
oc
co
 -
 I
ta
ly
 B
IT
 (
19
90
) 
w
hi
ch
 s
ta
te
s 
in
 A
rti
cl
e 
3(
3)
 
“I
nv
es
to
rs
 o
f t
he
 tw
o 
Co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
Pa
rti
es
 s
ha
ll 
no
t b
e 
en
tit
le
d 
to
 n
at
io
na
l t
re
at
m
en
t i
n 
te
rm
s 
of
 b
en
ef
iti
ng
 fr
om
 a
id
, g
ra
nt
s, 
lo
an
s, 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
an
d 
gu
ar
an
te
es
 
ac
co
rd
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f o
ne
 o
f t
he
 C
on
tra
ct
in
g 
Pa
rti
es
 e
xc
lu
siv
el
y 
to
 it
s o
wn
 n
at
io
na
ls 
or
 e
nt
er
pr
ise
s w
ith
in
 th
e 
fra
m
ew
or
k 
of
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 c
ar
rie
d 
ou
t u
nd
er
 
na
tio
na
l d
ev
el
op
m
en
t p
ro
gr
am
s.”
 S
ee
 a
lso
 th
e 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s –
 Ja
m
ai
ca
 B
IT
 (1
99
1)
 a
t A
rti
cl
e 
3(
6)
. 
73
 E
.g
. A
rti
cl
e 
5(
2)
 o
f t
he
 R
w
an
da
 - 
Tu
rk
ey
 B
IT
 (2
01
6)
. 
28
1 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
6)
 I
ns
er
t 
ge
ne
ra
l 
re
se
rv
at
io
ns
 t
ha
t 
pr
es
er
ve
 t
he
 
ho
st
 c
ou
nt
ry
’s
 a
bi
lit
y 
to
 ta
ke
 m
ea
su
re
s 
th
at
 m
ay
 
di
sc
rim
in
at
e 
ag
ai
ns
t 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s 
bu
t 
w
ill
 
pr
ot
ec
t t
he
 e
ss
en
tia
l i
nt
er
es
ts
 o
f t
he
 h
os
t s
ta
te
 in
 
si
tu
at
io
ns
 o
f e
m
er
ge
nc
y 
an
d 
cr
is
is.
 
 7)
 F
in
al
ly
, J
or
da
n 
ca
n 
qu
al
ify
 o
r 
lim
it 
th
e 
N
T 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
by
 
in
se
rti
ng
 
a 
“d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
ex
ce
pt
io
n.
” 
U
nd
er
 th
is 
ex
ce
pt
io
n,
 th
e 
ho
st
 s
ta
te
 
is
 e
nt
itl
ed
 to
 o
ffe
r i
ts 
do
m
es
tic
 in
ve
st
or
s 
ce
rta
in
 
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 a
nd
 b
en
ef
its
 t
ha
t 
ar
e 
de
sig
ne
d 
to
 
en
ha
nc
e 
its
 n
at
io
na
l d
ev
el
op
m
en
t. 
di
sa
bl
e 
th
e 
N
T 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
on
 t
he
 h
os
t 
sta
te
. 
H
en
ce
, 
Jo
rd
an
 i
s 
ad
vi
se
d 
to
 a
do
pt
 s
im
ila
r 
ex
ce
pt
io
ns
 to
 it
s N
T 
ob
lig
at
io
n.
  
 Th
e 
N
or
w
eg
ia
n 
M
od
el
 
BI
T 
ad
op
ts 
a 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t e
xc
ep
tio
n,
 w
hi
ch
 a
llo
w
s N
or
w
ay
 
to
 ta
ke
 d
is
cr
im
in
at
or
y 
m
ea
su
re
s 
th
at
 p
re
se
rv
e 
its
 
na
tio
na
l 
in
te
re
sts
 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 e
ve
n 
if 
th
es
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
br
ea
ch
 t
he
 
N
T 
ob
lig
at
io
n.
 I
t 
st
at
es
 “
Th
e 
Pa
rti
es
 a
gr
ee
/ 
ar
e 
of
 
th
e 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
th
at
 
a 
m
ea
su
re
 
ap
pl
ie
d 
by
 a
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
in
 p
ur
su
an
ce
 o
f 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
po
lic
y 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 o
f p
ub
lic
 in
te
re
st 
su
ch
 a
s t
he
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
of
 p
ub
lic
 h
ea
lth
, h
um
an
 
ri
gh
ts
, 
la
bo
ur
 
ri
gh
ts
, 
sa
fe
ty
 
an
d 
th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t, 
al
th
ou
gh
 
ha
vi
ng
 
a 
di
ffe
re
nt
 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
an
 in
ve
st
m
en
t o
r 
in
ve
st
or
 o
f a
no
th
er
 
Pa
rt
y,
 
is 
no
t 
in
co
ns
ist
en
t 
wi
th
 
na
tio
na
l 
tr
ea
tm
en
t a
nd
 m
os
t f
av
ou
re
d 
na
tio
n 
tre
at
m
en
t 
wh
en
 j
us
tif
ie
d 
by
 s
ho
wi
ng
 t
ha
t 
it 
be
ar
s 
a 
re
as
on
ab
le
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
to
 r
at
io
na
l 
po
lic
ie
s 
no
t m
ot
iv
at
ed
 b
y 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 o
f d
om
es
tic
 o
ve
r 
fo
re
ig
n 
ow
ne
d 
in
ve
st
m
en
t.”
74
 
It 
is
 
w
or
th
 
m
en
tio
ni
ng
 t
ha
t 
th
is 
te
st 
w
as
 a
do
pt
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
Po
pe
 &
 T
al
bo
t 
v.
 C
an
ad
a 
ca
se
,75
 b
ef
or
e 
its
 
in
cl
us
io
n 
in
 th
e 
N
or
w
ay
 M
od
el
 B
IT
. 
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
74
 N
or
w
ay
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 n
.1
 (2
01
5)
. 
75
 P
op
e 
&
 T
al
bo
t I
nc
 v
 T
he
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t O
f C
an
ad
a 
pa
ra
. 7
9 
(A
w
ar
d 
on
 th
e 
M
er
its
 o
f P
ha
se
 2
), 
(N
A
FT
A
, 2
00
1)
. 
28
2 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
Fi
na
lly
 Jo
rd
an
 m
ay
 w
an
t t
o 
de
fin
e 
“t
re
at
m
en
t”
 
an
d/
or
 
“m
ea
su
re
s”
 
th
at
 
w
ill
 
(o
r 
w
ill
 
no
t) 
br
ea
ch
 t
he
 N
T 
sta
nd
ar
d.
 T
hi
s 
gi
ve
s 
ce
rta
in
ty
 
an
d 
gu
id
an
ce
 t
o 
fu
tu
re
 t
rib
un
al
s 
as
 t
o 
w
ha
t 
m
ea
su
re
s 
br
ea
ch
 
th
e 
N
T 
st
an
da
rd
. 
Su
ch
 
de
fin
iti
on
s h
av
e 
be
en
 a
do
pt
ed
 in
 th
e 
TP
PA
.76
 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
St
an
da
rd
s:
 
M
os
t-
Fa
vo
re
d-
N
at
io
n 
(M
FN
) 
Th
e 
M
FN
 
sta
nd
ar
d 
el
im
in
at
es
 
na
tio
na
lit
y 
ba
se
d 
di
sc
rim
in
at
io
n 
an
d 
fa
vo
rit
is
m
 b
et
w
ee
n 
di
ffe
re
nt
 f
or
ei
gn
 
in
ve
st
or
s i
n 
th
e 
ho
st
 st
at
e.
 
 H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 v
ag
ue
 a
nd
 lo
os
e 
en
de
d 
M
FN
 c
la
us
es
 t
yp
ic
al
ly
 i
nc
lu
de
d 
in
 
B
IT
s 
ha
s 
al
lo
w
ed
 f
or
ei
gn
 i
nv
es
to
rs
 
to
 
im
po
rt 
m
or
e 
fa
vo
ra
bl
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
re
so
lu
tio
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 
fro
m
 
ot
he
r 
tre
at
ie
s –
 th
us
 e
xp
os
in
g 
th
e 
ho
st 
sta
te
 
1)
 
Jo
rd
an
 
sh
ou
ld
 
lim
it 
th
e 
sc
op
e 
of
 
M
FN
 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
to
 
po
st-
es
ta
bl
ish
m
en
t 
ac
tiv
iti
es
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, i
t c
an
 g
ra
nt
 e
ne
rg
y 
an
d 
w
at
er
 r
el
at
ed
 
FD
I 
pr
e-
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t 
M
FN
 
tre
at
m
en
t 
to
 
en
co
ur
ag
e 
su
ch
 i
nv
es
tm
en
ts.
 H
ow
ev
er
, a
s 
w
ith
 
th
e 
N
T,
 th
es
e 
ex
cl
us
io
ns
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 m
ad
e 
vi
a 
a 
po
sit
iv
e 
lis
t a
pp
ro
ac
h.
 
 2)
 
Ex
pl
ic
itl
y 
ex
cl
ud
e 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
re
so
lu
tio
n 
ar
tic
le
s 
of
 t
he
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
tre
at
y 
fr
om
 M
FN
 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n.
77
 I
t 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
m
or
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
if 
th
e 
Th
e 
TP
PA
 g
ra
nt
s 
po
st-
es
ta
bl
ish
m
en
t 
M
FN
 
tre
at
m
en
t 
th
at
 
re
qu
ire
s 
co
m
pa
ris
on
 
w
ith
 
na
tio
na
l 
in
ve
sto
rs
 i
n 
“l
ik
e 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s,”
79
 
al
th
ou
gh
 
th
e 
TT
PA
 
do
es
 
no
t 
pr
ov
id
e 
th
e 
cr
ite
ria
 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 
de
te
rm
in
e 
a 
si
m
ila
r 
co
m
pa
ra
to
r a
s t
he
 C
O
M
ES
A
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t.8
0  
 N
on
et
he
le
ss
, 
th
e 
TT
PA
 e
xp
lic
itl
y 
ex
cl
ud
es
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
al
 p
ro
vi
sio
ns
 f
ro
m
 t
he
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
M
FN
 
cl
au
se
. 
A
rti
cl
e 
9.
5 
re
ad
s 
“F
or
 
gr
ea
te
r 
ce
rta
in
ty
, t
he
 tr
ea
tm
en
t r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
76
 E
.g
. “
Th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
sh
al
l, 
in
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
, b
e 
de
em
ed
 ‘t
re
at
m
en
t l
es
s 
fa
vo
ur
ab
le
’ w
ith
in
 th
e 
m
ea
ni
ng
 o
f t
hi
s 
A
rti
cl
e:
 u
ne
qu
al
 tr
ea
tm
en
t i
n 
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f r
es
tri
ct
io
ns
 
on
 th
e 
pu
rc
ha
se
 o
f r
aw
 o
r a
ux
ili
ar
y 
m
at
er
ia
ls
, o
f e
ne
rg
y 
or
 fu
el
 o
r o
f m
ea
ns
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
or
 o
pe
ra
tio
n 
of
 a
ny
 k
in
d,
 u
ne
qu
al
 tr
ea
tm
en
t i
n 
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f i
m
pe
di
ng
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
tin
g 
of
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
in
si
de
 o
r o
ut
sid
e 
th
e 
co
un
try
, a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
an
y 
ot
he
r m
ea
su
re
s 
ha
vi
ng
 s
im
ila
r e
ffe
ct
s. 
M
ea
su
re
s 
th
at
 h
av
e 
to
 b
e 
ta
ke
n 
fo
r r
ea
so
ns
 o
f p
ub
lic
 
se
cu
rit
y 
an
d 
or
de
r, 
pu
bl
ic
 h
ea
lth
 o
r 
m
or
al
ity
 s
ha
ll 
no
t b
e 
de
em
ed
 ‘
tre
at
m
en
t l
es
s 
fa
vo
ur
ab
le
’ 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
m
ea
ni
ng
 o
f 
th
is
 A
rti
cl
e.
” 
A
rti
cl
e 
3(
2)
 o
f 
th
e 
Eg
yp
t -
 
G
er
m
an
y 
B
IT
 (2
00
5)
. 
77
 E
.g
. “
Fo
r g
re
at
er
 c
er
ta
in
ty
, n
ot
w
ith
sta
nd
in
g 
an
y 
ot
he
r B
ila
te
ra
l I
nv
es
tm
en
t A
gr
ee
m
en
t t
he
 C
on
tra
ct
in
g 
Pa
rti
es
 h
av
e 
si
gn
ed
 w
ith
 o
th
er
 S
ta
te
s b
ef
or
e 
or
 a
fte
r t
he
 
en
try
 in
to
 fo
rc
e 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
th
e 
m
os
t f
av
or
ed
 n
at
io
na
l t
re
at
m
en
t s
ha
ll 
no
t a
pp
ly
 to
 p
ro
ce
du
ra
l o
r j
ud
ic
ia
l m
at
te
rs
.”
 A
rti
cl
e 
3(
3)
 o
f t
he
 U
A
E 
- M
ex
ic
o 
B
IT
 
(2
01
6)
. 
79
 S
ee
 A
rti
cl
e 
9.
5 
of
 th
e 
Tr
an
s P
ac
ifi
c 
Pa
rtn
er
sh
ip
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t (
TP
PA
) (
20
16
). 
80
 S
ee
 A
rti
cl
e 
17
(2
) o
f t
he
 In
ve
st
m
en
t A
gr
ee
m
en
t F
or
 th
e 
C
O
M
ES
A
 C
om
m
on
 In
ve
st
m
en
t A
re
a 
(2
00
7)
. 
28
3 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
to
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
ar
bi
tra
tio
n 
in
 
an
 
un
an
tic
ip
at
ed
 m
an
ne
r. 
Th
is 
ha
s 
al
so
 
al
lo
w
ed
 fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
sto
rs
 to
 “
ch
er
ry
-
pi
ck
” 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
re
so
lu
tio
n 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 t
ha
t 
ar
e 
m
os
t 
su
ita
bl
e 
to
 
th
ei
r s
itu
at
io
n.
  
 Th
e 
ty
pi
ca
l 
M
FN
 c
la
us
e 
m
ay
 a
ls
o 
al
lo
w
 t
he
 i
m
po
rta
tio
n 
of
 t
re
at
m
en
t 
st
an
da
rd
s 
th
at
 d
o 
no
t 
ex
ist
 i
n 
th
e 
ba
sic
 t
re
at
y.
 A
ls
o,
 f
or
ei
gn
 i
nv
es
to
rs
 
m
ay
 b
e 
ab
le
 t
o 
re
m
ov
e 
ex
cl
us
io
ns
 
an
d 
lim
ita
tio
ns
 in
 th
e 
ba
sic
 tr
ea
ty
, b
y 
re
fe
rri
ng
 t
o 
th
ird
 p
ar
ty
 t
re
at
ie
s 
th
at
 
do
 n
ot
 c
on
ta
in
 su
ch
 li
m
ita
tio
ns
.  
M
FN
 
cl
au
se
 
en
um
er
at
es
 
th
e 
ar
tic
le
s 
th
at
 
it 
co
ve
rs
. 
 3)
 E
xp
lic
itl
y 
ex
cl
ud
e 
al
l 
pr
ev
io
us
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
tre
at
ie
s 
fro
m
 
th
e 
co
ve
ra
ge
 
of
 
th
e 
M
FN
 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 f
or
ei
gn
 i
nv
es
to
rs
 w
ill
 
no
t t
ry
 to
 b
en
ef
it 
fro
m
 m
or
e 
fa
vo
ra
bl
e 
tre
at
m
en
t 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 t
he
 h
os
t 
sta
te
 h
as
 c
on
cl
ud
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
pa
st
. 
 4)
 
Ex
pl
ic
itl
y 
ex
cl
ud
e 
al
l 
pa
st 
an
d 
fu
tu
re
 
ta
xa
tio
n,
 r
eg
io
na
l 
in
te
gr
at
io
n,
 c
us
to
m
s 
un
io
ns
, 
fr
ee
 t
ra
de
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
, 
an
d 
th
e 
lik
e 
fro
m
 t
he
 
co
ve
ra
ge
 o
f M
FN
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n.
 
 5)
 S
im
ila
r 
to
 N
T,
 J
or
da
n 
sh
ou
ld
 i
ns
er
t 
ge
ne
ra
l 
re
se
rv
at
io
ns
 t
ha
t 
pr
es
er
ve
 t
he
 h
os
t 
co
un
try
’s
 
ab
ili
ty
 t
o 
ta
ke
 m
ea
su
re
s 
th
at
 m
ay
 d
is
cr
im
in
at
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
sto
rs
 
bu
t 
pr
ot
ec
t 
th
e 
es
se
nt
ia
l i
nt
er
es
ts 
of
 th
e 
ho
st
 s
ta
te
 in
 s
itu
at
io
ns
 
of
 e
m
er
ge
nc
y 
an
d 
c r
isi
s. 
In
 a
dd
iti
on
, i
t 
sh
ou
ld
 
in
se
rt 
ex
pl
ic
it 
re
se
rv
at
io
ns
 t
o 
th
e 
ho
st
 s
ta
te
’s
 
rig
ht
 t
o 
im
po
se
 l
eg
iti
m
at
e 
no
n-
di
sc
rim
in
at
or
y 
pu
bl
ic
 p
ur
po
se
 m
ea
su
re
s.
78
 
 
th
is 
Ar
tic
le
 d
oe
s 
no
t e
nc
om
pa
ss
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
di
sp
ut
e 
re
so
lu
tio
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 o
r 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s, 
su
ch
 a
s 
th
os
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 S
ec
tio
n 
B 
(In
ve
sto
r-
St
at
e 
D
isp
ut
e 
Se
ttl
em
en
t).
”8
1  
 Th
e 
CO
M
ES
A
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
ex
cl
ud
es
 “
i) 
an
y 
cu
st
om
s 
un
io
n,
 
fre
e 
tr
ad
e 
ar
ea
, 
co
m
m
on
 
m
ar
ke
t 
or
 m
on
et
ar
y 
un
io
n,
 o
r 
an
y 
sim
ila
r 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
co
nv
en
tio
n 
or
 o
th
er
 f
or
m
s 
of
 
re
gi
on
al
 p
re
fe
re
nt
ia
l 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts,
 p
re
se
nt
 
or
 fu
tu
re
, o
f w
hi
ch
 a
ny
 o
f t
he
 M
em
be
r 
St
at
es
 
is
 o
r 
m
ay
 b
ec
om
e 
a 
pa
rty
; 
or
 ii
) 
an
y 
m
at
te
r, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
ag
re
em
en
ts
, 
pe
rt
ai
ni
ng
 w
ho
lly
 o
r 
m
ai
nl
y 
to
 t
ax
at
io
n,
”8
2  
fr
om
 th
e 
am
bi
t o
f M
FN
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n.
 
 Th
e 
Co
m
m
on
w
ea
lth
 S
ec
re
ta
ria
t 
re
co
m
m
en
ds
 
th
e 
ex
cl
us
io
n 
of
 a
ll 
pr
e-
ex
ist
in
g 
B
IT
s 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
ag
re
em
en
ts
 f
ro
m
 M
FN
 c
ov
er
ag
e.
83
 I
t 
al
so
 
su
gg
es
ts
 
lim
iti
ng
 
M
FN
 
to
 
de
 
ju
re
 
di
sc
rim
in
at
io
n,
84
 
al
th
ou
gh
 
no
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
tre
at
y 
to
 d
at
e 
ha
s a
do
pt
ed
 th
is
 a
pp
ro
ac
h.
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
78
 T
he
 N
or
w
eg
ia
n 
M
od
el
 B
IT
 (2
01
5)
 a
do
pt
s t
hi
s a
pp
ro
ac
h.
 S
ee
 th
is 
po
in
t i
n 
na
tio
na
l t
re
at
m
en
t a
bo
ve
. 
81
 A
rti
cl
e 
9.
5(
3)
 o
f t
he
 T
ra
ns
 P
ac
ifi
c 
Pa
rtn
er
sh
ip
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t (
TP
PA
) (
20
16
). 
82
 S
ee
 A
rti
cl
e 
19
 o
f t
he
 In
ve
st
m
en
t A
gr
ee
m
en
t F
or
 th
e 
C
O
M
ES
A
 C
om
m
on
 In
ve
st
m
en
t A
re
a 
(2
00
7)
. 
83
 P
EN
EL
O
PE
 S
IM
O
N
S 
J A
N
TH
O
N
Y
 V
A
N
D
U
ZE
R,
 G
RA
H
A
M
 M
A
Y
ED
A
, I
N
TE
G
RA
TI
N
G
 S
U
ST
A
IN
A
B
LE
 D
EV
EL
O
PM
EN
T 
IN
TO
 IN
TE
RN
A
TI
O
N
A
L 
IN
V
ES
TM
EN
T 
A
G
RE
EM
EN
TS
: 
A
 G
U
ID
E 
O
F 
D
EV
EL
O
PI
N
G
 C
O
U
N
TR
Y
 N
EG
O
TI
A
TO
RS
 1
35
 (C
om
m
on
w
ea
lth
 S
ec
re
ta
ria
t. 
20
13
). 
84
 Id
. a
t 1
34
. 
28
4 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
6)
 E
xp
lic
itl
y 
ex
cl
ud
e 
th
e 
se
ct
or
s, 
in
du
str
ie
s, 
an
d 
no
n-
co
nf
or
m
in
g 
m
ea
su
re
s 
th
e 
ho
st 
sta
te
 w
is
he
s 
to
 m
ai
nt
ai
n,
 a
nd
 r
es
er
ve
 a
 r
eg
ul
at
or
y 
sp
ac
e 
to
 
tre
at
 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s 
di
ffe
re
nt
ly
 
(w
ith
ou
t 
di
sc
rim
in
at
io
n)
 
in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 
w
ith
 
its
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
bj
ec
tiv
es
 a
nd
 n
ee
ds
. 
 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
St
an
da
rd
s:
 
Fa
ir
 a
nd
 
Eq
ui
ta
bl
e 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
(F
ET
) 
Th
e 
FE
T 
sta
nd
ar
d 
en
su
re
s 
th
at
 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
sto
rs
 a
re
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
 f
ro
m
 
si
tu
at
io
ns
 o
f 
un
ju
st 
tre
at
m
en
t b
y 
th
e 
ho
st
 s
ta
te
 th
at
 d
o 
no
t f
al
l w
ith
in
 th
e 
do
m
ai
n 
of
 o
th
er
 s
pe
ci
fic
 t
re
at
m
en
t 
st
an
da
rd
s, 
su
ch
 a
s 
N
T 
or
 M
FN
. I
t i
s 
an
 im
po
rta
nt
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
sta
nd
ar
d 
fo
r 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
sto
rs
; 
ho
w
ev
er
, 
its
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
in
 a
rb
itr
al
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
ha
s 
be
en
 c
rit
ic
iz
ed
 o
f 
im
po
si
ng
 a
 t
hr
ea
t 
to
 th
e 
ho
st
 st
at
e’
s r
ig
ht
 to
 re
gu
la
te
. 
 Th
e 
sh
or
t, 
va
gu
e,
 a
nd
 u
nq
ua
lif
ie
d 
fo
rm
at
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
FE
T 
st
an
da
rd
 
cu
rre
nt
ly
 a
do
pt
ed
 i
n 
a 
va
st 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 B
IT
s r
ai
se
s t
he
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
is
su
es
: 
  
Th
e 
FE
T 
sta
nd
ar
d 
is
 th
e 
m
os
t r
el
ev
an
t s
ta
nd
ar
d 
to
 th
e 
ho
st 
st
at
e’
s r
ig
ht
 to
 re
gu
la
te
 a
nd
 p
ur
su
e 
its
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
bj
ec
tiv
es
 w
ith
ou
t b
ei
ng
 h
in
de
re
d 
by
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
sta
nd
ar
ds
. H
en
ce
, t
he
 
dr
af
tin
g 
of
 t
hi
s 
sta
nd
ar
d 
in
 t
he
 J
or
da
ni
an
 B
IT
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
gi
ve
n 
ex
tra
 c
ar
e 
an
d 
tim
e.
  
 Th
is
 
th
es
is
 
su
gg
es
ts 
a 
st
ra
ig
ht
fo
rw
ar
d 
el
im
in
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
FE
T 
st
an
da
rd
. B
as
ic
al
ly
, t
he
 
Jo
rd
an
 m
od
el
 B
IT
 sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 re
fe
r t
o,
 o
r u
se
 th
e 
te
rm
s, 
“f
ai
r 
an
d 
eq
ui
ta
bl
e.
” 
Ra
th
er
, 
it 
is 
pr
op
os
ed
 
he
re
 
th
at
 
Jo
rd
an
 
br
ea
k 
do
w
n 
th
e 
co
nt
en
ts
 a
nd
 e
le
m
en
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
FE
T 
sta
nd
ar
d 
an
d 
sp
ec
ify
 p
re
ci
se
ly
 w
hi
ch
 o
f 
th
es
e 
el
em
en
ts
 a
re
 
pr
ot
ec
te
d 
in
 i
ts
 m
od
el
 B
IT
. 
Th
is
 a
llo
w
s 
fo
r 
a 
sm
al
le
r 
m
ar
gi
n 
of
 e
xp
an
siv
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
ns
 b
y 
ar
bi
tra
l 
tri
bu
na
ls,
 
an
d 
at
 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
tim
e,
 
id
en
tif
ie
s 
th
e 
co
nt
en
t 
an
d 
el
em
en
ts
 t
ha
t 
ar
e 
In
 it
s 
pu
bl
ic
at
io
n 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
th
e 
FE
T 
sta
nd
ar
d,
 
U
N
CT
A
D
 s
ug
ge
st
s 
di
ff
er
en
t o
pt
io
ns
 f
or
 h
os
t 
co
un
tri
es
 r
eg
ar
di
ng
 t
he
 F
ET
 s
ta
nd
ar
d.
86
 T
he
 
re
co
m
m
en
de
d 
op
tio
ns
 a
re
 a
 q
ua
lif
ie
d 
FE
T 
st
an
da
rd
, 
or
 n
o 
FE
T 
sta
nd
ar
d 
pe
r 
se
. 
In
 t
he
 
la
tte
r 
op
tio
n 
it 
su
gg
es
ts
 a
 l
ist
 o
f 
pr
oh
ib
ite
d 
st
at
e 
ac
tio
ns
 t
ha
t 
br
ea
ch
 t
he
 F
ET
 s
ta
nd
ar
d,
 
al
th
ou
gh
 n
ot
 e
xp
lic
itl
y 
m
en
tio
ni
ng
 “
fa
ir 
an
d 
eq
ui
ta
bl
e”
 
in
 
its
 
su
gg
es
te
d 
cl
au
se
. 
Th
e 
pr
oh
ib
ite
d 
sta
te
 a
ct
io
ns
 i
nc
lu
de
: 
i) 
de
ni
al
 o
f 
ju
sti
ce
 a
nd
 fl
ag
ra
nt
 v
io
la
tio
ns
 o
f d
ue
 p
ro
ce
ss
; 
ii)
 m
an
ife
stl
y 
ar
bi
tr
ar
y 
tr
ea
tm
en
t; 
iii
) 
ev
id
en
t 
di
sc
ri
m
in
at
io
n;
 
iv
) 
m
an
ife
stl
y 
ab
us
iv
e 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
co
nt
in
uo
us
, 
un
ju
sti
fie
d 
co
er
ci
on
 o
r 
ha
ra
ss
m
en
t; 
an
d 
v)
 I
nf
ri
ng
em
en
t 
of
 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 
ba
se
d 
on
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t-i
nd
uc
in
g 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
 
or
 
m
ea
su
re
s, 
on
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 h
as
 re
lie
d.
87
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
86
 U
N
CT
A
D
, F
ai
r a
nd
 E
qu
ita
bl
e 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t §
 II
 (U
N
CT
A
D
 S
er
ie
s o
n 
Is
su
es
 in
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l I
nv
es
tm
en
t A
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 e
d.
, U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 2
01
2)
. 
87
 Id
. a
t 1
08
-0
9.
  
28
5 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
1)
 H
os
t g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
 c
an
no
t b
e 
su
re
 
of
 th
e 
le
ve
l o
f d
ef
er
en
ce
 th
ey
 w
ill
 b
e 
gi
ve
n 
in
 t
he
 e
ve
nt
 o
f 
a 
di
sp
ut
e 
(i.
e.
 
lia
bi
lit
y 
th
re
sh
ol
d)
. 
H
en
ce
, 
th
e 
ou
tc
om
es
 o
f 
FE
T 
br
ea
ch
 c
la
im
s 
in
 
in
ve
st
or
-s
ta
te
 
ar
bi
tra
tio
ns
 
ar
e 
un
pr
ed
ic
ta
bl
e.
 
 2)
 
Th
e 
ty
pi
ca
l 
FE
T 
fo
rm
ul
at
io
n 
gi
ve
s 
a 
w
id
e 
m
ar
gi
n 
fo
r 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s 
an
d 
tri
bu
na
ls
 to
 e
xt
en
d 
th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 
ov
er
 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
sta
te
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
th
at
 
se
rv
e 
a 
pu
bl
ic
 
or
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ta
l g
oa
l. 
 3)
 T
he
re
 i
s 
no
 c
le
ar
 d
ef
in
iti
on
 o
f 
co
nt
en
t 
an
d 
el
em
en
ts 
pr
ot
ec
te
d 
un
de
r t
he
 F
ET
 s
ta
nd
ar
d.
 H
en
ce
, i
t i
s 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
fo
r 
ho
st 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 
in
te
rp
re
te
rs
 t
o 
dr
aw
 t
he
 b
ou
nd
ar
ie
s 
of
 t
he
 o
bl
ig
at
io
n 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 F
ET
 
tre
at
m
en
t a
nd
 to
 d
ev
el
op
 a
 c
on
sis
te
nt
 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n.
 
 4)
 P
ro
te
ct
in
g 
th
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
ot
ec
te
d,
 l
ea
vi
ng
 n
o 
ro
om
 f
or
 i
nv
es
to
rs
 a
nd
 
ar
bi
tra
l 
tri
bu
na
ls
 
to
 
w
id
en
 
th
e 
sc
op
e 
of
 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n.
 A
lth
ou
gh
 s
uc
h 
an
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
m
ay
 
re
qu
ire
 a
 l
on
g 
an
d 
de
ta
ile
d 
FE
T 
pr
ov
is
io
n,
 i
t 
w
ill
, h
ow
ev
er
, q
ua
lif
y,
 c
la
rif
y,
 a
nd
 n
ar
ro
w
 t
he
 
st
an
da
rd
, m
ak
in
g 
its
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
ea
sie
r a
nd
 m
or
e 
pr
ed
ic
ta
bl
e:
 
 1)
 T
he
 F
ET
 p
ro
vi
sio
n 
in
 th
e 
m
od
el
 B
IT
 s
ho
ul
d 
fle
sh
 o
ut
 th
e 
el
em
en
ts
 th
at
 J
or
da
n 
is
 w
ill
in
g 
to
 
pr
ot
ec
t. 
It 
w
ou
ld
 m
or
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e,
 in
 th
e 
vi
ew
 o
f 
th
is 
th
es
is
, 
to
 d
es
cr
ib
e 
an
d 
lis
t 
th
e 
pr
oh
ib
ite
d 
st
at
e 
ac
tio
ns
 th
at
 b
re
ac
h 
th
e 
FE
T 
st
an
da
rd
.  
Th
e 
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
of
 
pr
oh
ib
ite
d 
sta
te
 
ac
tio
ns
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
dr
af
te
d 
in
 a
 w
ay
 th
at
 g
iv
es
 a
 d
eg
re
e 
of
 
de
fe
re
nc
e 
an
d 
se
ve
rit
y 
to
 
sta
te
 
ac
tio
ns
 
th
at
 
br
ea
ch
 th
e 
FE
T 
ob
lig
at
io
n.
 A
 m
od
ifi
ed
 v
er
sio
n 
of
 t
he
 N
ee
r 
sta
nd
ar
d 
is 
re
co
m
m
en
de
d 
in
 t
hi
s 
re
ga
rd
.85
 
 2)
 I
n 
ad
di
tio
n,
 i
t 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
cl
ea
r 
w
ith
in
 t
he
 
dr
af
tin
g 
of
 
th
e 
cl
au
se
 
th
at
 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 
of
 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 
ar
e 
pr
ot
ec
te
d.
 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
se
 e
xp
ec
ta
tio
ns
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 w
ei
gh
ed
 
ag
ai
ns
t 
th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
bu
si
ne
ss
 r
is
k 
an
d 
du
e 
 A
lte
rn
at
iv
el
y,
 th
e 
Ira
n 
– 
Sl
ov
ak
 B
IT
 u
se
s 
th
e 
te
rm
s 
“f
ai
r 
an
d 
eq
ui
ta
bl
e,
” 
al
th
ou
gh
 
it 
co
nd
iti
on
s 
th
e 
br
ea
ch
 o
f 
th
e 
FE
T 
sta
nd
ar
d 
on
 
a 
se
t 
of
 p
ro
hi
bi
te
d 
sta
te
 a
ct
io
ns
 s
im
ila
r 
to
 
th
os
e 
su
gg
es
te
d 
by
 U
N
CT
A
D
.88
 A
rti
cl
e 
3(
2)
 
of
 t
he
 I
ra
n 
– 
Sl
ov
ak
 B
IT
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
th
at
 “
a 
br
ea
ch
 o
f 
th
e 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
of
 f
ai
r 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
re
fe
re
nc
ed
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
 m
ay
 b
e 
fo
un
d 
on
ly
 
wh
er
e 
a 
m
ea
su
re
 
o r
 
se
ri
es
 
of
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
co
ns
tit
ut
es
,”
 
an
d 
pr
oc
ee
ds
 
to
 
lis
t 
th
e 
pr
oh
ib
ite
d 
st
at
e 
ac
tio
ns
.89
 
 U
N
CA
TD
 s
ug
ge
st
s 
a 
su
bs
tit
ut
e 
fo
rm
ul
at
io
n 
th
at
 m
ak
es
 n
o 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 th
e 
te
rm
s 
“f
ai
r a
nd
 
eq
ui
ta
bl
e”
 a
nd
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
cl
ea
r 
la
ng
ua
ge
 t
ha
t 
tie
s 
th
e 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
of
 i
nv
es
to
rs
’ 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 b
us
in
es
s 
ris
k 
an
d 
th
e 
ho
st 
co
un
try
’s
 
po
lic
y 
ob
je
ct
iv
e.
 
Th
e 
su
gg
es
te
d 
cl
au
se
 r
ea
ds
: 
Ea
ch
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
ab
sta
in
 f
ro
m
 
tr
ea
tin
g 
in
ve
sto
rs
 a
nd
 t
he
ir 
in
ve
stm
en
ts 
in
 a
 
m
an
ne
r 
th
at
 
is
 
m
an
ife
stl
y 
ar
bi
tra
ry
, 
di
sc
ri
m
in
at
or
y 
or
 a
bu
siv
e.
 I
t 
sh
al
l 
no
t 
de
ny
 
ju
sti
ce
 
in
 
an
y 
le
ga
l 
or
 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s 
or
 o
th
er
wi
se
 f
la
gr
an
tly
 v
io
la
te
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
85
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 in
 th
e 
Ne
er
 c
as
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t a
ct
io
ns
 th
at
 b
re
ac
h 
th
e 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l m
in
im
um
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
to
 a
m
ou
nt
 to
 “
an
 o
ut
ra
ge
, t
o 
ba
d 
fa
ith
, t
o 
w
ill
fu
l 
ne
gl
ec
t o
f d
ut
y,
 o
r t
o 
an
 in
su
ffi
ci
en
cy
 o
f g
ov
er
nm
en
t a
ct
io
n 
so
 fa
r s
ho
rt 
of
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 th
at
 e
ve
ry
 re
as
on
ab
le
 a
nd
 im
pa
rti
al
 m
an
 w
ou
ld
 re
co
gn
iz
e 
its
 
in
su
ffi
ci
en
cy
.”
 S
ee
 L
. F
. H
. N
ee
r a
nd
 P
au
lin
e 
N
ee
r (
U
.S
.A
.) 
v 
U
ni
te
d 
M
ex
ic
an
 S
ta
te
s, 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 R
ep
or
ts 
of
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l A
rb
itr
al
 A
w
ar
ds
 I
V
 6
0,
 p
ar
a.
 3
 
(G
en
er
al
 C
la
im
s C
om
m
is
sio
n,
 1
92
6)
. 
88
 S
lo
va
k 
– 
Ir
an
 B
IT
 (2
01
6)
. 
89
 Id
. a
t a
rt.
 3
(2
). 
28
6 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
sto
r 
is
 
a 
bu
rd
en
so
m
e 
ta
sk
 o
n 
th
e 
ho
st
 s
ta
te
 i
n 
lig
ht
 o
f 
its
 
ne
ed
 to
 c
on
sta
nt
ly
 re
vi
ew
 a
nd
 a
m
en
d 
its
 n
at
io
na
l l
eg
is
la
tio
n 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 
its
 
ev
ol
vi
ng
 
po
lic
ie
s 
an
d 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
. H
ow
ev
er
, i
t i
s 
al
so
 u
nf
ai
r 
to
 n
ot
 p
ro
te
ct
 t
he
 p
re
su
m
pt
io
ns
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
 
re
lie
d 
up
on
 
w
he
n 
m
ak
in
g 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t. 
H
en
ce
, 
th
er
e 
ne
ed
s 
to
 b
e 
a 
ba
la
nc
e 
of
 b
ot
h 
in
te
re
st
s i
nv
ol
ve
d.
 
di
lig
en
ce
, 
al
on
g 
w
ith
 t
he
 r
ig
ht
 o
f 
th
e 
sta
te
 t
o 
re
gu
la
te
 in
 it
s b
es
t i
nt
er
es
t. 
 3)
 
Fi
na
lly
, 
th
re
e 
im
po
rta
nt
 
ex
ce
pt
io
ns
 
ar
e 
su
gg
es
te
d 
to
 f
ur
th
er
 l
im
it 
an
d 
cl
ar
ify
 t
he
 F
ET
 
ob
lig
at
io
n:
  
i) 
pr
es
er
ve
 J
or
da
n’
s 
ab
ili
ty
 to
 r
eg
ul
at
e 
an
d 
ta
ke
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
th
at
 
se
rv
e 
a 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
pu
bl
ic
 
/ 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ta
l 
go
al
, 
pr
ov
id
ed
 
th
at
 
su
ch
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ar
e 
no
t 
ta
ke
n 
in
 a
 d
isc
rim
in
at
or
y 
or
 
ar
bi
tra
ry
 fa
sh
io
n,
  
ii)
 a
ck
no
w
le
dg
e 
th
at
 J
or
da
n 
is 
a 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 
co
un
try
 a
nd
 th
at
 it
s l
ev
el
 o
f d
ev
el
op
m
en
t s
ho
ul
d 
be
 t
ak
en
 i
nt
o 
co
ns
id
er
at
io
n 
w
he
n 
cl
ai
m
s 
of
 
br
ea
ch
 o
f F
ET
 tr
ea
tm
en
t a
ris
e,
 a
nd
  
iii
) t
ha
t a
 b
re
ac
h 
of
 a
ny
 tr
ea
tm
en
t s
ta
nd
ar
d 
in
 th
e 
B
IT
 d
oe
s 
no
t e
nt
ai
l a
n 
au
to
m
at
ic
 b
re
ac
h 
of
 th
e 
FE
T 
sta
nd
ar
d.
 
du
e 
pr
oc
es
s. 
 [N
ei
th
er
 
Pa
rty
 
sh
al
l 
in
fri
ng
e 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 
ba
se
d 
on
 
in
ve
stm
en
t-i
nd
uc
in
g 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
 o
r 
m
ea
su
re
s, 
on
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
 
in
ve
st
or
 
ha
s 
re
lie
d 
wh
en
 
m
ak
in
g 
an
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t. 
In
 
th
is
 
re
sp
ec
t, 
th
e 
in
ve
sto
r’
s 
co
nd
uc
t 
an
d 
ac
ce
pt
ed
 b
us
in
es
s 
ris
k 
in
 t
he
 
te
rr
ito
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
Pa
rty
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 
ta
ke
n 
in
to
 
ac
co
un
t 
wh
en
 
de
te
rm
in
in
g 
th
e 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
f t
he
 in
ve
sto
r]
.90
 
 Th
e 
N
ig
er
ia
 –
 S
in
ga
po
re
 B
IT
 i
nc
lu
de
s 
an
 
ex
ce
pt
io
n 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
of
 e
ac
h 
pa
rty
 a
nd
 it
s r
el
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
of
 F
ET
 b
re
ac
he
s. 
Th
e 
ex
ce
pt
io
n 
re
ad
s 
“I
n 
ap
pl
yi
ng
 th
is 
ar
tic
le
, P
ar
tie
s 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 th
at
 
th
ey
 h
av
e 
di
ffe
re
nt
 f
or
m
s 
of
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e,
 
le
gi
sla
tiv
e,
 a
nd
 j
ud
ic
ia
l 
sy
st
em
s 
an
d 
ar
e 
at
 
di
ffe
re
nt
 l
ev
el
s 
of
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
an
d 
m
ay
 n
ot
 
ac
hi
ev
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
sta
nd
ar
d 
at
 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
tim
e.
”9
1  
Th
e 
CO
M
ES
A
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t 
ad
op
ts 
a 
si
m
ila
r e
xc
ep
tio
n,
 b
ut
 a
lso
 a
dd
s t
ha
t d
ue
 to
 th
e 
di
ffe
re
nt
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t l
ev
el
s 
of
 it
s 
pa
rti
es
, t
he
 
FE
T 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
do
es
 “
no
t 
es
ta
bl
ish
 a
 s
in
gl
e 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l s
ta
nd
ar
d 
in
 th
is
 c
on
te
xt
.”
92
 T
hi
s 
m
ak
es
 
th
e 
se
ve
rit
y 
le
ve
l 
in
 
sta
te
 
ac
tio
ns
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
90
 U
N
CT
A
D
, F
ai
r a
nd
 E
qu
ita
bl
e 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t §
 II
, a
t 1
09
 (A
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 e
d.
, U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 2
01
2)
. S
ee
 a
lso
 A
rti
cl
e 
8.
10
 o
f t
he
 C
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 T
ra
de
 a
nd
 E
co
no
m
ic
 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
Ca
na
da
 a
nd
 th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
on
. 
91
 A
rti
cl
e 
3(
4)
 o
f t
he
 N
ig
er
ia
 –
 S
in
ga
po
re
 B
IT
 (2
01
6)
. 
92
 A
rti
cl
e 
14
(3
) o
f t
he
 In
ve
st
m
en
t A
gr
ee
m
en
t F
or
 th
e 
CO
M
ES
A
 C
om
m
on
 In
ve
st
m
en
t A
re
a 
(2
00
7)
. 
28
7 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
re
qu
ire
d 
fo
r 
a 
br
ea
ch
 o
f 
th
e 
FE
T 
sta
nd
ar
d 
to
 
be
 fo
un
d 
de
pe
nd
en
t o
n 
th
e 
ho
st
 st
at
e’
s l
ev
el
 o
f 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t. 
 
 In
 
re
ga
rd
s 
to
 t
he
 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
of
 i
nv
es
to
r’s
 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
, t
he
 T
PP
A
 g
iv
es
 l
ev
er
ag
e 
to
 i
ts 
pa
rti
es
 b
y 
st
ip
ul
at
in
g 
th
at
 “
th
e 
m
er
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 a
 
Pa
rt
y 
ta
ke
s 
or
 fa
ils
 to
 ta
ke
 a
n 
ac
tio
n 
th
at
 m
ay
 
be
 in
co
ns
ist
en
t w
ith
 a
n 
in
ve
st
or
’s
 e
xp
ec
ta
tio
ns
 
do
es
 n
ot
 c
on
sti
tu
te
 a
 b
re
ac
h 
of
 t
hi
s 
Ar
tic
le
, 
ev
en
 if
 th
er
e 
is
 lo
ss
 o
r 
da
m
ag
e 
to
 th
e 
co
ve
re
d 
in
ve
st
m
en
t a
s a
 re
su
lt.
”9
3   
 Th
e 
rig
ht
 o
f t
he
 h
os
t s
ta
te
 to
 ta
ke
 m
ea
su
re
s 
in
 
pu
rs
ui
t 
of
 i
ts
 p
ub
lic
 p
ol
ic
y 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 c
an
 e
ith
er
 b
e 
ad
de
d 
in
 t
he
 F
ET
 
st
an
da
rd
 a
s a
n 
ex
ce
pt
io
n,
 o
r c
an
 b
e 
ad
de
d 
as
 a
 
st
an
da
lo
ne
 p
ro
vi
sio
n 
in
 J
or
da
n’
s 
m
od
el
 B
IT
 
as
 a
 g
en
er
al
 e
xc
ep
tio
n 
th
at
 a
pp
lie
s 
to
 a
ll 
tre
at
m
en
t s
ta
nd
ar
ds
. T
hi
s 
th
es
is 
is 
of
 th
e 
vi
ew
 
th
at
 a
 s
ta
nd
al
on
e 
pr
ov
isi
on
 i
s 
m
or
e 
ef
fic
ie
nt
 
th
an
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
is
 
ex
ce
pt
io
n 
w
ith
 
ea
ch
 
tre
at
m
en
t 
sta
nd
ar
d.
 
Su
ch
 
a 
pr
ov
isi
on
 
is 
di
sc
us
se
d 
be
lo
w
.  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
93
 A
rti
cl
e 
9.
6(
4)
 o
f t
he
 T
ra
ns
 P
ac
ifi
c 
Pa
rtn
er
sh
ip
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t (
TP
PA
) (
20
16
). 
28
8 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
D
isp
ut
e 
R
es
ol
ut
io
n 
 
Th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
re
so
lu
tio
n 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
go
ve
rn
in
g 
in
ve
st
or
-s
ta
te
 d
is
pu
te
s 
is 
on
e 
of
 th
e 
m
os
t i
m
po
rta
nt
 p
ro
vi
sio
ns
 
in
 a
ny
 B
IT
. 
U
su
al
ly
, 
BI
Ts
 p
ro
vi
de
 
fo
r 
ar
bi
tra
tio
n 
as
 
a 
m
et
ho
d 
fo
r 
di
sp
ut
e 
re
so
lu
tio
n 
un
de
r t
he
 a
us
pi
ce
s 
of
 th
e 
IC
SI
D
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n.
94
 
 H
ow
ev
er
, 
th
e 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
us
e 
of
 
in
ve
st
or
-s
ta
te
 
di
sp
ut
e 
se
ttl
em
en
t 
(IS
D
S)
 b
y 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s, 
co
up
le
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
in
co
ns
ist
en
t a
nd
 s
om
et
im
es
 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
y 
de
ci
si
on
s 
of
 t
rib
un
al
s 
ha
ve
 r
ai
se
d 
co
nc
er
ns
 f
or
 h
os
t s
ta
te
s. 
A
us
tra
lia
, 
G
er
m
an
y,
 
an
d 
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
a,
 fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e,
 h
av
e 
an
no
un
ce
d 
th
ei
r 
in
te
nt
io
n 
to
 n
ot
 i
nc
lu
de
 I
SD
S 
cl
au
se
s i
n 
th
ei
r f
ut
ur
e 
BI
Ts
.95
  
 Th
e 
ov
er
us
e 
of
 
IS
D
S 
by
 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s 
ca
n 
co
nt
rib
ut
e 
to
 
th
e 
cr
ea
tio
n 
of
 a
 “
re
gu
la
to
ry
 c
hi
ll”
 e
ffe
ct
 
in
 t
he
 h
os
t 
sta
te
. 
A
dd
iti
on
al
ly
, 
th
e 
IS
D
S 
is
 a
 c
os
tly
 a
nd
 ti
m
e-
co
ns
um
in
g 
Th
e 
IS
D
S 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
in
 th
e 
m
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r J
or
da
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
bo
th
 l
im
ite
d 
an
d 
pr
ec
ise
. 
Th
is 
ca
n 
ha
pp
en
 b
y 
ad
di
ng
 t
he
 f
ol
lo
w
in
g 
to
 t
he
 I
SD
S 
pr
ov
is
io
n:
 
 1)
 I
ns
er
t 
“c
oo
l-o
ff
” 
pe
rio
ds
 w
he
re
 t
he
 f
or
ei
gn
 
in
ve
st
or
 m
us
t 
en
ga
ge
 i
n 
am
ic
ab
le
 s
et
tle
m
en
t 
ef
fo
rts
 w
ith
 th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t f
or
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 p
er
io
d 
to
 a
tte
m
pt
 to
 r
es
ol
ve
 th
e 
iss
ue
 a
m
ic
ab
ly
 b
ef
or
e 
re
so
rti
ng
 to
 IS
D
S.
 
 2)
 R
eq
ui
re
 th
e 
ex
ha
us
tio
n 
of
 l
oc
al
 r
em
ed
ie
s 
in
 
th
e 
ho
st 
sta
te
 b
ef
or
e 
al
lo
w
in
g 
re
co
ur
se
 to
 IS
D
S.
 
Th
is
 a
llo
w
s 
th
e 
ho
st
 s
ta
te
, 
th
ro
ug
h 
its
 l
oc
al
 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
an
d 
ju
di
ci
al
 b
ra
nc
he
s, 
to
 r
ec
tif
y 
an
y 
br
ea
ch
 to
 th
e 
BI
T 
at
 a
n 
ea
rly
 st
ag
e,
 a
vo
id
in
g 
IS
D
S.
 
 3)
 L
im
it 
th
e 
ju
ris
di
ct
io
n 
of
 I
SD
S 
tri
bu
na
ls
 t
o 
re
vi
ew
 
di
sp
ut
es
 
ar
isi
ng
 
so
le
ly
 
fr
om
 
th
e 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f t
he
 B
IT
 (i
.e
. t
re
at
m
en
t 
st
an
da
rd
s)
. 
Su
ch
 
a 
lim
ita
tio
n 
w
ill
 
ex
cl
ud
e 
di
sp
ut
es
 a
ris
in
g 
fr
om
 o
th
er
 le
ga
l d
oc
um
en
ts
 (i
.e
. 
in
ve
st
m
en
t c
on
tra
ct
s, 
ho
w
ev
er
 th
is
 a
lso
 re
qu
ire
s 
Th
e 
Ca
na
da
 –
 H
on
g 
K
on
g 
B
IT
 i
nc
lu
de
s 
a 
de
ta
ile
d 
an
d 
pr
ec
is
e 
IS
D
S 
cl
au
se
.96
 T
he
 c
la
us
e 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
pa
rti
es
 to
 “
ho
ld
 c
on
su
lta
tio
ns
 a
nd
 
at
te
m
pt
 t
o 
se
ttl
e 
a 
cl
ai
m
 a
m
ic
ab
ly
 b
ef
or
e 
an
 
in
ve
st
or
 m
ay
 s
ub
m
it 
a 
cl
ai
m
 to
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n.
”9
7  
Th
e 
IS
D
S 
cl
au
se
 i
n 
th
e 
sa
id
 B
IT
 s
tip
ul
at
es
 
th
at
 th
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 s
ha
ll 
be
 h
el
d 
w
ith
in
 6
0 
da
ys
, 
un
le
ss
 t
he
 d
is
pu
tin
g 
pa
rti
es
 a
gr
ee
 t
o 
a 
lo
ng
er
 p
er
io
d.
98
 
 Th
e 
N
or
w
eg
ia
n 
M
od
el
 B
IT
 e
xp
lic
itl
y 
re
qu
ire
s 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s 
to
 
se
ek
 
lo
ca
l 
re
m
ed
ie
s 
be
fo
re
 
su
bm
itt
in
g 
a 
cl
ai
m
 
to
 
IS
D
S.
99
 
It 
pr
ov
id
es
 i
n 
A
rti
cl
e 
15
(3
) 
th
at
 a
n 
in
ve
st
or
 i
s 
en
tit
le
d 
to
 s
ub
m
it 
a 
cl
ai
m
 to
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
w
he
n 
“ a
gr
ee
m
en
t 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
re
ac
he
d 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
pa
rti
es
 to
 th
is 
di
sp
ut
e 
wi
th
in
 3
6 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 
its
 su
bm
iss
io
n 
to
 a
 lo
ca
l c
ou
rt
 fo
r t
he
 p
ur
po
se
 
of
 
pu
rs
u i
ng
 
lo
ca
l 
re
m
ed
ie
s, 
af
te
r 
ha
vi
ng
 
ex
ha
us
te
d 
an
y 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
re
m
ed
ie
s.”
 
Si
m
ila
rly
, t
he
 S
A
D
C 
M
od
el
 B
IT
 re
co
m
m
en
ds
 
ad
op
tin
g 
a 
pr
ov
isi
on
 
th
at
 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
ex
ha
us
tio
n 
of
 lo
ca
l r
em
ed
ie
s a
s a
 p
re
co
nd
iti
on
 
to
 in
iti
at
in
g 
IS
D
S 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s. 
Th
e 
su
gg
es
te
d 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
94
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
Se
ttl
em
en
t o
f I
nv
es
tm
en
t D
is
pu
te
s b
et
w
ee
n 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 N
at
io
na
ls 
of
 O
th
er
 S
ta
te
s (
19
65
). 
95
 L
ise
 J
oh
ns
on
 &
 L
isa
 S
ac
hs
, 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
In
ve
stm
en
t 
Ag
re
em
en
ts,
 2
01
3:
 A
 R
ev
ie
w 
of
 T
re
nd
s 
an
d 
Ne
w 
Ap
pr
oa
ch
es
, 
in
 Y
EA
RB
O
O
K
 O
F 
IN
TE
RN
A
TI
O
N
A
L 
IN
V
ES
TM
EN
T 
LA
W
 A
N
D
 P
O
LI
C
Y
, 2
01
3-
20
14
, a
t 2
9 
(A
nd
re
a 
K
. B
jo
rk
lu
nd
 e
d.
 2
01
4)
. 
96
 C
an
ad
a 
- H
on
g 
K
on
g 
B
IT
 (2
01
6)
. 
97
 Id
. a
t a
rt.
 2
1(
1)
. 
98
 Id
. a
t a
rt.
 2
1(
1)
. 
99
 N
or
w
ay
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 (2
01
5)
. 
28
9 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
pr
oc
es
s 
on
 
th
e 
ho
st
 
sta
te
 
th
at
 
im
po
se
s 
an
 e
xt
ra
 b
ur
de
n 
on
 th
e 
ho
st 
st
at
e’
s a
dm
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
re
so
ur
ce
s. 
 O
ne
 th
e 
ot
he
r h
an
d,
 IS
D
S 
ha
s 
be
en
 a
 
su
cc
es
sf
ul
 to
ol
 in
 p
ro
te
ct
in
g 
in
ve
st
or
 
rig
ht
s. 
H
en
ce
 
el
im
in
at
in
g 
IS
D
S 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 f
ro
m
 B
IT
s 
ca
n 
se
ve
re
ly
 
im
pa
ct
 t
he
 g
lo
ba
l 
flo
w
 o
f 
ca
pi
ta
l, 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 t
o 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 c
ou
nt
rie
s, 
an
d 
th
e 
w
ith
dr
aw
al
 o
f 
cu
rr
en
t 
FD
I 
fr
om
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
ho
st 
co
un
tri
es
. 
In
 
ad
di
tio
n,
 th
e 
IS
D
S 
cl
au
se
 m
ak
es
 th
e 
ho
st
 
sta
te
 
m
or
e 
di
lig
en
t 
in
 
its
 
de
al
in
gs
 w
ith
 f
or
ei
gn
 i
nv
es
to
rs
 a
nd
 
in
du
ce
s 
it 
to
 m
ak
e 
re
fo
rm
s 
in
 i
ts 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
an
d 
ju
di
ci
al
 b
ra
nc
he
s 
to
 a
vo
id
 d
is
pu
te
s 
an
d 
lia
bi
lit
y 
to
 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s. 
Th
us
, 
no
t 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
an
 I
SD
S 
cl
au
se
 m
ay
 h
av
e 
a 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
e 
on
 
th
e 
ov
er
al
l 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
of
 
th
e 
ho
st 
st
at
e.
 
 
no
t 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
an
 u
m
br
el
la
 c
la
us
e 
in
 t
he
 B
IT
). 
Th
is
 
lim
ita
tio
n 
al
so
 
se
rv
es
 
to
 
co
nf
in
e 
th
e 
ju
ris
di
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
IS
D
S 
tri
bu
na
l t
o 
br
ea
ch
es
 o
f 
tre
at
m
en
t s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 a
nd
 n
ot
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 
in
 th
e 
BI
T.
 H
en
ce
, l
an
gu
ag
e 
su
ch
 a
s “
an
y 
di
sp
ut
e 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 
an
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t”
 
or
 
“a
ny
 
m
at
te
r 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 a
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t”
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 
av
oi
de
d 
in
 th
e 
IS
D
S 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
 
 4)
 L
im
it 
th
e 
ju
ris
di
ct
io
n 
of
 I
SD
S 
tri
bu
na
ls
 t
o 
re
vi
ew
 d
is
pu
te
s 
ar
is
in
g 
fr
om
 i
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 t
ha
t 
ar
e 
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
 a
nd
 o
pe
ra
te
d 
in
 c
on
fo
rm
ity
 w
ith
 
ho
st
 s
ta
te
’ s
 l
oc
al
 l
aw
s. 
Su
ch
 a
 l
im
ita
tio
n 
w
ill
 
ex
cl
ud
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 t
ha
t 
ar
e 
no
t 
re
sp
ec
tfu
l 
of
 
Jo
rd
an
’s
 la
w
s, 
or
 in
ve
stm
en
ts
 th
at
 a
re
 in
vo
lv
ed
 
in
 c
or
ru
pt
io
n 
an
d/
or
 i
n 
br
ea
ch
 o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
co
nv
en
tio
ns
 re
la
tin
g 
to
 th
e 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
of
 h
um
an
 
rig
ht
s, 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t, 
la
bo
r a
nd
 th
e 
lik
e.
  
 5)
 I
ns
er
t 
tim
e 
lim
ita
tio
ns
 w
he
re
, 
on
ce
 p
as
se
d,
 
th
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
 s
ha
ll 
lo
se
 it
s 
rig
ht
 to
 s
ub
m
it 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 IS
D
S 
(i.
e.
 st
at
ut
e 
of
 li
m
ita
tio
ns
). 
 
 6)
 E
xp
lic
itl
y 
pr
oh
ib
it 
ac
ce
ss
 to
 I
SD
S 
w
he
re
 a
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t a
ut
ho
riz
at
io
n 
or
 a
 c
on
tra
ct
 in
cl
ud
es
 a
 
ch
oi
ce
 o
f 
fo
ru
m
 c
la
us
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
re
so
lu
tio
n 
of
 
di
sp
ut
es
 
pe
rta
in
in
g 
to
 
th
at
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t, 
au
th
or
iz
at
io
n,
 o
r 
co
nt
ra
ct
 (
th
is
 p
oi
nt
 a
pp
lie
s 
if 
te
xt
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
an
 i
nv
es
to
r 
to
 s
ub
m
it 
“a
 c
la
im
 
be
fo
re
 t
he
 d
om
es
tic
 c
ou
rt
s 
of
 t
he
 H
os
t 
St
at
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
 p
ur
su
in
g 
lo
ca
l 
re
m
ed
ie
s, 
af
te
r 
th
e 
ex
ha
us
tio
n 
of
 a
ny
 a
dm
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
re
m
ed
ie
s, 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 u
nd
er
ly
in
g 
th
e 
cl
ai
m
 
un
de
r 
th
is 
Ag
re
em
en
t, 
an
d 
a 
re
so
lu
tio
n 
ha
s 
no
t 
be
en
 r
ea
ch
ed
 w
ith
in
 a
 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e 
fro
m
 it
s 
su
bm
iss
io
n 
to
 a
 lo
ca
l c
ou
rt
 o
f t
he
 H
os
t S
ta
te
.”
10
0  
 O
n 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
ha
nd
, 
Th
e 
A
SE
A
N
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
al
lo
w
s 
th
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
 to
 p
ro
ce
ed
 d
ire
ct
ly
 
to
 
in
iti
at
e 
IS
D
S 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s 
in
 
an
y 
fo
ra
 
pr
ov
id
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
tre
at
y 
(IC
SI
D
, 
U
N
C
IT
RA
L,
 
or
 
lo
ca
l 
co
ur
ts
,) 
al
be
it 
co
nd
iti
on
in
g 
th
at
 
re
co
ur
se
 to
 o
ne
 f
or
um
 p
re
cl
ud
es
 th
e 
in
ve
sto
r 
fr
om
 u
si
ng
 a
ny
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
fo
ra
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
in
 
th
e 
tre
at
y 
(i.
e.
 n
o 
U
-tu
rn
 m
od
el
).1
01
 
 A
s 
to
 t
he
 i
ss
ue
s 
th
at
 c
an
 b
e 
su
bm
itt
ed
 t
o 
IS
D
S,
 
th
e 
A
SE
A
N
 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
ad
op
ts 
an
 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 
of
 
sp
ec
ify
in
g 
(a
nd
 
en
um
er
at
in
g)
 
th
os
e 
tre
at
y 
pr
ov
isi
on
s 
th
at
 c
an
 b
e 
cl
ai
m
ed
 a
s 
br
ea
ch
ed
 i
n 
IS
D
S 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s. 
A
rti
cl
e 
20
(1
) 
of
 th
e 
A
SE
A
N
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t r
ea
ds
: “
Th
is 
Ar
tic
le
 
sh
al
l 
ap
pl
y 
to
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
di
sp
ut
es
 b
et
we
en
 a
 
Pa
rt
y 
an
d 
an
 
in
ve
sto
r 
of
 
an
ot
he
r 
Pa
rty
 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 a
n 
al
le
ge
d 
br
ea
ch
 o
f a
n 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
10
0  S
ee
 A
rti
cl
e 
29
.4
(b
)(
i) 
of
 th
e 
SA
D
C 
M
od
el
 B
ila
te
ra
l I
nv
es
tm
en
t T
re
at
y 
Te
m
pl
at
e 
w
ith
 C
om
m
en
ta
ry
 (C
om
m
un
ity
 e
d.
,  
20
12
). 
10
1  
A
rti
cl
e 
20
(3
) 
of
 t
he
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
on
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t 
un
de
r 
th
e 
Fr
am
ew
or
k 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
on
 C
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 E
co
no
m
ic
 C
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
of
 
So
ut
he
as
t A
sia
n 
N
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 th
e 
Re
pu
bl
ic
 o
f I
nd
ia
 (2
01
4)
. 
29
0 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
an
 u
m
br
el
la
 c
la
us
e 
is 
in
cl
ud
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
m
od
el
 
B
IT
). 
 7)
 F
in
al
ly
, i
t i
s r
ec
om
m
en
de
d 
th
at
 J
or
da
n 
ad
ds
 a
 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
to
 t
he
 I
SD
S 
cl
au
se
 t
ha
t 
al
lo
w
s 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
in
g 
pa
rti
es
 t
o 
ag
re
e 
to
 r
es
or
t 
to
 o
th
er
 
di
sp
ut
e 
re
so
lu
tio
n 
m
et
ho
ds
 (
su
ch
 a
s 
m
ed
ia
tio
n)
 
at
 a
ny
 t
im
e,
 e
ve
n 
af
te
r 
th
e 
in
iti
at
io
n 
of
 I
SD
S 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s. 
 
of
 th
e 
fo
rm
er
 P
ar
ty
 u
nd
er
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
 (N
at
io
na
l 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t),
 
Ar
tic
le
 
7 
(T
re
at
m
en
t 
of
 
In
ve
st
m
en
t),
 
Ar
tic
le
 
8 
(E
xp
ro
pr
ia
tio
n 
an
d 
Co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n)
, 
Ar
tic
le
 9
 (
Co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
fo
r 
Lo
ss
es
) 
an
d 
Ar
tic
le
 1
1 
(T
ra
ns
fe
rs
), 
wh
ic
h 
ca
us
es
 l
os
s 
or
 d
am
ag
e 
to
 t
he
 i
nv
es
to
r 
in
 
re
la
tio
n 
to
 i
ts
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
as
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 i
n 
su
bp
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
 (
b)
 o
f A
rt
ic
le
 1
 (
Sc
op
e)
 w
ith
 
re
sp
ec
t 
to
 
th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
co
nd
uc
t, 
op
er
at
io
n,
 o
r 
sa
le
 o
r 
ot
he
r 
di
sp
os
iti
on
 o
f s
uc
h 
in
ve
st
m
en
t.”
10
2  
Th
e 
sa
m
e 
ar
tic
le
 c
on
tin
ue
s 
to
 p
ro
hi
bi
t c
la
im
s 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 d
is
pu
te
s 
ex
ist
in
g 
be
fo
re
 t
he
 e
nt
ry
 
of
 th
e 
BI
T,
 o
r t
ho
se
 th
at
 h
av
e 
be
en
 p
re
vi
ou
sly
 
se
ttl
ed
. 
 Th
e 
SA
D
C 
M
od
el
 B
IT
 re
co
m
m
en
ds
 a
dd
in
g 
a 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
th
at
 
ex
cl
ud
es
 
an
y 
“i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
au
th
or
iza
tio
n 
or
 a
 c
on
tr
ac
t [
wh
ic
h]
 in
cl
ud
es
 a
 
ch
oi
ce
 o
f 
fo
ru
m
 c
la
us
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
re
so
lu
tio
n 
of
 
di
sp
ut
es
 p
er
ta
in
in
g 
to
 t
ha
t 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
or
 t
he
 
au
th
or
iza
tio
n 
or
 c
on
tra
ct
” 
fr
om
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
un
de
r 
th
e 
BI
T,
 if
 “
th
e 
un
de
rl
yi
ng
 m
ea
su
re
 in
 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
wo
ul
d 
be
 c
ov
er
ed
 b
y 
su
ch
 a
 
ch
oi
ce
 o
f f
or
um
 c
la
us
e.
”1
03
 
 Fi
na
lly
, t
he
 r
ec
en
tly
 c
on
cl
ud
ed
 C
an
ad
a 
– 
EU
 
CE
TA
 
de
ni
es
 
IS
D
S 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s 
to
 
an
y 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
10
2  A
rti
cl
e 
20
(1
) o
f t
he
 id
. a
t. 
10
3  A
rti
cl
e 
29
.9
(b
) o
f t
he
 S
A
D
C 
M
od
el
 B
ila
te
ra
l I
nv
es
tm
en
t T
re
at
y 
Te
m
pl
at
e 
w
ith
 C
om
m
en
ta
ry
 (C
om
m
un
ity
 e
d.
,  
20
12
). 
29
1 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
iss
ue
s 
N
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ex
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
in
ve
st
or
 “
if 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
ha
s 
be
en
 m
ad
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
fr
au
du
le
nt
 
m
is
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n,
 
co
nc
ea
lm
en
t, 
co
rr
up
tio
n,
 
or
 
co
nd
uc
t 
am
ou
nt
in
g 
to
 a
n 
ab
us
e 
of
 p
ro
ce
ss
.”
10
4  
Th
is 
pr
oh
ib
iti
on
 a
llo
w
s 
on
ly
 th
os
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 th
at
 
co
nf
or
m
 t
o 
th
e 
ho
st 
sta
te
’ s
 l
oc
al
 l
aw
s 
to
 
su
bm
it 
cl
ai
m
s i
n 
IS
D
S 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s. 
 
A
ls
o,
 t
he
 C
ET
A
 a
llo
w
s 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
in
g 
pa
rti
es
 
“t
o 
ha
ve
 r
ec
ou
rs
e 
to
 m
ed
ia
tio
n”
 a
t a
ny
 ti
m
e,
 
ev
en
 
if 
th
e 
IS
D
S 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s 
ha
ve
 
be
en
 
in
iti
at
ed
.10
5  
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
10
4  A
rti
cl
e 
8.
18
(3
) o
f t
he
 C
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 T
ra
de
 a
nd
 E
co
no
m
ic
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
Ca
na
da
 a
nd
 th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
on
 (2
01
6)
. 
10
5  A
rti
cl
e 
8.
20
(1
) o
f t
he
 id
. a
t. 
29
2 
 
Su
gg
es
te
d 
R
es
er
va
tio
ns
 a
nd
 E
xc
lu
sio
ns
 in
 th
e J
or
da
n 
M
od
el
 B
IT
 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
In
ve
st
or
’s
 
O
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 
M
os
t B
IT
s 
se
t o
ut
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 f
or
 th
e 
ho
st 
sta
te
 w
ith
 n
o 
co
rre
sp
on
di
ng
 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 
on
 
th
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
sto
r. 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 B
IT
 i
s 
a 
to
ol
 d
es
ig
ne
d 
to
 p
ro
te
ct
 f
or
ei
gn
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
an
d 
en
ha
nc
e 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
of
 t
he
 h
os
t 
st
at
e.
  
 To
 a
ch
ie
ve
 t
he
 l
at
te
r 
go
al
, 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s 
an
d 
th
ei
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 c
er
ta
in
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
tie
s t
ha
t a
ss
ist
 th
e 
ho
st 
co
un
try
 in
 re
ac
hi
ng
 it
s 
de
sir
ed
 le
ve
l o
f 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t. 
Th
es
e 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 in
cl
ud
e 
ad
op
tin
g 
th
e 
be
st
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 in
 th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t’s
 re
sp
ec
tiv
e 
in
du
str
y 
by
 u
si
ng
 t
he
 l
at
es
t 
an
d 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
lly
 s
af
e 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
, 
ad
he
rin
g 
to
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
po
lic
es
, 
co
nv
en
tio
ns
, 
an
d 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
st
an
da
rd
s 
th
at
 e
ns
ur
e 
tra
ns
pa
re
nc
y,
 s
oc
ia
l r
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
, 
an
d 
ot
he
r s
im
ila
r o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
. 
 A
no
th
er
 
iss
ue
 
is 
ad
di
ng
 
a 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
th
at
 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
co
nt
rib
ut
es
 t
o 
th
e 
ho
st
 s
ta
te
’s
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t. 
Th
is
 a
dd
iti
on
 w
ill
 s
ig
na
l t
he
 h
os
t s
ta
te
’s
 m
ai
n 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
of
 a
ttr
ac
tin
g 
FD
I, 
an
d 
di
ct
at
es
 a
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t-o
rie
nt
ed
 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
of
 t
he
 t
re
at
y’
s 
tre
at
m
en
t 
sta
nd
ar
ds
. 
Th
e 
is
su
e 
is,
 h
ow
ev
er
, 
ho
w
 s
uc
h 
a 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
w
ill
 b
e 
as
se
ss
ed
 a
nd
 m
ea
su
re
d.
 D
iff
er
en
t i
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 c
on
tri
bu
te
 
Jo
rd
an
 s
ho
ul
d 
in
se
rt 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 o
n 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
sto
rs
 t
o 
he
lp
 i
ts 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t. 
Th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 a
nd
 e
xa
m
pl
es
 c
an
 
he
lp
 p
ol
ic
y 
m
ak
er
s 
an
d 
ne
go
tia
to
rs
 in
 d
ra
fti
ng
 th
es
e 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts:
 
 1)
 R
eq
ui
re
 th
at
 in
ve
st
or
s c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 Jo
rd
an
’s
 lo
ca
l l
aw
s a
t b
ot
h 
th
e 
pr
e-
en
try
 
an
d 
th
e 
po
st-
en
try
 
st
ag
e 
of
 
an
 
in
ve
stm
en
t. 
Fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s 
an
d 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 th
at
 d
o 
no
t c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 th
is 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
ca
n 
be
 sa
nc
tio
ne
d 
by
: 
i) 
de
ny
in
g 
th
em
 tr
ea
ty
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n,
 
ii)
 re
qu
iri
ng
 tr
ib
un
al
s 
to
 c
on
si
de
r i
nv
es
to
r c
on
du
ct
 w
he
n 
in
te
rp
re
tin
g 
tre
at
m
en
t s
ta
nd
ar
ds
, a
nd
 
iii
) p
ro
vi
de
 fo
r J
or
da
n’
s 
rig
ht
 to
 b
rin
g 
co
un
te
rc
la
im
s 
in
 IS
D
S 
ar
is
in
g 
fr
om
 in
ve
st
or
s’
 v
io
la
tio
ns
 o
f i
ts
 lo
ca
l l
aw
. 
 2)
 
Re
qu
ire
 
in
ve
st
or
s 
to
 
ad
op
t 
be
st
 
pr
ac
tic
es
 
an
d 
co
rp
or
at
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
, 
an
d 
en
de
av
or
 
to
 
co
nt
rib
ut
e 
to
 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
of
 t
he
 h
os
t 
sta
te
 (
Jo
rd
an
).1
06
 T
he
 I
ra
n 
– 
Sl
ov
ak
 B
IT
 
ad
op
ts 
a 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
to
 th
is
 e
ff
ec
t. 
It 
re
ad
s 
“I
nv
es
to
rs
 a
nd
 in
ve
stm
en
ts 
sh
ou
ld
 a
pp
ly
 n
at
io
na
l, 
an
d 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
lly
 a
cc
ep
te
d,
 s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 o
f 
co
rp
or
at
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 f
or
 t
he
 s
ec
to
r 
in
vo
lv
ed
, 
in
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 f
or
 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 
an
d 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
pr
ac
tic
es
. 
In
ve
sto
rs
 
an
d 
th
ei
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts 
sh
ou
ld
 
str
iv
e 
to
 
m
ak
e 
th
e 
m
ax
im
um
 
fe
as
ib
le
 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
 to
 th
e 
su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f t
he
 H
os
t S
ta
te
 a
nd
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
10
6  S
lo
va
k 
– 
Ir
an
 B
IT
 (2
01
6)
. 
29
3 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
in
 d
iff
er
en
t 
w
ay
s 
to
 t
he
 h
os
t 
sta
te
’s
 e
co
no
m
y.
 F
or
 t
hi
s 
re
as
on
, 
so
m
e 
re
ce
nt
 
tre
at
ie
s 
us
e 
a 
“b
es
t 
ef
fo
rts
” 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
on
 i
nv
es
to
rs
 t
o 
co
nt
rib
ut
e 
to
 t
he
 h
os
t 
sta
te
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t. 
It 
is
 
re
co
m
m
en
de
d 
to
 
in
cl
ud
e 
cl
ea
r 
la
ng
ua
ge
 t
ha
t 
sti
pu
la
te
s 
th
e 
ho
st
 s
ta
te
’s
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
t 
of
 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
to
 
its
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t, 
w
he
th
er
 
it 
is 
a 
co
m
pu
ls
or
y 
or
 b
es
t e
ffo
rts
 o
bl
ig
at
io
n.
  
 
lo
ca
l c
om
m
un
ity
 th
ro
ug
h 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 le
ve
ls
 o
f s
oc
ia
lly
 r
es
po
ns
ib
le
 
pr
ac
tic
es
.”
10
7  
Si
m
ila
rly
 t
he
 C
an
ad
a 
– 
Bu
rk
in
a 
Fa
so
 B
IT
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
pa
rti
es
 
to
 
en
co
ur
ag
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
sto
rs
 
to
 
ad
op
t 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
lly
 
re
co
gn
iz
ed
 p
rin
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
co
rp
or
at
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 p
rin
ci
pl
es
 
re
la
te
d 
to
 h
um
an
 ri
gh
ts
, l
ab
or
, a
nd
 a
nt
i-c
or
ru
pt
io
n.
 A
rti
cl
e 
16
 o
f t
he
 
sa
id
 B
IT
 re
ad
s: 
“E
ac
h 
Pa
rty
 sh
ou
ld
 e
nc
ou
ra
ge
 e
nt
er
pr
is
es
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
wi
th
in
 i
ts 
te
rr
ito
ry
 o
r 
su
bj
ec
t 
to
 i
ts
 j
ur
isd
ic
tio
n 
to
 i
nc
or
po
ra
te
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
lly
 
re
co
gn
iz
ed
 
st
an
da
rd
s 
of
 
co
rp
or
at
e 
so
ci
al
 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
in
 t
he
ir
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 a
nd
 i
nt
er
na
l 
po
lic
ie
s, 
su
ch
 a
s 
st
at
em
en
ts
 o
f p
rin
ci
pl
e 
th
at
 h
av
e 
be
en
 e
nd
or
se
d 
or
 a
re
 s
up
po
rte
d 
by
 
th
e 
Pa
rti
es
. 
Th
es
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 a
dd
re
ss
 i
ss
ue
s 
su
ch
 a
s 
la
bo
ur
, 
th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t, 
hu
m
an
 
rig
ht
s, 
co
m
m
un
ity
 
re
la
tio
ns
 
an
d 
an
ti-
co
rr
up
tio
n.
”1
08
 
 
H
os
t S
ta
te
 
Ex
ce
pt
io
ns
 
Jo
rd
an
 i
s 
ad
vi
se
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
ex
pl
ic
at
e 
re
se
rv
at
io
ns
 t
ha
t 
pr
es
er
ve
 i
ts
 r
ig
ht
s 
to
 r
eg
ul
at
e 
an
d 
ap
pl
y 
m
ea
su
re
s 
th
at
 
pu
rs
ue
 a
 l
eg
iti
m
at
e 
pu
b l
ic
 p
ol
ic
y 
or
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
go
al
. 
O
f 
co
ur
se
, 
th
es
e 
re
se
rv
at
io
ns
 s
ho
ul
d 
no
t 
be
 u
se
d 
as
 a
 
di
sg
ui
se
 t
o 
di
sc
rim
in
at
e 
ag
ai
ns
t 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s 
or
 
ca
us
e 
ha
rm
 t
o 
th
ei
r 
in
ve
stm
en
ts
 t
hr
ou
gh
 a
rb
itr
ar
y 
an
d 
un
ju
sti
fie
d 
m
ea
su
re
s. 
Ra
th
er
, 
th
e 
re
se
rv
at
io
ns
 p
re
se
rv
e 
Jo
rd
an
’s
 r
ig
ht
 t
o 
m
ai
nt
ai
n 
its
 p
ol
iti
ca
l, 
ec
on
om
ic
, 
an
d 
so
ci
al
 s
ec
ur
ity
 a
nd
 in
te
re
sts
. T
he
y 
sh
ou
ld
 a
lso
 p
re
se
rv
e 
Jo
rd
an
’s
 r
ig
ht
 t
o 
ta
ke
 m
ea
su
re
s 
in
 t
im
es
 o
f 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
an
d 
cr
ise
s. 
H
en
ce
, i
t i
s 
im
po
rta
nt
 th
at
 th
es
e 
re
se
rv
at
io
ns
 
be
 p
ur
po
se
-re
str
ic
te
d 
to
 a
ss
ur
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s 
th
at
 
su
ch
 r
es
er
va
tio
ns
 a
re
 o
nl
y 
us
ed
 f
or
 a
 l
eg
iti
m
at
e 
pu
bl
ic
 
Th
e 
Ira
n 
– 
Sl
ov
ak
 B
IT
 c
on
ta
in
s 
a 
re
se
rv
at
io
n 
th
at
 a
llo
w
s 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
pa
rti
es
 to
 ta
ke
 m
ea
su
re
s 
th
at
 p
re
se
rv
e 
th
ei
r 
in
te
re
sts
. I
t 
st
at
es
 “
Su
bj
ec
t 
to
 t
he
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
t 
th
at
 s
uc
h 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ar
e 
no
t 
ap
pl
ie
d 
in
 a
 m
an
ne
r 
th
at
 w
ou
ld
 c
on
sti
tu
te
 a
rb
itr
ar
y 
or
 u
nj
us
tif
ia
bl
e 
di
sc
ri
m
in
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 o
r 
be
tw
ee
n 
in
ve
sto
rs
, n
ot
hi
ng
 in
 
th
is 
Ag
re
em
en
t s
ha
ll 
be
 c
on
st
ru
ed
 to
 p
re
ve
nt
 th
e 
Co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
Pa
rty
 
fr
om
 a
do
pt
in
g 
or
 e
nf
or
ci
ng
 m
ea
su
re
s 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y:
 a
) t
o 
pr
ot
ec
t p
ub
lic
 
se
cu
rit
y 
or
 p
ub
lic
 m
or
al
s 
or
 to
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
pu
bl
ic
 o
rd
er
; 
b)
 to
 p
ro
te
ct
 
hu
m
an
, a
ni
m
al
 o
r 
pl
an
t l
ife
 o
r 
he
al
th
; c
) t
o 
en
su
re
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
wi
th
 
la
ws
 a
nd
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
; 
or
 d
) 
fo
r 
th
e 
co
ns
er
va
tio
n 
of
 l
iv
in
g 
or
 n
on
-
liv
in
g 
ex
ha
us
tib
le
 n
at
ur
al
 re
so
ur
ce
s.”
10
9  
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
10
7  I
d.
 a
t a
rt.
 1
0(
3)
. 
10
8  A
rti
cl
e 
16
 o
f t
he
 C
an
ad
a 
– 
B
ur
ki
na
 F
as
o 
B
IT
 (2
01
6)
. 
10
9  S
lo
va
k 
– 
Ir
an
 B
IT
 (2
01
6)
. A
rti
cl
e 
11
.1
 
29
4 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
pu
rp
os
e 
an
d 
w
ill
 n
ot
 b
e 
us
ed
 a
s 
a 
to
ol
 t
o 
in
fri
ng
e 
tre
at
m
en
t 
sta
nd
ar
ds
 w
ith
ou
t 
lia
bi
lit
y 
to
 i
nv
es
to
rs
. 
Th
e 
pr
oc
es
s 
of
 e
na
ct
in
g 
an
d 
ap
pl
yi
ng
 p
ub
lic
 p
ol
ic
y 
re
la
te
d 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 a
nd
 m
ea
su
re
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
bo
th
 le
gi
tim
at
e 
an
d 
tra
ns
pa
re
nt
. 
Th
is
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
Jo
rd
an
 t
o 
ad
op
t 
a 
br
oa
de
r 
re
fo
rm
 
po
lic
y 
on
 
al
l 
le
ve
ls
 
an
d 
br
an
ch
es
 
of
 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t. 
 
 In
 a
dd
iti
on
, 
Jo
rd
an
 s
ho
ul
d 
in
se
rt 
ex
ce
pt
io
ns
 t
o 
no
n-
co
nf
or
m
in
g 
m
ea
su
re
s 
th
at
 b
re
ac
h 
th
e 
BI
T.
 U
su
al
ly
 s
ta
te
s 
re
se
rv
e 
th
ei
r r
ig
ht
 to
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
so
m
e 
m
ea
su
re
s t
ha
t b
re
ac
h 
th
e 
BI
T 
bu
t a
re
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 fo
r t
he
 h
os
t s
ta
te
. B
IT
s u
su
al
ly
 
ex
pr
es
s t
he
se
 e
xc
ep
tio
ns
 in
 a
n 
an
ne
x 
at
ta
ch
ed
 to
 th
e 
BI
T.
 
Si
m
ila
rly
, t
he
 H
on
g 
K
on
g 
– 
Ch
ili
 B
IT
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
th
at
 “
No
th
in
g 
in
 th
is 
Ag
re
em
en
t 
sh
al
l 
be
 c
on
str
ue
d 
to
 p
re
ve
nt
 a
 P
ar
ty
 f
ro
m
 a
do
pt
in
g,
 
m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
, o
r e
nf
or
ci
ng
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
 o
th
er
wi
se
 c
on
sis
te
nt
 w
ith
 th
is 
Ag
re
em
en
t 
th
at
 i
t 
co
ns
id
er
s 
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
ac
tiv
ity
 
in
 
its
 
ar
ea
 
is 
un
de
rta
ke
n 
in
 
a 
m
an
ne
r 
se
ns
iti
ve
 
to
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l, 
he
al
th
 
or
 
ot
he
r 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
.”
11
0  
A
dd
iti
on
al
ly
, t
he
 s
am
e 
B
IT
 a
llo
w
s 
a 
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
pa
rty
 t
o 
ta
ke
 a
ny
 
ac
tio
n 
“t
ha
t 
it 
co
ns
id
er
s 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
to
 p
ro
te
ct
 i
ts 
es
se
nt
ia
l 
se
cu
rit
y 
in
te
re
sts
,”
 i
nc
lu
di
ng
 m
ea
su
re
s 
ta
ke
n 
“ i
n 
tim
e 
of
 w
ar
 o
r 
ot
he
r 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
in
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l r
el
at
io
ns
.”
11
1  
 So
m
e 
tre
at
ie
s, 
af
te
r t
he
 A
rg
en
tin
ea
n 
Pe
so
 c
ris
is,
 st
ar
te
d 
to
 in
cl
ud
e 
an
 
ex
ce
pt
io
n 
th
at
 a
llo
w
s 
th
e 
ho
st
 c
ou
nt
ry
 to
 a
do
pt
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 m
ea
su
re
s 
th
at
 p
re
se
rv
e 
its
 fi
na
nc
ia
l a
nd
 m
on
et
ar
y 
sy
st
em
s 
w
ith
ou
t l
ia
bi
lit
y 
to
 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s. 
Fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e,
 o
ne
 tr
ea
ty
 p
ro
vi
de
s: 
“T
hi
s A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
do
es
 
no
t 
ap
pl
y 
to
 
no
n-
di
sc
rim
in
at
or
y 
m
ea
su
re
s 
of
 
ge
ne
ra
l 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
ta
ke
n 
by
 a
 p
ub
lic
 e
nt
ity
 i
n 
pu
rs
ui
t 
of
 m
on
et
ar
y 
an
d 
re
la
te
d 
cr
ed
it 
or
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
ra
te
 p
ol
ic
ie
s.”
11
2  
 Fi
na
lly
, n
on
-c
on
fo
rm
in
g 
m
ea
su
re
s 
th
at
 th
e 
ho
st 
sta
te
 w
is
he
s 
to
 k
ee
p 
in
 e
ffe
ct
 a
fte
r 
th
e 
co
nc
lu
sio
n 
of
 t
he
 B
IT
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 e
xc
lu
de
d.
 T
he
 
la
ng
ua
ge
 o
f 
th
e 
ex
cl
us
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 i
de
nt
ify
: 
i) 
th
e 
no
n-
co
nf
or
m
in
g 
m
ea
su
re
(s
), 
an
d 
ii)
 w
ha
t 
tre
at
m
en
t 
sta
nd
ar
d(
s)
 t
he
y 
ar
e 
ex
cl
ud
ed
 
fr
om
. 
Fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e:
 “
Ar
tic
le
s 
4 
(N
at
io
na
l 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t),
 5
 (
M
os
t-
Fa
vo
ur
ed
-N
at
io
n 
T r
ea
tm
en
t),
 8
 (
Se
ni
or
 M
an
ag
em
en
t, 
Bo
ar
d 
of
 
D
ir
ec
to
rs
 
an
d 
En
try
 
of
 
Pe
rs
on
ne
l) 
an
d 
9 
(P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
Re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
) s
ha
ll 
no
t a
pp
ly
 to
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
 th
at
 a
 P
ar
ty
 a
do
pt
s o
r 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
11
0  A
rti
cl
e 
15
 o
f t
he
 H
on
g 
K
on
g 
– 
Ch
ili
 B
IT
 (2
01
6)
. 
11
1  I
d.
 a
t a
rt.
 6
(6
) a
nd
 6
(b
)(
iii
). 
11
2  A
rti
cl
e 
18
(3
) o
f t
he
 C
an
ad
a 
– 
B
ur
ki
na
 F
as
o 
B
IT
 (2
01
6)
. 
29
5 
A
rt
ic
le
 
D
isc
us
sio
n 
R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
m
ai
nt
ai
ns
 w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 to
 s
ec
to
rs
, s
ub
se
ct
or
s 
or
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
, a
s 
se
t o
ut
 
in
 it
s s
ch
ed
ul
e 
to
 A
nn
ex
 II
 (R
es
er
va
tio
ns
 fo
r F
ut
ur
e 
M
ea
su
re
s)
.”
11
3  
 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 
W
ith
in
 t
he
 f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
of
 i
ts
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
, 
Jo
rd
an
 
m
ay
 
de
ci
de
 
to
 
im
po
se
 
“p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts”
 o
n 
fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
or
s. 
 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts 
ar
e 
“s
tip
ul
at
io
ns
, i
m
po
se
d 
on
 
in
ve
st
or
s, 
re
qu
iri
ng
 th
em
 to
 m
ee
t c
er
ta
in
 s
pe
ci
fie
d 
go
al
s 
w
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 
th
ei
r o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 in
 th
e 
ho
st 
co
un
try
.”
11
4  
 A
s 
a 
m
em
be
r 
of
 t
he
 W
TO
, 
Jo
rd
an
 i
s 
pr
oh
ib
ite
d 
fro
m
 
im
po
si
ng
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 e
xp
or
t 
qu
ot
as
.11
5  
H
ow
ev
er
, 
Jo
rd
an
 
m
ay
 
in
se
rt 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 o
th
er
 m
at
te
rs
, s
uc
h 
as
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 
lo
ca
l l
ab
or
, t
he
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 o
f c
er
ta
in
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
fo
r l
oc
al
 
co
m
m
un
iti
es
, o
r t
he
 u
se
 o
f l
oc
al
 in
pu
t m
at
er
ia
ls.
11
6  T
he
se
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts 
al
ig
n 
w
ith
 t
he
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
ch
al
le
ng
es
 in
 Jo
rd
an
, s
uc
h 
as
 it
s h
ig
h 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e 
an
d 
ne
ed
 f
or
 t
he
 t
ra
ns
fe
r 
of
 s
ki
lls
 a
nd
 k
no
w
-h
ow
, 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 in
 th
e 
en
er
gy
 a
nd
 w
at
er
 se
ct
or
s. 
 
Th
e 
Ca
na
da
 –
 E
U
 C
TE
A
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
th
at
 a
 c
on
tra
ct
in
g 
pa
rty
 m
ay
 
im
po
se
 c
er
ta
in
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 t
ha
t 
ha
ve
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
pu
rp
os
es
. A
rti
cl
e 
8.
5 
re
ad
s: 
“P
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
 d
oe
s 
no
t p
re
ve
nt
 a
 P
ar
ty
 
fr
om
 c
on
di
tio
ni
ng
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
r 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
re
ce
ip
t o
f a
n 
ad
va
nt
ag
e,
 
in
 c
on
ne
ct
io
n 
wi
th
 a
n 
in
ve
stm
en
t i
n 
its
 te
rr
ito
ry
, o
n 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
wi
th
 
a 
re
qu
ir
em
en
t 
to
 l
oc
at
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n,
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
 s
er
vi
ce
, 
tr
ai
n 
or
 
em
pl
oy
 w
or
ke
rs
, c
on
st
ru
ct
 o
r 
ex
pa
nd
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 fa
ci
lit
ie
s, 
or
 c
ar
ry
 
ou
t r
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t i
n 
its
 te
rr
ito
ry
.”
11
7  
 O
th
er
 m
od
el
 tr
ea
tie
s 
go
 f
ur
th
er
 to
 a
llo
w
 th
e 
ho
st 
co
un
try
 to
 im
po
se
 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
qu
ot
as
 f
or
 i
ts 
na
tio
na
ls 
in
 F
D
I 
pr
oj
e c
ts.
 T
he
 S
A
D
C 
M
od
el
 B
IT
, f
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
th
at
 “
a 
St
at
e 
Pa
rty
 m
ay
 r
eq
ui
re
 
an
 I
nv
es
to
r 
of
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
Pa
rt
y 
or
 it
s 
In
ve
st
m
en
t, 
in
 k
ee
pi
ng
 w
ith
 it
s 
si
ze
 a
nd
 n
at
ur
e,
 t
o 
ha
ve
 p
ro
gr
es
siv
e 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 t
he
 n
um
be
r 
of
 
se
ni
or
 m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
or
 s
pe
ci
al
ize
d 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
po
sit
io
ns
 
th
at
 n
at
io
na
ls
 o
f t
he
 H
os
t S
ta
te
 o
cc
up
y;
 in
sti
tu
te
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 p
ro
gr
am
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
pu
rp
os
es
 o
f a
ch
ie
vi
ng
 th
e 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
se
t o
ut
 in
 th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
an
d 
to
 B
oa
rd
 o
f 
D
ire
ct
or
 p
os
iti
on
s;
 a
nd
 t
o 
es
ta
bl
ish
 
m
en
to
rin
g 
pr
og
ra
m
s f
or
 th
is 
pu
rp
os
e.
”1
18
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
11
3  I
d.
 a
t a
rt.
 1
7(
2)
. 
11
4  U
N
CT
A
D
, F
or
ei
gn
 D
ire
ct
 In
ve
st
m
en
t a
nd
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
: N
ew
 E
vi
de
nc
e 
Fr
om
 S
el
ec
te
d 
Co
un
tri
es
 §
 U
N
CT
A
D
/IT
E/
II
A
/2
00
3/
7,
 a
t 2
 (U
N
CT
A
D
 
ed
., 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 2
00
3)
. 
11
5  S
ee
 A
rti
cl
es
 II
I a
nd
 X
I o
f t
he
 G
en
er
al
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t o
n 
Ta
rif
fs
 a
nd
 T
ra
de
 (G
A
TT
) (
19
47
). 
 
11
6  A
 M
od
el
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l I
nv
es
tm
en
t A
gr
ee
m
en
t f
or
 th
e 
Pr
om
ot
io
n 
of
 S
us
ta
in
ab
le
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 2
 (K
on
ra
d 
vo
n 
M
ol
tk
e 
ed
., 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l I
ns
tit
ut
e 
fo
r S
us
ta
in
ab
le
 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 2
00
4)
. 
11
7  A
rti
cl
e 
8.
5(
3)
 o
f t
he
 C
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 T
ra
de
 a
nd
 E
co
no
m
ic
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
Ca
na
da
 a
nd
 th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
on
 (2
01
6)
. 
11
8  A
rti
cl
e 
7.
4 
of
 th
e 
SA
D
C 
M
od
el
 B
ila
te
ra
l I
nv
es
tm
en
t T
re
at
y 
Te
m
pl
at
e 
w
ith
 C
om
m
en
ta
ry
 (C
om
m
un
ity
 e
d.
,  
20
12
). 
29
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Ta
bl
e (
2)
: P
ro
po
se
d 
M
od
el
 B
IT
 fo
r J
or
da
n 
A
rt
ic
le
 
Su
gg
es
te
d 
D
ra
ft 
fo
r t
he
 J
or
da
n 
M
od
el
 B
IT
 
Tr
ea
ty
 
Pr
ea
m
bl
e 
D
es
iri
ng
 to
 st
re
ng
th
en
 th
e 
bo
nd
s o
f f
rie
nd
sh
ip
 a
nd
 c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
St
at
e 
Pa
rti
es
; 
 A
ck
no
w
le
dg
in
g 
th
e 
im
po
rta
nc
e 
of
 In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 th
ei
r c
on
tri
bu
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t o
f t
he
 P
ar
tie
s, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
re
du
ct
io
n 
of
 p
ov
er
ty
, i
nc
re
as
e 
of
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
e 
ca
pa
ci
ty
, e
co
no
m
ic
 g
ro
w
th
, t
he
 tr
an
sf
er
 o
f t
ec
hn
ol
og
y,
 a
nd
 th
e 
fu
rth
er
an
ce
 o
f 
hu
m
an
 ri
gh
ts
 a
nd
 h
um
an
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t; 
 Se
ek
in
g 
to
 p
ro
m
ot
e,
 e
nc
ou
ra
ge
 a
nd
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
ve
st
m
en
t o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s t
ha
t e
nh
an
ce
 e
co
no
m
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
nd
 g
ro
w
th
 w
ith
in
 
th
e 
te
rri
to
rie
s o
f t
he
 P
ar
tie
s; 
 Re
co
gn
iz
in
g 
th
at
 th
e 
pr
om
ot
io
n 
of
 In
ve
st
m
en
t r
eq
ui
re
s c
o-
op
er
at
iv
e 
ef
fo
rts
 b
y 
In
ve
st
or
s a
nd
 b
ot
h 
Co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
Pa
rti
es
, w
he
th
er
 
th
e 
H
os
t P
ar
ty
 to
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 o
r t
he
 H
om
e 
Pa
rty
 o
f I
nv
es
to
rs
; 
 U
nd
er
sta
nd
in
g 
th
at
 su
sta
in
ab
le
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t r
eq
ui
re
s t
he
 fu
lfi
llm
en
t o
f t
he
 e
co
no
m
ic
, s
oc
ia
l a
nd
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l p
ill
ar
s t
ha
t a
re
 
em
be
dd
ed
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
co
nc
ep
t; 
 
 Re
af
fir
m
in
g 
th
e 
in
he
re
nt
 ri
gh
t o
f t
he
 S
ta
te
 P
ar
tie
s 
to
 re
gu
la
te
 a
nd
 to
 in
tro
du
ce
 n
ew
 m
ea
su
re
s 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 th
ei
r 
te
rri
to
rie
s 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 t
he
ir 
la
w
s 
an
d 
in
 o
rd
er
 t
o 
m
ee
t 
na
tio
na
l 
po
lic
y 
go
al
s, 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
, 
an
d 
fa
ce
 
em
er
ge
nc
ie
s, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
rig
ht
 to
 c
ha
ng
e 
th
e 
co
nd
iti
on
s a
pp
lic
ab
le
 to
 su
ch
 In
ve
st
m
en
ts
; 
 Re
co
gn
iz
in
g 
th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 in
 th
e 
le
ve
ls
 o
f d
ev
el
op
m
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
Pa
rti
es
, a
nd
 h
en
ce
 th
e 
as
ym
m
et
rie
s 
w
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 
an
y 
m
ea
su
re
s c
ur
re
nt
ly
 in
 p
la
ce
; 
 Se
ek
in
g 
an
 o
ve
ra
ll 
ba
la
nc
e 
of
 t
he
 r
ig
ht
s 
an
d 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 a
m
on
g 
th
e 
Pa
rti
es
, t
he
 I
nv
es
to
rs
, a
nd
 t
he
 I
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 u
nd
er
 t
hi
s 
Tr
ea
ty
; 
 A
gr
ee
in
g 
th
at
 t
he
se
 o
bj
ec
tiv
es
 c
an
 b
e 
ac
hi
ev
ed
 w
ith
ou
t 
re
la
xi
ng
 h
ea
lth
, 
sa
fe
ty
 a
nd
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
m
ea
su
re
s 
of
 g
en
er
al
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n;
 
 D
et
er
m
in
ed
 to
 p
re
ve
nt
 a
nd
 c
om
ba
t c
or
ru
pt
io
n,
 a
nd
 p
ro
m
ot
e 
co
rp
or
at
e 
so
ci
al
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 a
nd
 a
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
; 
 
29
7 
Th
e 
Pa
rti
es
 o
f t
hi
s T
re
at
y 
ha
ve
 a
gr
ee
d 
to
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g:
 
  
Tr
ea
ty
 
O
bj
ec
tiv
es
 
Th
e 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
of
 th
is
 T
re
at
y 
is
 to
 s
tim
ul
at
e,
 e
nc
ou
ra
ge
, a
nd
 in
cr
ea
se
 th
e 
flo
w
 o
f I
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 th
at
 c
on
tri
bu
te
 to
, a
nd
 s
up
po
rt,
 
th
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t o
f e
ac
h 
Pa
rty
, i
n 
pa
rti
cu
la
r t
he
 H
os
t P
ar
ty
 w
he
re
 th
e 
In
ve
st
m
en
t i
s l
oc
at
ed
. 
 
Tr
ea
ty
 
Sc
op
e 
1.
 
Th
is
 T
re
at
y 
ap
pl
ie
s t
o 
m
ea
su
re
s a
do
pt
ed
 o
r m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
by
 th
e 
Pa
rti
es
 re
la
tin
g 
to
: 
 
i. 
In
ve
st
or
s, 
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 in
 th
is 
Tr
ea
ty
; a
nd
 
 
ii.
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
, a
s d
ef
in
ed
 th
is 
Tr
ea
ty
. 
 2.
 
Re
ga
rd
in
g 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 t
hi
s 
Tr
ea
ty
 t
o 
in
ve
stm
en
ts
, 
th
is 
Tr
ea
ty
 a
pp
lie
s 
to
 I
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 t
ha
t 
ar
e 
m
ad
e 
an
d 
m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
in
 g
oo
d 
fa
ith
 a
nd
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 H
os
t P
ar
ty
 la
w
s 
an
d 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
, w
he
th
er
 th
es
e 
In
ve
stm
en
ts
 w
er
e 
m
ad
e 
be
fo
re
 o
r a
fte
r s
ig
na
tu
re
 d
at
e 
of
 th
is 
Tr
ea
ty
. 
 3.
 
Th
is
 T
re
at
y 
do
es
 n
ot
 b
in
d 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 in
 re
la
tio
n 
to
 a
ny
 a
ct
 o
r f
ac
t t
ha
t t
oo
k 
pl
ac
e 
or
 a
ny
 si
tu
at
io
n 
th
at
 c
ea
se
d 
to
 e
xi
st 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f s
ig
na
tu
re
 o
f t
hi
s T
re
at
y.
 
 4.
 
Fo
r g
re
at
er
 c
er
ta
in
ty
, t
hi
s T
re
at
y 
pr
ov
id
es
 o
nl
y 
po
st 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
an
d 
do
es
 n
ot
 c
ov
er
 th
e 
pr
e-
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t 
ph
as
e 
or
 m
at
te
rs
 o
f m
ar
ke
t a
cc
es
s u
nl
es
s w
he
re
 e
xp
lic
itl
y 
pr
ov
id
ed
 o
th
er
w
ise
 in
 th
is
 T
re
at
y 
an
d 
its
 a
tta
ch
ed
 A
nn
ex
es
. 
 5.
 
Th
is
 T
re
at
y 
sh
al
l a
pp
ly
 to
 In
ve
st
m
en
ts 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 a
ut
ho
rit
y 
of
 th
e 
H
os
t P
ar
ty
, i
f 
so
 re
qu
ire
d 
by
 it
s 
la
w
s a
nd
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
, a
nd
 m
ad
e 
pr
io
r t
o 
or
 a
fte
r t
he
 si
gn
at
ur
e 
da
te
 o
f t
hi
s T
re
at
y.
 
 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
Th
e 
te
rm
 “
In
ve
st
m
en
t”
 m
ea
ns
: a
ny
 k
in
d 
of
 a
ss
et
 o
w
ne
d 
or
 c
on
tro
lle
d 
in
 g
oo
d 
fa
ith
 b
y 
an
 In
ve
st
or
 in
 th
e 
Te
rri
to
ry
 o
f t
he
 o
th
er
 
Pa
rty
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
la
tte
r’s
 a
pp
lic
ab
le
 la
w
s, 
an
d 
w
hi
ch
 is
 u
se
d 
by
 th
e 
In
ve
st
or
 in
 th
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 a
nd
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 
bu
si
ne
ss
 p
ro
je
ct
, a
nd
 h
as
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s: 
 
a)
 
th
e 
co
m
m
itm
en
t o
f c
ap
ita
l a
nd
 o
th
er
 re
so
ur
ce
s; 
an
d 
 
b)
 
th
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
n 
of
 g
ai
n 
or
 p
ro
fit
; a
nd
 
 
c)
 
th
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
of
 ri
sk
 fo
r t
he
 In
ve
st
or
; a
nd
 
 
d)
 
a 
re
as
on
ab
le
 d
ur
at
io
n;
 a
nd
 
29
8 
 e)
 
ha
s s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 to
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f t
he
 P
ar
ty
 w
he
re
 it
 is
 lo
ca
te
d.
 
 1.
 
Fo
r p
ur
po
se
s o
f t
hi
s T
re
at
y,
 a
nd
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
th
at
 it
 sa
tis
fie
s t
he
 a
bo
ve
, a
n 
In
ve
st
m
en
t i
nc
lu
de
s: 
 
i. 
sh
ar
es
, s
to
ck
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 fo
rm
s o
f e
qu
ity
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
in
 a
n 
en
te
rp
ris
e;
 
 
ii.
 
bo
nd
s, 
de
be
nt
ur
es
, l
oa
ns
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 fo
rm
s o
f d
eb
t i
ns
tru
m
en
ts
 th
at
 h
av
e 
a 
m
at
ur
ity
 d
at
e 
of
 th
re
e 
ye
ar
s o
r 
m
or
e;
 
 
iii
. 
ta
ng
ib
le
 p
ro
pe
rty
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 r
ea
l 
pr
op
er
ty
; 
an
d 
in
ta
ng
ib
le
 p
ro
pe
rty
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 r
ig
ht
s, 
su
ch
 a
s 
le
as
es
, 
m
or
tg
ag
es
, l
ie
ns
 a
nd
 p
le
dg
es
 o
n 
re
al
 p
ro
pe
rty
; 
 
iv
. 
rig
ht
s c
on
fe
rre
d 
pu
rs
ua
nt
 to
 la
w
, s
uc
h 
as
 li
ce
ns
es
 a
nd
 p
er
m
its
; 
 
v.
 
in
te
lle
ct
ua
l p
ro
pe
rty
 ri
gh
ts;
 
 2.
 
H
ow
ev
er
, a
n 
In
ve
st
m
en
t d
oe
s n
ot
 in
cl
ud
e:
 
 
i. 
an
y 
in
te
re
st 
in
 d
eb
t s
ec
ur
iti
es
 is
su
ed
 b
y 
a 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t o
r g
ov
er
nm
en
t- 
ow
ne
d 
or
 c
on
tro
lle
d 
en
te
rp
ris
e,
 
or
 lo
an
s t
o 
a 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t o
r g
ov
er
nm
en
t o
w
ne
d 
or
 c
on
tro
lle
d 
en
te
rp
ris
e;
 
 
ii.
 
an
y 
pr
e-
op
er
at
io
na
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 r
el
at
in
g 
to
 a
dm
is
si
on
, e
st
ab
lis
hm
en
t, 
ac
qu
isi
tio
n 
or
 e
xp
an
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
In
ve
st
m
en
t t
ha
t i
s i
nc
ur
re
d 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
co
m
m
en
ce
m
en
t o
f s
ub
sta
nt
ia
l a
nd
 re
al
 b
us
in
es
s o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
in
 t
he
 H
os
t 
Pa
rty
, 
ex
ce
pt
 i
n 
th
e 
de
sig
na
te
d 
ec
on
om
ic
 s
ec
to
rs
 i
n 
A
nn
ex
 I
 (
In
ce
nt
iv
iz
ed
 
Se
ct
or
s)
 o
f t
hi
s T
re
at
y;
11
9  
 
iii
. 
po
rtf
ol
io
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts:
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 in
 th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f a
cq
ui
si
tio
n 
of
 sh
ar
es
 o
r v
ot
in
g 
po
w
er
 a
m
ou
nt
in
g 
to
, o
r 
re
pr
es
en
tin
g 
le
ss
, t
ha
n 
(1
0%
) t
en
 p
er
ce
nt
 o
f a
 c
om
pa
ny
 th
ro
ug
h 
st
oc
k 
ex
ch
an
ge
s; 
 
iv
. 
cl
ai
m
s t
o 
m
on
ey
 th
at
 a
ris
e 
so
le
ly
 fr
om
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
 c
on
tra
ct
s f
or
 th
e 
sa
le
 o
f g
oo
ds
 o
r s
er
vi
ce
s; 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
11
9  T
he
 A
nn
ex
 sh
ou
ld
 st
ip
ul
at
e 
th
at
 In
ve
st
m
en
ts 
in
 th
e 
en
er
gy
 a
nd
 w
at
er
 se
ct
or
s (
in
 Jo
rd
an
) e
nj
oy
 p
re
-e
sta
bl
is
hm
en
t r
ig
ht
s a
nd
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n.
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9 
v.
 
G
oo
dw
ill
, b
ra
nd
 v
al
ue
, m
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
 o
r s
im
ila
r i
nt
an
gi
bl
e 
rig
ht
s; 
 
vi
. 
cl
ai
m
s 
to
 m
on
ey
 t
ha
t 
ar
ise
 s
ol
el
y 
fr
om
 t
he
 e
xt
en
sio
n 
of
 c
re
di
t 
in
 c
on
ne
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 a
ny
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
 
tra
ns
ac
tio
n 
re
fe
rre
d 
to
 in
 (v
) a
bo
ve
; 
 
vi
i. 
an
y 
in
te
lle
ct
ua
l p
ro
pe
rty
 ri
gh
ts
 b
el
on
gi
ng
 to
 a
n 
In
ve
st
or
 th
at
 a
re
 n
ot
 u
se
d 
in
 th
e 
In
ve
st
m
en
t; 
 
vi
ii.
 
an
 o
rd
er
 o
r 
ju
dg
m
en
t 
so
ug
ht
 o
r 
en
te
re
d 
in
 a
ny
 j
ud
ic
ia
l, 
re
gu
la
to
ry
, 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tiv
e,
 o
r 
ar
bi
tra
l 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
; 
 
ix
. 
an
y 
ot
he
r 
cl
ai
m
s 
to
 m
on
ey
 t
ha
t 
do
 n
ot
 i
nv
ol
ve
 t
he
 k
in
d 
of
 i
nt
er
es
ts 
or
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 s
et
 o
ut
 i
n 
th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f I
nv
es
tm
en
t i
n 
th
is 
Tr
ea
ty
. 
 3.
 
Th
e 
te
rm
 “
in
ve
st
m
en
t”
 s
ha
ll 
in
cl
ud
e 
re
in
ve
st
m
en
t (
in
ve
st
m
en
t o
f t
he
 p
ro
ce
ed
s 
of
 th
e 
in
iti
al
 in
ve
stm
en
t) 
an
d 
ch
an
ge
 in
 
th
e 
fo
rm
 o
f i
nv
es
tm
en
t (
al
te
ra
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
fo
rm
 in
 w
hi
ch
 a
ss
et
s a
re
 in
ve
ste
d)
, p
ro
vi
de
d 
th
at
 th
e 
ne
w
 in
ve
stm
en
t m
ee
ts
 th
e 
ab
ov
e 
cr
ite
ria
 a
nd
 is
 d
on
e 
is 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 th
e 
la
w
s o
f t
he
 H
os
t P
ar
ty
. 
  
D
ef
in
iti
on
 o
f 
In
ve
st
or
 
Th
e 
te
rm
 “
In
ve
st
or
” 
m
ea
ns
: a
ny
 n
at
ur
al
 o
r l
eg
al
 p
er
so
n 
fr
om
 o
ne
 P
ar
ty
 th
at
 h
as
 m
ad
e 
an
 In
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
Te
rri
to
ry
 o
f t
he
 
ot
he
r 
Pa
rty
, 
on
 t
he
 d
at
e 
w
he
n 
an
y 
br
ea
ch
 o
f 
th
is
 T
re
at
y 
is
 a
lle
ge
d 
an
d 
on
 t
he
 d
at
e 
w
he
n 
th
e 
cl
ai
m
 w
as
 s
ub
m
itt
ed
 t
o 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n.
 
 1.
 
a 
na
tu
ra
l p
er
so
n 
m
ea
ns
: a
 p
er
so
n 
ho
ld
in
g 
th
e 
na
tio
na
lit
y 
of
 th
e 
H
om
e 
Pa
rty
, i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 th
e 
la
tte
r’s
 d
om
es
tic
 
la
w
s 
in
 t
hi
s 
re
ga
rd
. 
N
at
ur
al
 p
er
so
ns
 w
ho
 h
ol
d 
du
al
 n
at
io
na
lit
ie
s 
sh
al
l 
be
 d
ee
m
ed
 n
at
io
na
ls 
of
 t
he
ir 
do
m
in
an
t 
an
d 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
na
tio
na
lit
y,
 b
ut
 a
 d
ua
l n
at
io
na
l w
ho
 h
ol
ds
 th
e 
na
tio
na
lit
y 
of
 th
e 
H
os
t P
ar
ty
 sh
al
l n
ot
, i
n 
an
y 
ca
se
, b
e 
de
em
ed
 a
n 
In
ve
st
or
 fo
r p
ur
po
se
s o
f t
hi
s T
re
at
y.
  
 2.
 
a 
le
ga
l p
er
so
n:
 is
 a
n 
en
tit
y 
du
ly
 c
on
sti
tu
te
d 
or
 o
rg
an
iz
ed
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
la
w
s o
f t
he
 H
om
e 
Pa
rty
, a
nd
: 
 
i. 
ha
s 
its
 r
eg
ist
er
ed
 o
ffi
ce
, c
en
tra
l 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tio
n 
or
 p
rin
ci
pa
l 
pl
ac
e 
of
 b
us
in
es
s 
in
 t
he
 t
er
rit
or
y 
of
 t
he
 
H
om
e 
Pa
rty
; a
nd
 
 
ii.
 
is
 o
w
ne
d 
or
 c
on
tro
lle
d 
by
 a
 N
at
ur
al
 P
er
so
n 
or
 a
 le
ga
l e
nt
ity
 o
f t
he
 H
om
e 
Pa
rty
; a
nd
 
 
iii
. 
co
nd
uc
ts
 r
ea
l 
an
d 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l 
bu
sin
es
s 
op
er
at
io
ns
 i
n 
th
e 
H
om
e 
Pa
rty
. 
Fo
r 
th
is 
pu
rp
os
e,
 s
ub
sta
nt
ia
l 
bu
si
ne
ss
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 a
re
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
 b
as
ed
 o
n:
 
30
0 
 
a.
 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f i
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
H
om
e 
Pa
rty
;  
b.
 
th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f j
ob
s c
re
at
ed
 in
 th
e 
H
om
e 
Pa
rty
;  
c.
 
th
e 
le
ng
th
 o
f t
im
e 
th
e 
le
ga
l p
er
so
n 
ha
s b
ee
n 
in
 o
pe
ra
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
H
om
e 
Pa
rty
. 
 3.
 
so
ve
re
ig
n 
w
ea
lth
 f
un
ds
, g
ov
er
nm
en
t o
w
ne
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
, a
nd
 n
ot
-fo
r-p
ro
fit
 e
nt
iti
es
 o
f 
on
e 
Pa
rty
 in
ve
sti
ng
 in
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
Pa
rty
’s
 T
er
rit
or
y 
ar
e 
de
em
ed
 In
ve
st
or
s 
fo
r p
ur
po
se
s 
of
 th
is 
Tr
ea
ty
, p
ro
vi
de
d 
th
at
 th
ey
 o
bt
ai
n 
th
e 
pr
io
r w
rit
te
n 
ap
pr
ov
al
 
of
 th
e 
H
os
t P
ar
ty
 b
ef
or
e 
co
nd
uc
tin
g 
an
y 
In
ve
st
m
en
t a
ct
iv
iti
es
. 
 4.
 
a 
le
ga
l p
er
so
n 
is
 d
ee
m
ed
 to
 b
e 
“c
on
tro
lle
d”
 b
y 
an
 In
ve
st
or
 if
 th
e 
la
tte
r h
as
 th
e 
rig
ht
 to
 a
pp
oi
nt
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f t
he
 d
ire
ct
or
s 
or
 s
en
io
r 
m
an
ag
em
en
t o
ffi
ci
al
s 
or
 to
 c
on
tro
l t
he
 m
an
ag
em
en
t o
r 
po
lic
y 
de
ci
si
on
s 
of
 s
uc
h 
le
ga
l p
er
so
n,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
by
 
vi
rtu
e 
of
 th
ei
r s
ha
re
ho
ld
in
g,
 m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
pa
rtn
er
sh
ip
 o
r o
th
er
 le
ga
l r
ig
ht
s 
or
 b
y 
vi
rtu
e 
of
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
ag
re
em
en
ts
 o
r 
vo
tin
g 
ag
re
em
en
ts
 o
r p
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 o
r a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 o
f s
im
ila
r n
at
ur
e.
 
 5.
 
a 
le
ga
l p
er
so
n 
is 
de
em
ed
 to
 b
e 
“o
w
ne
d”
 b
y 
an
 In
ve
st
or
 if
 th
e 
la
tte
r o
w
ns
 m
or
e 
th
an
 (5
0%
) f
ift
y 
pe
rc
en
t o
f t
he
 c
ap
ita
l o
r 
fu
nd
s 
or
 c
on
tri
bu
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
le
ga
l p
er
so
n,
 o
r b
y 
ot
he
r c
om
pa
ni
es
 o
r e
nt
iti
es
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 u
lti
m
at
el
y 
ow
ne
d 
an
d 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
by
 th
e 
In
ve
st
or
. 
N
at
io
na
l 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
(N
T)
 
1.
 
Ea
ch
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
ac
co
rd
 In
ve
st
or
s, 
an
d 
th
ei
r I
nv
es
tm
en
ts
, t
re
at
m
en
t t
ha
t i
s 
no
t l
es
s 
fa
vo
ra
bl
e 
th
an
 th
at
 a
cc
or
de
d,
 in
 li
ke
 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s, 
to
 i
nv
es
tm
en
ts 
of
 i
ts 
ow
n 
in
ve
st
or
s 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 i
ts 
la
w
s 
an
d 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 i
n 
re
la
tio
n 
to
 t
he
 
ex
pa
ns
io
n,
 m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
co
nd
uc
t, 
op
er
at
io
n 
an
d 
sa
le
 o
r 
ot
he
r 
di
sp
os
iti
on
 o
f 
an
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t 
by
 a
n 
In
ve
st
or
 i
n 
its
 
Te
rri
to
ry
. F
or
 g
re
at
er
 c
er
ta
in
ty
, t
he
 te
rm
 “
ex
pa
ns
io
n”
 in
 th
is 
A
rti
cl
e 
sh
al
l n
ot
 in
cl
ud
e 
th
e 
es
ta
bl
ish
m
en
t o
r a
cq
ui
sit
io
n 
of
 
an
 in
ve
stm
en
t. 
 2.
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
se
ct
or
s d
es
ig
na
te
d 
in
 A
nn
ex
 1
 o
f t
hi
s T
re
at
y 
sh
al
l e
nj
oy
 n
at
io
na
l t
re
at
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
pr
e-
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t, 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t, 
an
d 
ac
qu
isi
tio
n 
sta
ge
s. 
 
 3.
 
Fo
r g
re
at
er
 c
er
ta
in
ty
, r
ef
er
en
ce
s 
to
 “
lik
e 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s”
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
 o
f t
hi
s 
A
rti
cl
e 
re
qu
ire
s 
an
 o
ve
ra
ll 
ex
am
in
at
io
n 
on
 a
 c
as
e-
by
-c
as
e 
ba
si
s o
f a
ll 
th
e 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s o
f a
n 
In
ve
st
m
en
t i
nc
lu
di
ng
, b
ut
 n
ot
 li
m
ite
d 
to
: 
 
i. 
its
 e
ffe
ct
s o
n 
th
ird
 p
er
so
n 
an
d 
th
e 
lo
ca
l c
om
m
un
ity
; 
 
ii.
 
its
 e
ffe
ct
s 
on
 t
he
 l
oc
al
, 
re
gi
on
al
 o
r 
na
tio
na
l 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 a
ll 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 w
ith
in
 a
 ju
ris
di
ct
io
n 
on
 th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t; 
 
iii
. 
th
e 
se
ct
or
 in
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
In
ve
st
or
 is
 in
; 
 
30
1 
iv
. 
th
e 
ai
m
 o
f t
he
 m
ea
su
re
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
; 
 v.
 
th
e 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 p
ro
ce
ss
 g
en
er
al
ly
 a
pp
lie
d 
in
 re
la
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
; 
 
vi
. 
ot
he
r f
ac
to
rs
 d
ire
ct
ly
 re
la
tin
g 
to
 th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t o
r i
nv
es
to
r i
n 
re
la
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
; 
 Th
e 
ex
am
in
at
io
n 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 th
is 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
sh
al
l n
ot
 b
e 
lim
ite
d 
to
 o
r b
e 
bi
as
ed
 to
w
ar
d 
an
y 
on
e 
fa
ct
or
. 
 4.
 
Th
e 
tre
at
m
en
t p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r 
in
 th
is
 A
rti
cl
e 
sh
al
l n
ot
 o
bl
ig
e 
th
e 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 to
 a
cc
or
d 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 o
f 
In
ve
st
or
s 
of
 th
e 
ot
he
r P
ar
ty
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
tre
at
m
en
t t
ha
t i
t a
cc
or
ds
 to
 in
ve
stm
en
ts
 o
f i
ts
 o
w
n 
in
ve
sto
rs
 w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
: 
 
i. 
an
y 
In
ve
st
or
 o
r 
In
ve
st
m
en
t t
ha
t i
s 
no
t i
n 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 th
is
 T
re
at
y,
 o
r 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 
la
w
s a
nd
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 H
os
t P
ar
ty
; o
r 
 
ii.
 
an
y 
su
bs
id
ie
s, 
pr
iv
ile
ge
s, 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
, r
ig
ht
s, 
or
 p
re
fe
re
nt
ia
l t
re
at
m
en
t g
iv
en
 to
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 o
f i
nv
es
to
rs
 
in
 th
e 
ag
ric
ul
tu
re
 se
ct
or
 a
nd
 th
e 
se
ct
or
s p
ro
vi
de
d 
in
 A
nn
ex
 I 
of
 th
is 
Tr
ea
ty
; o
r 
 
iii
. 
an
y 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ad
op
te
d 
or
 m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 t
o 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
 o
nl
y 
fo
r 
th
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
 p
ro
m
ot
in
g,
 
en
co
ur
ag
in
g,
 a
nd
 s
af
eg
ua
rd
in
g 
sm
al
l 
an
d 
m
ed
iu
m
 s
iz
ed
 e
nt
er
pr
ise
s 
an
d 
in
fa
nt
 i
nd
us
tri
es
 i
n 
its
 
Te
rri
to
ry
; o
r 
 
iv
. 
an
y 
ex
is
tin
g 
no
n-
co
nf
or
m
in
g 
m
ea
su
re
 s
tip
ul
at
ed
 i
n 
A
nn
ex
 I
I 
(N
on
-C
on
fo
rm
in
g 
M
ea
su
re
s)
 o
f 
th
is
 
Tr
ea
ty
;12
0  o
r 
 
v.
 
an
y 
ac
tu
al
 o
r f
ut
ur
e 
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 a
cc
or
de
d 
by
 e
ith
er
 P
ar
ty
 b
y 
vi
rtu
e 
of
 it
s 
cu
rr
en
t o
r f
ut
ur
e 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
of
, o
r a
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
w
ith
 a
 c
us
to
m
s, 
ec
on
om
ic
 o
r m
on
et
ar
y 
un
io
n,
 a
 c
om
m
on
 m
ar
ke
t o
r a
 fr
ee
 tr
ad
e 
ar
ea
; 
to
 in
ve
stm
en
ts
 o
r i
nv
es
to
rs
 o
f i
ts
 o
w
n;
 o
r 
 
vi
. 
an
y 
m
at
te
r r
el
at
in
g 
w
ho
lly
 o
r p
ar
tia
lly
 to
 ta
xa
tio
n;
 o
r 
 
vi
i. 
an
y 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ta
ke
n 
in
 p
ur
su
it 
of
 a
 le
gi
tim
at
e 
pu
bl
ic
 p
ol
ic
y 
go
al
, d
ev
el
op
m
en
t o
bj
ec
tiv
e,
 o
r 
to
 f
ac
e 
a 
na
tio
na
l o
r i
nt
er
na
tio
na
l e
m
er
ge
nc
y,
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
th
at
 s
uc
h 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ar
e 
no
t t
ak
en
 in
 a
n 
ar
bi
tra
ry
 a
nd
/o
r 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
12
0  A
nn
ex
 II
 sh
ou
ld
 st
ip
ul
at
e 
th
e 
m
ea
su
re
s t
ha
t b
re
ac
h 
th
e 
N
T 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
un
de
r t
he
 T
re
at
y,
 h
ow
ev
er
 Jo
rd
an
 w
is
he
s t
o 
m
ai
nt
ai
n 
fo
r a
ny
 re
as
on
. 
30
2 
di
sc
rim
in
at
or
y 
m
an
ne
r a
nd
 a
re
 ju
sti
fie
d 
by
 s
ho
w
in
g 
th
at
 th
ey
 b
ea
r a
 re
as
on
ab
le
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
to
 ra
tio
na
l 
po
lic
ie
s a
nd
 o
bj
ec
tiv
es
. 
 
M
os
t-F
av
or
ed
-
N
at
io
n 
(M
FN
) 
1.
 
Ea
ch
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
ac
co
rd
 In
ve
st
or
s, 
an
d 
th
ei
r I
nv
es
tm
en
ts
, t
re
at
m
en
t t
ha
t i
s 
no
t l
es
s 
fa
vo
ra
bl
e 
th
an
 th
at
 a
cc
or
de
d,
 in
 li
ke
 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s, 
to
 i
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 o
f 
th
ird
 s
ta
te
 i
nv
es
to
rs
 i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 i
ts
 l
aw
s 
an
d 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 i
n 
re
la
tio
n 
to
 t
he
 
ex
pa
ns
io
n,
 m
a n
ag
em
en
t, 
co
nd
uc
t, 
op
er
at
io
n 
an
d 
sa
le
 o
r 
ot
he
r 
di
sp
os
iti
on
 o
f 
an
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t 
by
 a
n 
In
ve
st
or
 i
n 
its
 
Te
rri
to
ry
. F
or
 g
re
at
er
 c
er
ta
in
ty
, t
he
 te
rm
 “
ex
pa
ns
io
n”
 in
 th
is 
A
rti
cl
e 
sh
al
l n
ot
 in
cl
ud
e 
th
e 
es
ta
bl
ish
m
en
t o
r a
cq
ui
sit
io
n 
of
 
an
 in
ve
stm
en
t. 
 2.
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
se
ct
or
s 
de
si
gn
at
ed
 in
 A
nn
ex
 1
 o
f t
hi
s 
Tr
ea
ty
 s
ha
ll 
en
jo
y 
m
os
t-f
av
or
ed
-n
at
io
n 
tre
at
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
pr
e-
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t, 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t, 
an
d 
ac
qu
isi
tio
n 
sta
ge
s. 
 3.
 
Fo
r g
re
at
er
 c
er
ta
in
ty
, r
ef
er
en
ce
s 
to
 “
lik
e 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s”
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
 o
f t
hi
s 
A
rti
cl
e 
re
qu
ire
s 
an
 o
ve
ra
ll 
ex
am
in
at
io
n 
on
 a
 c
as
e-
by
-c
as
e 
ba
sis
 o
f a
ll 
th
e 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s 
of
 a
n 
In
ve
st
m
en
t i
nc
lu
di
ng
, b
ut
 n
ot
 li
m
ite
d 
to
 th
e 
cr
ite
ria
 s
tip
ul
at
ed
 in
 
A
rti
cl
e 
(N
at
io
na
l T
re
at
m
en
t)(
3)
 a
bo
ve
. 
 4.
 
Th
e 
tre
at
m
en
t p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r 
in
 th
is
 A
rti
cl
e 
sh
al
l n
ot
 o
bl
ig
e 
th
e 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 to
 a
cc
or
d 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 o
f 
In
ve
st
or
s 
of
 th
e 
ot
he
r P
ar
ty
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
tre
at
m
en
t t
ha
t i
t a
cc
or
ds
 to
 th
ird
 st
at
e 
in
ve
st
or
s a
nd
 th
ei
r i
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
: 
 
i. 
an
y 
bi
la
te
ra
l o
r 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t o
r 
tre
at
y 
th
at
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
be
tte
r 
tre
at
m
en
t t
o 
th
ird
 s
ta
te
 in
ve
st
or
s 
an
d 
th
ei
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 if
 s
uc
h 
ag
re
em
en
t o
r 
tre
at
y 
is 
en
te
re
d 
in
to
 b
y 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
si
gn
at
ur
e 
da
te
 o
f t
hi
s T
re
at
y;
 
  
ii.
 
an
y 
In
ve
st
or
 o
r 
In
ve
st
m
en
t t
ha
t i
s 
no
t i
n 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 th
is
 T
re
at
y,
 o
r 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 
la
w
s a
nd
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 H
os
t P
ar
ty
; o
r 
 
iii
. 
an
y 
su
bs
id
ie
s, 
pr
iv
ile
ge
s, 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
, r
ig
ht
s, 
or
 p
re
fe
re
nt
ia
l t
re
at
m
en
t g
iv
en
 to
 th
ird
 s
ta
te
 in
ve
st
or
s 
an
d 
th
ei
r i
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
ag
ric
ul
tu
re
 se
ct
or
 a
nd
 th
e 
se
ct
or
s p
ro
vi
de
d 
in
 A
nn
ex
 I 
of
 th
is
 T
re
at
y;
 o
r 
 
iv
. 
an
y 
ex
is
tin
g 
no
n-
co
nf
or
m
in
g 
m
ea
su
re
 s
tip
ul
at
ed
 i
n 
A
nn
ex
 I
I 
(N
on
-C
on
fo
rm
in
g 
M
ea
su
re
s)
 o
f 
th
is
 
Tr
ea
ty
; o
r 
 
v.
 
an
y 
ac
tu
al
 o
r f
ut
ur
e 
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 a
cc
or
de
d 
by
 e
ith
er
 P
ar
ty
 b
y 
vi
rtu
e 
of
 it
s 
cu
rr
en
t o
r f
ut
ur
e 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
of
, o
r a
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
w
ith
 a
 c
us
to
m
s, 
ec
on
om
ic
 o
r m
on
et
ar
y 
un
io
n,
 a
 c
om
m
on
 m
ar
ke
t o
r a
 fr
ee
 tr
ad
e 
ar
ea
; 
to
 th
ird
 st
at
e 
in
ve
stm
en
ts
 o
r i
nv
es
to
rs
; o
r 
 
30
3 
vi
. 
an
y 
m
at
te
r r
el
at
in
g 
w
ho
lly
 o
r p
ar
tia
lly
 to
 ta
xa
tio
n;
 o
r 
 
vi
i. 
an
y 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ta
ke
n 
in
 p
ur
su
it 
of
 a
 le
gi
tim
at
e 
pu
bl
ic
 p
ol
ic
y 
go
al
, d
ev
el
op
m
en
t o
bj
ec
tiv
e,
 o
r 
to
 f
ac
e 
a 
na
tio
na
l o
r i
nt
er
na
tio
na
l e
m
er
ge
nc
y,
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
th
at
 s
uc
h 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ar
e 
no
t t
ak
en
 in
 a
n 
ar
bi
tra
ry
 a
nd
/o
r 
di
sc
rim
in
at
or
y 
m
an
ne
r a
nd
 a
re
 ju
sti
fie
d 
by
 s
ho
w
in
g 
th
at
 th
ey
 b
ea
r a
 re
as
on
ab
le
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
to
 ra
tio
na
l 
po
lic
ie
s a
nd
 a
re
 n
ot
 d
riv
en
 b
y 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 to
 in
ve
stm
en
ts
 o
r i
nv
es
to
rs
 fr
om
 a
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 th
ird
 st
at
e.
 
 5.
 
Fo
r 
gr
ea
te
r 
ce
rta
in
ty
, t
he
 tr
ea
tm
en
t r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 th
is 
A
rti
cl
e 
ap
pl
ie
s 
ex
cl
us
iv
el
y 
to
 th
e 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is 
Tr
ea
ty
, 
in
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 A
rti
cl
es
 (
A
, 
B,
 C
, 
&
 D
). 
Th
e 
tre
at
m
en
t 
re
fe
rre
d 
to
 h
er
e i
n 
do
es
 n
ot
 a
pp
ly
 t
o,
 o
r 
en
co
m
pa
ss
, 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l d
isp
ut
e 
re
so
lu
tio
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 o
r m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s, 
su
ch
 a
s 
th
os
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 A
rti
cl
e 
X
 (I
nv
es
to
r-S
ta
te
 D
isp
ut
e 
Se
ttl
em
en
t).
 
 
Fa
ir
 a
nd
 
Eq
ui
ta
bl
e 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
(F
ET
) 
1.
 
Ea
ch
 P
ar
ty
 sh
al
l a
bs
ta
in
 fr
om
 tr
ea
tin
g 
In
ve
st
or
s o
f t
he
 o
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
ei
r I
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 in
 a
 m
an
ne
r t
ha
t i
s: 
 
i. 
m
an
ife
stl
y 
ar
bi
tra
ry
; o
r 
 
ii.
 
di
sc
rim
in
at
or
y 
on
 m
an
ife
stl
y 
w
ro
ng
fu
l g
ro
un
ds
, s
uc
h 
as
 th
e 
In
ve
st
or
’s
 g
en
de
r, 
ra
ce
 o
r r
el
ig
io
us
 b
el
ie
f; 
or
  
 
iii
. 
ab
us
iv
e,
 su
ch
 a
s c
oe
rc
io
n,
 d
ur
es
s a
nd
 h
ar
as
sm
en
t o
f I
nv
es
to
rs
; o
r 
 
iv
. 
fu
nd
am
en
ta
lly
 in
 b
re
ac
h 
of
 th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
e 
of
 d
ue
 p
ro
ce
ss
 e
m
bo
di
ed
 in
 th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
e 
le
ga
l s
ys
te
m
s 
of
 th
e 
w
or
ld
, s
uc
h 
as
 d
en
yi
ng
 ju
sti
ce
 in
 a
ny
 c
iv
il,
 c
rim
in
al
, o
r a
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s; 
or
 
 
v.
 
in
 fu
nd
am
en
ta
l b
re
ac
h 
of
 th
e 
co
nc
ep
t o
f t
ra
ns
pa
re
nc
y 
in
 ju
di
ci
al
 a
nd
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s. 
 2.
 
N
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
in
fri
ng
e 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t-i
nd
uc
in
g 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
 o
r 
m
ea
su
re
s, 
w
hi
ch
 
th
e 
In
ve
st
or
 h
as
 re
lie
d 
on
 su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
 w
he
n 
m
ak
in
g 
an
 In
ve
st
m
en
t. 
In
 th
is 
re
sp
ec
t, 
th
e 
In
ve
st
or
’s
 c
on
du
ct
 a
nd
 a
cc
ep
te
d 
bu
si
ne
ss
 r
is
k 
in
 t
he
 T
er
rit
or
y 
of
 th
e 
Pa
rty
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 ta
ke
n 
in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 w
he
n 
de
te
rm
in
in
g 
th
e 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
In
ve
sto
r. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
th
e 
m
er
e 
fa
ct
 t
ha
t 
a 
Pa
rty
 t
ak
es
, 
or
 f
ai
ls 
to
 t
ak
e,
 a
n 
ac
tio
n 
th
at
 m
ay
 b
e 
in
co
ns
ist
en
t w
ith
 a
n 
In
ve
sto
r’s
 e
xp
ec
ta
tio
ns
 d
oe
s 
no
t c
on
sti
tu
te
 a
 b
re
ac
h 
of
 th
is
 A
rti
cl
e,
 e
ve
n 
if 
th
er
e 
is
 lo
ss
 o
r d
am
ag
e 
to
 th
e 
co
ve
re
d 
In
ve
st
m
en
t a
s a
 re
su
lt.
 
 3.
 
In
 a
pp
ly
in
g 
th
is
 A
rti
cl
e,
 th
e 
Pa
rti
es
 u
nd
er
st
an
d 
th
at
 th
ey
 h
av
e 
di
ff
er
en
t f
or
m
s o
f a
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e,
 le
gi
sla
tiv
e,
 a
nd
 ju
di
ci
al
 
sy
st
em
s, 
an
d 
ar
e 
at
 d
iff
er
en
t l
ev
el
s o
f d
ev
el
op
m
en
t; 
he
nc
e 
th
ey
 m
ay
 n
ot
 a
ch
ie
ve
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
st
an
da
rd
 a
t t
he
 sa
m
e 
tim
e.
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4.
 
A
 d
et
er
m
in
at
io
n 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ha
s 
be
en
 a
 b
re
ac
h 
of
 a
no
th
er
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 o
f t
hi
s T
re
at
y,
 o
r o
f a
 se
pa
ra
te
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l t
re
at
y 
or
 
ag
re
em
en
t, 
do
es
 n
ot
 e
sta
bl
ish
 th
at
 th
er
e 
ha
s b
ee
n 
a 
br
ea
ch
 o
f t
hi
s A
rti
cl
e.
 
 5.
 
N
ot
hi
ng
 in
 th
is 
A
rti
cl
e 
sh
al
l b
e 
co
ns
tru
ed
 to
 p
re
ve
nt
 a
 P
ar
ty
 fr
om
 ta
ki
ng
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
(s
) i
t d
ee
m
s 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
to
 a
ch
ie
ve
 
pu
bl
ic
 p
ol
ic
y 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t g
oa
ls
, m
ai
nt
ai
n 
th
e 
sta
bi
lit
y 
an
d 
in
te
gr
ity
 o
f i
ts
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ys
te
m
, r
es
po
nd
 to
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
r 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l e
m
er
ge
nc
y,
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
se
cu
rit
y 
an
d 
or
de
r w
ith
in
 it
s 
Te
rri
to
ry
, r
eg
ul
at
e 
an
y 
m
at
te
r t
ha
t i
t d
ee
m
s 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
an
d 
be
ne
fic
ia
l t
o 
its
 p
eo
p l
e,
 p
re
se
rv
e 
its
 n
at
io
na
l r
es
ou
rc
es
 a
nd
/o
r p
ub
lic
 h
ea
lth
 a
nd
/o
r t
he
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
t, 
or
 to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 a
ny
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l o
bl
ig
at
io
n 
or
 u
nd
er
ta
ki
ng
, e
ve
n 
if 
su
ch
 m
ea
su
re
(s
) c
au
se
 h
ar
m
 o
r d
am
ag
e 
to
 a
 c
ov
er
ed
 In
ve
st
or
 
or
 In
ve
st
m
en
t u
nd
er
 th
is
 T
re
at
y,
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
ho
w
ev
er
 th
at
 s
uc
h 
m
ea
su
re
(s
) a
re
 ta
ke
n 
in
 g
oo
d 
fa
ith
 a
nd
 a
re
 n
ot
 a
pp
lie
d 
in
 
an
 a
rb
itr
ar
y 
or
 d
isc
rim
in
at
or
y 
fa
sh
io
n.
  
 
D
en
ia
l o
f 
Be
ne
fit
s 
Th
e 
H
os
t P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 a
t a
ny
 ti
m
e,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
af
te
r t
he
 in
sti
tu
tio
n 
of
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s, 
de
ny
 th
e 
be
ne
fit
s o
f t
hi
s T
re
at
y 
to
: 
 
i. 
an
 In
ve
st
m
en
t o
r I
nv
es
to
r o
w
ne
d 
or
 c
on
tro
lle
d,
 d
ire
ct
ly
 o
r i
nd
ire
ct
ly
, b
y 
pe
rs
on
s 
of
 a
 n
on
-P
ar
ty
 o
r o
f t
he
 H
os
t 
Pa
rty
, 
or
  
 
ii.
 
an
 I
nv
es
to
r 
th
at
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
ha
ve
 s
ub
st
an
tia
l 
bu
si
ne
ss
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 i
n 
th
e 
H
om
e 
Pa
rty
 w
he
re
 i
t 
is
 c
on
sti
tu
te
d 
or
 
or
ga
ni
ze
d;
 o
r 
 
iii
. 
an
 In
ve
st
m
en
t o
r I
nv
es
to
r t
ha
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
 o
r r
es
tru
ct
ur
ed
 in
 b
ad
 fa
ith
, o
r w
ith
 th
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
 
ga
in
in
g 
ac
ce
ss
 to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
re
so
lu
tio
n 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s p
ro
vi
de
d 
in
 th
is
 T
re
at
y,
 o
r 
 
iv
. 
an
 In
ve
st
m
en
t o
r 
In
ve
st
or
 th
at
 is
 n
ot
 in
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 th
is 
Tr
ea
ty
, o
r 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 la
w
s 
an
d 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 i
n 
ef
fe
ct
 a
t 
th
e 
H
os
t 
Pa
rty
, o
r 
an
y 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
co
nv
en
tio
n 
th
at
 t
he
 H
os
t 
Pa
rty
 i
s 
a 
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
m
em
be
r t
o.
 
 
In
ve
st
or
-S
ta
te
 
D
isp
ut
e 
Se
ttl
em
en
t 
(I
SD
S)
 
1.
 
D
is
pu
te
s b
et
w
ee
n 
a 
H
os
t P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 a
n 
In
ve
st
or
 in
 re
la
tio
n 
to
 a
n 
In
ve
st
m
en
t s
ha
ll 
be
 re
so
lv
ed
 v
ia
 a
m
ic
ab
le
 c
on
su
lta
tio
ns
 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
H
os
t P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
In
ve
st
or
. W
he
n 
su
ch
 d
isp
ut
e(
s)
 a
ris
es
, t
he
 In
ve
st
or
 sh
al
l s
ub
m
it 
w
ith
in
 (9
0)
 n
in
et
y 
da
ys
 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
at
 e
ve
nt
 g
iv
in
g 
ra
is
e 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
(o
r 
(9
0)
 n
in
et
y 
da
ys
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
da
te
 w
he
n 
th
e 
In
ve
st
or
 b
ec
om
es
 
aw
ar
e 
of
 s
uc
h 
ev
en
t),
 a
 w
rit
te
n 
re
qu
es
t t
o 
th
e 
H
os
t P
ar
ty
 to
 h
ol
d 
am
ic
ab
le
 c
on
su
lta
tio
ns
 fo
r p
ur
po
se
s 
of
 re
so
lv
in
g 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 T
he
 H
os
t P
ar
ty
 sh
al
l r
es
po
nd
 to
 th
e 
In
ve
st
or
 a
nd
 in
iti
at
e 
am
ic
ab
le
 c
on
su
lta
tio
ns
 w
ith
in
 (3
0)
 th
irt
y 
da
ys
 fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f i
ts 
re
ce
ip
t o
f t
he
 In
ve
st
or
’s
 w
rit
te
n 
re
qu
es
t. 
 
 2.
 
If 
th
e 
H
os
t P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
In
ve
st
or
 fa
il 
to
 re
so
lv
e 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
w
ith
in
 (1
80
) 
on
e 
hu
nd
re
d 
an
d 
ei
gh
ty
 d
ay
s 
fro
m
 th
e 
da
te
 
w
he
n 
th
e 
am
ic
ab
le
 c
on
su
lta
tio
ns
 w
er
e 
in
iti
at
ed
, o
r 
a 
se
ttl
em
en
t c
an
no
t b
e 
re
ac
he
d 
w
ith
in
 th
is
 p
er
io
d 
fo
r 
an
y 
re
as
on
, 
th
en
 th
e 
In
ve
sto
r s
ha
ll 
ex
ha
us
t a
ll 
lo
ca
l r
em
ed
ie
s, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
an
y 
ju
di
ci
al
 o
r a
dm
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
re
m
ed
ie
s, 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
un
de
r t
he
 
30
5 
la
w
s a
nd
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 H
os
t P
ar
ty
.  
  3.
 
If 
th
e 
In
ve
st
or
 fa
ils
, f
or
 a
ny
 re
as
on
, t
o 
re
so
lv
e 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
vi
a 
lo
ca
l r
em
ed
ie
s w
ith
in
 (3
6)
 th
irt
y 
si
x 
m
on
th
s f
ro
m
 th
e 
da
te
 
of
 in
iti
at
io
n 
of
 a
ny
 ju
di
ci
al
 a
nd
/o
r l
oc
al
 re
m
ed
ie
s 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
un
de
r t
he
 la
w
s 
an
d 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 H
os
t P
ar
ty
, t
he
n 
th
e 
In
ve
st
or
 m
ay
, w
ith
in
 (1
2)
 tw
el
ve
 m
on
th
s 
fro
m
 th
e 
da
te
 w
he
n 
th
e 
ex
ha
us
tio
n 
of
 lo
ca
l r
em
ed
ie
s 
pe
rio
d 
ha
s l
ap
se
d,
 re
so
rt 
to
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
to
 fi
na
lly
 re
so
lv
e 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
un
de
r, 
an
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
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III. CONCLUSION 
Balancing investment treaties and preserving the two competing and inextricable objectives 
(investment protection and host state development) is not an easy task for any country. To strike 
the right balance between the two interests involved, the host state (i.e. capital-importing state) 
must design and draft a model BIT that is meticulously drafted to accommodate its need and 
objectives. The host state will use its tailored model BIT as an indication of its position, and a 
projection of the level of protection it is willing to afford to home state investors and its 
development goals that it wishes to achieve. The host state, along with the home state, will use 
their model BITs to reach a truly negotiated and balanced final BIT that preserves both parties’ 
objectives and interests. Over protecting host state’s interests will render the model BIT 
ineffective at protecting the rights and property of home state investors. At the same time, over 
protecting home state investors will affect that host state’s right to regulate and pursue its 
development objectives. 
The table provided in the previous section provides how to approach the issue of 
balancing BITs. At the beginning, each country has to determine its development objectives that 
it seeks to achieve from protecting FDI. It then has to incorporate these development challenges 
into its model BIT by incentivizing FDI in these sectors (for example, providing FDI in these 
sectors with pre-establishment rights exclusively). The objectives of the treaty and assurance that 
all interests of the involved parties are preserved should be explicitly mentioned in the treaty 
preamble and included in the BIT terms. 
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The definition of investment is of extreme importance; it should be defined in a fashion 
that requires incoming FDI to comply with the host state’s law and contribute to its development 
in order to gain treaty protection. Similarly, the definition of investor must ensure that incoming 
investors have real ties with their home countries to avoid treaty shopping by investors, who 
otherwise are not entitled to treaty protection. 
The treatment standards are of vital importance to the success of any model BIT. 
Balancing these standards requires avoidance of open-ended phrases and loosely drafted 
provisions that have the potential of expansive interpretation. Rather, these treatment standards 
should be clearly defined, and their scope of protection should be precisely outlined. Host states 
are encouraged to insert limitations and exceptions that help in narrowing and clarifying the 
scope of these treatment standards, which will shrink the possibilities of their breach by the host 
state. Special attention should be given to the national treatment, most-favored-nation, and fair 
and equitable treatment standards, as they are the most invoked in investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS). 
Similarly, the ISDS clause should require the home state investor to exhaust local 
remedies and attempt to settle the dispute amicably as a pre-condition to ISDS. It should also 
restrict access to ISDS to those investments and investors who are in compliance with host state 
laws and have fulfilled their obligations under the treaty. The jurisdiction of the ISDS tribunal 
should be confined to the substantive provisions of the BIT (i.e. treatment standards) as to not 
allow claims based on other procedural provisions of the BIT. Also, ISDS tribunals should be 
obliged to take the home state investor’s conduct in the host state into account when reviewing 
any claims of treaty breach, by inserting a requirement to that end in the BIT. 
311 
Finally, home state investors should be obligated to comply with international standards 
and principles that ensure their integrity and beneficial input to the host state development, such 
as compliance with corporate governance principles, human rights and labor conventions, and 
protection of the environment. The host state may also want to impose performance requirements 
that do not contradict the prohibited restrictions under the GATT and TRIMS agreements. These 
can be in the form of requiring the home state investor to employ a certain number or percentage 
of nationals in managerial and technical positions, or to train local labor on how to use new 
technologies and industrial processes, as well as other similar requirements that provide a 
positive asset to the host state. 
By tracing the evolution of international investment law since its early beginnings in the 
BC era until modern times, this thesis finds that economic development was, and remains, the 
primary purpose behind the conclusion of BITs and other investment agreements. Most 
international agreements and conventions pertaining to international investment, such as ICSID 
and MIGA, put the development of host countries as their chief objective and purpose. 
The current formulation and drafting of BITs has overprotected home state investors and 
negated the development of host states and their right to regulate and pursue their interests. It has 
also shown, through ICSID case law, how the broad and loosely drafted clauses and treatment 
standards in BITs have enabled interpreters to expand the protection of investors on the account 
of host states. 
The solution to the current state-of-affairs is not one related to the ISDS process itself, 
but rather is related to the broad and unqualified provisions of BITs. In particular, the definitions 
and treatment standards found in typical BITs need to be clearly defined and limited in scope. No 
model BIT can suffice on a universal level, due to the difference in development levels and 
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objectives of different countries. Hence, the solution rests in drafting balanced model BITs for 
each country in accordance with its objects and goals. This approach allows for country-specific 
issues to be addressed in a balanced investment treaty, which will result in a greater impact and 
role of FDI in the development of the host state. 
A model BIT for Jordan should incorporate the country’s development objectives, in 
addition to balancing and qualifying the BIT terms to avoid the issues and interpretations that 
have appeared previously in ISDS cases. The model BIT for Jordan uses the best practices and 
recent trends in other model BITs, recently concluded BITs, and multilateral investment 
agreements. The recommendations and suggestions made for the Jordan BIT can be conceptually 
transferred to other model BITs for other countries, provided that they are amended in alignment 
with the host state’s needs, objectives, and policies. 
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